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Abstract 
 
Mexico’s partial democratic transition resulted in widespread violence, human rights 
violations, inequality, corruption and impunity, frustrating the hopes and aspirations 
of many sections of society. However, between 2011 and 2016 three major social 
movements emerged to challenge injustice and demand social change. The Movement 
for Peace and Justice with Dignity, YoSoy132 and Ayotzinapa 43 were plural non-
institutional social mobilizations empowering those victimised and marginalized in the 
defective democratic settlement. 
 
Human rights discourse and digital and social media have become embedded in 
political discourse and social practice around the world, but their meaning, uses and 
implications are complex and contested. This thesis examines their role in contentious 
collective movements in Mexico’s specific socio-political context. Qualitative case 
study research methods are used to examine their dynamic uses and meanings in the 
three mobilization processes in order to explore their enabling and constraining 
features. The thesis also draws on the author’s previous experience as an international 
human rights advocate and researcher working on Latin America. 
 
The research shows the diverse ways that human rights discourse and digital and social 
media feature in the practice and meaning of each movement. They are understood to 
enhance key aspects of civil society mobilization processes, such as strengthening the 
impact of trigger events and enabling the configuration of skilled support networks, 
but also to entail certain constraining logics which the movements grapple with to 
sustain contention. They contribute shaping qualities to the movements but do not 
monopolise or determine their practices or meaning. These are rooted in the dynamic 
adaptive approaches of plural actors engaging with their concrete social and political 
context, creatively using the resources available to mount collective public sphere 
challenges to the powerholders of Mexico’s partial democracy. 
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Introduction  
 
 Introduction 
This PhD thesis examines how three recent social movements in Mexico – Movement 
for Peace and Justice with Dignity (MPJD), YoSoy132 and Ayotzinapa 43 - used human 
rights discourses1 and digital and social media2 to mobilize and enact political 
contention. By analysing these practices and their implications in the concrete social 
context of Mexico’s partial democracy, the thesis presents important findings on how 
diverse uses of human rights discourse and digital and social media enable and 
constrain civil society’s expressive and strategic collective actions oriented toward 
justice and progressive social change.  
 
 What are the issues? 
The transition to electoral democracy in many Latin America countries at the end of 
the 20th century did not produce rights-protective regimes, greater social justice or 
consolidated liberal democracies as assumed by much Western political theory 
(O’Donnell et al. 1986; Fukuyama 1989; Huntington 1993). Instead, in countries such 
as Mexico, elections and economic liberalism created a partial democracy which also 
featured aspects of authoritarianism and state capture (O’Donnell 1994; Waisman 
2006). This includes pervasive clientalism, corruption, discrimination, violence, human 
                                                        
1 In this thesis ‘human rights discourse’ refers to the broad intellectual project and tradition of human 
rights as universal standards of behaviour and treatment that individuals and communities are entitled 
to by virtue of being human. Human rights discourse encompasses structured international norms such 
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as international, regional and national laws, treaties 
and mechanisms, but these legal instruments are only part of the wider discourse of human rights used 
and contested in the media, popular culture, activism and academia. See appendix 1 for a more detailed 
definition of aspects of human rights discourse addressed in this thesis. 
2 The term ‘digital and social media’ is used in this thesis to refer to the range of digital communications 
tools and platforms available to citizens in Mexico and around the world. This includes more interactive 
‘web 2.0’ social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram, but also other 
internet based tools such as email and websites and messenger services, such WhatsApp and Telegram, 
primarily used on smart phones. The broad nature of this term is intended to capture the range of digital 
communications tools and practices which rely on the internet and which increasingly feature as part of 
daily life, including in political and social activism.   
 2 
rights violations, impunity and extreme inequality (Olvera 2010; Espinoza Valle et al. 
2012; Esquivel Hernández 2015). Despite this, a plural civil society and public sphere 
continued to develop in the region (Olvera et al. 2003; Munck 2013). Independent and 
progressive elements of civil society have promoted greater equality, political 
participation, accountability and protection of human rights (Dagnino et al. 2006; Farro 
et al. 2014).3 However, the absence of effective institutional routes to challenge elites 
and shape remedies to acute social grievances entrenched forms of partial and violent 
democracy (Arias et al. 2010a). It has also inadvertently fostered the emergence of 
several social movements demanding action on specific issues but also aspiring to more 
radical transformation of Mexico’s democracy (Bizberg 2014; Pleyers et al. 2017).  
 
It is in the context of obstructed political and social development, but creative civil 
society engagement in the public sphere, that I examine how three social movements 
struggled to change the terms of Mexico’s deficient democracy through non-
institutional collective action. However, these movements cannot be understood only 
in terms of their narrow strategic impact on the institutional order. They also represent 
an expressive culture and values of non-institutional resistance to the status quo 
(Cohen 1985; Melucci 1996) through claims-making against powerholders.4 As people 
motivated to participate in collective contention they represent the complex potential 
of non-institutional social engagement, but their experiences also illustrate some of 
the limitations of these processes. This is particularly so when facing an entrenched 
political establishment unwilling to address profound democratic deficits. The July 
                                                        
3 ‘Civil society’, as chapter two discusses, is a contested concept. This research focuses on individuals, 
groups, collectives and associations operating independently of institutions of the state or political 
parties in collective action oriented toward forms of progressive social change. There are other actors 
that participate in the wider field civil society activities, which include a range of less-independent and 
non-progressive actors, but they are not the focus of this research. 
4 In this thesis the term “powerholder” is used to indicate official political authorities, but also economic, 
political and criminal actors that wield considerable informal power, often imposing their interests over 
official political and administrative authorities. Human rights discourse is traditionally focused on 
circumscribing the responsibilities and actions of a strong unitary Weberian state. These responsibilities 
include prevention and punishment of arbitrary abuses of power and also use of institutional resources 
to positively ensure the welfare, equality, autonomy and dignity of all citizens. The concealed networks 
of power that often guide Mexico’s formal political and administrative office-holders, challenge 
assumptions about the unitary state as the locus of power. They also reinforce the importance of 
ensuring that all powerholders, not just official office-holders, are held accountable and bound by 
human rights norms.    
 3 
2018 election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) as President of Mexico 
provides an opportunity to change these entrenched practices and deepen Mexico’s 
democratic and social development, but only time will tell if this is the case. Civil 
society, the public sphere and social mobilizations will continue to be important factors 
in shaping institutional and non-institutional political culture and practice in the 
coming years in Mexico.  
 
The political opportunity structure (Tarrow 1998) of Mexico’s partial democracy 
imposed constraints but also proved fertile for the three movements to mobilize, 
articulate, communicate and enact their protest. These mobilization processes also 
shed light on the challenges of enacting different forms of plural collective contention 
(Laclau et al. 1985; Mouffe 2005) and public sphere deliberations (Calhoun 1992; 
Habermas 1996) in the process of constructing identity and meaning to promote justice 
and social change. A key discourse for enacting forms of collective contention is human 
rights, appealing to both the idea of universal values, but also concrete legal 
protections. In Mexico, human rights discourse became part of the formal language of 
the transition to democracy and institutionalisation, but it continues to be a discourse 
for non-institutional and independent civil society to demand social accountability of 
powerholders (Ackerman 2005). The plurality of uses and openness of human rights 
discourse make it useful, but also double edged, for a range of social actors (Morris 
2010). Despite the rise in nativist popularism in different parts of the world challenging 
the idea of universal human rights (Rieff 2018), in Mexico it has remained an important 
discourse in the country’s political development.   
 
It is therefore important to understand how human rights discourse has been 
mobilized and made meaningful in different ways by contemporary movements, 
including consideration of the limiting logics of the discourse for particular social 
mobilizations (Landman 2006; Goodale et al. 2007). As such, this work contributes to 
debates about how ideas of human rights are constructed and fought for in specific 
contexts and political cultures (Stammers 1999, 2009; Goodhart 2013). This contrasts 
with the approach of conceptualising the spread of human rights discourse in terms of 
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‘socialising’ cosmopolitan international human rights law to non-compliant peripheral 
states through institutionalization (Risse et al. 1999; Goodman et al. 2013a). 
 
Digital and social media has also become increasingly integral to social relations in Latin 
America, with the digital divide declining rapidly in Mexico since 2010, particularly in 
urban areas (Asociación de internet.mx 2018). In line with other international 
experiences, this increasing digital permeation has disruptive dynamics; influencing the 
wider media environment which has traditionally been dominated by elite aligned 
mass media (Trejo Delarbre 2011a). This has opened up new forms of communicative 
practice for networked social activists. However, it has also provided a powerful new 
tool for institutional political actors and other types of powerholders to defend their 
domination (Bradshaw & Howard 2017; Faith & Prieto-Martin 2016). Mexico’s partial 
democracy makes it particularly relevant to understand the enabling and constraining 
features of digital and social media uses for grassroots mobilizations in the pursuit of 
social change as well as their relation to a burgeoning hybrid media environment 
(Chadwick 2013).  
 
 Significance of research 
a) The thesis is timely as it explores pressing issues, particularly in Latin America, 
where the consolidation of democracies, such as in neighbouring Central and South 
American countries, challenges traditional liberal democratic theory (Arias et al. 
2010b). This raises questions about the capacity of civil society to peacefully influence 
political and social development of states captured by often violently competing vested 
interests which operate under the cover of competitive electoral democracy.  
 
b) Human rights discourse has become increasingly embedded in social practice 
and public discourse in Latin America. Despite this, its meaning and relevance is 
constantly contested and undercut by state failures to guarantee rights or instrumental 
use of human rights, for example, to justify military adventures or impose Western 
capitalist values (Rajagopal 2003; Douzinas 2007; Posner 2014). This thesis examines 
the different meanings and uses that human rights discourse has had in plural 
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contentious mobilizations at national level in instrumental and expressive terms. This 
is important for reflecting on how human rights discourse is adopted and adapted as 
part of local and national struggles for accountability, agency, participation and social 
change, but also, simultaneously, how it can be perceived as alien, external, 
institutional and limiting of these mobilization processes. This dual dimension of 
human rights discourse is less well recognised in scholarly literature, particularly in 
relation to the ‘socialization’ of international human rights law (Finnemore et al. 1998; 
Goodman et al. 2013a; Risse et al. 2013). This research addresses the complex, and 
sometimes ambiguous, processes involved in human rights discourse becoming 
meaningful in national contexts and political cultures. 
 
c) Use of digital media, particularly social media, is increasingly integral to the 
social and political life of countries of the Global South as well as the North. This makes 
it an important area of sociological and political study, particularly concerning the 
potential to modify civil society’s ability to communicate, organize and challenge 
established powerholders in partial democratic settings such as in Latin America 
(Breuer et al. 2014). By facilitating the extension, distribution and density of network 
connections between individuals and groups, as well as their capacity to produce and 
share information independently, uses of digital media can shape changes to the 
communications environments and media practices. As a result, these emerging uses 
of digital and social media have the potential to impact social and power relations, 
including the way citizens interact with each other, with institutions, with state and 
non-state actors, and with global networks. However, the increasing reliance on digital 
media has also introduced new instabilities to public sphere discourse, including 
threats directed at social activists and journalists to deter independent voices 
contesting official narratives.  
 
In Mexico, social mobilizations have used internet based digital technology as part of 
their communications practices since the pioneering transnational support networks 
of the Zapatistas in 1994 (Ronfeldt et al. 1999; Rovira Sancho 2007). The uses of social 
media that facilitate civic participation in politics and protest movements has been 
analysed and researched from different standpoints (Dahlgren 2009; Milan 2013; 
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Wessels 2017), including in relation to aspects of the movements in this study (Rovira 
Sancho 2012; Garcia et al. 2014; Treré et al. 2014; Meneses Rocha 2015; Treré 2015a). 
This thesis explores the uses of digital and social media in terms of their contribution 
to mobilization, identity, agency and endurance in the context of partial democracy 
and how this relates to increasing plurality in the wider media environment. It 
considers aspects of digital and social media practice as part of an increasingly 
hybridised media environment (Chadwick 2013) where actors rapidly shift between 
different platforms and technologies to maximise strategic impact. It also examines 
some theoretic claims of social media practices, such as sharing of emotion 
(Papacharissi 2015) and individualised participation processes (Bennett et al. 2013) to 
understand their contribution to mobilizations. By examining these features in context, 
rooted in the experience and understanding of participants, this research provides new 
empirical evidence of some of the constraining and enabling aspects of digital and 
social media practices in the development of political agendas and mobilization 
processes.  
 
 Research purpose  
As human rights discourse and digital and social media have become integral to many 
forms of social activism and the wider political culture, this appears to have changed 
the potential of collective social actors to mobilize and challenge power structures 
dominating Mexico. The objective of the research is to understand the different 
dynamics of these practices and what their implications are for social movements 
challenging the terms of Mexico’s partial democracy. 
 
The social processes engaging plural actors in collective action are complex, negotiated 
and often contested. The different meanings of movements are constructed through 
the process of mobilization, but are not necessarily shared uniformly across diverse 
participants with different roles in the movement or by those not directly involved in 
the mobilization process. This research explores these intersubjective processes of 
meaning-making and social practice, seeking to identify particular features of the uses 
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of human rights discourse and digital and social media which enable and constrain 
mobilizations in concrete contexts.5   
 
The research focuses on the movements as manifestations of non-institutional national 
political contention, responding primarily to domestic events and oriented toward local 
political actors, but also as part of wider global dynamics and networks. The rootedness 
in the national setting is important for understanding the mobilization processes and 
the varied significance of human rights discourse and digital and social media for plural 
social actors.  
 
In the course of developing the research, I refined my research questions to address 
more precisely these central dynamics. Firstly, the different ways that human rights 
discourse and digital and social media feature in each movement as part of the 
instrumental and expressive practices. Secondly, how these different dynamics are 
understood by the plural actors involved and the implications for civil society collective 
action aspiring to social change. This approach does not limit the meaning of actions to 
the intentions of the actors, but explores the various ways these processes unfolded 
and were understood. Civil society activism is a diverse, reflexive and adaptive activity, 
with actors examining their own actions and those of others. This is not only to evaluate 
the extent to which intentions have been realised and are consistent with values, but 
also the ways this has not occurred and there have been unforeseen consequences 
with implications for future actions.6 This dynamic process also relates to the 
                                                        
5 These enabling and constraining qualities are not treated as objective structural determinants, but as 
part of the meaningfulness of movements engaged in specific non-institutional civil society struggles 
oriented toward justice claims and of progressive social change. 
6 This approach adopts features of Giddens’ structuration theory (Giddens 1984), which proposes 
understanding the relations between social structure and individual agency as a duality between the 
structuring effects of social relations enacted through the agency of both ‘practical’ and ‘discursive’ (or 
reflexive) consciousness of actors engaged in the world. The point that I take from this theoretical 
approach is how actors engage in forms of routinized, intuitive but also reflexive practice in their actions, 
interpreting their context and experience (though Giddens refers to these factors in terms of ‘rules and 
resources’) as part of processes of action and reaction. The complex basis of motivation for action may 
never be possible to fully determine (particularly given the difference between how action is taken in 
reactive daily activity compared to retrospective rationalizations). However, the meaning that 
individuals attribute to context, causes and motivations is central to decision-making processes. These 
are constitutive of individual agency as well as the constraining and enabling features of social relations.  
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developing orientations of the actors; their beliefs, values and ideologies, and how 
these are negotiated and adapted in the mobilization processes and subsequently. It is 
these nuances of the mobilization process and how these relate to understandings of 
human rights discourse and digital and social media which the research questions 
explore, ensuring the data analysis emerges from but remains rooted in the specific 
context of each mobilization. 
 
 Research questions 
1.5.1 In relation to recent social movements involved in non-institutional contentious 
politics in Mexico, how have human rights discourses and uses of digital and 
social media enabled and constrained these mobilization processes? 
 
The principle research question establishes the overarching field of investigation, that 
is the domain of recent non-institutional progressive social movements in Mexico 
engaged in forms of politically contentious mobilization in the public sphere directed 
at institutional actors. This means the emergence and maintenance of the movement 
in enacting contentious politics online and offline. The purpose of the mobilization is 
understood broadly as addressing democratic deficits. The core of the question focuses 
the research on the particular ways that human rights discourse and digital and social 
media were mobilized by the movements, and their specific enabling and constraining 
features for the mobilization process. This is understood as their contribution to the 
meanings and significance of the movements.  
 
The following three subsidiary questions focus in on particular aspects of the process.  
 
1.5.2 What was the role of human rights discourse in claims-making in the social 
mobilizations challenging powerholders and pursing social change? 
 
This question addresses the different dimensions of how human rights discourse was 
mobilized; its relevance to movement actors and the particular ways it was used in 
each movement’s claims-making. This considers how human rights discourse has 
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certain legitimated meanings in society which featured in interpreting and enacting the 
movement trigger events, developing claims-making and featuring in mobilizing 
narratives against the institutional powerholders. In addition, it explores how the 
adoption of human rights discourse is not necessarily limited to narrow instrumental 
purposes, but can also involve claimants and movements in expressive enactment of 
universal values with the potential to empower claims-makers, facilitate convergence 
of diverse actors in plural movements and further embed the social meaning of human 
rights discourse. This also enables exploration of how these processes are varied and 
unstable, including some of the perceived negative or ambiguous connotations of 
mobilizing human rights discourse.  
 
1.5.3 How has the use of digital and social media featured in the practice and 
significance of these social mobilization processes? 
 
This question addresses how uses of digital and social media increasingly featured in 
each social mobilization, contributing to networked recruitment, coordination and 
movement projection to national and international audiences, but also how this 
increased instability. The question allows the movement practices to be considered in 
the light of claims that particular affordances of digital and social media facilitate forms 
of mobilization, including individualised engagement in collective action. It also 
explores how these practices developed with each movement and claims that digital 
and social media can contribution to deliberative democratic practice through more 
horizontal forms of digital mobilization. It enables an empirically grounded assessment 
of these processes according to those involved, revealing the limitations and 
vulnerabilities of such practices as well as the increased potential for contentious 
movements.  
 
1.5.4 How did movement practices relate to changing digital news media environment 
and to digital counter-attacks and threats? 
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The third question interrogates how movement mobilization processes related to 
wider changes in the media environment, including disruptions to the mainstream 
media. This involved the emergence of new independent and alternative new media 
outlets as well as more horizontal communications within movements. The question 
also considers how increasing civil society recognition of the vulnerability of digital and 
social media to manipulation and attack by powerholders, has resulted in various 
modifications in practice and understanding of the role of digital and social media in 
contentious mobilizations.  
 
These questions ensure the research is rooted in the context and particular features of 
each social movement, especially in relation to Mexico’s partial democratic transition. 
In order to reflect on the wider implications of the research for Mexico’s political and 
institutional development, the concluding chapter also considers an additional 
question: 
 
1.5.5 What does the research mean for our understanding of civil society, the role of 
social media, the state, and censorship in contemporary Mexico? 
 
This question addresses the impact of the three movements and their practices in 
contemporary Mexico, particularly in the light of the 2018 presidential elections, and 
what this may herald in the coming years.  
 
 Context 
In 2000, Mexico ostensibly became a democracy when the Partido Revolucionario 
Institutional (PRI), which had ruled Mexico for 70 years, was defeated in elections by 
the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN). Notwithstanding the PAN’s commitment to 
institutionalise international human rights, in practice it failed to develop a rights-
protective democracy or hold to account those responsible for grave human rights 
violations and corruption. It enabled dominant vested interests to flourish and 
inequality to increase, leading to worsening insecurity and violence. In 2006, the 
second PAN government started a militarized ‘war’ on organized crime, dramatically 
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exacerbating violence and insecurity. This led to tens of thousands of killings, 
disappearances and forced displaced at the hands of criminal gangs and security forces. 
In 2012, the PRI returned to power but failed to address democratic deficits, allowing 
corruption and impunity to accelerate further and deepening the crisis of human rights 
violations and violence. The years of political transition consolidated electoral 
processes, but undermining undermined social cohesion, institutional trust and belief 
in democracy (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2017).  
 
It was in this context that the three overlapping social movements emerged to 
challenge the state’s handling of the violence and human rights violations as well as 
institutions captured by vested interests involved in propelling the PRI back to power 
in 2012. The first was the MPJD which emerged in April 2011 in response to the killing 
of the son of nationally renowned poet, Javier Sicilia. It mobilized shared outrage at 
unprecedented levels of criminal violence and state abuses which President Calderon’s 
‘war’ had unleashed. The mobilization rapidly recruited relatives, students, activist 
groups, human rights defenders, faith groups and dissident trade unions in a plural 
coalition committed to exposing the violence and the plight of victims.7 Public actions 
included demonstrations, vigils, silent marches, masses civil society caravans across 
violent regions of the country and the USA. The MPJD gained widespread media 
attention and public support leading to Peace Dialogues with the government and 
subsequently the General Law on Victims. However, by 2013 the movement had lost 
momentum and gradually fragmented. The movement was arguably the first major 
social movement to emerge during the transition years. It represented a citizen-based 
initiative to challenge government policy by placing victims at the centre of the national 
crisis of violence, human rights violations and impunity. It used aspects of human rights 
discourse in its practice and involved human rights NGOs, but it did not originate in the 
NGO sector. It also used digital and social media from the outset to circulate 
information and facilitate participation. It was an organic mobilization, emerging in 
direct response to the social and political context. 
 
                                                        
7 The term ‘victims’ also includes the relatives of those killed or disappeared. 
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The second movement, YoSoy132, irrupted in May 2012 as a political revolt, primarily 
by university students, against the manner in which the 2012 presidential election was 
being conducted. It was particularly targeted at the PRI candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto 
(EPN), and mainstream media manipulation of the political narrative in his favour. 
Social media featured in the initial process of mobilization and subsequent forms of 
participation, mirroring aspects of the Occupy and 15-M protests in the US and Spain, 
but specifically focused on Mexico’s political context. Digitally enabled networking 
allowed participation to spread to groups around the country and internationally, 
facilitating an array of public protest actions and creative events online and offline to 
challenge the electoral process and awaken the political consciousness of a new 
generation. The movement received national and international attention, shifting the 
dynamic of the electoral process, but not ultimately changing the result. The 
movement itself rapidly evolved into a broad-based student mobilization with 
aspirations to become a popular movement uniting plural social actors across the 
country. However, it struggled to regain momentum after the elections, ultimately 
becoming the target of police violence and arrests during the inauguration of the new 
PRI president. Human rights discourse featured in parts of the movement mobilization, 
but it was not a human rights movement. This distance from human rights discourse 
provides an important contrast to the other two movements. In Mexico, YoSoy132 was 
particularly identified with millennials’ use of social media as a tool for counter-power 
communications to challenge the institutional political system.8  
 
Ayotzinapa 43 emerged in September 2014 in response to the enforced disappearance 
by state agents and non-state actor criminals of 43 young men studying to become 
rural teachers (Hernández 2017). Supported by human rights NGOs and a wide variety 
of social and political groups, the parents and surviving students called for mass 
protests to demand the authorities return the disappeared alive and bring those 
responsible to justice. Despite support from around the world and protests over 
                                                        
8 Media and political elites as well as the security services attempted to portray YoSoy132 as controlled 
by the left-wing opposition candidate, Andres Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Despite the 
acknowledged sympathy of some activists with AMLO, there was no evidence of further links and the 
movement refused to endorse particular candidates.  
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months and years, a government cover-up prevented the victims’ access to truth and 
justice (GIEI 2015a, 2015b). Nevertheless, the movement contributed significantly to 
the collapse in the PRI government’s credibility. The movement focused on the victims, 
particularly the struggle of the mothers and fathers for truth and justice. Human rights 
discourse was important to the mobilization process, but not exclusively. This makes it 
an important case to understand the manner in which human rights has been made 
meaningful for different actors involved in the movement. Social media practices have 
also featured as an important element of actions. The movement presents instances of 
integration of human rights discourse and social media practices, but also the limits of 
these in the process of sustaining contentious collective action against entrenched 
powerholders.    
 
The three movements often shared participants and know-how, developing new 
approaches in response to earlier experiences. They confronted different 
powerholders with varying strategies and expressive practices. These similarities and 
differences emerged from and in response to the concrete context of flawed 
democratic transition and specific trigger events. The latter dramatically representing 
wider institutional failings.  
 
Despite these systemic problems and crises, most Mexicans continued to lead their 
lives in relative normality and detached from social violence or contentious political 
struggles. In this context, it was a challenge for active civil society to find the means to 
express and communicate grievances effectively; to reach new sectors of the 
population and foster mobilizations capable of challenging the official narrative of 
improving democratic governance and modernizing efficiency. Human rights discourse 
and digital media were two means available to social activists to engage with the public 
sphere through nationally focused collective action which also enjoyed wide 
international support and solidarity. That is why these three movements are important 
examples of contentious civil society mobilizations rooted in their specific socio-
political context.   
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 Research approach  
This research adopts a qualitative social science methodology to examine the 
movements, but with an interdisciplinary outlook. It draws on concepts developed in 
various disciplines such as sociology, political science, history, media and 
communications, international relations, human rights law and philosophy.  
 
In line with my worldview (Creswell 2009), the research is focused on exploring the 
intersubjective understanding of social and political processes and how their meanings 
are culturally constructed and negotiated among various social actors. The qualitative 
methodology (Mason 2002) is based on 30 semi-structured interviews with 
participants and close observers of movements, as well as additional data drawn from 
qualitative analysis of media and social media content of the movements. This 
methodology assumes a constructivist ontological outlook in which the empirical data 
gathered in the interviews is subject to inductive reasoning and an interpretative 
analysis to identify patterns of meaning to make sense of the data. The interviewees 
were a range of social and political actors with different roles and participation in the 
movements, involving a variety of perspectives. They included NGO human rights 
defenders, communications workers with NGOs, student activists, faith-based 
participants, digital activists, political activists, survivors, journalists and others. Using 
Gertz’s model of ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) to explore the beliefs, attitudes, 
values, judgements and interpretations of the interviewees, the research develops a 
framework analysis (Ritchie et al. 2003) to systematise and map the different thematic 
issues and concepts that emerge from and explain the data in relation to the research 
questions. This method facilitated detailed accounts of and perspectives on the various 
social interactions and dynamics involved in each movement’s practices as well as 
reflections on the cumulative experiences of the different social movements and their 
contribution to Mexico’s political culture.  
 
The development of this framework emerged in the data analysis through the process 
of comparing and contrasting different features of the practices of each movement. 
This ensured that the analysis remained rooted in the movements’ socio-historical 
context and content of the interviews. But the thesis is also developed through a 
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dialogue with analytical and empirical literature on democracy, civil society, human 
rights, social movements and digitally enabled activism. These fed into the data 
analysis and understandings of particular features of practice. As a result, this process 
ensures that the analytical framework presented in the discussion chapter and 
conclusions in the final chapter develop organically in response to the research 
material in the three case studies, but are also rooted in contemporary debates on the 
role and meaning of human rights discourse and digital media.  
 
The research methods are compliant with the guidelines set by the British Sociological 
Association, UK Data Archive and University of Sheffield. The research was funded by 
the University of Sheffield 2022 Futures scheme.  
 
 Personal experience motivating research 
Prior to undertaking this doctorate, I worked for 18 years with Amnesty International 
(AI) as a human rights researcher and campaigner focused on Latin America. I was 
responsible for field research on Mexico for 12 years, regularly visiting different regions 
of the country to gather information on human rights violations, work with local NGO 
partners and lobby government and state officials. I was responsible for writing AI 
reports on a range of human rights issues in Mexico, including on impunity, gender-
based violence, police and security force abuses, discrimination, violence against 
indigenous peoples, migrants and peasant communities, politicised use of the justice 
system and attacks on human rights defenders and journalists (for example, Amnesty 
International 2006; Amnesty International 2007b; Amnesty International 2009; 
Amnesty International 2010; Amnesty International 2013a; Amnesty International 
2014). This period covered Mexico’s transition governments enabling me to observe at 
close hand the institutionalisation of human rights discourse for state legitimation 
purposes and the failure in practice to develop a rights-protective and more socially 
just democratic society. 
 
As a representative of the international human rights movement, I was also aware of 
the important but limited impact of advocacy campaigns undertaken with international 
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and local partners to exert ‘boomerang’ (Keck et al. 1998) pressure on the Mexican 
government to improve institutional compliance with international human rights 
norms. A question that struck me was how does human rights discourse become 
meaningful and gain political traction for domestic actors not involved in organized 
human rights activism? How can the struggle for the recognition and implementation 
of human rights norms move beyond simulated institutional responses to the demands 
made by foreign experts and national NGOs? In what circumstances can human rights 
discourse become an enduring contentious issue in the local and national political 
agenda, meaning a cost for political parties or leaders that ignore or misuse it in 
domestic politics? In such a context, political leaders might potentially consider the 
investment of substantial political capital to make real human rights advances, rather 
than simply using formal institutionalisation of human rights to serve the appearance 
of democracy. In short, in what circumstances could human rights discourse be more 
organically relevant and meaningful in Mexico’s partial democracy, enabling the 
enactment of citizenship and public sphere engagement as part of bottom-up 
democratic development.9 These reflections did not exclude the role of international 
actors in exerting pressure, but understood them as secondary to domestic processes. 
 
A form of dynamic challenge to institutional actors, including political parties, that I 
observed during my time working for AI, was the role of civil society, particularly social 
movements. These emerged to challenge the terms of the status quo and injustice, 
often involving unruly protest practices (Khanna et al. 2013). Their dynamic collective 
practices suggested how local or national social movements could make sense of and 
use human rights discourses, making them a particularly important focus of potential 
research. The three movements in this research project first appeared while I was still 
working with AI, enabling me to observe their development and impact. 
                                                        
9 It could be argued that this is a description of the ‘socialization’ process of international human rights 
(Goodman et al. 2013a). However, this term tends to assume a rather direct transmission of values and 
norms by external or international actors to local settings and institutions. My experience was that it 
was only when these issue were contested and struggled over in domestic political culture did they gain 
a rooted significance which was no longer reducible to conceptions of international human rights law. 
As a result, I consider ‘socialization’ is an inadequate term to reflect these processes that are primarily 
subject to conditions of domestic political context, even if international actors play an important role. 
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Another important feature of these new movements which I detected was the 
increasing use of digital and social media as part of the mobilization process and the 
environment they emerged from. The use of this technology in the region was shifting 
communicative practices, including the relation of citizens to the traditional 
mainstream sources of news information. These changes reflected the increasing 
fluidity and rapidity of information flows between global, national and local networks 
(Castells 2009a). They also seemed to support the capacity of movements to reach 
beyond limited local contexts to secure the support of national and international 
networks. This also had interesting parallels to the way human rights discourse could 
be used to reframe local injustice as a universal issue affecting human dignity and 
attracting global solidarity (Castells 2009b).  
 
As a result, working on Mexico with an INGO and my reflections on that experience 
informed the development of this research project. In addition, my experience as an 
advocacy researcher with contacts among diverse civil society organizations and social 
activists in Mexico enabled me to recruit a wide range of interviewees during fieldwork. 
My sensitivity to security concerns and the context of social activism in Mexico also 
enabled me to develop a safe and productive interview environment for my recruits 
which helped ensure a rich dataset to develop my analysis and conclusions.10    
 
 Scope and limitation of research  
The interdisciplinary approach means that the thesis does not fit neatly within one 
academic field, but applies different elements of these to interpret Mexico’s particular 
social and political dynamics. The thesis develops a narrative discussion of the 
framework themes, exploring how they relate to different understandings and 
practices involving human rights discourse and digital and social media. But the 
conclusions do not propose a totalising analytical or conceptual model to interpret 
                                                        
10 In chapter 4, I discuss in more detail my methodology and my reflexive position in relation to the 
research material, observing both its contribution to the analysis and the steps taken to limit any 
potential bias. 
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contexts beyond Mexico’s partial democratic situation. Nonetheless, they shed 
important light on how mobilization processes are enabled and constrained by 
different uses of human rights discourse and digital and social media. These are 
relevant to other regional contexts, particularly in Latin America, where plural civil 
societies struggle to challenge the terms of partial democracy. 
 
The research is limited to three case studies of specific movements. Not all aspects of 
the movements are analysed, only those that relate to how human rights discourse and 
digital and social media were mobilized as part of dynamic movement practices. The 
focus on the significance of the movement for participants and close observers also 
means this research does not seek to establish a quantitative assessment of the 
political and social impact of each movement in terms of institutional politics - though 
reflections on impacts form part of the context, data analysis and discussion chapters.   
 
Another potential limitation of the research is that the analysis is developed on the 
basis of a dataset of 30 qualitative interviews conducted over a month in Mexico. A 
larger sample might have enriched the dataset and analysis. However, the interviews 
enabled clear thematic patterns to emerge to address the research questions in depth.  
 
This thesis does not seek to analyse issues of gender equality or forms of discrimination 
in relation to the movements or social change agendas in Mexico. Neither does it 
address some of the particular human rights approaches of the movements, for 
example, in regard to litigation strategies, documentation of abuses or institutional 
advocacy campaigns of NGOs which participated in the movements. Equally, the thesis 
is not primarily concerned with the process of institutionalisation of human rights 
discourse in Mexico’s state apparatus outside the particular dynamics of the social 
movements and the context out of which they emerged.  
 
 Structure of thesis 
This thesis is made up of 10 chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 explores 
scholarly literature, both theoretical and empirical, engaging with the key concepts of 
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the thesis in relation to democracy, civil society, human rights, social movements and 
digital and social media. Chapter 3 explores the socio-political context out of which the 
three movements emerged and which their mobilizations were oriented toward. This 
includes an examination of Mexico political development, the ‘war on the cartels’, the 
institutionalization of human rights, the emergence of plural civil society and shifting 
patterns of media influence over the political agenda with the increasing adoption of 
digital and social media. The methodology of the project is presented in chapter 4, 
setting out the constructivist and interpretivist approach to the research and the 
thematic framework developed to identify and analyse key themes which emerged in 
relation to the movements. In chapter 5, each case study movement is described briefly 
in context, including the relevant events, actors and impacts involved in the 
mobilizations. Chapter 6 presents the data and analysis of on the MPJD. Chapter 7 
applies the same approach to #YoSoy132, and chapter 8 to Ayotzinapa 43. These data 
chapters enable the central concepts and themes to be surfaced and analysed in 
relation to the framework analysis. Chapter 9 brings these points together in a 
discussion of the key themes, involving a fuller comparative exploration of these ideas 
and themes in the framework. Finally, chapter 10 concludes by addressing the research 
questions and makes recommendations in the light of these findings. 
 
 Summary Findings 
This is a summary of some of the enabling and constraining features which this 
research identifies in relation to the evolving uses of human rights discourse and digital 
and social media as part of social mobilizations. 
  
• The increasing incorporation of human rights discourse into the public sphere 
to analyse institutional deficiencies, violence and citizenship, facilitated the 
interpretation of trigger events in terms of the crisis confronting the country. 
This supported the activation of plural civil society in collective acts of public 
solidarity and resistance.  
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• Despite this, the MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43 movement narratives were not 
primarily framed in terms of human rights discourse which was considered alien 
and too technical for national constituencies. A more emotionally expressive 
discourse was integral to identity and activation of grassroots mobilization. This 
focused on the human face of suffering, the abusive and stigmatising 
institutional treatment of victims and the urgent demand for justice in a 
language resonant with the experiences and feelings of ordinary people.  
 
• In YoSoy132, where the focus was not on justice for victims, but transforming 
democratic participation and media bias, the minimum standard of human 
rights discourse was not felt to be particularly useful, either for problematizing 
the focal issues or for mobilizing support.  
 
• In the MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43, human rights discourse was facilitated by the 
participation of national and international networks of adaptive skilled activists. 
It also contributed to the agency and legitimacy of victims in their concrete 
claims-making against the state. It provided an important, but limited point of 
articulation for plural movement actors. However, this was insufficient for the 
movements to develop a unifying and enduring transformative political agenda.  
 
• Digital and social media malleability and low costs facilitated networked 
mobilization locally and globally. In particular it facilitated the sharing of the 
movement’s emotional narrative, key to transforming claims-making of the 
movement into a personalised and affective language engaging the moral 
sentiments of national constituencies. It also helped root the mobilizations in 
their context, which facilitated the participation of diverse international 
solidarity networks. 
  
• Increasing use of digital and social media with each movement facilitated early 
forms of horizontal autonomous participation in the mobilizations, but these 
dynamics were insufficient to maintain movement mobilizations in the longer 
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term. This required more traditional social movement practices to sustain 
expressive and strategic collective action against entrenched powerholders.  
 
• The vulnerability of digital and social media to manipulation, surveillance and 
threats by powerholders introduced new forms of risk for activists, resulting in 
self-limiting communications practices, restricting more deliberative and open 
forms of engagement in the public sphere. 
  
• Despite the continuing dominance of mainstream media, the changing digital 
media landscape enabled more diverse voices to reach national and 
international audiences. This strengthened the capacity of civil society actors to 
challenge official narratives, shape the public sphere, support mobilization 
processes and influence the political agenda.  
 
These findings, based on empirical experiences and interpretative analysis of the cases, 
suggest that human rights discourse and digital and social media play important but 
also limited roles in mounting and sustaining contentious mobilizations against 
powerholders. These features are often under-recognised or over-estimated in 
academic and activist understandings of how human rights discourse and digital and 
social media are used in pursuit of justice and social transformation, particularly in 
contexts of partial democracy.  
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Literature review 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter examines theoretical and empirical approaches to the key themes 
addressed in the research, particularly the role of collective non-institutional actors in 
processes of social change. I explore a range of concepts developed in different 
disciplines which underpin and are in dialogue with the analytical categories that 
emerge in the data chapters and which are presented and discussed in full in chapter 
nine.  
 
Firstly, I consider different understandings of democracy and the role of civil society, 
participation and human rights discourse in relation to democratic practice as part of a 
globalised world; reflecting on how these ideas have featured in and been interpreted 
in Latin America’s political development from authoritarian to partial democratic 
regimes. The second section considers aspects of social movement theory as a means 
of analysing and understanding multiple aspects of non-institutional collective 
mobilization, particularly those relevant to interpreting the dynamics of the case 
studies. The last section considers the significance of digitally networked 
communications for civic engagement, including the relevance of a diversifying and 
hybrid news media environment. This also includes discussion of debates about 
particular features of digital and social media practices which have the potential to 
enable and constrain aspects of contentious social mobilization.  
 
 Democracy, civil society and the contested public sphere 
2.2.1 Democracy 
There is a clear tension between the normative ideals of democracy and its historical 
development, particularly the focus on elections as the principle legitimising moment 
of citizen involvement compared to other forms of civic participation. The wider role 
of non-institutional civic engagement has been less theorised in comparison to the 
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dominant focus on the state and institutional order in the processes of democratic 
transition. The historical development of democratic theory tends to downplay or 
ignore the role of non-institutional actors in the consolidation of rights-protective 
regimes and more participatory forms of democracy based on equality and justice. In 
Latin America, this has generated intense debate about the form that civic participation 
should take and the role of dominant elites in shaping the configuration of the state 
and governance. In this context, the contributions of collective social mobilizations are 
understood in varying and disputed terms.  
 
The normative ideal of democracy is a system of self-governance by which a 
constituent community, or people, share equal status in the direct deliberation, 
formulation and expression of their collective will (Held 2006). However, the practical 
process by which the idealised ‘collective will’ is established is infinitely problematic, 
particularly in mass societies where direct participation in deliberations and decision-
making is logistically challenging and majority power risks domination of individuals or 
minorities (Cohen 1997; Held 2006). In 17th century Europe and America, ideas of 
liberal democracy developed to dilute executive power and extend political 
participation within elites. The election of political representatives served to aggregate 
societal interests into political parties, enacting majoritarian decisions through the 
powers of the state. However, these were also constrained by the rule of law on the 
basis of individual pre-given ‘natural rights’ (Locke 2014) to ‘life, liberty and property’ 
(Axford 1997). Nevertheless, until well into the 20th century, the electorate was limited 
to educated men with substantial property. The majority of the population was 
excluded from participation in the election of representatives to formulate the 
collective will, and liberal rights primarily served to preserve and strengthen the 
particular advantages of the enfranchised elite.  
 
Yet this is only one dimension of institutional democratic development. Equally 
important is the challenge of non-institutional collective actors identifying with 
Rousseau’s (1968) republican ideal of civic engagement, agitating for the extension of 
the franchise and other rights (Tilly 2004; Stammers 2009) promoted by movements 
like Chartism. In addition, internal establishment voices such as JS Mill (1986) 
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advocated limited, but greater individual and collective involvement in democratic 
politics as a moral good (Held 2006). These combined pressures, including the growing 
power and status of the industrial working class and women, gradually forced the 
extension of the franchise, reorienting liberal democracy more toward the normative 
ideal of equality.11 
 
However, growing populations and industrialization also created complex mass 
societies. This introduced new inequalities and state bureaucracy. Mass political 
participation representing new interests only increased the complexity and risks of 
realising the common good.12 Schumpeter (2003) dismissed normative ideals of 
democracy as dangerous, instead proposing a form of pragmatic rational-legal 
‘competitive elitism’ (Held 2006). This allowed mass society to legitimise elite 
government through narrowly controlled elections between elite groups, but excluded 
any other popular or civic influence over the political agenda.13 Dahl (1956; 1998) 
recognised this approach was insufficient to address the complexity of modern 
societies, proposing ‘polyarchic’ democracy to aggregate multiple interests and widen 
political elites. However, this once again primarily focused on competitive elections in 
line with market theory, albeit with limited civil and political rights to extend the 
criteria of the fairness and openness.  
 
These dominant US academic models of liberal democracy helped marginalized more 
horizontal and participatory democratic ideas about the formation of collective 
political will (Pateman 1970; Barber 2003). As such, democracy was reduced to the 
management of elections. Issues of the public good, allocation of resources, human 
                                                        
11 Admittedly, this normative ideal applies more to European democracies than the United States, which 
preserved individual liberty above that of equality - at least until the civil rights movement.  
12 This is reflected in Weber’s sceptical approach to democratic governance. It is also exemplified by the 
crisis of European democracy in the first half of the 20th century and its failure to avoid the slide into 
popularism and totalitarianism. 
13 As Espinoza Valle and Monsiváis (2012) suggest, this instrumental vision of democracy, focused on 
choreographed elections and technocratic elites to the exclusion of other forms of civic engagement, 
has cast a long shadow over Latin America’s political development. 
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dignity and how these were defined, deliberated and addressed was the realm of state 
institutions and political elites, with civic deliberations reduced to electoral choice.14  
 
This elite conception of state politics and democracy was highly influential in Latin 
America and the interpretation of transition processes to democracy (Avritzer 2006).15 
O’Donnell (1986) argued the transitions from authoritarian to electoral regimes came 
about almost exclusively as a result of cleavages, negotiations and pacts within ruling 
elites. He granted human rights organizations an important moral authority in 
reasserting the realm of ‘personal dignity’ (p52), against the abuses of authoritarian 
regimes. However, he considered the ‘popular upsurge’ of grassroots movements as 
merely useful in hurrying the transition, and ‘always ephemeral’ (p55), even ultimately 
destabilising. He argued that elections were essential to demobilize non-institutional 
social actors and return politics to purely institutional channels.  
 
Yet this approach became problematic when the new electoral democracies in the 
region did not consolidate into the liberal ideal which many Western political theorists 
had assumed would occur at the end of the Cold War (Fukuyama 1989; Huntington 
1993). Instead, they continued to display many of the qualities of their predecessors. 
As a result, scholars proposed hybrid models such as ‘competitive authoritarianism’ 
(Levitsky et al. 2002) and ‘illiberal democracy’ (Zakaria 1997). O’Donnell (1993, p1355) 
referred to ‘delegative democracies’ based on ‘low-intensity citizenship and a state 
which combines strong democratic and authoritarian features’ with institutions 
marked by ‘clientalism, patrimonialism and corruption’ (O’Donnell 1994, p59).16 The 
result of this flawed process was that political transitions in the region often produced 
                                                        
14 The narrow focus on election processes, to the exclusion of the content of democracy and the role of 
citizens, played a key role in interpreting the third wave of democratic transitions in the 80s and 90s, 
particularly in Latin America (Huntington 1993; Brownlee 2009; Levitsky et al. 2010).  
15 During the Cold War, the US policy of strategic ‘containment’ of communism (Smith 2005), promoted, 
at best, versions of “competitive elitism”, but more broadly authoritarian regimes sympathetic to US 
interests, ensuring dominant client elites, regardless of elections, were the exclusive political actors at 
national level, largely free to crush dissent, including non-institutional social and political activism 
(Edward et al. 1988). 
16 He suggested that electoral democracy in the region empowered forms of centralised executive 
authority to wield, often unconstrained, power outside the control of formal constitutional safeguards. 
This also enabled subnational levels of authoritarian governance to operate unhindered. 
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electoral democracies which followed the prescriptions of neoliberal economics, but 
did not enact democratic governance understood as upholding equality and the rule of 
law or responsive to the social and economic welfare of the population. This included 
failing to prevent abuses by state officials, curb crime or maintain security, and equally 
importantly, failure to address high levels of poverty and social exclusion.17 The hopes 
of many sections of the population that political transition would not only enable 
elections, but also transform the state, creating more responsive and accountable 
governance and more equal societies, were not fulfilled (Weyland 2004; Olvera 2010; 
Espinoza Valle et al. 2012).18  
 
O’Donnell’s model of ‘delegative democracy’ focuses on the illiberal actions of elected 
executives. However, this insufficiently addresses the fragmentation of formal and 
informal power, including the ‘captured’ (Acemoglu et al. 2015) dimensions of political 
parties and institutions. In relation to Mexico, scholars have referred to ‘frustrated 
democracy’ (Alonso Sánchez 2012), ‘elusive democracy’ (Olvera 2010) and ‘civil war 
democracy’ (Schedler 2013), ‘violent pluralism’ (Arias & Goldstein 2010a), suggesting 
that inequality and violence are integral to its form of neoliberal democracy (Velasco 
2005; Von Holdt 2014). These analyses reflect differing attempts to approximate the 
complex empirical reality with wider analytical criteria of democracy, not limited to fair 
elections. In this thesis I use the term ‘partial democracy’ to convey the multiple deficits 
of Mexico’s existing democracy without seeking to establish an exhaustive typology or 
suggest that Western liberal democracy is the definitive version.19  
                                                        
17 In the 2000s, it could be argued that this changed significantly as various shades of left-wing 
government were elected in several South American countries, leading to a decade-long shift to more 
statist and redistributive policies which has now gone into reverse. However, in general this did not 
change the quality of governance, which continued to manifest the features that O’Donnell identified in 
relation to “delegative democracies”. 
18 The end of the Cold War and democratic transition in different regions also led to an increasing focus 
by international institutions such as the UN on the quality of democratic participation and pluralism as 
an intrinsic element of development (UNDP 2002). This process stimulated comparative political studies 
assessing features of “rights-protective regimes” (Donnelly 2013), gradually widening the evaluation of 
democratic performance to include criteria of enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. These 
indicators remain state focused (Landman 2006) but suggest the relevance of human rights norms as a 
legitimated discourse to identify types of democratic deficits which are not limited to electoral 
procedures. 
19 This does not mean the end of centralised state power, but institutions, including political parties, 
have become interpenetrated by multiple interests, such as criminal networks. In this confused melee 
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O’Donnell and others could only conceive of state elites to strengthen ‘horizontal 
accountability’ (O’Donnell 1993, p1367) across institutions, leaving citizens with 
elections as the exclusive moment of ‘vertical accountability’. However, other scholars 
have proposed various forms of ‘societal accountability’ outside elections to enable 
civic monitoring and influence over institutional performance (Peruzzotti et al. 2003; 
Ackerman 2005; Camargo et al. 2013; Hibbert 2017). These models of non-institutional 
civic engagement include ideas of participatory involvement in policy decision-making 
(Avritzer 2006), critical independent media (Malena et al. 2004), scrutiny of 
institutional performance and policy (Cameron et al. 2012) as well as mobilized 
citizenry (Shefner 2008) and social movements (López Pacheco 2013).  
 
These initiatives focus on how forms of non-institutional, sometimes unruly, civic 
participation, can positively influence or shape the conduct of the state. They illustrate 
the inadequacy of traditional approaches to democratic transition which assumed that 
periodic elections were sufficient to ensure the state and political elites would 
recognise and effectively pursue the public good. These traditional political science 
approaches not only tended to downplay the role of independent civil society in 
democratic development, but ignored the importance of creative engagement of plural 
autonomous social actors with the political process and challenging the injustices of 
superficially democratic states.  
 
2.2.2 Civil society and active citizenship 
There are diverse historical approaches to the concept of civil society. These have 
influenced autonomous political and social action in Latin America, resulting in the 
                                                        
of actors, violence is a routine medium of social action and interaction; human rights violations are 
frequently committed by state actors and non-state actors, and, the state is unwilling or unable to 
protect the population, particularly socially marginal communities, from multiple forms of violence 
(Pearce 2010). This contrasts with Weber’s (Weber 1946) notion of modern unitary state, exerting 
domination through institutions governed by rational law, with a monopoly of the use of force. 
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plural and sometimes contradictory understandings of the role of civil society from 
which social movements emerge and which contribute to political development.20  
 
Civil society is an amorphous concept: ‘a sphere of uncoerced human association 
between the individual and the state, in which people undertake collective action for 
normative and substantive purposes, relatively independent of government and the 
market’ (Edwards 2011, p4). Cohen and Arato (1994) argue autonomous social 
participation challenges and constrains state power, particularly promoting the 
instantiation of rights. Alexander (2006) defines civic space as a vital realm of universal 
solidaristic sentiment and action underlying social interaction. The vagueness these 
notions is due to the normative idea of civil society bringing together diverse processes, 
interactions and actors into a single concept.21 This diversity makes plurality itself a 
defining feature of civil society.22 Nonetheless, it is important to trace the historical 
development of the idea to illustrate how different approaches to the individual, 
community, social relations, the economy and the exercise of organized power are all 
involved in different understandings of civil society as a political actor.  
 
In the European enlightenment, the idea of civil society emerged as an intermediary 
realm connecting individuals and mediating relations to politics, society, economy and 
the state. Liberal thinkers like Locke considered civil society had emerged from nature 
as the realm of social organization guaranteeing the individual’s right to liberty and 
property under law. Adam Smith identified civil society as the realm of economic 
activity; of autonomous individual capitalist interests driving collective wealth creation, 
but also driven by high moral purpose (Alexander 2006). Hegel recognised the realms 
of the family, civil society and the state. He initially accepted Smith’s vision of civil 
society as autonomous commercial interaction of equal individuals, but increasingly 
                                                        
20 The plurality of understandings make it contested but also open to interpretation and appropriation 
by diverse actors. This has served social actors in Latin America in their relationship with each other and 
approaches to the state, including the aspiration of social transformation (Dagnino 2011). 
21 For example, the Oxford Handbook of Civil Society identifies six different categories of civil society 
practice: non-profit sector, development NGOs, grassroots associations, social movements, social 
enterprise and social entrepreneurs and global civil society (Edwards 2011). 
22 More pessimistically, Shefner (2008) considers “division” rather than plurality as its defining feature. 
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believed that it was not shaped by high moral purpose but by power and selfish 
individualism, creating inequality and undercutting the public good, thus requiring the 
state’s controlling intervention (Ehrenberg 2011).  
 
Following this approach, Marx (1844) dismissed civil society as the sphere of ‘egoistic’ 
capitalist self-interest, there to conceal the structural drivers of the class struggle.23 
Gramsci was the first Marxist thinker to reconsider the potential of civil society, but 
largely as an enemy terrain which could be instrumentally subverted to challenge the 
cultural codes with which the dominant class imposed its hegemony through control 
of civil society (Gramsci 1971). His focus on struggles within civil society and democracy 
as strategic routes for subaltern resistance and social transformation particularly 
influenced the Latin American Left, which had unsuccessfully pursued ideas of state 
developmentalism or confrontation with capitalist authoritarian regimes (Munck 
2013). As a result, by the end of the 1970s, many left-wing progressives viewed civil 
society as ‘a space between the state and the market where social organizations of 
citizens could organize human rights associations, trade unions, and varied social 
movements’ (p43).24 It was this plurality of civil society practices and their relative 
autonomy from the repressive state which made them a promising catalyst for social 
transformation. It led to a reawakening of interest in the idea of civil society as a 
progressive force in the region, particularly popular community-based movements 
challenging social exclusion (Alvarez et al. 1992) and increasingly as part of alliances 
demanding democratization (Olvera 1997).25 
                                                        
23 This identification of civil society with capitalism strongly influenced left-wing thinkers for generations. 
In the 20th century, the emergence of complex mass industrial societies and the growth of the 
technocratic administrative state also reduced interest in ideas of an autonomous civil society, 
particularly when it had failed to prevent the rise of totalitarianism.   
24 In Eastern Europe, the emergence of autonomous civil society as a space of resistance to all-
encompassing state socialism also rekindled interest in the radical potential of civil society and the 
possibility of instantiating rights through autonomous social mobilization (Cohen et al. 1994; Baker 
2002). However, these democratization processes also reawakened interest in civil society as the 
handmade of liberal individualist capitalism, leading neoliberal advocates to equate the demands for 
democracy to demands for liberal individualism (Madison 2002).  
25 The resurgence of normative ideas of civil society also coincided with the emergence of a multiplicity 
of civil society organizations in Western democracies from the 1970s onwards in the wake of New Left 
thinking which broke with the paradigm of class struggle to engage in new forms of social action and 
engagement in political and cultural struggles. These included grassroots community associations, but 
also new movements focused on feminism, human rights and environmentalism as well as other groups 
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In contrast to this more radical stance, civil society has also frequently been identified 
with conservative and liberal approaches to culture. De Tocqueville (2003) argued that 
the practices of associational voluntarism of 19th century USA (based on personal 
liberty and commercial self-interest), generated a political culture capable of 
preventing the state falling under the control of popularist majorities (Calhoun 2011). 
A century later, the concept of civic culture shaping political regimes was analysed by 
Almond and Verba (1989) who tried to empirically test this comparative cultural 
influence on state formation in five different countries. Putnam (2000) later argued 
that the collapse in associational life of modern North America undermined the social 
capital which De Tocqueville had identified as necessary to sustain democracy. These 
culturalist approaches to political attitudes and practice have faced considerable 
criticism for their methods, assumptions and conclusions, particularly for downplaying 
structural economic drivers shaping political regimes, cultures and practices; for 
confusing causes with effects. Despite these limitations, they address an important 
dimension of political society; how individual beliefs, attitudes and agency are central 
to meaning-making as part of collective political processes. These are not only the 
consequence of institutional politics or reducible to structural determinants, but have 
to be considered in their own right, playing an important role in the enactment of 
transformational moments in the life of societies (Goldfarb 2012). As such, they point 
to how forms of political engagement necessarily involve culturally rooted dimensions. 
These play a role, albeit imprecise, in individual engagement in collective political 
processes. Each of the case studies explores these complex and nuanced dynamics in 
relation to the meaningfulness of participation in the social movements.  
 
Despite the differences in these understandings of civil society, there is a measure of 
convergence around the potential of non-institutional actors to strengthen democracy 
                                                        
committed to democratic societal accountability of institutions, and others engaged in a range of global 
issues. Many of these new actors became increasingly institutionalised and professionalised, developing 
into non-governmental organizations (NGOs). At the same time, the resurgence of liberal capitalism in 
the 1980s and the increasing hegemony of neoliberalism, fostered the creation of civil society 
organizations to take over the provision state services; a “third sector” of non-profit organizations and 
client associations dependent on the state.  
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on the grounds that ‘societies should maximize individual self-development and self-
direction by altering power structures in favor of inclusion and voice’ (Warren 2011, 
p388). This also points to the dual role of civil society as both opening democracy up to 
more republican participation, but also how such participation enables the emergence 
of a culture of self-realising autonomous and expressive citizenship, reasserting the 
role of agency and political subjectivity in the process of civic engagement.26 However, 
the question then arises as to what form of civil society practice in the public sphere 
contributes to democratic citizenship and social change.  
 
2.2.3 Public sphere, deliberation and contestation 
There are two normative approaches to public sphere processes of political 
engagement and deliberation that have been particularly influential in Latin America, 
including with social activists engaged in the social movement practice of the three 
case studies.  
 
Habermas (1991) envisages the public sphere as an intersubjective discursive process, 
involving an open and equal group of autonomous individuals enacting public 
reasoning, reflecting on issues of public good. He suggests this ideal process can 
overcome the self-interested rationality of the enlightenment individual, through 
debate, challenge and impartial consensus formation. This can then be communicated 
to wider publics and the political establishment, influencing state policy and action.27 
He argues an open and inclusive public space constitutes a normative ideal of 
democratic deliberation, independent of institutional concerns and not reduced to the 
aggregation of individual or class interests of representative democracy. He suggests 
the deliberations of autonomous civil society in a distributed public sphere, facilitated 
by forms of media communication, is the basis of collective evaluations of the political 
system and the state. This is particularly important for states suffering a collapse in 
                                                        
26 This is the dimension of democratic practice frequently ignored by political scientists focused on 
institutional democratic performance and elections. 
27 Habermas reimagines the historical precedent of the 18th century bourgeois coffee house society 
approaching this ideal, but falling short due to its own contradictions, such as the exclusion of women 
and classes outside the privileged bourgeoisie (Habermas 1991). 
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governance credibility with their citizens or ‘legitimation crisis’. The state’s capacity to 
respond to the ‘communicative rationality’ of the autonomous public sphere can act as 
a democratic corrective. The capacity of civil society to exercise this function is 
maintained by the instantiation and protection of the constitutional rights of citizens 
(Habermas 1996). 
 
Critics have pointed out that any empirical public sphere will always exclude some 
voices, and also that there will always be power imbalances between individuals within 
publics (Fraser 1990). These deficits in openness and equality will inevitably shape the 
resulting consensus undercutting its claim to impartial rationality (Held 2006). Others 
have also pointed to an absence of clarity (which Habermas also acknowledges) about 
the process by which impartial deliberations are transmitted through public opinion 
and to the political system, without becoming subject to the instrumental interests of 
media and technology corporations.28 However, the normative ideal of civil society 
publics, including counter-publics of the excluded (Fraser 1990), deliberating and 
challenging institutional political elites through public communication and diverse use 
of media technologies is powerful. It is an important inspiration for forms of non-
institutional collective political and civic engagement (Castells 1996), particularly those 
challenging the reductive vision of elite dominated neoliberal democracy.29 In Latin 
America, the ideas of Cohen and Arato (1994), who developed Habermas’ concepts in 
the context of democratic transition, were widely adopted. They served to analyse the 
role of autonomous civil society as part of the ‘lifeworld’ resisting domination by the 
authoritarian state and neoliberal market forces in deliberative consensus forming 
processes to instantiate cosmopolitan human rights and strengthen democratic 
practice (Olvera 1997; Davis 1999). However, the failure of legal instantiation to result 
in changes in practice has called into question the applicability of this model, 
particularly in contexts of weak or captured states such as found in Latin America.  
                                                        
28 Habermas recognises this problem and is particularly critical of the mass media in shaping the 
communicative narrative for instrumental purposes. 
29 It also influenced Castells approach to digitally networked communications of autonomous individuals 
enacting forms of horizontal communicative rationality, free from the shaping power of the mass media 
to enact emancipatory and democratic deliberations in distributed counter-publics (Castells 2008).     
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A different approach to plural civil society publics, which rejected the pursuit of 
impartial deliberative consensus, has been particularly influential on the Left in Latin 
America. This focused on the construction of radical democracy and popular 
sovereignty, not the instantiation of rights. Laclau and Mouffe (1985; Mouffe 2005; 
2018; Laclau 2005) argue that liberalism and democracy are historically contingent, not 
intrinsically connected as liberals assume. In the place of representative democracy, 
they envision a radical democracy based on sustained popular contentious conflicts. 
They identify plural excluded social actors coalescing to press their interests forged in 
particular contexts of social injustice, and developing their political subjectivity, 
autonomy and identity in processes of collective struggle and claims-making against 
the neoliberal authoritarian state (Laclau et al. 1985; Mouffe 2005). They argue that 
collective popular movements can avoid the trap of liberal aggregation of interests. 
This requires plural social mobilizations which do not aspire to take control of the state 
or to reach consensus. Instead, they propose sustained ‘agonism’, a form of vivifying 
conflictual challenge to dominant interests. Through this process of political 
engagement new political actors emerge in praxis and as such their identity cannot be 
predetermined. This reworking of Marx and Gramsci focuses on popular plural civil 
society mobilizations, rather than class, as the primary form of political resistance to 
domination. It re-politicises civil society and the public sphere, making them a domain 
of popular contention rather than a space of deliberative consensus formation. This 
approach to plural social actors collectively challenging the injustices of neoliberal 
democratic transitions offered a more radical reenvisaging of democratic practice and 
social activism than suggested by Habermasian consensus.  
 
However, the idea of plural popular social actors coming together, but not in 
consensus, to assert forms of radical democracy, begs the question of what unifies and 
articulates the actors beside their acceptance of democratic rules. Laclau proposed the 
notion of an ‘empty signifier’ to enable ‘populist unification …on a radically 
heterogeneous social terrain’ (Laclau 2005, p98). In effect, the enactment of radical 
democracy acts as this signifier in the process of participants developing their political 
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subjectivity.30 However, the articulation of plural movements around contested 
concepts or ‘empty signifiers’, including human rights discourse, seems to avoid the 
question of how plural actors develop common strategic or expressive practices or 
political agendas cohesive enough to carry them beyond the symbolic and idealised 
moment of unifying plurality. This is a theme which is explored in relation to the 
experiences of the three case study movements.   
 
These are two very distinct normative ideals of civil society actors engaged in non-
institutional public space processes, one oriented toward deliberation and consensus, 
the other toward plural contestation of domination. They represent different points on 
the spectrum of theories of civic and popular engagement in collective democratic 
struggle. Both helped academics and activists, including those involved in the case 
studies, to interpret and engage with the social and political context in Latin America 
and the role of autonomous civil society in the pursuit of forms of democratic social 
change. One draws on more liberal and reformist traditions, the other more radical 
with transformative aspirations. Yet both draw on the universalist ideas of human 
rights as a potential discourse to strengthen civil society capacity to challenge the 
injustices of the political order and to reconfigure the relationship between citizens 
and with the state.  
 
 Human rights discourse 
Different and shared approaches to human rights discourse and activism is a feature of 
our increasingly globalised world. These include, on the one hand, human rights 
discourse being relevant for the claims-making of victims of abuses and movements 
engaged in social justice struggles against powerholders, on the other hand, operating 
as a discourse of state legitimation for institutional actors. These different aspects of 
human rights discourse play an important role in understanding various dimensions of 
social movement practice.31  
                                                        
30 He also suggested that human rights discourse had served in the 1980s as a point of unity to articulate 
resistance struggles to authoritarianism. However, this was only a historically contingent convergence 
with aspects of liberalism, as other popular demands could emerge (Laclau 2005, p171). 
31 See appendix for a more detailed account of what is meant by human rights discourse in this thesis. 
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2.3.1 Emerging human rights norms, practice and justification 
The modern understanding of human rights developed in response to the horrors of 
WWII with the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
subsequent international and regional human rights treaties. These codified legal 
constraints on states (Turner 1993) to prevent abuses of power as well as positive 
obligations to fulfil minimum elements necessary for human dignity (Sjoberg et al. 
2001).  
 
The new international legal order affirmed these human rights were universal and 
indivisible, including economic, social and cultural rights. These went far beyond the 
limited conception of ‘negative’ rights of traditional liberal political thought (Habermas 
2010).32 The international legal recognition of human rights asserted their moral 
authority and universal validity, but compliance remained the responsibility of 
sovereign states themselves. As a result, human rights obligations and commitments 
were largely rhetorical for states amidst the wider geopolitical demands of 
international relations and domestic governance.33 However, it was the engagement 
of emerging civil society actors in the 1960s and 70s with the ideal of pressing states to 
respect the human rights enshrined in the UDHR, that challenged their marginal status 
in international relations. New INGOs, like Amnesty International, treated them as 
contentious issues, demanding solidarity and political action to exert pressure on 
states to live up to their commitments. In an increasingly interconnected world, these 
INGOs along with local activists who increasingly adopted the discourse of human 
rights, exposed grave violations around the world, principally addressing instances of 
political repression. The strategy focused on mobilizing international public opinion to 
                                                        
32 In principle the inclusive process of drawing up the UDHR, involving contributions from a range of civil 
society actors and legal traditions around the world, affirmed human rights on the basis of equal right 
to dignity of all humans. This universal equality reclaimed the discourse of rights from narrow liberal 
traditions, applied within nation states and often only for the benefit of particular groups. However, 
human rights treaties while asserting universal applicability also establish a host of exceptions, for 
example, the rights that migrants can claim in host countries (Nash 2015).   
33 Human rights discourse was also used selectively and instrumentally by powerful states to further 
their interests and justify military interventions (Douzinas 2007) and impose neoliberalism (Baxi 2012a). 
This once again exposed human rights discourse to the charge of the Marxist Left that rights were simply 
a liberal smokescreen for the pursuit of economic interests and domination. 
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get governments of the Global North to include human rights demands in their foreign 
policy and pressure non-complaint states, principally in the Global South or the then 
Soviet bloc.34  
 
The status of and attitude toward the idea and practice of human rights human rights 
has an important bearing on their significance and political weight in particular socio-
political contexts. The UDHR simply asserts the universality of human rights on the 
basis of shared humanity, but scholars have attempted a variety of ontological 
justifications to bolster or refute this assertion.35 These includes appeals to ‘natural 
law’ (Tasioulas 2013), universal human frailty (Turner 1993), personhood (Grifﬁn 2008), 
universal consensus (Donnelly 2007) and cosmopolitan democratic citizenship 
(Habermas 2010).36 Others argue that the lack of incontrovertible foundational support 
for human rights is also their strength (Freeman 2011) making their refutation 
impossible and focusing attention on their practical use to further human agency and 
freedom (Ignatieff 2003).  
 
In the absence of consensus on foundational justification, the universality and moral 
authority of human rights is frequently claimed on the basis of their codification in 
international treaties and legal mechanisms which states have voluntarily committed 
themselves to uphold. This is particularly the case with INGOs, whose great success has 
                                                        
34 The new activism was primarily focused on mobilization of Western public opinion to influence 
governments to put pressure on usually weak or client states in the developing world – though not 
exclusively, as some human rights violations were also addressed in the US and Western Europe. This 
largely pragmatic approach to state power provided ammunition to counter-charges that human rights 
norms were often really Western human rights, hiding behind universalist claims to legitimate cultural 
imperialism by hegemonic powers (Rajagopal 2003; Douzinas 2007). However, this process has never 
been clear cut. For example, the Carter administration (1977-81) in the US, was the first to explicitly 
incorporate human rights concerns into its foreign policy agenda (Moyn 2010). As a result, there was 
pressure on the client dictatorships of Latin America - which earlier US administrations had helped to 
install - to be held to account for human rights violations. Despite the Regan administration reverting to 
the traditional US approach to Latin America, civil society human rights demands continued to feature 
as a primary critique of the client regimes and US-backed armed opposition groups. In this context, civil 
society demands, both locally and internationally, for human rights to be respected were increasingly 
linked to calls for democratization and not simply as a tool for furthering narrow state interests.  
35 To rebut the traditional Burkean dismissal of rights as ‘nonsense on stilts’, but also other conservative 
and relativist arguments attacking claims that human rights are universal.  
36 Others like Moyn (2010) argue human rights discourse is simply historically contingent on the collapse 
of utopian socialist ideals, generating the promotion of a discourse advocating forms of social justice. 
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been to encourage many nation states to adopt these legal statutes, making them a 
form of de facto global consensus.37 This has the advantage of seeming to place human 
rights beyond the challenge of everyday political debate in many countries; focusing 
attention on their technical implementation not partisan political agendas or disputes 
about whether there are such things as rights. However, there are perils in over 
reliance on international law as justification of the validity of human rights (Nash 2015). 
It risks downplaying or inadequately understanding the actual social and political 
processes involved in sustaining human rights claims to challenge abusive practices. 
These processes have the potential to generate the type of domestic political 
contention leading to substantive, not just rhetorical, respect for human rights 
(Goodhart 2013). Put another way, excessive belief in the claims of human rights 
discourse to apolitical universality may lead practitioners to pay insufficient attention 
to understanding the complex dynamics that make human rights discourse meaningful 
(or not) in domestic political contention. It is this aspect of the struggle around the 
meaning and uses of human rights discourse that that this research addresses.  
 
2.3.2 Transnational activism versus local context in construction of human rights  
There are important tensions between understandings of human rights discourse as 
rooted in the system of international relations compared to the construction of rights 
through local claims-making.  
 
International relations (IR) scholars identified the emerging international human rights 
movement as ‘principled-issue networks’ (Sikkink et al. 1993) made up of activists of 
globalized civil society promoting human rights norms to benefit others and to 
moderate sovereignty. The ‘boomerang-spiral’ model (Risse et al., 1999, p15) 
highlighted how INGOs worked with local human rights activists who lacked domestic 
leverage due to living in repressive political environments in the Global South. This 
enabled them to publicly ‘shame’ the states responsible for human rights violations on 
the international stage, leading to international pressure from the UN and Western 
                                                        
37 Though this climate is under threat as powerful international actors seek to unpick and debilitate 
international human rights mechanisms and law (Posner 2014; Rieff 2018).   
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governments to recognise human rights norms and ratify treaties. In effect, violator 
states seeking to assert their political legitimacy in the modern world order would 
entrap themselves into legal commitments to respect and protect human rights. 
Further violations would then be exposed by local activists and INGOs, leading to more 
shaming and, ultimately, national political decisions to end human rights violations and 
establish ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p31). This analytical theory 
invested INGOs and second governments with the function of ‘socialising’ human rights 
law from international law to peripheral local contexts (Goodman et al. 2004, 2013a). 
However, this model has faced several criticisms.38 These include the fact that the role 
of local human rights activists was conceived of as relatively unimportant compared 
with the advocacy, resources and expertise of INGOs (Stammers 2004; López Pacheco 
2013). As a result, national political dynamics and the agency of local actors and social 
movements were treated as marginal and under-theorised (Risse et al. 2013), 
particularly in contexts of partial democracy.  
 
Beth Simmons (2009) partially addresses this, acknowledging the importance of 
nationally oriented social movements to promote human rights norms domestically. 
However, she adopts a narrowly instrumental account of social mobilization processes 
whose aim is to gain access to political decision-making as part of the transition from 
abusive authoritarian to democratic rights-protective governance (Tarrow 1998). This 
characterisation of domestic social mobilization assumes a relatively unitary social 
movement, strategically promoting the socialization and implementation of 
international human rights law in domestic settings, following the model of INGO 
advocacy campaigns.39 The limits of this model are discussed later in this chapter in 
section 2.4.1.40 The subsequent data chapters also suggest this approach does not 
                                                        
38 Including by its authors in their update analysis (Risse et al. 2013). 
39 Additionally, IR models of mobilization tend to assume a unitary State (Simmons 2009) which 
negotiates political interests in line with democratic theory and efficient Weberian administrative, legal 
and security systems. However, this model of State practice is not consistent with the empirical 
experience of many partial democracies in Latin America. 
40 Political Process Theory seeks to explain contentious social mobilization as efforts of excluded groups 
to gain institutional status. This account fails to address the more complex dynamics of social 
movements rooted in their own political context. 
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adequately reflect the plural practices of nationally focused social movements in which 
human rights discourse is one aspect among several of the mobilization.41 
 
In contrast to this IR approach, Stammers (1999; 2004; 2009; Stammers & Eschle 2005) 
argues sociologically that human rights have been constructed in specific local socio-
political contexts. Movements deploy instrumental strategies orientated toward the 
state, but are, also characterised by performative and expressive activism which is 
‘oriented towards the construction, reconstruction and/or transformation of norms, 
values, identities and ways of living and being’ (Stammers 2009, p165).42 In this theory, 
the process of diverse autonomous movements formulating and claiming rights against 
power is the moral source of their universality, not the inscription of rights in national 
or international law. This approach refocuses attention on politics and the self-
legitimating agency of movements to challenge their exclusion and domination by 
elites through collective action and normative aspirations. It also points to how rights 
claims can be betrayed in processes of institutionalization. However, it fails to 
acknowledge that instantiation in law and the exercise of forms of power, as Habermas 
and Cohen and Arato recognise, are also the means of protecting and upholding human 
rights.43 Despite these limitations, Stammers embeds social movements in their 
                                                        
41 In such cases, human rights NGOs may only represent a small part of the movement coalition. Some 
other actors may only consider international human rights norms as contingent (Laclau 2005) or not a 
priority, relevant or appropriate to the particular forms of political struggle. This may include “unruly” 
groups (Khanna et al. 2013) which are not necessarily committed to “civic” forms of protest. However, 
the case can potentially be made in relation to specific advocacy coalitions of local and national human 
rights NGOs lobbying for particular institutional actions (López Pacheco 2017), but as the research data 
illustrates, this is not predominantly how human rights discourse features in complex, dynamic and 
socially rooted domestic mobilizations.   
42 He follows Cohen and Arato’s theory of autonomous civil society acting collectively to resist 
domination, but not the deliberative processes of communicative rationality leading to the instantiation 
of law to protect rights. Instead, he regards the pre-legal formulation of rights claims by movements as 
emancipatory, but considers their institutionalization in law as ambiguous and paradoxical. He suggests 
the self-affirming agency of claimants is replaced in the institutionalization process by a technocratic 
constitutionalism and administrative bureaucracy which exert Foucauldian power and control over their 
subjects once again. 
43 Stammers’ work is relevant to this thesis as it focuses on the role of local and national social 
movements in the historic processes of claiming and constructing rights. It recognises the secondary 
logistical contribution of NGOs to this process, but identifies the transformative expressive and 
instrumental potential of mass collective action in and of itself. This has the potential to prefigure forms 
of social change not yet visible to institutional culture. However, he fails to adequately account for the 
universal dimension of the disparate local social processes or acknowledge that some of the paradoxes 
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particular context and makes them agents of their political action rather than offshoots 
of the international human rights movement. He also points to underlying paradoxes 
of appealing for institutional protection of human rights from states that are only 
concerned with simulating respect for human rights to preserve their power.  
 
Despite the importance of refocusing on local or nationally-oriented social movements 
in the construction of human rights, the role of globalization and international actors 
cannot be ignored. In particular, the increasing connectedness made possible by 
digitally networked communications. These enable diverse social actors to rapidly and 
dramatically visibilise local contexts on the global stage, especially with reference to 
human rights discourse (Bob 2005). For some this constitutes a democratic, globalized 
public sphere with new forms of social movement practice (Cohen & Rai 2000). In this 
approach, human rights discourse is treated as a form of ‘lingua franca’ of values of the 
new critical global civil society; as ‘códigos culturales compartidos a partir de la práctica 
crítica sobre la globalización’ (Castells 2009b, p17). This contributes discursive support 
for collective resistance to the domination and inequality of global capitalism in the 
vein of Habermas’ cosmopolitan public sphere deliberations.  
 
Another feature of these more horizontal and diverse forms of local and globalized 
action is the challenge to established INGOs whose professionalisation and altruism 
have increasingly been questioned.44 In addition, new classes of professionalised NGOs 
at national level have also faced criticism for creating privilaged interlocutors with 
institutions and speaking for victims (Baxi 2012a; Estévez López 2015). In Latin America, 
this process of profesionalisaton of civil society has been blamed for marginalizing the 
space for popular social movements to contest the injustices of neoliberalism (Alvarez 
et al. 1998), and for uncritical adoption of the depoliticised and technocratic language 
of international human rights law. However, other scholars have noted that the 
                                                        
of institutionalisation are contingent on socio-political context, not the necessary outcome of legal 
instantiation of human rights.  
44 For example, for pursing their own interests by imposing their priorities on local partner NGOs, such 
as a narrow focus on certain civil and political rights supportive of the economic adjustment programmes 
of Western governments (Petras 1997), ignoring wider social and economic structural inequalities 
(Estévez López 2008) or through the pursuit of donar funding (Reith 2010). 
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relationship of influence with INGOs is not one-way, as national NGOs also shape INGO 
agendas (Rodio et al. 2010). In addition, new national and local NGOs are part of the 
modernization of national civil society. This increasingly involves multiple 
organizational forms and practices reflecting different interests and values; among 
them, local grassroots movements, community groups and faith-based associations 
alongside increasingly diversified and specialised human rights NGO and think-tank 
organizations focused on economic, social and security issues. This, as Lavelle and 
Bueno (2011) argue, created a new ‘organizational ecology of civil society’ (p415), but 
without displacing grassroots social actors or the role victims in claims-making. The 
plurality of civil society actors involved and their contributions to molibilizations are 
examined in relation to the three movements, particularly the challenges of using 
human rights discourse to sustain and articulate unstable movement identities and 
coalitions.    
 
2.3.3 Human rights, injustice, victims, voice and agency 
Victims are key actors in many human rights-oriented movements, including those 
studied in this research. They often play a unique role as the legitimised agents of 
human rights claims-making against powerholders.45 However, the process by which 
victims of injustice come to understand and challenge their situation using human of 
rights discourse, including as central actors in social movements, is a complex and 
sometime fraught process. 
 
In this research, I use the term ‘victim’ to refer to persons or communities who are 
directly the subject of crimes, including grave human rights violations - such as killings, 
enforced disappearance, torture and forced displacement. However, the term also 
applies to the victim’s relatives whose lives are harmed in multiple and enduring 
ways.46 This understanding of victim includes human rights concepts, such as the 
                                                        
45 Baxi argues that the ‘historic mission of “contemporary” human rights is to give voice to human 
suffering, to make it visible’ (Baxi 1999, p6). 
46 The term victim has been subject to criticism, particularly in the criminal justice system (Wolhuter et 
al, 2009) including by feminist theorists, for representing the person solely in terms of the harm “done 
to” her, as a passive object of the offence, deprived of agency and “fetishized”(Goodale et al. 2007) 
seemingly identified solely in terms of victimhood. “Survivor” and other terms potentially overcome this 
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relatives’ right to access truth, justice and reparations. In this context, self-identifying 
with the term victim does not necessarily imply passivity as some suggest (Wolhuter et 
al, 2009). It can form part of relatives’ understanding of their situation as suffering 
injustice, empowering them to recount their experiences (Hastrup 2003) and facilitate 
their agency in the process of demanding justice (Forst 2012; Brysk 2013).     
 
The change from understanding a personal situation as a misfortune to an injustice is 
frequently a political decision (Shklar 1990).47 In contexts of routinized violence and 
stigmatised victims, the process of relatives interpreting their experience as unfair is a 
necessary step in the formulation of demands against powerholders. A further step is 
reframing this cry of injustice into the discourse of human rights with its ‘distinctive 
force and remedial logic’ (Donnelly 2013, p8). This legitimises and specifies concrete 
demands for action from the state and other powerholders to meet their obligations 
toward the victims and society. This complex process of formulating and sustaining 
human rights-based claims often involves relatives coming into contact with social 
actors who have human rights know-how, particularly, but not exclusively, legal 
knowledge. As a result, those with relative expertise and skill, can play an important 
role in ‘socializing’ human rights concepts and ideas to make them relevant for victims 
and affected communities with less knowledge (Goodale et al. 2007; Gordon et al. 
2007; Goodale 2009; Goldstein 2012; Landy 2013). Merry (2006b) notes that this 
‘vernacularization’ (p39) of human rights norms - that is making them meaningful to 
the lived experience of those affected - can enable local actors without knowledge of 
human rights discourse to recognise its usefulness and adopt it to develop new 
perspectives on their situation.48 This process can facilitate and shape claims-making 
against powerholders (Merry 2006b, 2006a) and translate local injustices into the 
                                                        
effect. However, I use the term “victim” as defined in international human rights norms (UN General 
Assembly 1985; A/Res/60/147 UN General Assembly 2006), in part because many of the direct victims 
of violence in Mexico do not survive, and also because the term includes within its scope indirect victims, 
such as relatives. In relation to wider human rights norms, victim can also refer to those denied social, 
political, civil, economic, cultural and environmental rights. 
47 Shklar also argues that our emotional sense of injustice is prior to and exceeds our sense of justice. 
48 In contrast, Speed argues that affected communities themselves can reconstitute rights discourse in 
relation to their own specific social context as part of the process of subaltern resistance without 
recourse to external expertise or international human rights law (Speed 2007). 
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globally legitimised discourse of human rights. In this context, the use of human rights 
discourse is instrumental as it is understood to exert moral and legal pressure on 
powerholders for a particular end. This includes potentially attracting international 
support to reinforce the political leverage of claims-makers in line with IR ‘boomerang’ 
theory.  
 
However, this process also includes expressive dimensions. The adoption of human 
rights approaches can imply new frameworks by which individuals and communities 
interpret their situation and their relation to powerholders, contributing to a sense of 
enhanced agency, self-hood and citizenship.49 This is part of the value transformative 
aspiration of claiming human rights. However, this is only the case when the use of 
human rights discourse empowers the voice of victims, rather than speaking for them 
or marginalizing their complex interests and needs (Nyamu-Musembi 2005).50 The 
former cannot be taken for granted as there are often differences in power, knowledge 
and status between local human rights ‘experts’ and ‘victims’, between the lived 
complex suffering of victims and the instrumentalism of legal discourse (Hastrup 2003). 
As a result, these relationships are sensitive and vulnerable to manipulation, 
misunderstanding as well as calculated misrepresentation by powerholders (Merry 
2006a).51 This can potentially undermine the claims-making of victims as well as social 
mobilizations supporting them. These risks, which have become apparent as human 
right practice has developed, have also contributed to some NGOs paying increasing 
attention to forms of integral psycho-social accompaniment of victims and 
                                                        
49 The use of this legitimised discourse, institutional channels for claims-making and international 
attention may also reduce the risk of direct confrontation with powerholders and repression, but this is 
by no means guaranteed. 
50 Another feature that is less acknowledged in this global/local dynamic, is that the direction of influence 
can also work in the opposite direction: from the local to the global. Concrete and particular examples 
of injustice ground the more abstracted concepts of human rights norms of international law in real-
world human experience. This facilitates debate and development of human rights norms and their 
official monitoring and interpretation mechanisms as part of the constantly evolving dialogue between 
international human rights principles and specific situations of injustice. 
51 The counter-narrative of outsider troublemakers manipulating ‘naïve’ victims to extort powerholders 
or undermine their legitimacy is common to virtually all contentious conflicts. However, it is also true 
that local social mobilizations tend to downplay the role of outside influences in the development of 
claims-making, often focusing the legitimacy and authenticity of their claims on the local rootedness of 
the injustice (Nash 2012).  
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communities, particularly in response to situations of violence. In this practice, human 
rights claims-making can be seen a part of a wider restorative process for victims, at 
least in theory, driven by claimants themselves (Villa Gómez 2012). It is important to 
note that while these relationships are not the primary focus of the subsequent data 
chapters, it is necessary to keep their complex dynamics in mind in the processes of 
social mobilizations focused around the claims-making of victims of grave abuses. 
 
It is also the case that many social movements do not adopt human rights discourses, 
particularly when their primary claims-making is not focused on victims of grave 
injustices, but also when human rights expertise is lacking or when human rights 
discourse is not understood as meaningful, useful or adequate to the claims-making 
and mobilization processes.52 As a result, it is necessary to examine wider theoretical 
and empirical approaches to analyse and understand social movements.  
  
 Understanding social movements 
Social movements ‘are sustained, intentional efforts to foster or retard broad legal and 
social changes, primarily outside the normal institutional channels endorsed by 
authorities’ (Jasper 2014b, p28). They are collective social and political responses to 
perceived unfairness or inadequacy in the prevailing political, economic or cultural 
order. This makes them sociologically important for understanding individual 
engagement in collective non-institutional processes, but also in terms of their 
significance as collective political actors. They are outsider challengers to the routinized 
reproduction of the social order and the closed circle of institutionally endorsed power. 
As such, they have the potential to impact the political order, but also in a broader 
sense, to shift accepted norms and values in cultures, contributing to social change 
(Melucci 1996). In Habermas’ terms, social movements challenge the legitimacy 
claimed by institutions to regulate and represent the social and political order. They 
assert an alternative legitimacy based on fundamental values of the public sphere, such 
as humanity, justice, human rights, autonomy, solidarity, citizenship and the common 
                                                        
52 As the data chapters will illustrate, this is the case of YoSoy132 
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good.53 These principles invoke Rousseau’s universal democratic ideals, rather than 
electoral proceduralism as the basis of legitimacy. The following sections examine the 
development of theoretical approaches to social mobilizations and the development 
of different analytical tools to understand various features of their practices. These are 
explored subsequently in relation to the case studies and the mobilization of human 
rights discourse and digital and social media. 
 
2.4.1 Collective behaviour, rationality and structural determinants   
In the positivist climate in the US after WWII, the new social sciences favoured forms 
behaviourism to research mass society, which, like Schumpeter, they viewed with 
suspicion.54 Blumer (1951) used symbolic interactionism and behavioural psychology 
to focus on individual emotional interactions in mass public events, including social 
movements. He treated these as manifestations of social unrest, but also with the 
potential to generate new norms and values outside the prevailing social order. 
Smelser’s (1962) functionalist ‘value added’ theory focused on social movements as a 
manifestation of imbalances in the overall social system. He proposed minimum 
requirements for mobilization, including external strains in society and ‘trigger’ events 
producing ‘generalised beliefs’ amongst potential adherents about grievances.  
 
Despite such important psychological insights, this early theoretical approach tended 
to conceptualise individuals within a collective as victims of their emotions and 
circumstances, subject to manipulation rather rational political individuals consciously 
seeking social change.55 In a world where civil rights and national liberation movements 
were increasingly recognised as reasonable collective responses to unjust elites, this 
                                                        
53 This is a somewhat romanticised representation of social movements as necessarily progressive. As 
noted elsewhere, they can also be regressive, opposing democracy and progressive social change. 
However, this characterisation serves to illustrate some of the qualities associated with progressive 
social movements such as those in this research.  
54 This psychological approach focused on individual relations to groups and wider society is a far cry 
from Marx’s external structural determinants of capitalism giving rise to specific collective working class 
interests, leading to class based movements emerging to seize power as part of historical materialism. 
This approach recognises social movements only in terms of their structural position in relation to other 
interests, not as dynamic and complex political or social configurations.    
55 They tended to view non-institutional collective action in pejorative terms, particularly Smelser who 
referred to it as “deviance” 
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approach to political unrest and non-institutional social action seemed crudely 
negative.56 New scholars in the US argued that social strain was not sufficient to cause 
mobilization, as such grievances were common to all societies, but movements were 
relatively rare (McCarthy et al. 1977), so there must be other factors facilitating 
mobilization.  
 
Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) used Rational Actor Theory (RAT) to analyse 
individual participation in movements. RAT, a form of utilitarianism, was developed as 
part of neoclassical economics to analyse individual and group choices when 
confronted with alternatives. It circumscribed individual action to self-interested 
calculations of costs and benefits, treating emotions as producing irrational decisions 
and actions (Olson 1965). RMT argued that it was the particular internal resources that 
movements could use to get individuals to overcome their rational reluctance to join 
collective action which determined their success.57 RMT focused on the role of Social 
Movement Organizations (SMOs), activist biographies, protest repertoires, leadership 
and communications practices to create the organizational capacity to enable 
participation in collective action in response to grievances. However, this reduced the 
agency of decisions to participate to a cold cost-benefit calculation, ignoring features 
of self-realising agency, solidarity, subjectivity or even external political factors.  
 
Political Opportunity or Process Theory (POT) addressed the latter shortcoming, 
arguing that the conditions for mobilization were a) the favourable configuration of the 
political context, b) movement recourses (RMT) and c) an ‘insurgent consciousness’ 
(McAdam 2010, p51).58 POT was particularly applied to authoritarian states, where 
                                                        
56 However, their behaviourist analysis was often caricatured and marginalized by the subsequent 
generation by more structuralist thinkers. Reassessment of their interactionist and subjectivist 
approaches has supported the cultural turn of recent years, which allows greater weight for meaning 
and emotions in the interpretation of grievances and decisions to participate in mobilizations (Jasper 
1997, 1998; Crossley 2002). 
57 This was a response to Olsen’s “free rider” challenge. This argued that rationally acting individuals 
would rely on others to take the risk of involvement in social mobilizations, realising that they would 
benefit if the movement was successful, but not be adversely impacted if it failed. As a result, there must 
be other grounds for individuals to participate than mere sympathy with the movement as their self-
interested judgement would prevail. 
58 This “insurgent consciousness”, which remains vague in the theory, raises the question of internal 
psychological motivation, which RMT and POT theorists tended to avoid because of their reliance on 
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excluded movements were understood to demand inclusion in the political system 
(Tarrow 1998).59 The analysis of the political context focused on ruptures in the ruling 
elites and democratic liberalization much like O’Donnell’s interpretation of transition 
processes.60 This bias to institutional politics and assumptions about democratic 
transition, alienated activists and scholars in Latin America (Davis 1999).61 Above all, 
while the structuralist approach of POT recognised the importance of the external 
political context, it tended to assume these were objective conditions, rather than 
resulting from movement participants interpreting the context as an opportunity. As a 
result, the purposive agency of movement participants and their subjective meaning-
making was reduced to responding to the ‘cognitive clues’ (McAdam 2010, p51) 
generated by the political elites.  
 
These more structuralist approaches provide important insights into the necessary 
internal resource requirements and external political dynamics contributing to 
mobilizations. These are explored later in relation to the three case studies. However, 
they fail to adequately address collective meaning-making or identity formation 
processes.  
 
2.4.2 Framing theory 
Frame alignment theory tries to address these cognitive processes (Snow et al. 1986; 
Gamson et al. 1996; Benford 1997; Benford et al. 2000).62 It suggests how an event 
routinely accepted in life as a ‘misfortune’, can be reinterpreted as an ‘injustice’ which 
focuses ‘on the kind of righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul’ 
                                                        
Rational Action Theory and structural causes to understand human behaviour, but it is suggestive of a 
shared spirit of rebellion against the status quo.  
59 Ruptures in ruling elites resulted in partial liberalization, reducing the threat of violent repression, 
opening up the communications environment to influence wider audiences and facilitate participation. 
However, this locates the point of political opportunity only as subsequent to elite fracture, rather than 
contributing to this process.  
60 This is also the approach adopted by Simmons (2009) in her analysis of social movements mobilizing 
human rights discourse referred to previously. 
61 Nevertheless, the focus on political opportunities emerging from the institutional order remains an 
important feature for understanding mobilization, for example in relation to the failures of transition 
processes, the security environment and changes in the media ecology. These are all factors considered 
in the three case studies. 
62 It was adopted from Mead’s symbolic interactionism. 
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(Gamson 1995) suggestive of McAdam’s ‘insurgent consciousness’.63 Benford and 
Snow argued that movement recruitment succeeded or failed to the extent that 
potential supporters could recognise and identify with its discourse on the basis of their 
own experience, values and beliefs; that it cognitively ‘resonated’ with them (Snow et 
al. 1986).64 Gamson identified three primary frames in collective action: injustice, 
agency and identity. He argued that an ‘injustice frame’ was fundamental as this was 
not merely a ‘cognitive or intellectual judgement about what is equitable’ but was also 
a “hot cognition” – one laden with emotion’.65  
 
More constructivist approaches to framing theory recognised that enabling and 
constraining factors for movement mobilization were not determined by objectivist 
causes, but depended on actors interpreting them or being encouraged to interpret 
them in a personally meaningful way. However, frames have tended to be conceived 
of in narrowly instrumental terms in which movements project their discourse or 
narratives in the media to induce recruitment and mobilize public opinion (Tarrow 
1998). This assumes a form of utility maximising marketing by ‘movement 
entrepreneurs’, regardless of the consistency of messages or the values, beliefs and 
ideologies of recruits or to what extent frames emerge out of more complex processes 
not necessarily under the control of unitary movement actors.66 Also frame analysis 
focuses on ‘cognitions’ as meaning. As Jasper’s notes (1997), this ignores the role of 
wider culture and emotions in the resonance of frames, evaluations and judgements. 
                                                        
63 RMT and POP had presumed the existence of grievances but did not explained the process by which 
they were understood as grievances. For example, McAdam characterised it vaguely as a form of 
“cognitive liberation”, but without explaining its development. 
64 Gamson (2004) describes a frame as spotlighting ‘certain events and their underlying causes and 
consequences, and direct[ing] our attention away from others. Like a building frame, it gives shape and 
support. A frame organizes and makes coherent an apparently diverse array of symbols, images, and 
arguments, linking them through an underlying organizing idea that suggests what is at stake on the 
issue.’ (p260).  
65 The identity frame depended on identifying those responsible for harm as “them”, against which the 
“we-consciousness” (Gamson 1992, p7) of the movement is formed. Lastly, the agency frame is 
developed on the basis of the movement proposing solutions, that is, what social actors can do to change 
the situation. This is essential to make participation goal-oriented and meaningful for potential recruits 
(Noakes & Johnston 2005, p6). 
66 For example, Feminist critics argued this reliance on utility calculations to maximise frame appeal, 
ignored the fact that this was not necessarily the objective of some movements whose passionate 
convictions and identity were more important than mass appeal (Marx Ferree & Merrill 2000). 
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It freezeframes fluid multilayered processes involving plural actors, falsly simplifying 
dynamic and often contradictory practices (Melucci 1996; Benford et al. 2000). As a 
result its usefulness as a tool of empircal analysis has been called into question 
(Crossley 2002).  
 
Despite this, forms of framing analysis have served to interpret local movements in 
terms of their strategies to secure support of human rights INGOs (Bob 2005; Hagan 
2010) and in critiques of media strategies of INGOs to mobilize their supporters and 
raise funds in the Global North by marketing distant suffering (Boltanski 1999; 
Hopgood 2013), commodifying victims or displacing their voice in favour of ‘media 
friendly’ experts (Silverstone 2007; Baxi 2012a).67 However, others regard instrumental 
framing tactics more positively, as part of the practical strategic process of mobilizing 
national and international awareness and solidarity to support victims and just causes 
(Brysk 2013).  
 
The importance of framing theory for this thesis is its recognition of subjective 
interpretation by diverse actors in the process of interpreting context specfic 
grievances in the mobilization and demoblization process; how various movement 
narratives develop and contribute to identity and motivaition to participate.  
 
2.4.3 New social movements (NSM) 
New social movement theory addressed the complexity of identity formation. It 
developed in Europe from the 1970s in the aftermath of the New Left, the emergence 
of post-industrial capitalism, and the resurgence of plural civil society (Touraine 1971; 
Habermas 1996; Melucci 1996; Castells 1997). New social movements promoting 
                                                        
67 Silverstone points to the risk of silencing the actual voice of victims in favour of ‘experts’ or by the 
media (2007, p98). The traditional international humanitarian campaign which narrates the suffering of 
the distant victims (McLagan et al. 2006) in order to mobilize international public opinion, faces the same 
risks. The strategic logic of attracting a distant audience can reduce the human rights repertoire to a 
purely instrumental engagement with the media to secure international attention (Bob 2005; Hagan 
2010) if there is insufficient regard to the actual agency and voice of claimants. The framing narrative 
oriented purely toward the sensibilities of a globalised audience can also jeopardise the meaning and 
value of human rights discourse, removing it from its localised context and its significance for the actual 
claims-makers. 
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feminism, human rights, LGBTism, environmentalism and peace, among others, were 
no longer seen as representing class interests of structuralist approaches, but shared 
autonomous identities, particularly around cultural values (Melucci 1996). These 
movements could act both instrumentally to achieve political ends, but also 
expressively, that is dramatically enacting and representing their identity, values and 
beliefs through their actions (Cohen 1985). The strength of this approach was its focus 
on reflexive individuals, interpreting their lives within social and political contexts, 
constructing meaning through experience, and recognising themselves in others in the 
process of developing collective identity (Della Porta & Diani 2006). The process of 
participation was self-transforming, echoing post-Marxist ideas of emerging political 
subjectivity through participation and contestation (Laclau et al. 1985).68 Advocates 
argued that plural individual and collective identities could co-exist and cooperate 
(Castells 1997), developing diverse political and cultural practices, aspiring to social 
transformation, but without seeking to seize power or demand representation of 
narrow interests in the institutional political system as envisaged by POT theorists.69  
 
Despite Latin America’s economic and social conditions not reflecting most features of 
post-industrial capitalism, scholars and activists in the region widely adopted NSM 
ideas to interpret and develop their own social movement analysis and practice (Davis 
1999).70 Particularly relevant was NSM focus on movement values, identity, autonomy 
and plurality. This echoed strongly in political cultures where there was a wide range 
                                                        
68 Habermas suggested movements were primarily defensive publics and counter-publics, deliberative 
spaces in which social and political changes could be debated and challenged, potentially resisting, and 
in some cases contributing to, political and social change in democratic states facing legitimation crises 
(Habermas 1981, 2010). This was a mainly defensive conception of social movements resisting the 
colonization of the autonomy of the ‘Lifeworld’ by the encroaching welfarism of the ‘System world’ in 
European social democracies of the 1970s. This was widely criticised for its conservative view of social 
actors resisting change, and inadequately acknowledging the role of marketization, gender inequality 
and globalization (Edwards 2009). However, the model was adapted to acknowledge the increasing 
colonization of the Lifeworld by global neoliberal marketization in the 1990s and 2000s, and the 
progressive resistance of social movements demanding enhanced state protection. 
69 The supposed newness of these NSM qualities has been called into question, suggesting these identity 
and value features existed in many social movements prior to the post-modern era (Calhoun 1992). 
70 The focus on autonomous identity based social action, for example, assisted the emergence of local 
feminist (Alvarez et al. 1998; Avritzer 2006) and indigenous people’s movements (Yashar 2005). Other 
grassroots movements, though often tenuously based on identity, also suggested new fields in which to 
apply the theory, and focus on the emergence of new collective political subjects not based on class 
interests but engaged in forms of radical democracy (Laclau et al. 1985; Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2005). 
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of social actors. However, strategies of engagement with corrupt authoritarian or semi-
democratic institutions usually resulted in co-optation, repression and demobilization, 
not social change nor real representation in the institutional political system.71  
 
2.4.4 Emotions 
The increasing recognition of social movements as dynamic intersubjective 
collectivities formed of reflexive individuals (Giddens 1990), engaged with their 
understanding of and responsive to the world, reclaimed the role of psychology and 
subjectivity to examine individual motivations (Klandermans 1997). According to 
Jaspers (2010), the ‘cognitive, moral, and emotional dimensions of protest’ cannot be 
understood without ‘thick’ description (Geertz 1973) of the process of identification, 
evaluation and decision, in which emotions play an intrinsic part of reasoned action. 
Narrow RAT cost-benefit equations were insufficient to account for this process. In this 
context, he stresses the importance of ‘moral shocks’ and their emotional impact in 
the mobilization process:  
 
‘“Moral shocks” are often the first step toward recruitment into social 
movements: when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a 
sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action… 
Most are dramatic and attention getting, but some are modest, more like the 
‘last straw’ that finally spurs action. Similarly, the shock may come from a plan 
for something new or from new information about something existing, which 
has already done unseen damage. The information or event helps a person 
think about her basic values and how the world diverges from them in some 
important way. Such individuals often search out political organizations 
themselves, without waiting for recruiters to contact them. These shocks …can 
spur recruitment. Events can be powerful symbols’ (Jasper 1997, p106) 
 
                                                        
71 However, as Davis (Op. Cit.) notes, other less relevant features, such NSM assumptions of an efficient 
Weberian unitary State, were largely overlooked. 
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As a result, it is not possible to understand social movements without paying sufficient 
regard to the constitutive effects and affect of the grievance event and how this also 
relates to betrayed expectations and profound feelings of injustice (Shklar 1990). This 
is particularly important as this approach reasserts the importance of how movement 
actors understand and respond to “trigger events” to give meaning and emotional 
resonance to grievances. As the subsequent research data suggests, this is a key 
element in shaping the mobilization process.  
 
In addition, emotions play a fundamental role in the agency felt by those that 
participate in mobilizations (Jasper 1997). Agency is both the self-realising action which 
influences events, however limited this impact may be, and also an awareness of this 
actual or potential influencing process. It is ‘a sense of personal and collective efficacy, 
a feeling that one’s participation may actually make a difference’ (Ibid, p197).72 As a 
result, the emotional repercussions of agency are a feature of reflexive understanding 
and essential to the meaning of participation, contributing to continued motivation to 
participate.73  
 
2.4.5 Actors and practices. 
The theoretical approaches considered above have frequently focused on particular 
aspects of the mobilization process, reducing the importance of other dimensions. This 
has sometimes failed to adequately reflect the complex interpenetration of structure, 
                                                        
72 Alice Poma and Tommaso Gravante (2015) provide a vivid account of the emotional process of agency 
and empowerment on the basis of their empirical research with recent social movement participants in 
Mexico: ‘El hecho mismo de luchar y organizarse, a pesar de las burlas o actitudes de los que no creen, 
es un trabajo emocional que los que luchan tienen que hacer desde el principio de la movilización. A 
estas alturas, el empoderamiento es el poder de intentar, de no dejarse arrastrar por los que no creen 
que valga la pena luchar.’ (p34) and ‘El empoderamiento como “poder de” hacer algo, les queda a las 
personas que luchan, relacionando tanto las capacidades de luchar y ganar la batallas (empoderamiento 
político), como a nivel psicológico, en los cambios que los sujetos observan en su misma persona, por 
ejemplo, el aumento del autoestima, o con la pérdida de la vergüenza de hablar en público…está 
relacionado con la superación de la soledad y el placer de la unión’ (p35). 
73 Addressing the emotional dimensions of mobilization recognises the complex factors involved in 
participation which cannot be reduced to utility calculations. However, this analysis alone, which has 
echoes of Blumer’s original behaviourist approach, is not sufficient to account for social mobilization, 
rather it accompanies structural and symbolic approaches described above (Polletta and Amenta 2001). 
Nonetheless, it reasserts the importance of emotions in the dynamic processes of individuals becoming 
engaged in collective action.  
 53 
meaning and agency in the way social movement participants act, relying on the 
reproduction of social norms, but also creatively developing forms of political and 
social action through practice. Crossley (2002) proposes a relational account of how 
social actors engage in collective action with others on the basis of their lived routinised 
customs, but open to opportunities and experience of acting with others to generate 
new movement practices, drawing on and developing protest repertoires (Tilly 2004).74 
This represents a ‘thicker’ understanding of participation in which strategic decision-
making is based on, but not bound by, the existing dispositions, frames of 
interpretation and rationality, but is also alert to new ways of acting: 
 
‘their actions are not rooted in abstract logical calculations of utility but in a 
“feel for the game” which they have acquired through involvement in the social 
world. Their experiences have given rise to a “second nature” and new, social 
instincts which they draw upon to act’ (Crossley 2002; p176)  
 
This intuitive and reflexive development, which is oriented to strategic action but not 
defined by it, contributes to evolving movement cultures and practices, as well as 
forming part of the wider repertoires of engagement in the public sphere.75 The 
adoption of human rights discourse and the different ways it is used and understood 
by movements relate to this adaptive practice in a structured world.76 This concept of 
practice is not set against previous social movement theories, but recognises their part 
                                                        
74 This uses Bourdieu’s theory of practice and habitus (Bourdieu 1990) to account for movement activists 
as ‘social beings endowed with forms of knowledge and competence, schemas of perception, discourse 
and action, derived from their involvement in the social world. They are beings with personal histories, 
which affect them and which are woven into broader collective histories, which affect them too’ 
(Crossley 2002, p176). However, these constraining or structuring features do not impose a rigid 
reproduction of social relations as the actors are related to others in their orientations, disposed to adapt 
and shape their practice in context in pursuit of aims, values and beliefs as well as the day-to-day practice 
of ‘getting on’. This also reflects Gidden’s approach to practical and reflexive consciousness of actors 
creatively engaged in the world (Giddens 1984).  
75 The meaning of these practices are not limited to the actors intentions, as unintended or 
misunderstood consequences are also part of the fabric of activity in which actors act and react. 
However, the fact that practices may result from these unintended consequences does not mean 
movements cease to be purposively directed collective endeavours. 
76 As human rights have come to feature in global and local discourses, they have a structuring quality 
of the way the world is interpreted, but they are also open to adaptation and appropriation in different 
forms. 
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in the complex ways individuals engage in the collective processes of meaning making, 
interaction and interpretation in a politically structured and resource-unequal world 
which both enables and constrains particular mobilizations.77 It is this aspect of 
reflexive practice which is explored in the in the interviews and is fundamental to 
developing the nuanced understanding of the dynamics of each movement. 
 
The next section turns to the communicative culture of movements, both internally but 
also the wider media environment in which they operate. These represent both a key 
element of movement practice but also the structured social relations out of which the 
three case study movements emerge.  
 
 Networks, technology and communications 
The importance of social networks has been widely recognised in social movement 
theories even before the global spread of digital technology (Castells 1996; Melucci 
1996; Diani et al. 2003; Della Porta et al. 2006). Affinity and trust networks enable initial 
mobilization processes, but also as movements recruit, they produce new network 
connections, increasing their extension but also the density of connections within the 
movement.78 This process is facilitated and reinforced by the capacity to develop 
multidirectional informational feedback loops across the participating networks. The 
widespread adoption of digitally networked communications by individual users has 
scaled up this capacity and practice. The interpenetrating layers of multiple affiliations 
within and across societies made possible by individualised digital communications 
have become an intrinsic aspect of social relations, suggesting, for some, a new global 
public sphere (Guidry et al. 2000; Castells 2008; Brysk et al. 2017), potentially able to 
                                                        
77 It is also a template for considering the practical and reflexive involvement of participants in 
movements which are discussed in the case studies. 
78 ‘networks operate to create predispositions to action. Being linked to people who are already 
committed to a certain cause enables individuals to feel part of a “collective we,” to elaborate systems 
of meaning that render collective action both a meaningful and a feasible undertaking, to perceive 
certain issues as socially relevant and worthy of collective efforts.  At the same time, social networks 
often create opportunities for transforming predispositions into action...People with certain 
predispositions will be more likely to contact organizations and come across opportunities for 
participation if they are connected to people already involved’ (Della Porta & Diani 2006, 118-119).  
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enact Habermas’ communicative action in a globalized world (Della Porta 2013) and 
facilitating contentious social mobilization at a transnational scale (Tarrow 2005).79  
 
The features of digital networks, such as horizontality, speed and distribution, have 
suggested for some their inherently democratising influence, aligned with human 
liberty, individualism and enterprise (Rheingold 2000; Benkler 2006). This optimistic 
liberal form of technological determinism has been contested as hype, disguising more 
malign consequences of digital social-networking, such as social fragmentation, selfish 
individualism and capitalist domination (Hindman 2009; Morozov 2013; Fuchs 2014) as 
well as facilitating political manipulation and repression (Howard et al. 2016; Bradshaw 
et al. 2017). Nonetheless, the increasing global adoption of digitally networked 
communications means they are now embedded in global social relations (Wellman 
2001), albeit with the particular social characteristics of the digital divide prevalent in 
the context in which they are used.80 This includes forming part of political culture 
(Dahlgren 2009) and the communicative networking practices of social movements 
(Milan 2013) as well as the wider media landscape (Silverstone 2007). It is this context 
of evolving embedded use of digital and social media and its implications for social 
movement mobilization dynamics that this research explores. 
 
2.5.1 Mainstream media, digital media, the public sphere and movement practices  
The Media, particularly electronic media, such as television, radio, internet and the 
phone, have come to play a crucial and complex role in mediating the public sphere 
and our engagement with the world, including politics (Silverstone 2007). Despite 
liberal assumptions that market competition ensures plurality and democratic 
accountability (Lawson 2001; Curran 2002), the dominant role of commercial mass 
media companies (Habermas 1991) and corporate control of digital communications 
platforms undercut claims of an autonomous and impartial public sphere (Fuchs 2014) 
                                                        
79 However, networks do not predetermine or cause movements or guarantee their success, rather they 
are part of the shifting fabric of human connectivity which movements seek to take advantage of (Diani 
et al. 2003). 
80 Although in general terms high rates of digital and social media use around the world are usually 
concentrated in younger more educated urban generations, with older generations, the poor and rural 
populations usually experiencing less access.  
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and place in doubt its deliberative capacity to contribute to democratic culture 
(Couldry 2012). The extent to which digitally enabled communications can and do 
contribute to involvement in diverse forms of political participation and civic-
engagement is an ongoing debate (Dahlgren 2009, 2013; Wessels 2017). However, 
academic attention has focused predominantly on democratic or authoritarian 
contexts, with less research into specific situations of partial democracy where civil 
society is active but under threat and with marginal influence over institutional political 
practice.  
 
Historically, social movements engage with the diverse forms of media available at the 
time of mobilization.81 These media are used to reach new recruits, organize and 
announce activities, inform on the success of events and address wider public opinion 
(Downing 2001). In the 20th century, the emergence of mass communication, 
particularly TV and radio, with close links to the state and elite commercial and political 
interests, created dilemmas and opportunities for social movements about how to 
project their message and narratives to wider constituencies and reinforce their 
identity with participants (Gamson 2004). However, the hostility of the mass media, in 
both democratic and authoritarian states, to challenger social movements meant their 
actions were usually framed negatively (Gitlin 1980).82 The globalization of mass media 
outlets also provided more opportunities for strategically reaching wider international 
publics, particularly to highlight human rights abuses and deter repression by 
authoritarian regimes (Bob 2005; Hagan 2010). However, coverage was still produced, 
framed and distributed by news corporations and consumed by mass audiences. The 
advent of digitally networked communications, such as email and the early internet, 
began to disrupt this paradigm, providing new possibilities for independently creating 
and sharing information to distributed actors. However, this was still largely theorised 
                                                        
81 For example, pamphlets and newsletters in the anti-slavery movement 18th century (Tilly 2004) 
82 Many movements - where possible and with greater or lesser success - engaged strategically with the 
media to try to shape coverage. This increasingly relied on professionalised SMO/NGO experts and 
strategies working with telegenic leaders to reach wider audiences and institutional actors as well as 
deflect counter-framing attacks (Gamson et al. 1993). 
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in terms of narrow instrumental use of digital media to achieve movement strategic 
communication goals (Mattoni et al. 2014; Treré 2014). 
 
The Zapatistas were one of the first movements to engage with the potential of the 
incipient internet to reach wider global support networks, without purely relying on 
the mediation of the mass media. By adopting peer-to-peer internet communication, 
in the form of bulletin boards, mail-lists and websites, tech activists, primarily in the 
Western university system, developed support networks. These linked to offline 
communities prepared to mobilize in public spaces and through other media to show 
solidarity with the Zapatists and also engage in political lobbying on their behalf 
(Froehling 1997). The online network was increasingly theorised as an alternative 
political space of contention and challenge to the neoliberal order (Castells et al. 1995; 
Cleaver 1998) made concrete through the construction and assertion of autonomous 
identity (Castells 1997). However, others have observed that the Zapatista success was 
equally due to their strategy with local and international mainstream media; and that 
the role of the internet was mythologised from the outset as part of the identity 
building process (Bob 2005; Mattoni et al. 2014).  
 
Castells, in particular, has argued that individuals have the potential to re-programme 
capitalist digital networks to produce and distribute information and to collectively 
deliberate and resist domination in horizontal global counter-publics (Castells 2009a).83 
This individualised and autonomous digital networking he has characterised as ‘self-
communication’, which is facilitated by the appropriation of the interactive features of 
Web 2.0, particularly social media platforms. In this context, the horizontalality of 
networks and internet communication is theorised not only as upscaling strategic 
communications capacity of movements to influence mainstream media. 84 It is also 
conceived of as having radical emancipatory dimensions; as an expressive means of 
                                                        
83 The surfacing of diverse activist groups, many inspired by the Zapatistas, in the anti-neoliberal 
globalization protests in Seattle in 1999 is frequently invoked as the symbolic moment when plural 
networked digital resistance took to the streets.   
84 Other activist scholars theorising the collective action of global justice movements (Hardt et al. 2001, 
2005) also argued that loose horizontal networks of individuals, associations and collectives, critical of 
corporate globalization have developed ‘alternative political imaginaries’ (Juris 2005). 
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constituing new forms alternative citizenship in counterpower struggles against 
neoliberal global dominace (Lievrouw 2011). Central to this idealised view of digitally 
enabled activism is the new capacity to independently produce and circulate news 
information not framed by the mainstream media. This conception of digital activism 
has played an important role in fostering and interpreting digitally assisted social 
mobilizations (Castells 2013), but has been subject to less scrutiny in relation to specific 
movement experiences, such as undertaken in this research. 
 
2.5.2 Citizen journalism, alternative media and independent digital news platforms 
One aspect of this the increasing adoption of digital technology was to facilitate the 
emergence of alternative media (medios libres) and citizen journalism (Couldry et al. 
2003).85 This phenomena was not new (Downing 2001), but the low costs of digital 
technological and its increasing availability, enabled citizens and activists to enact 
‘participatory journalism’ (Lievrouw 2011). Any activist or citizen could create and 
circulate instantaneously digital audio-visual and text covering events, such as police 
violence and social protests, to distributed networks. This allowed diverse ideological 
groups and individuals to share and make visible forms of civic resistance, encouraging 
recruitment and activating international solidarity.86 
 
In tandem with this process, plural independent digital news information platforms 
have also developed to try to challenge the dominance of mainstream media, for 
example, Buzzfeed or Vice. These employ more traditional journalistic principles, 
                                                        
85 For example, in 1999 Indymedia established a network of alternative news platforms which hosted 
information on local and global economic, political and social issues posted by grassroots political 
activist. 
86 This facilitated the creation of niche global constituencies based around forms of activism and 
acknowledged ideological affinity, but not subject to the mediating frames of mainstream media or the 
supposed standards of quality journalism, such as fact-checking or impartiality. Initially, sites such as 
Indymedia hosted contributions, but increasingly digital skills and low costs enabled individuals and 
groups to autonomously manage and run their own blogs and websites, developing their own particular 
brand of politically committed alternative news and comment oriented to socially and politically 
engaged groups and individuals. After 2014, Indymedia faced state clampdowns in several countries and 
reduced participation. This coincided with a decline in global justice activism, but also local citizen 
journalists increasingly published independently (Giraud 2014). It is also the case that right-wing 
platforms, such as Breitbart, have become much more prominent as new manifestations of this practice, 
exploiting the potential of skewed political narratives to generate reactionary political following. 
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claiming to provide digital news and comment along similar lines to traditional media 
but with greater flexibility.87 Some seek major capital investment to upscale 
operations, thus taking them into the mainstream media market place.88 In contrast, 
other portals seek to preserve their independence and develop forms of critical 
journalism, but with politically militancy. This includes coverage of social movements, 
but not the participatory approach taken by alternative media. This area of 
independent media has yet to face significant academic research outside western 
democracies (Carlson et al. 2016).89 
 
Chadwick notes how the diversity of online and offline media platforms means that 
expressive and instrumental political activity is increasingly enacted and represented 
across platforms with great fluidity, creating a form of hybridized media culture which 
skilled activists can take advantage of to influence institutional political practice 
(Chadwick 2013). This hybridization, including the increasing popularity of alternative, 
independent and international portals, has also reduced some of the gatekeeper 
power of traditionally dominant local or national mainstream news media at domestic 
level. 
 
In this increasingly diverse media environment, social movements deal with multiple 
actors, ranging from global media corporations, mainstream national broadcasters, 
print and internet media, various forms of independent news portals, web based global 
social media platforms, alternative activist information producers, and internet 
platforms facilitating citizen actions.90 This provides the opportunity to try to 
springboard information between one platform and another to create feedback loops 
and amplify attention and participation (Chadwick 2013; Wessels 2017) providing new 
                                                        
87 However, these new actors often use recycled news from other sources or commentary on news flows, 
with limited resources to report directly or conduct investigative journalism compared to large media 
companies (Couldry 2010). 
88 For example, the Huffington Post or Breitbart. 
89 In addition to these processes, mainstream news media platforms have rapidly digitalised to try to 
overcome the disruption to their business models and the migration of audiences and advertising 
revenues to social media platforms, particularly Facebook. The latter is playing an increasingly dominate 
role in the global news media environment as its algorithms determine which particular news 
information reaches different audiences on its platform (Allcott et al. 2017).  
90 For example, change.org and avaaz.org. 
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opportunities for social movements such as the case studies in this research.91 
However, social movement media actions are not limited to strategic engagement with 
news-based media, but also involve a wider range of communications practices with 
diverse implications for movements and activists (Treré 2014). The following section 
examines theoretical and empirical approaches to digitally networked mobilization 
which are of particular relevance to the case study movements. 
 
 Digital and social media in social movements practice 
2.6.1 Reducing resource costs of organizing protest 
Despite early deterministic claims that digital networks enabled virtual deliberative 
publics (Rheingold 2000; Benkler 2006; Castells 2009a), facilitating democratic 
citizenship and social mobilization, social movement scholars were sceptical, invoking 
traditional social movement theories. They argued that online activism substituted and 
weakened offline participation, excluding those without access to the internet (Tarrow 
1998; Tilly 2004). However, as the digital divide has declined more empirical studies 
have gradually indicated that digital media communications tend to support offline 
activism (Harlow et al. 2012). In addition, the spread of digital media increased the 
opportunity to reduce resource costs and time spent on organizational and information 
sharing activities (Shirky 2009; Earl et al. 2011). This finding challenged Resource 
Mobilization Theory that movements depend on resource rich professional 
SMOs/NGOs to overcome the rational reluctance of individuals to engage in collective 
mobilization (Bimber et al. 2005a), making small flexible resource-poor mobilizations 
more possible.92  
 
2.6.2 Social media as interactive emancipatory technology  
In 2011 the Arab Spring, Occupy, and 15-M in Spain seemed to confirm that social 
media enabled looser non-hierarchical movements, with emancipatory democratic 
                                                        
91 Cammaerts refers to this as the new ‘media opportunity structure” (Cammaerts 2012). 
92 However, this conclusion, still based on theoretical models using utilitarian decision-making of 
participants, also implied that these movements were not particularly ‘new’ or radical (Earl et al. 2002). 
This contrasts with idealised theoretical claims that digitally enabled activism was leading to new forms 
of protest, public engagement and social movement culture.  
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potential (Alhindi et al. 2012; Tufekci et al. 2012; Castells 2013), apparently confirming 
the potential of digital networks to enact forms of leaderless ‘collective intelligence’ 
(Johnson 2001) as part of the mobilization process.93 However, others argued that this 
was Western media hype which overlooked, a) the underlying weakness of ‘clicktivism’ 
which prevented the development of strong ties (Granovetter 1973) of trust sufficient 
to sustain dangerous social mobilization (Gladwell 2010) and b), the risks of the 
technology being used by repressive authorities against protesters (Morozov 2012). 
Fuchs (2014) and (Gerbaudo 2012) claimed the euphoric emancipatory theorising was 
not supported by empirical research which in fact demonstrated the underlying 
importance of traditional face-to-face contacts and organizing over the interactive 
dimensions of social media in protest practice. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring 
protests, particularly the failure to sustain movements or consolidate public space or 
democracy (Salem 2014), there has been a more measured focus on the particular 
social and political contexts of protest, and how these relate to online and offline 
movement practices (Van Laer et al. 2010). This includes attention to the ways that 
media connectivity can help transmit key movement sentiments facilitating 
participation in protest.  
 
2.6.3 Digital and social media and emotional engagement 
As the earlier discussion in section 2.4 illustrated, non-institutional collective action has 
gradually come to be understood neither as primarily irrational (Blumer 1951; Smelser 
1962) nor wholly utilitarian (Olson 1965; McCarthy et al. 1977) as it involves culturally 
shaped intuitive practice (Crossley 2002), including important emotional and affective 
dimensions (Goodwin et al. 2009).  
 
According to Hoggett and Thompson (2012), affect is the more ‘embodied, unformed 
and less conscious dimension of human feeling, whereas emotions concern the feelings 
which are more conscious since they are more anchored in language and meaning’ (p2). 
                                                        
93 Activist scholars like Hardt and Negri (2004) and Juris suggested that the “cultural logic” (Juris 2012) 
of digitally enabled networking was crucial to horizontal forms of plural activism, including the potential 
for decentred swarm-like collective actions, but also important was the accumulation of people 
protesting in offline public space to forge identity. 
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This distinction represents the different ways that affect is felt and communicated 
more viscerally, while emotion is more consciously negotiated and interpreted in 
response to events and the process of developing understanding, meaning and 
decisions. These aspects of sentiment are shaped through social relations, recognition 
of feelings in others, and feature in individual and collective motivations to participate 
in protest, particularly in response to the ‘moral shocks’ and anger provoked by of 
trigger events and the sense of agency felt through taking self-directed actions.  
 
Papacharssi (2015) argues that the emotional connectedness that social media can 
facilitate is crucial to new forms of open digitally enabled protest. This activates what 
she refers to as ‘the in-between bond of publics’ (p9) by sharing expressive 
information, including the developing movement narrative, with potential or actual 
recruits to ‘liberate the individual and collective imaginations’ (p71).94 She maintains 
that sharing, adding, reworking and commenting on material and the unfolding 
narrative through distributed individualised networks can constitute ‘affective publics’ 
which are less reliant on traditional ideological formation to mobilize and more open 
to personal interpretation in the construction of meaning:  
 
‘Unlike collectively rendered signifiers that summon specific publics to 
ideological alignment, connectively rendered signifiers remain open; their 
appeal depends on their ability to invite and contain personalized manifestos 
for action rather than dictate a single one.’ (Ibid, p71-72).  
 
It is useful to note here the important role she also attributes to ‘open signifiers’ in the 
mobilization process. This echoes the potential role of human rights discourse (see 
section 2.3.3) to facilitate the articulation of ideological plural social actors. However, 
Papacharssi’s argument is that the looser connectivity and personal interpretation that 
digital and social media can facilitate in distributed publics enables this type of plural 
affective participation.  
                                                        
94 In the Arab Spring, social media platforms were used to share visual images and video. This was widely 
recognised as helping arouse and share emotional responses with others (Lim 2013; Salem 2014). 
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Perhaps inevitably, her account of affective engagement is somewhat opaque and 
almost metaphysical given its attempt to describe collective emotional connectivity, 
with less attention paid to other features or potential limitations of open ‘affective 
publics’. These include questions of resilience and vulnerability to instrumental 
manipulation, intimidation, deactivation and misdirection. Nevertheless, her analysis 
highlights the importance of creating and contributing to rooted collective narratives 
of movements through the connectedness of social media communication. This is a 
feature of the mobilization process examined in relation to the case study movements.  
 
2.6.4 Connective vs collective action 
The increased connectedness and flexibility afforded by digital and social media 
networking also appears to suggest different dynamics of movement organization. 
Bennet & Segerberg (2013; 2012) argue that digital networks enable contentious action 
on the basis of ‘personalized action frames’ (p202) which constitute forms of 
‘connective action’. They also suggest that this makes them less reliant on mobilizing 
conditions of social movement theory requirements of resources, leadership or 
collective identity. In effect, self-communicating individualised digital engagement 
affords new ‘logics’ of mobilization and political participation.95 Bennet & Segerberg 
also challenge traditional assumptions that SMO brokered movement coalitions have 
more discursive and political impact, suggesting that while more hybrid and crowd-
enabled mobilizations manifest different ‘configurations of power’ (p160), they can 
have equally important outcomes.  
 
Despite these claims, they recognise that very loosely networked ‘connective’ 
mobilizations face greater difficulty in sustaining action over time, particularly in 
unconducive political environments.96 Their analysis of hybrid mobilizations, involving 
                                                        
95 They do not argue that all new movements are of this sort, proposing a continuum of analytical 
movement types to reflect these varying practices: a) traditional SMO brokered movements, to b), looser 
hybrid forms of organizationally enabled mobilization but which encourage autonomous individualised 
participation, and c), loose “crowd-enabled” movements in which digital networks are the most visible 
organizational forms. 
96 Despite acknowledging the particular “opportunity structure” in which movements emerge, the 
authors do not address implications of movements operating in partial democratic contexts. The 
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digital networks and face-to-face brokered coalitions, illustrate the complex movement 
practices emerging in response to the opportunities and constraints of digitally 
supported mobilizations operating alongside traditional protest repertoires. As such, 
this approach provides an important template for interrogating some of the practices 
of the case study movements, particularly in relation to aspects of the political 
opportunity structure of mobilizing in partial democratic contexts. This includes the 
role of digital communications in threats to movement activists.  
 
2.6.5 Security threats 
Early theoretical assumptions about the democratizing effects of digital media tended 
to overlook how technology could serve powerholders to demobilize social movements 
and target protesters and activists (Morozov 2012). The debate has since evolved in 
relation to the practices of liberal democracies and authoritarian states, but has not 
focused on the specific features of partial democracies. In such contexts, regulation is 
weak and routinely ignored by the state agents and other powerholders, enabling 
social activists to be the target of orchestrated digital harassment, threats and smear 
campaigns.97  
 
In recent years, authoritarian states, such as Russia and China, have increasingly 
developed their digital capacity to filter, limit and shape information circulating 
domestically online to maintain their social and political control as well as to contribute 
to foreign policy objectives (King et al. 2013). The Snowdon case and others have 
highlighted how Western democratic governments are also engaged in various forms 
of covert digital surveillance without clear accountability, often with the discreet co-
operations of tech corporations (Poell et al. 2016; Trottier 2016).98 The manipulation 
of information circulated on digital platforms and covert methods used to influence 
virality either by government, corporations or other powerful actors has also come 
                                                        
movements they analyse remain focused on limited political objectives in Western democracies, rather 
than more transformative and autonomous movements. 
97 As opposed to more disorganized or random acts of trolling or uncivil social media activity constituting 
bully and threatening behaviour common in liberal democracies as elsewhere.  
98 These companies manage their platforms to advance their commercial interests. They also lobby to 
preserve a favourable regulatory regime as well as relative discretion to handle user-data and content. 
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under increasing scrutiny (Cook et al. 2014; Tufekci 2015; Howard et al. 2016). These 
already form part of the practices of powerful interests in liberal democracies as well 
as more authoritarian states (Bradshaw & Howard 2017; Faith & Prieto-Martin 2016). 
There has also been increasing concern at the use of social media by terrorist 
organizations (Gabriel Weimann 2014), criminals and right wing vigilante gangs (Ekman 
2018).  
 
As a result, the complex uses and contradictory implications of digital and social media 
adopted by different institutional and non-institutional actors is increasingly evident 
(Gayo-Avello 2016). This includes recognition that the threats posed by powerholder 
uses of digital media against social activists can result in changes in practice, such as 
the ways that activists use digital and social media and particular platforms (Treré 
2012). However, these studies have not taken into account the particular features of 
partial democracies, where threats to life and liberty are more diffuse than in 
authoritarian regimes and less often carried out, but are nonetheless real. The difficulty 
for citizens to reliably assess this security climate is also an important factor shaping 
practices of activists and journalist, modifying levels of connectivity and openness in 
public sphere deliberations and engagement. This, as the three case studies, show has 
implications for social movement practice.  
 
 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined analytical and empirical literature addressing some of the 
tensions in democratic state formation, particularly the lack of attention paid to 
collective citizen action oriented toward participation, accountability and social 
transformation in contexts of partial democracy. This includes exploring the 
increasingly important but diverse role played by human rights discourse as a 
globalised system of values and law which straddles the legitimating power of modern 
sovereign states and grassroots claims-making of ordinary people suffering injustice. 
The analysis has identified how democratic theory is often reduced to electoral 
proceduralism and market theory, marginalizing the role of non-institutional struggles 
for more profound democratic governance, whether through the development of 
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deliberative consensus or political contention of plural actors in the public sphere. It 
also illustrates how human rights discourse has often been considered primarily as a 
system of cosmopolitan values ‘socialised’ to developing countries by international 
human rights networks. This points to a lack of attention paid to how human rights 
discourse is understood and mobilized in rooted national contexts struggling for social 
change, enabling but also constraining the configuration of mobilizations and their 
demands. My research addresses this aspect of human rights practice.  
 
The second half of the chapter explored different theoretical approaches to 
understanding collective action. This included consideration of internal resources and 
external opportunities, the meaningfulness of grievances and mobilizing narratives, 
emotional connection and reasoned justification, and the role collective plural identity 
and individual agency as part of the adaptive practices of activists and movements. 
These form a rich set of tools to analyse complex processes involved in social 
mobilizations. They are referred to in the course of the research to examine and 
understand the dynamics of the case study movements.   
 
The last section examined debates in relation to social networks and digital 
communications in terms of their role in social movements and the pluralization of the 
news media environment. This contrasted some radical democratising claims with 
more empirical studies illustrating the complex, but not always emancipatory ways that 
digital and social media have become embedded in social activism. In particular, I 
examined claims that digital and social media reduce costs, facilitate sharing of 
emotions and increase individually connective dimensions of mobilization. These 
potentially contributed new logics to social movement practice. However, these ideas 
have not been adequately examined in relation to the particular features of partial 
democracies, including the implications of digital security threats for activist practice. 
This research takes up that challenge. 
 
The importance of the different ideas presented in this chapter emerge concretely in 
the analysis of the context and the three case studies. This results in a fully developed 
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thematic framework in the discussion chapter. However, to orient this unfolding 
analysis it is necessary to signpost the six thematic categories. These are:  
 
1. Understanding the socio-political context as the opportunity structure of partial 
democracy. In particular this relates to how violations of grave human rights 
form the basis for structured grievances and also the communicative 
possibilities of a rapidly changing media environment.  
2. The role of symbolic ‘trigger events’ as the pivot moment when fragmented 
social grievances are transformed into collective emotional and reasoned 
responses to a crisis which the event makes manifest.  
3. The orienting resource of skilled networked actors connecting and 
reconfiguring to shape collective action through their adaptive practice.  
4. The meaning and emotional resonance of mobilizing narrative frames for the 
identity and significance of the movement.  
5. The role of personal and collective agency in an enduring mobilization process.  
6. The dynamics of articulating plural actors to sustain the cohesive unity of 
purpose of a movement against entrenched powerholders.   
 
But before exploring these categories in relation to the uses of human rights 
discourse and digital and social media in each case study, it is necessary to analyse 
features of the socio-political context out of which the movements emerged.   
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Socio-political context 
 
 Introduction  
A key dimension of the research project is to analyse the practices and meanings of the 
movements as rooted mobilizations oriented toward their particular social and political 
context. This requires close examination of the political, social and media opportunity 
structures (Tarrow 1998; McAdam et al. 2003; Cammaerts 2012) out of which the 
movements emerged. These played an important part in the interpretative 
understanding of participants, helping to motivate their involvement and influencing 
their practice.  
 
This chapter discusses Mexico’s political development in the 20th century leading to its 
long democratic transition. It addresses the central role of the PRI and its relation to 
increasingly assertive and diverse forms of popular mobilization and civil society 
practice demanding democratization and human rights. It also examines key failures of 
the transition governments after 2000, particularly spiralling criminal violence, 
corruption and militarization, which resulted in a major human rights crisis. It examines 
how human rights discourse has featured as part of state legitimation, but also as part 
of victims’ claims-making, NGO activism and democratization. Lastly, it considers the 
shifting media landscape in which dominant media interests aligned with political and 
economic elites have been disrupted as the adoption of digital and social media has 
increased. It considers the wider global influences on these processes, but also the 
particular features of the media environment in Mexico in relation to forms of digital 
journalism and activism, including the vulnerability of activists to threats.  
 
 Socio-political context and consolidation of a partial and violent democracy 
Mexico is a federal republic made up of the federal government and 32 states. It has 
more than 124 million inhabitants99, at least 6.5% of speak one or more indigenous 
                                                        
99 Consejo Nacional de Población, Indicador demográfico de México de 1990 a 2050, CONAPO <  
http://www.conapo.gob.mx/work/models/CONAPO/Mapa_Ind_Dem/index_2.html#> [12 March 2018] 
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languages.100 Over the last 30 years, GDP grew annually by approximately 2.58%101, 
keeping only slightly ahead of population growth, and primarily advantaging wealthier 
elites (Esquivel Hernández 2015).102 In 2015, more than 55 million people continued to 
live in poverty or extreme poverty.103 Criminal violence, which was on a downward 
trajectory during the 1990s and early 2000s, dramatically rose after 2007. In 2015 and 
2016 the murder rate was 17 and 20 per 100,000 inhabitants respectively (compared 
to the UK which was 1 per 100,000).104 Only 7% of crime was reported and 95% of 
recorded crime did not lead to a conviction, as a result the level of impunity for all 
crime was over 99%.105 In 2016, Mexico was rated 123rd most corrupt country out of 
176.106 
 
As these indicators suggest, despite the transition to competitive electoral democracy 
since 2000, Mexico has failed to develop accountable and responsive institutions 
capable of fostering broad-based prosperity, safety and social justice for the growing 
population. Nevertheless, the political and economic system, which has adhered to 
neoliberal orthodoxy for the last 35 years, has remained relatively stable. The 
democratic transition, which ended more than 70 years of PRI dominance, has 
ultimately been stunted by political parties and economic elites determined to 
preserve their power (Espinoza Valle et al. 2012). The political system, including the 
                                                        
100Consejo Nacional de Población, Población Indígena 2015, CONAPO < 
https://www.gob.mx/conapo/documentos/infografia-de-la-poblacion-indigena-2015> [12 March 2018] 
101 United Nations Data, Country Profiles 1985-2015, < http://data.un.org/default.aspx > [12 March 
2018]. 
102 According to the Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality, economic inequality marginally declined 
during this period, but remained the highest of all OECD countries. Source: Inequality in Mexico, World 
Economic Association, < https://www.worldeconomicsassociation.org/newsletterarticles/inequality-in-
mexico/> [13 March 2018]. 
103 CONEVAL informa los resultados de la medición de Pobreza 2014, Consejo Nacional de la Política de 
Desarrollo Social, < https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Paginas/Pobreza_2014.aspx> [13 
March 2018]. 
104 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía (INEGI), Datos preliminares revelan que en 2016 se 
registraron 23 mil 953 homicidios,   
<http://www.inegi.org.mx/saladeprensa/boletines/2017/homicidios/homicidios2017_07.pdf> [13 
March 2018]. 
105 Universidad de las Américas, Puebla, Índice Global de impunidad México igi-MEX 2016, < 
http://www.udlap.mx/igimex/> [13 March 2018]. 
106 Transparency International, Corruption Perception 2016 < 
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016>  [13 March 2018]. 
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PAN the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD)107, and more recently the 
Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (MORENA)108 have frequently relied on traditional 
practices of corruption, clientalism and coercion at federal, state and municipal level 
to further their interests (Bartra 2013). After 2000, there was no substantial 
transitional justice process to hold to account those responsible for gross human rights 
violations or corruption. This entrenched a culture of abuse and violence in which 
formal and informal powerholders have operated with almost complete impunity.109 
As corruption, violence and impunity have grown so have doubts about whether these 
are temporary phenomena in the process of democratic consolidation, or are, in fact, 
structural features of Mexico’s particular configuration of neoliberalism and electoral 
democracy (Goldstein & Arias 2010).110 
 
As with many countries, distrust of and alienation from party politics is a feature of 
Mexico’s democracy, but not generally to the extent of widespread demands for major 
political change. Opinion polls have reflected a fluctuating but relatively constant 
dissatisfaction with actual democracy since 2000. More than 75% of respondents 
generally expressed dissatisfaction compared to 20% satisfaction, with slightly 
increasing dissatisfaction in recent years (Latinobarómetro 2016). Yet, those regarding 
democracy as preferable to alternatives have also remained relatively constant, just 
short of 50%, with a regular 30% considering the nature of the political system 
irrelevant to their lives. This mixed picture indicated increasing dissatisfaction with 
existing democracy, particularly the high levels of insecurity and corruption (Olvera 
2015), but also grudging passivity toward the political culture, particularly when 
alternatives appeared worse. So, while before 2018, there was no groundswell of 
popular opinion against the actual political settlement, there was a significant pool of 
                                                        
107 Party of the Democratic Revolution  
108 Movement for National Regeneration 
109 As a result, the political, economic, administrative and public security systems have become locked 
in complex illicit relations with different vested interests at national and local level, including with 
organized crime networks (Buscaglia 2013). 
110 In July 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador and his party, MORENA, won a landslide victory in the 
elections, promising to sweep away the dominance and corruption of the traditional political parties, to 
respect human rights and develop a more socially just society. At the time of writing it remains to be 
seen how far these radical goals will be achieved.   
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dissatisfaction which can be traced to the many failures of the transition, which the 
social movements in this research expressed and mobilized.  
 
 PRI corporatism, the neoliberal turn, civil society and partial transition 
The enduring success of the PRI owed much to the post-revolutionary coalition of 
interests which successfully contained violence and promoted national development 
under the banner of revolutionary nationalism. In practice, this meant entrenching 
powerful societal groups, such as the military, business sector, state elites, labour 
organizations, peasant and popular movements within the umbrella of the party and 
the corporatist State. During the years of economic growth and state-led 
industrialisation and until the late 60s, PRI governments had resources to negotiate 
settlements between factional interests. The ruling party maintained its legitimacy 
through a mixture of economic success, national pride, redistribution and authoritarian 
coercion. As a result, civil society and social movements enjoyed little independence 
and those that did were not tolerated for long (Levy & Bruhn 2006). In addition, the 
state’s domination of social organizations, such as trade unions or community 
associations, enabled the PRI to exert its authority into micro levels of social and 
economic life. Thus it ensured loyalty by the distribution or denial of resources and 
favours (Ackerman 2018). This practice of instrumentalising civil society and social 
movements remains a feature of institutional approaches to social actors – it is also 
matched by suspicion and distrust felt by independent civil society toward institutional 
actors.  
 
The first major challenge to PRI domination by a mass independent social movement 
occurred in 1968, when a student mobilization demanded greater political openness 
(Aguayo 2015). The government violently repressed the students, resulting in 
emblematic abuses such as the Tlatelolco square massacre before the Mexico 
Olympics. In response, small left-wing armed insurgent groups emerged, but these 
were in turn repressed by PRI governments. This ‘dirty war’ featured the widespread 
use of torture, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention 
of suspected political and social activists (FEMOSPP 2006). Ironically, while eliminating 
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domestic left-wing opposition, the PRI maintained its political discourse of 
revolutionary nationalism, particularly abroad. This increasingly alienating progressive 
sympathisers and independent social activists.111  
 
The credibility of PRI governments also deteriorated as the policy of import 
substitution developmentalism faltered amidst the debt crisis of the 70s and 80s. The 
decision of political elites to adopt liberal capitalism in 1980s promoted by the 
‘Washington consensus’ meant a new ideology that opposed state-directed growth 
and redistribution. This reduced the loyalty of worker and peasant-based movements 
to the PRI. But the influence of these sectors declined as power definitively shifted to 
political and economic elites whose connections served to exploit the privatization of 
state monopolies and commercial regulation to capture large sections of the economy 
(Esquivel Hernández 2015). As a result, administrations, particularly at subnational 
level, increasingly relied on violence and corruption to preserve PRI dominance and 
contain independent social or political mobilizations challenging the new orthodoxies. 
In 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) marked Mexico’s symbolic 
integration into the system of global capitalism. However, it also announced the 
Zapatista uprising in Chiapas and resistance to the PRI, exposing continuing economic 
and social inequality, particularly suffered by indigenous communities. This further 
undermined the PRI’s claim to be represent inclusive national development.  
 
In 1977, the PRI allowed the first tentative reforms to the electoral process which 
would ultimately lead to the PAN victory in 2000. However, this process was not 
smooth or willingly undertaken, it was the result of waves of social mobilization, 
gradual international pressure, tactical concessions, rigged elections, splits in the ruling 
party, cycles of repression and maintenance of the corporatist party machine to sustain 
                                                        
111 The ideological contradictions of the PRI nation-building project were evident throughout its history. 
The 1917 revolutionary Constitution enshrined vanguard civil and social rights, promising a democratic 
and socially just society. However, there was always a large gap between this vision and the political 
priorities chosen by the governing party, particularly after the high-water mark of corporatist left-wing 
radicalism of the Cardenas presidency (1934-1940). However, the PRI managed to contain the 
ideological debate about the nature of revolutionary nationalism within the broad church of the party, 
avoiding major splits until the 1980s. 
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the PRI vote (Bartra 2013).112 Despite the role of opposition political parties, grassroots 
social and political movements, NGOs, public intellectuals, academics and some parts 
of the press, the slow political transition is usually characterised according the 
O’Donnell’s model (O’Donnell et al. 1986) of splits and pacts in the ruling elites, with 
the role of civil society relegated to the side-lines (Olvera 2010). This approach tends 
to regard the 2000 election as the culmination of the transition to full democracy (AI 
Camp 2007). However, this ignores other key indicators of democratic governance, 
such as effective protection of human rights, media plurality, participation, 
accountability, social justice and the rule of law.113  
 
 The failures of the PAN transition governments  
The PAN governments between 2000 and 2012 continued the neoliberal economic 
policies of the latter PRI years, ensuring increasing integration into the global economic 
system, but also social dislocation and inequality. It failed to introduce major political 
reforms to tackle the corporatist and clientalist political culture (Bartra 2013). As a 
result political corruption and cronyism increased, exposing the political system to ever 
greater influence of organized crime (Hernández 2012; Buscaglia 2013).114 In addition, 
the PAN continued to rely on the police and the military, ingrained with authoritarian 
and abusive practices (Davis 2010) and a criminal justice system that ensured impunity 
for most crimes, particularly those implicating powerholders (Amnesty International 
2007b).115  
                                                        
112 The party first lost full control of election processes in in 1988. Realising that the official PRI candidate, 
Carlos Salinas de Gotarí, was about to lose against a left-wing coalition candidate, the election results 
were falsified to preserve PRI hegemony. This moment of democratic betrayal by the PRI, which it has 
never officially acknowledged, continues to mark attitudes and doubts about election processes and 
results.  
113 This narrow electoral interpretation of democratic transition also ignored the fact that despite the 
peaceful transition of the federal executive to the PAN in 2000, the PRI retained control of most state 
and municipal governments as well as sufficient representation in the federal Congress to block 
legislation. The PRI was not defeated, but prepared to return to national power without reform or 
answering for past abuses which it did in 2012. 
114 The PAN reduced the authoritarian practices of the federal government, but these continued 
unchanged in most subnational state governments. It also allowed greater media freedom at national 
level. Freedom of Information legislation and public access to the national archives for the first time 
allowed journalists and civil society to gather sensitive state information and facilitated greater scrutiny 
of federal official actions by civil society. 
115 The 2008 judicial reforms to introduce accusatory criminal procedure system modelled on the US and 
Chile was still not implemented until 2018. It has yet to improve judicial outcomes. 
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Competitive elections changed the party in power, but institutional routes for citizens 
and civil society to effectively claim justice and promote wider change remained 
confined or subject to processes of negotiation, co-optation and privileged access in 
the mould of PRI governments. The traditions of non-institutional claims-making in the 
form of contentious social mobilizations continued but were primarily focused on local 
grievances at subnational level (Stolle-McAllister 2005). The PAN governments did not 
repress these social movements to the same extent as former PRI administrations, but 
where repression and grave abuses occurred, such as in San Salvador Atenco in Mexico 
State and Oaxaca City in 2006, the perpetrators and political authorities responsible 
were not held to account (Amnesty International 2006, 2007b).116 These new instances 
of repression and human rights violations committed under the transition 
governments also called into question the nature of Mexico’s political parties and 
democracy, particularly for social actors demanding greater forms of social 
transformation.117 However, perhaps the greatest threat to democratic transition and 
improved protection of human rights was the increasing criminal violence related to 
drug-trafficking and other forms of organized crime.  
  
 The ‘war on drugs’, violence and political process 
Historically, organized crime had deep links with institutions and political parties, 
particularly the PRI which had managed different regional criminal groups for mutual 
benefit (Hernández 2012; Watt et al. 2012).118 However, from the 1990s, drug cartels 
benefited from trade liberalisation and shifts in cocaine trafficking routes to generate 
huge profits. These in turn facilitated widespread corruption of politicians, businesses, 
public security and criminal justice institutions, undermining formal and informal 
                                                        
116 The reliance of the PAN government on PRI support, particularly from increasingly powerful PRI 
governors, effectively ensured wide leeway for PRI State governors to act against local opposition to 
maintain party domination and impunity.  
117 They also illustrated that social mobilizations remained focused on street power and unruly protest 
(Khanna et al. 2013), in which violent police and protest practices were the theatre for forms of 
transactional contention to secure particular concessions or drive through powerholder actions. 
118 The notorious rule applied by the PRI to ensure control of the drug trade was called ‘plata o plomo’, 
which meant drug-traffickers either agreeing to pay off political masters and submitting to their overall 
authority or face being killed. Ironically, this has now been reversed to explain the control imposed by 
the cartels on public officials.  
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controls. As part of the ‘War on Drugs’, the US increasingly pressured the Mexican 
government to use the Armed Forces in counter-cartel operations - despite their 
consistent record of committing human rights violations (Human Rights Watch 
2009).119 The security situation deteriorated under the PAN transition governments as 
the informal arrangements managed through the PRI hierarchy broke down. This 
created power vacuums and economic opportunities, which cartels and other criminal 
networks competed to exploit (Serrano 2017). As violence spread to new regions in 
dispute, so did other crimes such as kidnapping, extortion and human trafficking. This 
affected ever greater civilian populations which had traditionally been able to ignore 
or co-exist with politically managed drug-trafficking activities. Across newly 
democratized Latin America, crime and insecurity became an explosive political issues, 
with local politicians often proposing popularist hard-line anti-crime measures (Arias 
et al. 2010b) and sections of civil society mobilizing to demand improved security 
(Placencia 2016). However, these initiatives usually ignored the underlying institutional 
weaknesses and corruption that ensured impunity for 99% of crimes and allowed 
political parties to receive financing from organized crime (Buscaglia 2013).  
 
In 2006, Felipe Calderón became president after a contentious and polarized election. 
In order to assert his authority, he announced a ‘guerra contra el narcotráfico’ (Bartra 
2013). He greatly expanded the role of the armed forces, deploying 50,000 troops to 
reclaim control in regions dominated by criminal gangs. As a result, civilian populations 
were frequently caught between feuding criminal gangs and security forces, resulting 
in killings, disappearances and forced displacement.120 Pervasive institutional 
corruption meant civilians could rarely trust the security forces or criminal justice 
officials; to seek official assistance risked reprisals or, at best, the disinterest of 
investigating authorities (Amnesty International 2013). Violence, crime and human 
rights violations spiralled in States such as Michoacán, Guerrero, Chihuahua, Coahuila, 
                                                        
119 The framing of organized crime as an alien threat to the State facilitated the representation of 
criminal violence as an attack on national security, justifying the intervention of the armed forces. It also 
conveniently presented organized crime as separate from society, inhuman and, most importantly, 
unconnected to the institutional and political order. 
120 In 2016 the Open Society issued a report documenting instances of crimes against humanity by 
government forces and the Zeta cartel in the preceding years (Open Society Foundation 2016). 
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Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas and Veracruz (Amnesty International 2009; Human Rights 
Watch 2011).  
 
The PAN transition governments had failed to address fundamental democratic 
deficits, including corruption and insecurity, leaving the political system permeated by 
vested criminal and economic interests and a growing human rights crisis (Espinoza 
Valle et al. 2012; Tuckman 2012a; Meyer 2015).121 
 
 The return of the PRI and gathering indignation  
In 2012, the PRI returned to power with President Enrique Peña Nieto, the former 
governor of the State of Mexico (2005-2011). Peña Nieto promised economic 
continuity, competence and modernization. The PRI argued, with the support of key 
media allies, that it was no longer authoritarian and would use its political experience 
to exercise power efficiently after the fragmentation of authority under the PAN, 
suggesting this would reduce violence and insecurity (Bartra 2013). However, the 
candidate was also identified with authoritarian and abusive practices during his 
governorship in the State of Mexico (Centro Prodh 2011). This included violent police 
repression in San Salvador Atenco, control over local media and intolerance of 
independent civil society. As a result, for some people the return of the PRI promised 
administrative efficiency and possibly less violence. For others, it confirmed the 
continuing power of political and economic elites to shape the political process in 
Mexico for their own interests.  
 
The new PRI government negotiated liberal economic reforms and initially achieving a 
slight reduction in violence.122 However, the reforms failed to produce promised 
economic benefits and the security strategy was primarily focused on discouraging 
                                                        
121 In 2010, journalist Anibal Hernández (2012) exposed corruption and links between politicians, police 
and security forces and drug cartels. She argued that Mexico’s democratic transition had largely been 
hijacked by corrupt business and political elites along with security officials operating in alliance with 
powerful cartels.  
122 This was received with great international fanfare by Western media and governments. Fox example, 
Time’s front cover of Peña Nieto above the title, “Saving Mexico” (Crowley 2014). 
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media attention.123 The decline in violence rapidly went into reverse as organized crime 
morphed and spread despite the continuing deployment of the military. Killings and 
disappearances spiralled, dramatically represented by the enforced disappearance of 
the Ayotzinapa students and multiplying groups of victims demanding justice.124 In 
addition, reports of corruption, authoritarianism and impunity multiplied at every level 
of government.125 By 2015, the credibility of the PRI administration was in tatters, 
confirming once again the failure of political system to consolidate a deeper rights-
protective democracy.  
 
 Human rights crisis and the victims  
Despite efforts by PAN and PRI governments to deny and conceal the scale of the crisis 
of violence and human rights violations since 2006, the evidence is compelling. 
Between 2007 and 2017, there were more than 199,958 killings126, criminal gangs or 
the police and security forces were suspected of at least 32,000 ongoing 
disappearances127, several hundred thousand people were forcibly displaced128 and 
annually there were thousands of reports of torture and ill-treatment committed by 
federal and state level police and security forces.129 Ninety-six journalists, many 
                                                        
123 Other reforms, such as that to the education sector, faced concerted resistance from trade unions. 
124 In 2017, the highest murder rate for 20 years was recorded with 29,168 killings (24 per 100,000) 
(Aristeguinoticias, En 2017, más de 29 mil asesinatos en México; 671 fueron feminicidios < 
https://aristeguinoticias.com/2101/mexico/en-2017-mas-de-29-mil-asesinatos-en-mexico-671-fueron-
feminicidios/> [14 March 2018]). 
125 In November 2014, independent journalist and national radio presenter, Carmen Aristegui published 
evidence implicating Peña Nieto’s family in corrupt financial dealings. Aristeguinoticias, ‘La casa blanca 
de Enrique Peña Nieto (investigación especial)’ aristeguinoticias.com< 
https://aristeguinoticias.com/0911/mexico/la-casa-blanca-de-enrique-pena-nieto/> [14 March 2018]. 
126  Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, ‘Cifras de homicidio doloso, secuestro, extorsión y robo de 
vehículos 1997-2016, secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx 
<http://secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/docs/pdfs/cifras%20de%20homicidio%20doloso%20secuestro%
20etc/HDSECEXTRV_012016.pdf> [30 May 2018].  
127 Consulta Publica, ‘Registro Nacional de Datos de Personas Extraviadas o Desaparecidas’, 
<https://rnped.segob.gob.mx>, [14 March 2018]. 
128Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de Derechos Humanos, ‘Desplazamiento interno 
inducido por la violencia, una experiencia global una realidad mexicana’, cmdpdh.org, 
<http://cmdpdh.org/project/desplazamiento-interno-inducido-por-la-violencia-una-experiencia-global-
una-realidad-mexicana/> [14 March 2018]. 
129 Amnesty International, ‘Surviving death: Police and military torture of women in Mexico (AMR 
41/4237/2016)’, amnesty.org, < https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr41/4237/2016/en/> [14 
March 2018]. 
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covering issues of corruption and violence, were killed between 2006 and 2017.130 
While some areas, such as central Mexico City, remained relatively unaffected by the 
violence, in other areas violence reached levels of an internal armed conflict.131  
 
As the violence escalated after 2006, relatives of the disappeared or killed frequently 
faced social stigma due to the assumption that anyone who was targeted by organized 
crime or the security forces must themselves have been involved in crime. Despite the 
absence of evidence or investigations to support this belief, it was often encouraged 
by the authorities and sections of the media (Amnesty International 2013).132 Public 
sympathy for victims, including relatives of the killed or disappeared, was often 
lacking.133 This had the advantage for the authorities of reducing pressure to 
investigate disappearances or killings.134 As a result, in the early Calderón years, the 
rising number of relatives of victims of the violence were rendered socially invisible, 
compounding their isolation and the denial of access to justice.  
 
In fact, Calderón used human rights discourse to validate his militarized public security 
policy, claiming the state was defending the human rights of citizens being violated by 
criminals. This instrumental use of human rights discourse for state legitimation 
purposes, ignored or dismissed allegations of abuses committed by state agents and 
growing evidence of the systematic collusion of state actors with criminal networks to 
                                                        
130 Article 19 , ‘Periodistas asesinados en México’, article19.org, <https://articulo19.org/periodistas-
asesinados-mexico/> 18 March 2018]. 
131 The human rights crisis was not restricted to drug-related violence, but also included widespread 
gender-based killings, discrimination and marginalization of indigenous communities, attacks on 
human rights defenders, criminalization of social protest, economic investment projects that ran 
roughshod over local community rights, widespread abuses against irregular migrants and asylum 
seekers as well as vast social and economic inequalities (Amnesty International, Report 2017/18, 
amnesty.org <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/mexico/report-mexico/> [14 March 
2018]. 
132 Even if these assumption were proven to be true, it would not entitle the State to deny the rights of 
the victims and relatives. 
133 As a human rights researcher with AI, I interviewed scores of relatives during several visits to regions 
of Mexico. I documented how they experienced this stigmatization and negative attitude of the State, 
including threats to deter them from pressing the authorities to locate their loved ones and to establish 
the truth. This often left families no alternative than to carry out their own investigations at great 
personal risk. 
134 Even when evidence showed ‘uninvolved’ civilians had been killed in public security operations they 
were often treated as “collateral damage” (Ballinas 2010) or military authorities falsely presented them 
as members of criminal gangs (Campos Garza 2016). 
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commit and cover-up killings and disappearances. Despite the evidence presented by 
IGO monitoring bodies (Inter American Commission on Human Rights 2015), the Pena 
Nieto government also refused to recognise the increasing scale of the human rights 
crisis affecting the country under his government. This represented the PRI 
government’s growing rejection of the validity of independent human rights indicators 
(Guzmán Vergara 2017). As such, it was a symptom of the frustration that it could no 
longer control the media narrative around human rights, the crisis of violence and 
impunity.     
 
However, it is also important to recognise that features of the human rights crisis also 
challenged traditional understandings of human rights discourse. These had often been 
associated with democratic struggles to protect civil and political rights against 
government repression of dissent. In the new context, the primary perpetrators of 
killings and disappearances were understood to be non-state actor gangs pursuing 
their criminal interests - albeit with the collusion in some cases of state actors. Despite 
this, the situation did not appear to equate with traditional understandings of 
centralised state power used to implement a policy of political repression against 
opponents, such as had occurred in the ‘dirty war’ of the 1970s and 80s.  
 
Even as evidence implicating state actors in many crimes emerged, including military 
and police involvement, the situation remained complex. The abuses were not 
politically motivated, and in some cases were committed as part of anti-crime 
operations against violent gangs. This distanced them from popular and traditional 
ideas of those deserving human rights protections. This context of criminal violence 
also challenged the relevance and application of traditionally state centric international 
human rights law (Anaya Muñoz 2015).135 As such, the victims of the violence and their 
relatives were isolated and stigmatised as were human rights defenders and journalists 
                                                        
135 As my field experience with AI demonstrated, it was the painstaking and dangerous work of relatives 
and human rights NGOs that was necessary to demonstrate the complicity and acquiescence of state 
actors, regardless of their motives, in many of these supposed non-state actor abuses. As a result, human 
rights law could be invoked to challenge impunity either in terms of direct state responsibility or in terms 
of the wider state responsibility to protect citizens and investigate abuses committed by third parties.   
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who spoke out in in support their demands for justice and appealed to human rights 
standards.136 In this context, the violence was not treated or recognised by the 
government or the mainstream media as a human rights crisis.   
 
 The role of international human rights discourse in the transition process  
In the political culture of PRI governments, until the 1980s, international human rights 
treaties were the exclusive preserve of the Mexican foreign ministry, with little 
application or meaning domestically (Saltalamacchia et al. 2011). This gradually 
changed during the long transition as the international community began to pay more 
attention to domestic human rights contexts, particularly of developing countries, as 
promoted by IGOs and INGOs. As President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) sought closer 
economic relations with Mexico’s northern neighbours and in response to military 
repression of the Zapatista uprising in 1994, respect for human rights in Mexico 
became a significant international concern. This pressure gradually led to more 
measures to recognise the writ of international human rights standards in domestic 
law.137  
 
In 2000, Fox’s transition government took the process of institutionalising human rights 
norms to the next stage, establishing what Risse (1999; 2013) calls the ‘prescriptive 
status’ (p29) of human rights norms. This involved ratifying most international treaties; 
inviting UN and IACHR human rights experts to visit the country; promising to 
implement their recommendations; and facilitating the establishment of an office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in the country. According to the then 
Foreign Minister, Mexico’s new democracy was to be built not just on competitive 
elections, but also respect and protection of international human rights norms 
(Castañeda 2002). However, as my experience researching human rights violations for 
AI repeatedly demonstrated (Amnesty International 2006, 2007a, 2009, 2010, 2014), 
                                                        
136 Relatives or human rights activist denouncing such violations have often been represented by the 
media and public officials as defending the rights of criminals over and above the rights of victims of 
criminals. In the context of high criminal violence, this has often encouraged the association of human 
rights discourse with protecting criminals rather than ensuring fair and just treatment for all.   
137 This included, for example, the Zedillo government (1994-2000) accepting international human rights 
monitoring and the jurisdiction of the Inter American Court of Human Rights in 1998.  
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the transition governments did not move to Risse’s fifth and crucial stage, of ‘rule-
consistent behaviour’ (1999 p31; 2013). The rhetorical pledge to comply with human 
rights norms was not matched by actions across government, particularly at the state 
and municipal level (Anaya Muñoz 2014).138  
 
After 9/11, the change in global geopolitical priorities also reduced external human 
rights attention on Mexico. Despite this, the UN and transnational and local human 
rights NGOs campaigned to exert pressure on the Mexican government to comply with 
commitments (Anaya Muñoz 2009), but these efforts were of limited success, focusing 
primarily on institutional and legal reform, but not implementation.139 In contrast, 
international financial institutions and foreign governments preferred to view Mexico’s 
democratic transition in model terms, particularly its adherence to neoliberal 
economic orthodoxies, which facilitated foreign investment and, it was presumed, 
would necessarily produce liberal democratic consolidation. In this context, external 
pressure on Mexico primarily focused on US security demands (Serrano 2017) and 
technical assistance for institution building. Underlying this approach of second 
governments was the assumption that political repression, excluding supposedly 
isolated subnational level incidents, was no longer a major factor in Mexico’s human 
rights situation.140 However, this approach ignored continuing repressive uses of the 
                                                        
138 It is important to note that commitments to comply with international human rights law often only 
reinforced many existing guarantees in the Mexican Constitution, many dating from the Revolution and 
before. This included, for example, the right not to be tortured, killed or arbitrarily deprived of liberty; 
and the amparo legal recourse to remedy abuses of State power as well as recognition of many social 
rights. Yet, these vanguard constitutional guarantees were frequently ineffective due to a formalistic 
and selective application of the law at the service of political and economic elites and corrupt police 
forces (Amnesty International 2007b). 
139 Between 2001 and 2014, the author represented Amnesty International in numerous meetings with 
Mexican government officials at all levels. If officials acknowledged a failure to meet human rights 
commitments, they invariably denied the absence of political will to push through real change. Instead, 
they usually argued that the failures of implementation were due to legacy issues of former 
governments, the complex layers of institutional responsibility in a federal system, lack of resources and 
training and the weak status of international human rights treaties in relation to the Constitution and 
domestic law. While these arguments had some merit, the underlying drivers to human rights violations 
and obstacles to compliance, such as impunity, corruption, inequality and an unaccountable political and 
business elites and security forces, were rarely acknowledged. 
140 This also illustrates how second government approaches to human rights discourse also reflected this 
traditional liberal understanding of human rights primarily in terms of political repression. In the absence 
of political repression, progress on human rights issues was deemed to be a matter of technical solutions 
not political will.  
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judicial and public security system, but above all, the absence of significant political will 
to transform the practices of institutions or hold perpetrators, whether state actors or 
non-state actors, to account for abuses. In this context, diverse sectors of civil society 
came to regard the institutionalisation of human rights as merely simulation; serving 
the purpose of state legitimation to deflect national and international criticism, but 
lacking substantive enforcement or concern for wider social justice (Human Rights 
Watch 2006; Estévez López 2008; Centro Prodh 2013).141 
 
Despite this, there were some important measures over this period to improve legal 
protection of human rights in domestic law.142 In particular, in 2011, after 20 years of 
advocacy by human rights activists and international organizations, Constitutional 
reforms established the legal obligation to comply with international human rights law 
(Juárez 2011). As a result, victims of human rights violations had an increasing number 
of potential avenues to pursue legal remedies, even if these remedies were rarely 
forthcoming.143 This changed the political opportunity structure of the judicial field, 
increasing the potential impact of judicial-oriented human rights activism.   
 
In this context, the various uses of human rights discourse reflected the tensions in 
consolidating and deepening Mexico’s democratic transition. On the one hand, after 
2003 governments predominantly used human rights discourse for purposes of state 
legitimation. This focused on the state-centric paradigm of human right discourse and 
technical assistance, downplaying or ignoring continuing abuses and impunity. On the 
other hand, diverse civil society actors continued to push for human rights discourse 
to have real teeth in domestic legal and administrative practice on a range of social and 
political issues.144   
                                                        
141 Many NGOs engaged in sustained consultation with the PAN governments in the hope of securing 
real institutional change in the approach to human rights, but increasingly found these were 
bureaucratic processes with little impact on institutional policy or practice.  
142 This included ground-breaking legislation to combat violence against women and criminal justice 
reforms. Unfortunately, like so much of the legislation of the transition years, progressive laws were 
rarely enforced effectively to change institutional practice  
143 This remained hypothetical in the vast majority of cases and particularly dependent on the committed 
support of lawyers conversant with international human rights law. 
144 This shift also reflected the increasing status of many NGOs from the Global South in the international 
human rights movement demanding that issues of social justice, gender violence, economic inequality 
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 Plural civil Society, social movements and human rights NGOs145 
Mexico has a long tradition of diverse civil society and plural social movements, with a 
range of ideological positions and practices.146 Human rights groups came to occupy an 
important role in exposing state abuses and promoting human rights discourse, but 
there are other traditions and practices, more focused on political resistance and 
expressive values aspiring to radical bottom-up transformation.147 These approaches 
to human rights discourse have often struggled to reconcile institutional, emancipatory 
and legal defence strategies of different NGOs and social actors in the transition 
process.  
 
In the early 70s and 80s some social activists began adopting human rights discourse 
in response to domestic political repression and the growing relevance of human rights 
norms in regional and international relations, promoted by the emerging international 
human rights movement (Saltalamacchia Ziccardi 2009).148 Prior to this, repression of 
                                                        
and cultural rights be treated with equal importance to civil and political rights which had been the 
traditional focus of the international human rights movement. It was during this period that, for 
example, Amnesty International extended its mandate to work on the full spectrum of human rights. 
This also reflected the debate within the human rights movement between those advocating traditional 
liberal conceptions of limited “defensive” rights, focused on political liberty, versus more progressive 
visions of human rights addressing complex social, economic and cultural conditions preventing 
individuals and communities being able to enjoy a dignified life. 
145 In Mexico, there is often a distinction made between ‘organized’ civil society and ‘unorganized’ civil 
society. However, I have chosen not to use this distinction as it tends to be rather arbitrarily assigned 
and reflect a certain hierarchical self-asserted legitimacy by parts of civil society with more 
organizational structure and resources.  
146 This includes independent NGOs, associations, neighbourhood committees, local grassroots 
movements, social movements, feminist networks, independent social activist collectives, faith-based 
groups, identity-focused groups, alternative media platforms as well as some trade unions and think-
tank advocacy organizations. They represent a host of interests and political ideologies (Olvera 2003). 
There are also ‘unruly’ groups (Khanna et al. 2013), such as less formally organized collectives of 
anarchists and other radical political groupings engaged in direct, not necessarily ‘civic’, action. These 
different actors represent the hybrid nature of civil society and also how it shades into various forms of 
institutional and non-institutional political practice (Edwards 2011). There are also thousands of 
clientelist organizations delivering services and social programmes on behalf of the neoliberal state and 
political parties, but these are not the focus of this research. 
147 As Olvera (2003) points out, there is also a long tradition of right-wing catholic civil society 
associations and in recent years economic elites have also increasingly financed new more technocratic 
associations focused of advocacy around government policy and administrative efficiency, including 
issues of corruption, transparency and public security.   
148 The civil wars in Central America and the abuses committed by the US-backed regimes and the 
Contras were increasingly framed in terms of human rights violations and social demands of the poor 
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internal opposition was challenged in terms of PRI authoritarianism, betrayal of 
revolutionary nationalism and commitment to ideological political struggles of the Left. 
These new groups began to formulate claims in terms of universal human rights, 
particularly respect for civil and political rights of those suffering persecution, but also 
increasingly in terms of wider democratic reform (Olvera et al. 2003).149   
 
In the same period, as the economic crisis took hold, small rural and urban popular 
movements emerged to demand access to housing and services which the state was 
no longer delivering. These organizations did not adopt human rights discourse, but 
frames of popular class struggle (Munck 2013). They often faced selective repression 
and/or co-optation. In 1985, the Mexico City earthquake resulted in a host of 
community groups and popular associations forming to demand housing and other 
social rights (Alvarez et al. 1992). This experience of autonomous self-organizing social 
mobilization was crucial for developing ideas of grassroots participatory democracy as 
well as independent civil society demanding social as well as political rights (Camp 
2007).150   
 
In 1994, the Zapatista rebellion drew on Mexico’s revolutionary traditions, but also 
advocated horizontal and plural engagement with civil society to develop new forms 
of political organization and contestation to challenge the prevailing order without 
advocating armed revolution to seize power.151 The protection of human rights had 
initially featured as a means of attracting international support to prevent the 
                                                        
and the excluded. This was often inspired by the work of activist priests committed to liberation 
theology. 
149 Estévez López (2008) argues that the initial adoption of human rights discourse reflected liberation 
theology and a focus on the social rights of the poor, not just political and civil rights. 
150 Olvera (2003) identifies the emergence of three types of independent civil society organizations 
during this period: a) loose open associations promoting democratic processes such as Alianza Cívica, b) 
closed professional non-governmental organizations (NGOs) narrowly focused on a human rights 
agenda, c) popular resistance movements often emerging from localised demands for services.   
151 This echoed the reworking of Marxism by such thinkers as Ernesto Laclau, who also visited the 
Zapatista communities. The Zapatistas maintained an ambiguous relation to the armed struggle, using 
images of armed rebellion and assertion of indigenous self-determination to attract support, but also 
aware that its use of arms during the uprising was largely symbolic to gain world attention and not viable 
as a sustained option to challenge the state.  
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repression of indigenous communities involved in the uprising (Bob 2005).152 However, 
as negotiations with the government ended in disillusionment153, the Zapatists 
increasingly focused on autonomy and self-organization as an alternative form of praxis 
rather than engaging with the state in pursuit of reform (Dinerstein 2014). This process 
also entailed reframing human rights discourse, rooting it in the practice and culture of 
the communities involved as the basis of self-asserting legitimacy rather than appealing 
to the machinery of international human rights law or NGOs to legitimise their claims 
(Speed 2007). This contributed to the self-exclusion of the Zapatistas from mainstream 
political currents in Mexico. Despite this, their long-term autonomous and non-violent 
resistance to political parties and state power (Baker 2002), based in part on 
emancipatory rather than institutionalised conceptions of human rights, inspired 
progressive social activists and academics in Mexico as well as globally.  
 
In the late 80s and early 90s, Mexico’s integration into the world economy also 
supported greater space for more professional civil society organizations, including 
human rights NGOs.154 International funding agencies supported the boom in human 
rights NGOs, enabling key NGOs, such as Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín 
Pro Juárez and Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos, to develop their 
institutional and political status promoting human rights discourse in the agenda of 
democratization (Aguayo et al. 1997). However, the adoption of this internationally 
legitimised, apparently non-political and technocratic discourse also distanced some 
NGOs from more grassroots social mobilizations.155 The latter were often focused on 
                                                        
152 In Mexico, the rebellion received support from progressive political and civil society activists, 
independent associations, NGOs and local popular movements. This resulted in massive public 
demonstrations to stop the military counter-offensive – some of the largest protests in Mexico since 
1968. 
153 The Acuerdos de San Andres signed with the Zedillo government to strengthen the rights of 
indigenous communities were never fulfilled according to the Zapatistas.  
154 The retreat of the state from social programmes as part of neoliberal reforms also fuelled expansion 
of ‘third sector’ civil society organizations to provide services. However, these organizations were often 
clientelist, receiving and disbursing resources in line with the political interests of the financing state 
institutions and political parties. As such, despite numerically outnumbering independent NGOs, they 
rarely engaged with concerted or contentious human rights advocacy.  
155 Estévez López (2008) argues that this professionalization of human rights activism in the 1990s 
resulted in the fragmentation of the human rights agenda as social justice causes were sidelined in 
favour of a more limited civil and political rights demands aligned with Western funders pursuing a 
narrow liberal democratization agenda (López Pacheco 2015a). 
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more overt political resistance to neoliberal reforms in order to improve access to 
services, challenge local powerholders and address social injustices. Social mobilization 
processes tended to look more to Mexico’s revolutionary traditions and experiences of 
resistance as exemplified by the Zapatistas. As a result, effective cooperation with 
more technical and institutionally oriented human rights NGOs was weak (López 
Pacheco et al. 2015).156 NGOs were seen as more focused on national or transnational 
institutional processes which treated human rights as an impartial, non-political 
discourse of international law, rather than the language of local political struggle.157  
 
After 2000 this tendency increased as many human rights NGOs, particularly in central 
Mexico, engaged in protracted consultation with the Federal and Federal District 
transition governments to integrate human rights law into the public administration in 
the new democratic setting (López Pacheco 2015a).158 Estévez López (2015) argues this 
was a process of the state capturing human rights NGOs, distracting them from the 
task of defending the rights of communities under attack in the neoliberal democratic 
settlement. This delegitimised human rights as a discourse of grassroots struggle (Arias 
Marín et al. 2015). However, scholars have also argued this was a more complex 
process, involving specialization and pluralization of NGOs to take advantage of the 
new opportunity structure and the diversity of human rights contexts and resources in 
subnational settings (López Pacheco 2015a) as well as an increasing societal 
                                                        
156 The recognition that these divides of ideology, practice and culture have often limited the articulation 
of grassroots social and political mobilizations, social activist collectives and the professional human 
rights NGOs is reflected in the emergence of organizations like Services and Advice for Peace (Servicios 
y Asesoria para Paz, SERAPAZ) and National Centre for Social Communication (Centro Nacional de 
Comunicación Social, CENCOS). These NGOs focus on bridging these divides by supporting 
communication and articulation between different social actors, particularly grassroots social 
movements not necessarily conversant with human rights discourse. 
157 As a representative of an INGO, I was aware of this tension between the requirements of impartial 
evaluation of particular social contexts in relation to international human rights standards and the 
particular political dynamics shaping local struggles. The impartial application of international human 
rights standards was key to building credibility to engage external actors, but it also tended to 
marginalize the position of structural political drivers leading to violations and their role in fomenting  
the determination of victims and communities to demand justice.  
158 In addition, Mexico’s apparent democratic consolidation and the post 9/11 world had the effect of 
redirecting international resources and attention away from Mexico’s national and local human rights 
NGOs, leaving many too weakened to develop a strong national public agenda on human rights (Anaya 
Muñoz 2009) and ill-equipped to deal with the challenge of sustained negotiation with institutions. 
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recognition of the importance of local human rights NGOs (Ron et al. 2014).159 This was 
a process of modernization of civil society, responding to changing social, institutional 
and political context of the transition, leading to an increasingly heterogenous ecology 
of civil society actors adopting human rights discourse in different ways (Lavalle et al. 
2011). As a result, this hybrid context differed from the traditional IR conception 
international human rights law ‘socialised’ to peripheral states as much as from the 
ideas of radical grassroots activism self-asserting human rights claims referred to in the 
chapter two (Section 2.3.2).  
 
In fact, after 2006 it was subnational NGOs, close to communities affected by violence 
and other human rights violations, and distant from the institutional relationships of 
Mexico City, which began to provide consistent accompaniment to victims (López 
Pacheco 2015b) and publicly denounce the a growing human rights crisis.160 In the new 
context of spiralling criminal violence and militarization, relatives of victims were not 
political activists with network connections to political and social movements as had 
been the case in the 1970s and 80s. As a result, the processes of understanding the 
context of violence in each region and for relatives to recognise themselves as victims 
with the right to demand action from the authorities was complex (and frequently 
dangerous). This often required creative responses of small human rights NGOs to 
develop new networks and skills to apply human rights discourse to their context.161 
                                                        
159 It is also important to note that the range of civil society organizations widened considerably during 
the transition years as crime and violence deteriorated. These include organizations such as Stop 
Kidnapping (Alto al Secuestro) which received funding from the business sector and were close to the 
government. These organizations usually advocated tougher public security approaches on crime, 
dismissing human rights concerns. The government and its allies in the media frequently adopted the 
anti-crime organizations as the primary representatives of civil society, seeking to marginalize more 
inconvenient independent human rights NGOs. This also happened during negotiations with the MPJD.  
160 As part of my work with AI over this period, I personally experienced how local human rights activists 
worked with victims and communities in states such as Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Baja 
California, Guerrero, Morelos and Veracruz. Among these subnational NGOs were Centro Diocesano 
para los Derechos Humanos Fray Juan Larios and Fuerzas Unidas de Nuestros Desaparecidos en Coahuila 
(FUNDEC) in Coahuila state and Ciudadanos en Apoyo a los Derechos Humanos (CADHAC) in Nuevo León 
state (Ciudadanos en Apoyo a los Derechos Humanos A. C 2010; Fuerzas Unidas por Nuestros 
Desaparecidos en Coahuila (FUUNDEC) 2010). 
161 I relate my own experiences of witnessing victims of violence coming together in Chihuahua in 2010 
with the support of local human rights NGOs to recount, often for the first time, the disappearance or 
killing of their loved ones as part of a wider processes of recognition, organization and debate about 
human rights amidst the spiralling violence between 2007 and 2010 (Knox 2017). 
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The increasing number of victims coming forward also outstripped the capacity of 
human rights NGOs to accompany cases, which in turn also created tensions between 
and within NGOs and groups of victims.162 Despite this, the process of subnational 
NGOs working with the victims refocused contentious repertoires on mobilization to 
challenge injustice and the role of the state (López Pacheco 2017). This also contributed 
to re-legitimizing human rights discourse in grassroot claims-making, reclaiming it from 
seemingly co-opted technical institutional negotiation which NGOs engaged in during 
the early transition years (Arias Marín et al. 2015). Nevertheless, as the case studies 
indicate, tensions continue between plural civil society actors about how human rights 
discourse is understood and used in Mexico’s partial democracy to communicate and 
challenge injustice and pursue social change agendas.  
 
I now turn to the changing communications environment in Mexico and the adoption 
of digital and social media. In particular, I examine how these new technologies have 
become embedded in social relations, including in diverse forms of critical social 
activism (Flores-Márquez 2017) and disrupting the wider media landscape. 
  
 Media and new media environment 
A longstanding feature of Mexico’s media environment has been the dominance of 
certain mainstream media outlets closely linked to the political establishment, 
ensuring favourable coverage of elite agendas and limiting public access to alternative 
critical narratives. The emergence of independent internet-based and social media 
information portals, as well as increased networked connectivity of citizens and 
activists, has altered patterns of access, production, diversity and circulation of 
information, creating new opportunities but also risks. 
 
The media environment is dominated by a duopoly of private TV corporations, Televisa 
and TV Azteca (Open Society 2010) in what Brambila calls a ‘hyper-commercialization 
                                                        
162 This remains a central dilemma of human rights NGOs focusing on strategic litigation or 
comprehensive accompaniment of victims, where a range of factors, including limited resources and 
institutional priorities, usually result in the selection of particular cases for litigation and advocacy. This 
leaves other cases with less or without accompaniment, creating tension in NGOs and among victims.  
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offering of news’ (Brambila 2017, p400). Between 1995 and 2010, Televisa and TV 
Azteca captured at least 96.5% of national television audience (Huerta-Wong, 2013). 
In 2012, 93% of homes in Mexico had a television, with 76% of the population primarily 
obtaining their information on politics from TV news programmes (SEGOB 2012). In 
contrast, 9% of the population used radio and only 5% the press as their primary 
information source on politics. Televisa news coverage in particular dominated how 
political, social and economic issues were framed for the majority of the population, 
limiting plurality, impartiality and quality of information (Trejo Delarbre 2011b). These 
media corporations played an important part in sustaining the limited nature of 
Mexico’s democratic transition and creating a distorted narrative around the violence 
of the ‘war’ on drugs (Escalante Gonzalbo 2012).  
 
In election periods, coverage has been strongly aligned with favoured candidates 
(Tuckman 2012a; Escalante 2013). Both corporations owe their foundation, growth and 
continued market domination to political elites who have benefited from positive 
media coverage. The PRI presidents initially controlled this relationship. However, 
gradual democratization and fragmentation of power centres, as well as the growing 
dominance of TV to shape subnational and national political agendas, enabled Televisa 
and TV Azteca to manage transactional relationships with different political parties. 
This ensured a weak regulatory environment and continued revenues from 
government advertising at federal and state level as well as power to promote political 
candidates favourable to their interests (Trejo Delarbre 2014). In the 2012 presidential 
elections, when both channels promoted the Peña Nieto candidacy, this raised 
increasing public concern about media diversity and the capacity of political, economic 
and media elites to subvert the democratic process (Tuckman 2012b).163  
 
During the years of PRI hegemony, the press, radio and TV were controlled, with a few 
rare exceptions, by the use of economic favours, monopoly of newsprint paper, 
discretional government advertising, preferential treatment, bribes and, when 
                                                        
163 The 2013 Telecommunications law reforms potentially weakened the stranglehold of these dominant 
media companies by allowing increased competition and strengthened regulation (Esteinou Madrid 
2013). However, secondary legislation weakened this regulatory framework. 
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necessary, violent coercion (Rodríguez Munguía 2007). Some independent newspapers 
were allowed to operate in later years, such as La Jornada and El Proceso, but their 
readership remained small compared to the dominant reach of radio, then TV. During 
the transition years, government publicity budgets continued to operate as levers of 
influence, but there was also increased competition and less direct state intervention, 
leading some academics to conclude that quality of journalism and plurality of media 
coverage improved (Lawson, 2002). However, media ownership remained relatively 
concentrated and aligned with local elites, particularly at state level.  
 
A number of critical independent investigative journalists, amongst them Carmen 
Aristegui and Anabel Hernández, emerged during the transition years.164 However, the 
constant attacks on reporters posed a serious threat to freedom of expression and 
access to information. This was particularly the case at subnational level in high crime 
areas. In some states, such as Tamaulipas, the chilling effect of attacks on journalists 
and outlets meant news reporting on contentious issues disappeared.165 Research also 
pointed to a mixed picture in terms of quality and plurality of media reporting (Reyna 
García 2016) and the continued dominance of unchallenged official narratives and 
deficient journalism in many media outlets, particularly in television (Martínez Garza 
et al. 2015).166  
 
In contrast to the dominant role of private TV networks, which enjoy national reach, 
there are no truly national newspapers. There are important titles, such as El Universal, 
Milenio, La Jornada and Reforma. These claim the status of national newspapers but 
frequently have limited circulation beyond major urban centres. Outside Mexico City, 
                                                        
164 There are also journalist-led initiatives to improve professionalism, such as Periodistas a Pie, a 
journalists’ collective to train and share experiences for independent investigative reporting founded in 
2007  
165 In 2018 the World Press Freedom Index placed Mexico at 147 out of 180 countries. World Press 
Freedom Index, 2018, Reporters without Borders, available at:  https://rsf.org/en/ranking. 
166 This can be explained by the continued financial dependence of many media outlets on state or 
federal governments. When Peña Nieto became president, he adopted the practices he had employed 
during his tenure as governor of the State of Mexico, which - like many state governors - meant ensuring 
media solvency and thus loyalty through the use of government publicity contracts. For example, in the 
first two years of Pena Nieto’s presidency (2013 and 2014), federal expenditure on publicity was over 
14,000 billion MXN (US$1 billion) (Fundar & Art 19 2015; 64).  
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regional papers enjoy far wider readership and influence.167 Many states are home to 
various local media outlets, which are frequently paid for by state governments’ 
publicity contracts. Thus, while there is often an impression of multiple news sources, 
there is frequently a lack of diversity of voices, particularly as independent-minded 
journalists and editors have faced threats and attacks (Brambila 2017).  
 
Above all, the domination of television as the primary source of news information for 
the majority of the population, guaranteed the political and economic power of the 
private TV networks, particularly Televisa. This ensured political contention was largely 
framed according to its commercial and political interests. Such a bias in shaping the 
political agenda led progressive social activists to identify Televisa’s dominance of the 
media landscape as an obstacle to Mexico’s democratic development. However, the 
rapid and increasing adoption of digitally networked communications gradually 
disrupted features of this dominance.  
 
 lnternet access, social media and information plurality 
 
 
                                                        
167 For example, the network of 70 regional papers of the Organización Editorial Mexicana (OEM), closely 
linked to the PRI since its foundation in the 1970s, is the most widely sold in Mexico. It also controls 20 
radio stations and a TV channel. 
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Use of Internet and social media platforms has grown steadily in Mexico. In 2010, 40.6 
million people were accessing the internet, 34% of the population, this had risen to 70 
million, 63% of the population by 2017 (Asociación de internet.mx 2018). Female and 
male users were equally represented, but young people under 35 years-old were the 
majority. In 2010, 60% of users connected to social media platforms, by 2015 this had 
risen to over 90%. In 2011 there were 27 million Facebook members and 4 million 
Twitter users. In 2016, this had grown to 63 million and 9.6 million respectively. 
Facebook was the most popular social media site, but Whatsapp was more regularly 
accessed via Smartphones. By 2016 smartphones accounted for 77% of the means of 
accessing the internet. As with many other countries, Internet access was concentrated 
amongst the educated middle class and in urban areas, reflecting economic and social 
inequalities. However, the digital divide was changing as, despite relatively high costs 
of access, users were increasingly represented in less socio-economically advantaged 
sections of society.168 The increasing use of social media as a source of news 
information was also represented by 9 out of 10 Internet users showing interest in 
following the 2018 election process by accessing social media (Asociación de 
internet.mx 2018).   
 
The dominant TV networks and other mainstream information and entertainment 
providers were slow to respond to increasing choice available through digital platforms 
and the threat to their business model.169 TV and radio networks as well as newsprint 
media have attempted to reclaim market share via their own web platforms, but 
international sites like CNN and new digital native news information sites have also 
grown rapidly. In Mexico, these include, SDPNoticias, SinEmbargo, Animal Politico, 
Aristeguinoticias or youth-oriented sites such as Sopitas.170   
                                                        
168 Access to the internet remained just below other comparable countries in the region, such as Brazil, 
Colombia and Argentina (Miniwatts Marketing Group 2018).  
169 The resulting shift in advertising revenues to the online environment also made some companies 
even more susceptible to government influence through the de facto subsidy of government advertising. 
170 Despite these changes in the communications environment, the federal government continued to 
limit the summary of the official daily news items circulated to public officials and civil servants to 
sources in the traditional mainstream media, apparently keen to restrict the influence of media to those 
over which it had greatest leverage (interview with journalist in March 2016). 
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A range of other new independent online news and opinion platforms, known as 
alternative or medios libres (free media), emerged in recent years providing more 
radical views and socially committed reporting. These included platforms such as 
Desinformémonos, Subversiones, Horizontal as well as online TV platforms, such as 
RompevientoTV, offering more overtly left-wing information and comment. They made 
a virtue out of the social causes they promoted, arguing these were not adequately 
represented in the mainstream offline or online media (Rovira Sancho 2013).171 These 
platforms encouraged interaction and dialogue with their audiences. This had the 
advantage of developing a community inside Mexico and beyond, but also risked 
reaching only those members of the public who already subscribed to the political 
outlook of the platform, the ‘echo chamber’ or ‘bias confirmation’ effect. Many of 
these new platforms were either only beginning to take shape in 2011 or emerged as 
part of the evolving digital environment. They reflected the determination to exploit 
new media opportunities to provide alternative news information at low cost to an 
audience increasingly aware that it no longer had to settle for the limited narrative 
provided by much of the mainstream media (Downing 2001). These alternative media 
platforms also provided an opportunity for social activists to challenge some of the 
dubious journalistic practices of mainstream media. These included prejudiced framing 
of social movements in line with government interests and failure to cover the 
experience of victims and other marginalized communities whose rights were denied.  
 
The increasingly globalized nature of digital information also meant that international 
news networks began to play an increasingly important role in national media stories. 
For example, when reporting on Mexican issues, if the New York Times or BBC 
referenced independent information circulated on social media, this could force 
national media to follow suit. This facilitated an increasingly hybrid news environment 
where information moved rapidly between media platforms (Chadwick 2013). In effect, 
international media attention could rapidly push a contentious issue ignored by 
national media onto the news agenda. As a result, while the private TV networks 
                                                        
171 On the basis of interviews with journalists conducted in March 2016. 
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maintained their dominant role in framing national political debate (Brambila 2017), 
digitally networked communications began to significantly widen the potential to 
disrupt and challenge this influence.   
 
 Digitally networked activism 
By 2010, networked digital communication increasingly featured in the repertoire of 
practices of autonomous social mobilizations. Since the Zapatistas, email and the 
internet had been widely used by political and social activists to disseminate and share 
information throughout support networks and coordinate actions (Rovira Sancho 
2007). However, the interactive and autonomous creative potential of social media 
networking, whose potential Castells and others (1997; Hardt et al. 2005) had pointed 
to, remained incipient. This began to change in 2009 as internet access and social 
media adoption accelerated.172  
 
The changing global political opportunity structure also influenced local activists. In 
early 2011, the Arab Spring and Western media claims that social media was the 
decisive factor enabling protests, provided an inspiration to diverse social movements. 
Later in 2011, 15-M and Occupy began their protests, using social media as both 
expressive performance and enabling tool to bring people onto the streets (Gerbaudo 
2012). This inspired a range of political and digitally oriented activists in Mexico, some 
of whom forged links with activists in Spain and the US, seeking to learn from and 
replicate their experiences. One dimension of this influence was the potential to 
develop identity and participation in street protests against neoliberalism, the second, 
                                                        
172 For example, in 2009 a wide range of citizens participated online in the ‘voto nulo’ campaign to 
promote the spoiling of votes as a protest in the mid-term elections. Also, ContingenteMX appeared on 
Twitter, a loose collective promoting digital activism on social and political rights issues. Some NGOs 
began to develop social media capacity from training videos disseminated by international NGOs 
promoting online activism (Harlow 2013). Other activists also point to the 2009 swine flu outbreak in 
Mexico leading to rapid take up of Twitter as a means of obtaining “live” information on the situation 
due to the dearth of reliable official communication (interview with digital activist in March 2016). The 
deteriorating security environment in high violence regions and the absence of information on threats 
also encouraged citizens to adopt social media to share news on local dangers. In 2010, social media 
became an important platform to support the campaign for justice of the families of the 49 children 
killed in 2009 in the ABC nursery fire in Hermosillo, Sonora state. These experiences often linked 
networks of activists, who shared their know-how, increasing awareness of the potential of digital 
activism and reducing the technical skills deficit. 
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focused on the apparently spontaneous and expressive cultural revolt through the use 
of social media, energizing plural networks of resistance-oriented activists. These 
experiences encouraged a small but growing number of social activists in Mexico to 
adopt social media practices to further their causes and make links across different 
forms of social activism. Professional human rights NGOs were also gradually 
incorporating social media practices into their information dissemination and 
campaigning (Harlow 2013), but these remained largely advocacy tools rather than 
oriented to networked contentious social mobilization. 
 
Despite these changes, Internet access and social media adoption in 2011 remained 
relatively narrow and unaligned with traditions of grassroots political mobilization 
practices by socially marginalized communities. Many traditional social activists 
promoting forms of contentious grassroots mobilization believed the digital divide 
excluded and disempowered communities already disadvantaged by the currents of 
neoliberal globalization.173 At the same time, growing numbers of younger activists 
used digital and social media in their daily lives, networks and political activities. As a 
result, they experienced how this could contribute to rather than replace offline 
collective action (Harlow 2014). In this rapidly evolving context, digital and social media 
increasingly featured in the communications practices of diverse activists (Treré 2011, 
2012; Treré et al. 2013), but tensions remained about its relative role in progressive 
activism in Mexico.  
 
The potential of digital and social media was also apparent to institutional actors. This 
not only included for purposes of political party activism, but also as a means to 
undermine and attack opponents (Meneses 2013).  
 
 Digital threats 
The threats to activism on digital networks and social media have become increasingly 
evident in Mexico, particularly the openness of platforms to manipulation by well-
                                                        
173 Interview social movement activist March 2016 
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resourced powerholders to delegitimize and harass journalists, political opponents and 
social activists (Treré 2016; O’Carroll et al. 2017).174  
 
Several important cases have been documented of digital surveillance and politically 
sponsored digital smear campaigns.175 This has gradually increased the awareness of 
activists to some of the potential risks of using digital communications as part of their 
practices as these tools can be used against them by powerholders (Morozov 2012). 
                                                        
174 Several digital activists have been subject to sustained digital death threat campaigns on multiple 
platforms suggesting a measure of organization and coordination behind the threats. The authorities 
have failed to conduct full investigations, leaving activists in fear of their lives. These cases have a chilling 
effect on other activists seeking to exercise their right to freedom of expression and participate in 
collective action (Fernando García et al. 2016). On occasions social media users and citizen journalists 
posting information on organized crime and insecurity have been detained by the authorities (Martinez 
2011; Zires 2014) and killed by organized crime (Proceso 2014). 
175 These include: a) In 2016, Bloomberg Businessweek published a detailed investigation into the 
activities of professional hacker, Andrés Sepúlveda, who allegedly played a key off-book role in the 2012 
election campaign of Peña Nieto (Robertson et al. 2016). The report provided evidence that Sepùlveda 
had been given wide latitude to carry out an online “dirty tricks” strategy. This included providing false 
information about opponents, using automated software attacks (BOTs) on opponents’ web profiles as 
well as espionage. The Peña Nieto government denied the allegations. From the start of Peña Nieto’s 
election campaign in 2011, young largely anonymous online PRI supporters, known as Ectivistas, were 
mobilized to support their candidate and drown out critical voices with concerted trolling. The media 
also reported that these actions included the use of BOTS to manufacture the appearance of massive 
online support for twitter hashtags favoring the PRI candidate (Montalvo 2012). 
b) On 18 June 2012, when the YoSoy132 was most active, one of the organizers, Manuel Cossío, leaked 
footage to the media showing a movement spokesperson, Saúl Alvídrez, recognizing his links to the 
campaign of the presidential candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. The information was used to 
discredit the movement by appearing to show that, as the PRI had alleged, the movement was aligned 
to the campaign of the left-wing candidate. However, in 2013 media investigations showed that Manuel 
Cossío had in fact been acting for the intelligence services, Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional 
(CISEN), as part of sting operation against YoSoy132, which included harvesting names and email 
addresses of sympathizers from a movement database (Villamil 2013). 
c) In 2015, the media revealed that Mexican government agencies had been the largest client of Hacking 
Team, an Italian company supplying cyber-surveillance technology to governments around the world. 
The company was paid more than US$ 6 million, which included contracts with the civilian intelligence 
agency (CISEN) (Fernando García et al. 2016). These agencies had targeted social activists in the past 
(Fundar Centro de Análisis e Investigación 2014). In 2017, an investigation, including independent 
international technology experts, demonstrated that spyware, Pegasus, developed by an Israeli tech-
company solely for States to carry out digital surveillance, was sold to the PGR, CISEN and the Ministry 
of Defence. Despite its use being contractually limited to national security purposes, the investigation 
demonstrated that it had been used to target journalists, opposition politicians and civil society activists 
as well as international experts investigating the Ayotzinapa case (Article 19 et al. 2017; Ahmed 2017). 
The malware was used to try and access and monitor all smart phone communications of the targets. To 
date no official responsible for the misuse of the technology has been held to account and President 
Peña Nieto publicly dismissed the importance of such surveillance. In February 2018 the New York Times 
reported that the FBI had refused to collaborate with the official Mexican investigation on the basis that 
it was a sham, designed to avoid clarifying institutional responsibility for the illegal surveillance 
operation (Ahmed 2018).   
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The cases also illustrate some of the covert digital tactics adopted by powerholders to 
undermine political opponents and social movements. However, these may only 
represent a small number of the actual practices. This uncertainty is an important 
dynamic affecting how social activists struggle to assess and respond to their 
vulnerability (Garcia et al. 2014) creating a form of what Treré calls ‘social media 
paranoia’ (2015, p175).  
 
A key aspect of both offline and online threats is the state’s constant failure to identify 
and effectively prosecute those responsible. This pervasive impunity encourages new 
bouts of harassment and attacks. It also makes it very difficult for activists or journalists 
to determine the origin of threats and assess the scale of risk or reduce their insecurity 
while continuing their engagement with the public sphere and contentious activism.176  
 
This impunity is reinforced by the lack of effective oversight and legal accountability of 
police, security and military agencies in the use of digital technology in Mexico’s partial 
democracy. This means formal challenges to misuse of digital communications are 
extremely difficult. In addition, the weak international regulatory system of digital and 
social media platforms means it is also difficult for citizens to obtain information from 
capitalist corporations about the misuse of digital and social media to target social and 
political activists.  
 
However, it is also important to remember that social activists and independent 
journalists in Mexico regularly face the most severe threats in their offline activities. 
This includes physical attack, disappearance and murder in reprisal for their lawful 
activities (UN Human Rights Council 2017). As such digital threats are part of a wider 
context of targeted harassment. Those engaged in grassroots activism, including 
relatives of victims and human rights activists, often have to overcome or ignore fear 
and uncertainty about the nature and severity of the threats they face to continue their 
claims-making. This uncertainty, suspicion and sometimes disregard of threats, is a 
                                                        
176 A protection mechanism for human rights defenders and journalists was established by the Mexican 
government in 2012, but it remains weak and largely ineffective (UN Human Rights Council 2017).  
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feature of participating, particularly in a high-profile role, in protests or other 
contentious public actions which impact economic, political or criminal interests.177 
Trying to understand and manage these uncertainties is an unwelcome aspect of 
participation in contentious social movements and human rights activism.  
 
In this context, digital communications facilitate new possibilities for activism, but also 
generate new vulnerabilities and dynamics of risk which affect how activists regard and 
practice online activism.178 These issues are explored in more detail in relation to each 
ease study.  
 
 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined key aspects of Mexico’s political and social development, 
particularly the legacy of corporatist authoritarianism in the partial transition to 
democracy. This process frustrated the construction of rights-protective governance, 
greater social justice and space for effective civic participation. Instead, it fuelled 
corruption, impunity, violence and an increasing number of stigmatised victims. 
Despite this, plural forms of autonomous and contentious civil society activism 
developed, including grassroots mobilizations and diverse human rights NGOs. The 
transition governments used the institutionalisation of human rights discourse for the 
purposes of state-legitimation, but only simulated implementation. This more or less 
cynical appropriation of human rights discourse, particularly its treatment as a non-
political technical legal discourse, exclusively the domain of experts, alienated some 
social actors who perceived it as divorced from the more political dimensions of 
grassroots social mobilization. However, other actors regarded this situation as 
increasing the legitimacy of human rights claims-making, strengthening international 
                                                        
177 As a human rights researcher, I investigated numerous cases of threats and attacks against activists 
in Mexico. This included deliberations about security measures and risk reduction. The approach taken 
often depended on the personality and approach of the particular human rights defender and their 
determination not to give into the logic of those behind the threats seeking to deter their activism. 
178 International and regional NGOs, such as Access Now and Socialtic, focused on digital 
communications, increasingly collaborate with local organizations in networks to strengthen analysis, 
training and understanding of the security dimensions of digital communications for civil society 
activism. 
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solidarity networks and facilitating articulation of plural social actors in domestic 
mobilizations.  
 
The changing media and communications landscape ushered in by the increasing social 
adoption of digital and social media weakened the mass media’s grip on the political 
agenda. This included enabling new independent media actors to emerge, lending 
communicative visibility to different voices and more diverse social actors. Digital social 
networking also impacted interpersonal communications as it became more 
embedded in social practice. This enabled new forms of interaction, sharing and 
distribution of information, reducing the dominant role of mainstream media in 
shaping news narratives. However, this connectivity also produced new types of threat 
and risk for those involved in activism or independent journalism.  
 
This contextual chapter provides an essential road map to locate each movement 
clearly within a rapidly reconfiguring landscape of political, social and media 
opportunities. This complex and dynamic context played an important role in shaping 
the initial emergence of the movements, but did not determine them. This required 
the interpretation of their significance by multiple participants involved in different 
forms of critical deliberation and adaptive social activism. However, before exploring 
the cases in more detail, it is also important to present the methodology adopted which 
underpins the case research and grounds the findings in well-establish social science 
research practices. 
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Methodology 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology developed to investigate and analyse plural 
civil society contentious mobilizations in a partial, and sometimes hostile, democratic 
setting. My research questions address the uses of human rights discourse and digital 
and social media as central elements in movement dynamics and in wider social 
relations. The methodology adopted to explore these issues is based on my 
constructivist outlook which understands social practices, such as the uses of human 
rights discourse and digital social media, as bound up with the meaning and 
significance negotiated and disputed by those involved. I also analyse my reflexive 
position in relation to this sensitive area of research, the actors involved and my past 
experience; setting out how this positively contributed to the research but also the 
measures taken to avoid bias. I account for the use of qualitative interviewing and how 
I recruited participants to generate positive, safe and productive interviews which 
yielded multi-layered ‘thick’ data. The process of data organization and analysis is 
explained, including checks and controls to strengthen the trustworthiness of my 
analytical approach and findings. Lastly, I explain the ethical considerations and 
safeguards in the design and implementation of the research to ensure its quality and 
integrity.  
 Philosophical outlook: Ontology and epistemology 
In this section, I discuss my philosophical approach to the world and social relations as 
part of the underlying theoretical framework for addressing the research questions. 
This is key to understanding the particular methodology applied to gather the data and 
the epistemological claims of my research findings.  
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Guba (1990) refers to our ‘basic beliefs’ about the world shaping our research 
processes and our knowledge claims.179 These beliefs generally lie on a spectrum 
between realist and constructivist ontologies.180 The first views the external world in 
positivist terms, as an objective reality independent of our experience, about which 
generalizable knowledge can be deduced as definitively true or false. The second does 
not view the external world as independent of us, as it is meaningful to us through our 
subjective experiences, which are intrinsically related to our orienting beliefs and 
attitudes. Therefore, reality is constructed through our individual and collective 
experiences and processes of meaning-making. According to this more constructivist 
outlook, knowledge of the social world is about meaningfulness subjectively 
constructed through inductive interpretation of complex processes and relations. This 
approach to knowledge does not ignore empirical concepts such as validity and 
reliability, but these are justified in terms of the quality of interpretation, which is 
gauged by evidence of consistency, coherence and accuracy. As such, knowledge-
claims are more open-ended and context contingent, without aspiring to 
epistemological certitude. This outlook locates the researcher, as interpreting subject, 
as central to the process of meaning-making. In consequence, it necessarily introduces 
reflexivity and instability to knowledge-claims about the social world (Giddens 1990), 
as the researcher’s own beliefs and orientations shape the approach to the research 
field and the process of interpretation.  
 
My basic beliefs about reality are constructivist in which knowledge of the social world 
derives from inductive interpretation. This outlook is particularly relevant in research 
examining complex social and political phenomena such as the social movements in 
this thesis. The three movements involve multiple individual and collective actors 
shaped by and responding to structuring social forces operating in their particular 
society, but also increasingly as part of global cultural dynamics. The meanings these 
                                                        
179 Other scholars addressing methodological principles also point to the importance of recognizing this 
stance toward the social world and knowledge, with expressions such as philosophical “position” (Mason 
2002), “orientation” (Patton 2002) or “worldview” (Creswell 2009). 
180 Guba also points to critical theory approaches which draw on both viewpoints to develop an 
emancipatory methodology oriented to exposing domination in the world and changing it by enabling 
subject liberation.  
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actors ascribe to their environment and other actors is key to understanding 
motivations, intentions and actions in a constantly unfolding process. But the meaning 
of their actions is not bounded by their particular intentions, as actions have 
unforeseen results and are constantly open to varied interpretation by others, 
producing rippling consequences for the beliefs and actions of others. These cycles of 
actions, interactions and interpretations fan out and overlap, influencing other actors 
who respond to or reflect on their meaning and significance. This in turn shapes and 
motivates a new series of actions and reactions (Giddens 1984). These processes are in 
constant flux and open to different interpretations which are not reducible to a single 
external realist truth, rather they are dynamic meaning-making processes, often 
contradictory and multi-dimensional. However, an approach to gaining greater insight 
and understanding of these processes is through the empirical evidence of participants. 
That is through their reconstructed accounts, reflecting on meaning, beliefs and 
orientations toward the collective social processes they are or were engaged in.181 My 
interpretivist epistemology based on a constructivist outlook is the starting point for 
developing a research methodology to address my research questions exploring the 
complex dynamics of the social movements and their practices.182  
 
In order to get at the meaning understood by actors operating in complex social 
contexts such as social movements engaged in political contention and making human 
rights demands against powerholders, I adopt Geertz’s (1973) approach to 
interpretation of culture based on ‘thick description’. This is the close study of the 
symbols of culture and their meaning as understood by those involved and bound up 
with contextual events: ‘[W]e begin with our own interpretations of what our 
informants are up to, or think they are up and then systematize those’ (Ibid., p15). This 
approach leads to careful, defensible interpretation of context specific data, not 
                                                        
181 However, as Giddens suggests, there reasoned retrospective accounts of motivation are not 
necessarily consistent with the “practical consciousness” involved in individuals responding and acting 
in real-time on a more intuitive basis drawing on routine and Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’. 
182 My constructivism does not dismiss the reality of the external world. Hammersley (1992) suggests a 
form of “subtle realism”, which recognises the separate existence of the world, but also the mediating 
function of meaning and interpretation. This undercuts epistemological certainty, but enables a practical 
engagement with the shared world as individuals experience it and act.  
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totalizing theory. Nonetheless, the aim is still to ‘draw large conclusions from small, 
but very densely textured facts’ (Ibid., p28). This is consistent with more ethnographic 
and anthropological social science methods which examine how ideas and meanings of 
human rights are constructed locally or are understood and made meaningful in 
concrete social contexts (Short 2009). Richard Wilson calls this the ‘social life of rights’ 
(Wilson 1996, p3). This implies ‘exploring their meaning and use’ and conducting 
‘detailed studies of human rights according to the actions and intentions of social 
actors within wider historical constraints of institutionalised power’ (Ibid., p4). This 
research draws on this approach to examine how human rights discourse was used and 
understood as part of each movement’s mobilization process.  
  
A similar approach is also applied to uses of digital and social media in the context of 
the social mobilizations. By examining how communications technologies feature in 
movement practice and are made meaningful by and to movement participants and 
potential recruits, this enables a nuanced understanding of their role in the ‘social 
drama’ (Wessels 2010, p40). This means engaging with movement actors and their 
reflections and understanding of communications practices in the cycles of social 
movement mobilization and technological change.  
 
In order to examine the complex meaning of these practices, they also have to be 
considered in the context of the wider social relations in which they are rooted. In 
Mexico, this relates directly, on the one hand, to the contested democratic transition, 
multidimensional violence, impunity, corruption and extreme social inequalities, but 
also, on the other hand, to non-institutional forces such as civil society, independent 
media and international solidarity. These different historical, social, political and 
economic elements are interwoven into the context, constraining and enabling social 
actors. However, the meaning attributed to them by actors is key to understanding the 
motivations and forms of participation in collective contentious action.  
 
In addressing the different dimensions of social practice and socio-political context, I 
draw on various disciplines. This includes political science, history, sociology, 
communications and philosophy. Relevant aspects of these different fields were 
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discussed in chapter two and contribute to the interpretation and analysis of the data, 
supporting the empirical research with theoretical insights (Della Porta 2014).  
 
4.2.1 Reflexivity  
A feature of qualitative research is the position of the researcher in relation to the field 
of study and the steps taken by the researcher to reflect on the subjectivist implications 
for the study and the findings (Mason 2002). On the one hand this is a process of 
identifying potential bias and limiting its influence, but on the other, it is recognising 
how the researcher’s biography may contribute positively to the quality of the research 
(Berger 2015). In this section, I reflect on the dimensions of my biography, beliefs and 
orientations in relation to the study, their shaping influence, but also the measures 
take to limit and recognise their impacts to ensure the accuracy and credibility of the 
research. 
 
In relation to research method, reflexivity is understood as the ‘the process of a 
continual internal dialogue and critical self-evaluation of the researcher’s positionality 
as well as active acknowledgement and explicit recognition that this position may 
affect the research process and outcome’ (Berger 2015, p220). Ritchie and Lewis (2003, 
p2) argue that while qualitative research necessarily has subjective elements, 
reflexivity is part of striving toward greater ‘objectivity and neutrality’; a 
methodological approach whose ultimate goal may be unobtainable, but which is 
important to strengthen the reliability and trustworthiness of research findings.  
 
4.2.2 Identity position 
I am a white male middle-class academic from the Global North. I am a fluent Spanish 
speaker as a second language. These identity attributes make me an outsider to the 
Mexican social movements under investigation and potentially create a perceived 
power imbalance between me and some interviewees.183 This outsider status arguably 
                                                        
183 Insider/outsider status of the researcher can influence the quality and type of research. An insider 
status can provide insight into the feelings and experiences and willingness to share more openly on the 
part of the interviewee. On the other hand, outsider status can facilitate a more detached view on 
processes that an insider may be too immersed in to recognise. On occasions distance from a community 
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makes it more difficult for me to appreciate the nuances of activist beliefs and actions 
in Mexico and also perhaps to unconsciously assume certain cultural attitudes about 
democracy and social activism which an insider researcher might not do.184 However, 
my biography also includes important insider dimensions which significantly 
contributed to the research process. 
 
4.2.3 Biography 
Prior to undertaking this doctoral research, I worked as a human rights activist and 
researcher for Amnesty International (AI). Between 1996 and 2014, I was involved in 
research and campaign work on most Latin America countries. Between 2001 and 
2014, I was responsible for the organisation’s research work and advocacy strategy on 
Mexico. I carried out regular visits to different regions of Mexico and developed close 
relationships with human rights NGOs, activists, victims, lawyers and academics as part 
of my activities to advocate Mexico’s compliance with international human rights 
norms. This work also included documenting the repression of collective social actors 
in different regions confronting local powerholders and involved interviewing victims, 
relatives, witnesses, observers, experts and authorities to understand and report on 
specific contexts. As part of these activities I also followed the emergence of the three 
social movements in this research.  
 
As a human rights researcher-advocate, I also engaged in forms of reflexive practice. 
This included reflecting on my own privileged status as international human rights 
activist, identifying with social actors to gain trust and understanding, but also 
preserving detachment in order to analyse evidence impartially. This approach implied 
commitment to human rights and victims, as well as abiding by such principles as 
                                                        
with conflictive dimensions may also facilitate greater openness in discussion with an outsider (Merriam 
2009). 
184 I was aware that potential power imbalances and identity disparities could affect my communication 
with interviewees and the research. However, I concluded that most interviewees belonged to urban 
educated groups with active political consciousness. As such they were used to engaging in social-
political discussion with a range of actors. As a result, they were not intimidated by or particularly closed-
off to me in terms of identity differences. In addition, the research was not focused on particular identity 
features of movement practice relating to such issues as gender or class - though it is possible to argue 
that the status of victim and student were identity features of the MPJD/Ayotzinapa and YoSoy132 
movements respectively, but this was not an approach that my research was focused on.     
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honesty, respect and ‘do no harm’. Despite being an outsider from the Global North, 
my work with AI enabled me to develop credibility and recognition with a range of 
actors in the field of human rights. This afforded a degree of insider understanding, 
while preserving my status as a critical observer. This parallels Patton’s qualitative 
research recommendation to developing rapport with interviewees, but maintain 
neutrality toward the content of the interview (Patton 2002, p365) - an approach which 
I adopted in this research project.    
 
These biographical experiences enabled me to develop a well-grounded and practical 
understanding of Mexico’s socio-political context, including knowledge of the diverse 
actors involved in contentious social mobilizations. It also enabled me to build a 
network of contacts embedded in the fabric of Mexico’s human rights activist 
community, which in turn overlaps with many other networks of social and political 
activists. In undertaking this academic research, I drew on these contacts to identify 
and recruit relevant actors in each social movement. My status as credible, serious and 
respectful researcher helped secure access with diverse movement actors, often with 
the assistance of contacts. My experience in Mexico on human rights also facilitated an 
important level of trust and openness on the part of participants which would not have 
been possible for someone without my biography. However, I was also aware that my 
previous advocacy work might create expectations which would affect the interviews 
and my research data. Therefore, I took care to clarify the difference between my 
previous role as researcher focused on human rights advocacy and my new role as 
academic social science researcher; taking time to explain the difference in 
methodology and approach to the interviews. This enabled the interviewees to 
gradually settle into the more relaxed and open discussion of the semi-structured 
interview. Nonetheless, my knowledge of human rights and social movement practice 
in Mexico, including sensitivity to complex movement relations, also facilitated a level 
of detailed discussion. This allowed me to explore unresolved and contradictory 
feelings about the mobilization processes, which participants would otherwise not 
have been willing to share; for example, the successes and failures of the movement 
and their individual contributions, the challenges of sustaining plural alliances, the 
stresses of intense activism as well as the disappointments of demobilization and 
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fragmentation. As a result, my biographical experience was key to facilitating access to 
interviewees and ensuring the quality of the interviews, contributing to the ‘thick’ 
description in the data as well as insights in the analysis stage.  
 
4.2.4 Beliefs and worldview 
My orientation towards human rights, democracy and contentious civil society 
collective action are shaped by personal beliefs and also my professional experiences 
as a human rights advocate. In the introduction (section 1.8), I explained how these 
experiences contributed to the development of this project, particularly in relation to 
globally networked activism promoting the socialization of human rights standards 
versus more domestic processes of social mobilization embedded in local political 
cultures. My commitment to human rights principles could be perceived as a 
potentially bias, imposing a narrative on these social movements. However, my 
experiences and reflexive practice have also facilitated a nuanced and open 
understanding of human rights rooted in observing the complex ways in which they are 
used by different actors – not always positively. As a result, in this research I have 
guarded against making simple assumptions about the role of human rights discourse 
and what it means for social movement actors.  
 
In contrast to these more structured human rights orientations, my outlook on digital 
and social media is less defined or subject to potential biographical bias. My experience 
relates to uses of digital and social media in my private and professional life. The latter 
primarily concerned with using digital and social media for strategic campaigning 
purposes to raise the profile of AI’s concerns on cases and issues. I understood this as 
the pragmatic use of new communications technology to support AI’s objectives. 
However, on occasions I also felt concern that some digital and social media 
campaigning on human rights tended to oversimplify or personalise issues excessively 
to instrumentally attract interest. I was also aware of wider media and academic 
debates about the role of social media in facilitating protest and democratic 
engagement, for example in media coverage of the Arab Spring and public sphere 
debate between Clay Shirky and Malcom Gladwell (2010). However, I remained open 
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to exploring different uses and meanings of digital and social media without 
subscribing to a particular position. But I also remained aware of the importance of 
reflecting on received wisdoms and unconscious assumptions on my part and those of 
participant interviewees. This meant addressing positive and negative perspectives and 
beliefs about digital and social media and interrogating these in relation to the 
particular practices of the movements and the wider communications environment in 
Mexico.  
 
4.2.5 Reflexive practice 
There are different approaches to acknowledging and working with reflexivity. 
However, these are usually based on transparency and documentation. Lincoln and 
Guba (Lincoln et al. 1985) propose a detailed research diary to develop thought 
processes and reflections, including analysis of assumptions, to show how ideas 
develop and how possible bias is addressed. Strauss and Corbin (1967) recommend 
creating memos as part of the research process in grounded theory to transparently 
develop concepts which are subject to iterative revision in developing theory. 
However, Cutcliffe (2003) suggests these documenting processes in themselves cannot 
account for the ‘magic’ of insight of the researcher and should not become so 
burdensome as to inhibit ‘intellectual entrepreneurship’ (p136).  
  
As part of my research methodology, reflecting on my own assumptions and how I 
might be influencing the research and analysis process, I kept a field research diary. I 
started this before going to Mexico, then made entries on a nightly basis in order to 
facilitate my thinking processes, record my responses to interviews and interrogate my 
assumptions. I also engaged in frequent conversations with my supervisors to check 
my ideas, often discussing distinctions between the types of research practice and 
thinking I was engaged in. These routines provided an important means of considering 
my responses to the information I was gathering and reflecting on my own attitudes in 
the process of understanding and interpreting their meaning. For example, this 
included reassessing an initial assumption that human rights discourse was being 
devalued for social activists in Mexico’s partial democracy. This type of reflection 
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indicates my efforts to engage with the content of the interviews and challenge my 
beliefs, ensuring my analysis was based on the interview data.  
 
In addition to the fieldwork diary, I also kept a digital research journal throughout the 
research project. This provided a forum for reflecting on reading, research data, new 
information, assumptions and analytical frameworks. This included examining my 
position in relation to these developing thought processes underlying the research.  
 
Another means of reappraising interviews to increase neutrality toward the content, 
was in the process of transcribing and translating. As part of this process I exhaustively 
scrutinised the audio recordings of the interviews and transcriptions. This also revealed 
instances where my interventions in the interviews were overly leading or where I 
failed to pick up and follow-up on an issue that the interviewee raised. It was generally 
not possible to revisit these issues with interviewees given the constraints of field 
research timetable, but this systematic review of the material enabled a more 
detached reading of the interviews in the process of detecting key themes and 
associations. This was also reinforced with writing memos or short texts to explore and 
explain themes. These memos also included reflections on my assumptions and 
expectations in relation to the interviews and issues.  
 
In conclusion, the awareness of my identity, biography and outlook, not only prevented 
these dimensions shaping the project unwittingly, but positively contributed to the 
quality of the research. They facilitated access to a range of participants and ensured a 
rigorous but sensitive approach to gathering data. In addition, they helped stimulate 
reflexive practices to interrogate my assumptions and biases, contributing to the 
development of a robust analysis and conclusions.  
  Research design and implementation 
The objective of the research project was to inductively explore the roles of human 
rights discourse and digital and social media practices in the dynamic social processes 
of three social movements engaged in political challenges to institutional 
powerholders. The research method was designed to engage with the plural 
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experiences and perspectives of those involved in the movements. I wanted to 
understand how movement actors interpreted and made meaningful their practices as 
part of collective political contestation and how human rights discourse and digital and 
social media featured in this process. Despite not seeking to develop a grounded theory 
to account for these processes (Glaser et al. 1967), it was important to ensure the data 
gathered was rooted in the context and addressed how different actors understood 
these complex social processes and their roles in contributing to mobilization. 
 
To do this I chose qualitative semi-structured interviews of a selected sample of 
participants in each social movement and close observers to explore the subjective 
understandings and interpretations of the movement practices and how they related 
to the wider context.185 The table below provides a brief description and rational for 
the selection of the three cases in relation to the research questions and the field of 
study. 
 
Social 
Movement 
Participants 
in 
movements 
Primary 
locations 
Social 
media 
platform 
Human 
rights  
Discourse 
Rational 
Movement 
for Peace 
with 
Justice and 
Dignity 
(MPJD) 
(March 
2011 – 
2013) 
Relatives of 
disappeared 
and killed, 
human 
rights 
activists, 
social 
activists, 
Faith based 
groups, 
trade 
Mexico City 
Morelos 
Chihuahua 
Coahuila 
Nuevo León 
Guerrero 
Michoacán 
USA 
 
Facebook, 
YouTube 
Twitter 
Limited 
but 
incipient 
use of 
social 
media. 
Demands 
for justice 
victims of 
violence 
and peace.  
First major 
grass roots 
movement of 
victims of 
violence 
enjoying mass 
support and 
targeting 
government’s 
on ‘war on 
drugs’. Aimed 
                                                        
185 Patton (1999) suggests the most important issue is ensuring an appropriate fit between field of study, 
research questions and method. 
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unions, 
independent 
journalists, 
network of 
national and 
global 
solidarity.  
to legitimize 
the status of 
victims and 
their struggle 
for justice. 
Yosoy132 
(May- Dec 
2012) 
Students 
and young 
social 
activists.  
Mexico City, 
university 
students 
across 
Mexico, 
international 
student 
network and 
activist 
diaspora.   
Twitter 
YouTube 
Facebook 
 
Creative 
use of 
social 
media. 
Protest 
against 
biased 
electoral 
and media 
processes. 
Human 
rights in 
background. 
First full social 
media 
facilitated 
movement 
promoting 
participation 
and 
challenging 
institutional 
settlement. 
Ayotzinapa 
43 (Sept 
2014 – 
present) 
Parents of 
43 
disappeared 
student 
teachers and 
survivors. 
Human 
rights 
activists, 
local social 
movements, 
trade 
unions, 
national and 
Guerrero, 
Mexico City, 
International 
solidarity 
actions. 
Twitter, 
YouTube 
Facebook 
Instagram 
 
Integral 
use of 
social 
media in 
multiple 
movement 
actions. 
Demand for 
truth and 
justice and 
resisting 
government 
efforts to 
misdirect 
and close 
the case. 
National and 
international 
solidarity. The 
case exposed 
State 
involvement 
in violence 
and impunity. 
The 
movement 
united diverse 
groups in 
support of 
families 
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global 
solidarity 
support. 
challenging 
powerholders. 
Table 1: Primary features of the social movements and reasons for selection. 
 
This case study approach was adopted to enable ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 2003, p13). This 
allowed me to examine not only how individuals and groups used human rights 
discourse and digital and social media but also how they understood these practices 
and the meaning for the movements in relation to the socio-political context. This 
exploration of subjective meaning is also crucial to understanding how and why human 
beings interpret facilitating and constraining social relations to motivate or demotivate 
their actions, including taking part in collective contentious mobilization.186   
 
I used purposive sampling to select interviewees. Identifying and recruiting participants 
was initially through my existing network of contacts and facilitating intermediaries. 
This process was also supported by use of data analytics of movement related Twitter 
activity to identify some bridging actors in movement networks who I approached 
through my network contacts. In some instances, I also used snowball or chain 
sampling (Merriam 2009) to recruit new participants performing different roles in the 
                                                        
186 Another reason for using qualitative interviews is that primary data is not available from other sources 
(Mason 2002). In this case, social movements rarely maintain records about internal processes, 
particularly in relation to decision-making, strategic practice and shifting alliances. The primary events 
under investigation in relation to the three movements had taken place previously to the field research. 
As a result, other methods of gathering data on public events, such as participant observation were not 
available. The exception to this was the Ayotzinapa 43 movement which remained relatively active in 
March 2016 enabling observation of the monthly protest in Mexico City involving family members and 
supporters. However, this isolated event did not allow a more generalized use of the method. I also 
examined the possibility of using internet data sources and social media platforms to carry out digital 
social network analysis and other digital data analysis tools on the patterns of social media use relating 
to the movement networks. However, after evaluating these approaches I concluded that these more 
quantitative methods focused on digital traces of social media activity would not probe how users 
understood and reflected on the social media practices. 
 113 
movements.187 My biography and recognition among relevant actors also encouraged 
trust among new contacts and potential participants, enabling me to secure consent 
and involvement in the project.  
 
In general, I selected participants with a mid-range level of movement involvement, 
rather than movement leaders. This was to limit the risk of more reductive self-
validating reflections of those responsible for strategic movement decision-making. It 
also enabled me to interview participants with more activist outlooks, engaged with 
diverse communicative and strategic practices, but less implicated in the specific public 
profile of the movement. I also selected close observers who had followed the 
movements, mainly as journalists and academics. This provided a more critical outsider 
perspective to check against the movement insider views. However, I did not seek out 
directly hostile perspectives toward the movements as this would have shifted the 
research away from understanding the dynamics of meaning-making within the 
movements and independent civil society.  
 
I grouped the participants into different categories depending on the roles they 
performed in relation to the movements: 
 
Abbreviation  Role 
A   Academic 
CSS   Civil society solidarity supporter 
DA   Digital activist 
IGO   Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) observer   
IMJ   Independent media journalist 
J   Journalist 
NGOP   Human rights NGO professional 
NGOCP  Human rights NGO communications professional 
PA   Political or social activist 
                                                        
187 Despite concerns that snowballing can lead to the recruitment of likeminded interviewees, two 
recruits I reached through this process expressed surprise that they had been recommended by the 
previous interviewee given their difficult relationship and contrasting perspectives.  
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S   Student 
SA   Student activist 
V   Victim/relative/survivor 
 
In some instances, these roles changed, particularly when actors were involved in 
different movements.188 However, this enriched the quality of the interviews as 
participants could reflect on their experiences and perspectives developed over time 
and in relation to the practices of different movements. 
 
The 30 qualitative interviews involved 33 participants (21 men and 12 women), all but 
one was conducted in Mexico City. Each lasted between 1.30 to 2 hours. They were 
oriented to get at the participants ‘knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations, 
experiences, and interactions’ (Mason 2002, p63). In the process of developing my 
research questions, I identified key issues to address, preparing a list of themes and 
questions in line with Patton’s ‘interview guide’ (2002, p343). However, I remained 
flexible to facilitate open-ended fluid responses and discussion of emerging issues. This 
allowed a detailed exploration of the social processes involved from the subjective 
point of view of the interviewee, enabling evaluations, contradictions, misgivings, 
hopes and disappointments to be aired and examined but not necessarily resolved. 
This included participants who had invested emotional, moral and physical energy into 
the mobilizations, but who had also come to recognize inconsistencies and flaws in the 
processes. These did not invalidate the experiences, but they added an important level 
of reflection about the movement dynamics. As Mason (2002) observes, qualitative 
interviewing is about gathering data with an ‘emphasis on depth, nuance, complexity 
and roundness’ (p66).  
 
In the preparations for interviews, I built trust through preparatory email and phone 
conversations. This was partly to assist a smooth and fully informed consent process, 
                                                        
188 In the data chapters, a code of two or three letters is used to anonymise the identity of the 
interviewee responsible for the particular quote. This code is then followed by an abbreviation for the 
particular role or roles of the interviewee. For example, (LT/PA/IMJ) refers to the anonymised author of 
the quote and then his/her roles as Political Activist and Independent Media Journalist. 
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but also to ensure clarity about the interview and confidence in me as a researcher. 
This included explaining the nature of the research, the reasons for the interview, my 
knowledge and experience of Mexico, the differences to my previous role as human 
rights researcher-advocate, the procedures to ensure safe handling of data gathered 
and the hoped-for outcomes of the interview and the overall project. In addition, I 
demonstrated awareness of security concerns that some social activists face in Mexico. 
This included evaluating interview locations and times to ensure that they were 
compatible with the safety criteria of the interviewees as well as my own fieldwork 
security protocols. The upfront and open discussion of these consent, ethics and 
security issues helped the process of developing confidence and quality of the 
interviews.  
 
An important feature of qualitative interviewing from a constructivist outlook is that 
meanings and understandings are generated through the interaction between 
researcher and participant in a co-production process rather than simply disclosing pre-
existing reflections.189 To generate this climate, there needs to be respect, trust and 
rapport between interviewer and interviewee/s (Patton 2002). As observed above, in 
this regard my fluent Spanish, biography and knowledge of contexts facilitated positive 
connections which enriched the interviews and the quality of the data. I was also 
sensitive to dynamics when an interviewee lost this confidence, enabling me to take 
measures to rebuild trust. For example, when an interviewee became slightly agitated 
about some of my questions, I detected this was due to suspicions about my motives 
for exploring issues related to the internal dynamics of a movement. I was aware of the 
sensitivity of these issues for movement participants and was able to reassure him that 
I was not seeking details or identities, but rather general reflections which would not 
harm him or the movement. This enabled the interview to continue productively. 
 
It is also important to note that during the course of fieldwork, as I settled into the 
rhythm and style of academic qualitative interviews, I gained confidence in my own 
                                                        
189 However, I do not subscribe to a radical constructivist approach which constrains the limits of 
knowledge to the interview itself, rather than illuminating the wider social relations referred to in the 
interview (Miller et al. 2001). 
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approach.190 This included appreciating the differences between the advocacy-
oriented interviews conducted for AI, compared to a social science approach to 
qualitative interviewing. In particular, this allowed for a nuanced exploration of 
experience and beliefs, encouraging interviewees to reflect on aspects of activism that 
were contradictory or not necessarily central to their strategic outlooks or 
expectations. This also strengthened my own reflexive practice, facilitating 
consideration of my position in relation to the interviewee and in the co-production 
process of qualitative interviewing, rather than the more fact-finding mind-set of 
advocacy research.  
 
I documented the interviews with a digital audio recorder and took written 
contemporaneous notes. I used both to type up my notes onto a laptop in the evening 
which facilitated initial thinking about the content of the interview as well as my own 
interview technique, encouraging a flexibility grounded in the experience of the 
interviews and the emerging patterns of information.191 This process fed into 
subsequent interviews, both in terms of issues and ideas to address, but also methods 
to successfully building rapport. This was also supported by entries in my fieldwork 
diary.  
 
                                                        
 
 
191 This also helped me adjust my approach to emerging patterns in the data. For example, my initial 
expectation was that digital and social media practices would be seen in terms of making movement 
human rights claims. Instead, interviewees regarded these as separate processes contributing to the 
movement in different respects and only converging at particular points. This led me to adjust the 
research questions to maintain a separation between understanding the meaning of human rights 
discourse for the movement and ways in which digital and social media was meaningful in the 
mobilization process, and only looking in the latter stages of the interviews to reflect on the points of 
convergence. Another shift in my approach in response to the interviews and initial analysis was to 
change from an exclusive focus on social media to one including other forms of digital media. This 
reflected the outlook of most interviewees who regarded social media platforms, messengering services, 
webpages, blogs, email and other forms of digital communication as a continuum, where social media 
interaction was one feature of practice but did not reflect the integrated way that many activists used 
the technology in the mobilization process. 
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Reflecting on potential bias in the case selection and recruitment process, the choice 
of the three social movements was based on their relevance to the national political 
agenda and differing uses of human rights discourse and digital and social media. 
However, the dissimilarity of the YoSoy132 movement with regard the other two 
movements also constituted a form ‘deviant case analysis’ (Ritchie & Lewis 2003, 
p275), enabling features of the two other movements to emerge more clearly. The 
recruitment of interviewees was not based exclusively on specialisation in human 
rights or social media as I also sought the perspective of others who observed these 
processes with more detachment. While acknowledging that the sample group of 30 
interviews could have been more extensive, I also found that in the latter stages of the 
fieldwork, interviewee contributions and attitudes were repeated. This suggested a 
level of ‘data saturation’, a marker to indicate a full dataset (Bryman 2012, p425).  
 
In addition to qualitative interviews during fieldwork, I gathered supporting data 
through qualitative content analysis (Bryman 2012) of specific texts and audio-visual 
documents produced by the social movements online or circulated in the media. I also 
examined selected online media and social media coverage of specific movement 
events, particularly those referred to during qualitative interviews, for example in 
relation to MPJD marches and caravans, YoSoy132 public protests and Ayotzinapa 
actions, such as ‘Fue El Estado’ and #yamecanse. This provided supplementary text and 
audio-visual information to triangulate with data gathered during the interviews. 
 
4.3.1 Data analysis and framework method 
My approach to analysis of the data was to systematise the information, including an 
intense process of familiarization and classification. This gradually facilitated the 
detection of patterns and associations which in turn yielded a framework for 
understanding different and shared aspects of the movements. This section examines 
this process, highlighting those elements that demonstrate how the analytical 
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approach and findings were grounded in the data and developed on the basis of 
methodical analysis.192   
 
The process of familiarization and systematization involved transcribing 30 audio files 
of the interviews into written Spanish. This ensured the accuracy of the transcriptions 
and facilitated a deepening understanding of the content. The process of revision and 
checking against my original notes, enabled me to detect initial mishearings or false 
assumptions. This allowed me to pick up more clearly on the tone as well as content of 
the interviews.  
 
In order to categorise the interview transcripts, I developed a basic handwritten list of 
issues covered in each interview. I then used computer-aided qualitative data analysis 
software (CAQDAS), Nvivo 11.4.1, to support this process, extending and refining the 
coding categories to reflect the different aspects of the interview content. The 
software facilitated the sifting and labelling of research material, including the flexible 
alterations to the classification index – which ultimately resulted in more than 100 
classification codes. This enabled the transcripts to be rapidly and dynamically 
regrouped according to themes to assist the process of making comparisons and 
distinctions, but also ensuring my analysis remained rooted in the detail of the research 
data. This also facilitated reflection on possible alternative interpretation of the data 
to check its correspondence with the research material (Yin 2009). For example, I 
considered the extent to which YoSoy132 was a human rights-focused movement and 
how this fitted with the evidence I had gathered from participants. The rapid grouping 
of coded text on this issue meant I could check how far it was reflected in interviewee 
                                                        
192 The extent to which classic criteria of quantitative research methods, particularly validity, reliability 
and generalizability should or can be applied to qualitative research has been widely debated 
(Hammersley 1992). Lincoln & Guba (1985) argue that a better approach is establishing trustworthiness 
of research constituted through credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability (p43). 
Mason (2002) sticks as close as possible to the standards of validity, reliability and generalizability, while 
Lewis and Ritchie (2003) suggest slightly broader evaluating categories of “sustainable” and “well-
grounded” (p270-272), proposing questions for researchers to check the reliability of their research. 
These include: a) Was the sample selection without bias and did it adequately reflect the target 
population? b) Was the fieldwork consistent? c) Was the analysis systematic and comprehensive? d) Are 
interpretations supported by the evidence? and, e) Did the design allow equal opportunities for different 
perspectives to emerge? 
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responses. The thematic reorganization of data enabled ideas and assumption to be 
challenged and verified in relation to aggregated evidence in the data. This facilitated 
a consistency in the treatment of emerging ideas and ensured they were grounded in 
the data.  
 
I am aware that using CAQDAS to support analysis is not without critiques.193 However, 
I found Nvivo facilitated making connections across a wide range of texts while 
ensuring each micro section of text was immediately visible within its original setting. 
I was aware of concerns that CAQDAS could have shaping influences in the research 
process, but found that the labelling and sorting functions did not impose a particular 
mind-set. By enabling rapid regrouping of data, it facilitated the process of seeing 
patterns and associations, but did not determine those comparisons and distinctions. 
It increased the flexibility of data configuration, facilitating the rethinking of categories.  
 
It is also important to note that I maintained my research journal throughout the 
process to reflect on the classification and analysis stages. I also used A4 and A3 paper 
to jot down ideas, possible connections, pictorial mind maps and alternative thematic 
matrices to facilitate the process of analysis alongside Nvivo. This enabled me to try 
out, visualise and test ideas which were not constrained by the design of the software 
package. These dual processes contributed to the development of my categories of 
analysis which remained rooted in a sensitive and thoughtful interpretation of the 
qualitative interviews.  
 
Framework method (Ritchie et al. 2003) includes summarizing or synthesizing the 
classified or grouped data in order to distil its main features. Using digital and 
handwritten memos and notes, this enabled me to methodically identify and formulate 
                                                        
193 Mason (2002) points to the risks of CAQDAS imposing quantitative type approaches on the treatment 
of the data, undermining some of the complex, context-based interpretive nuance of qualitative 
research. Bryman (2012) also notes that CAQDAS software has been criticized for excessively 
fragmenting research data and delinking it from its context, jeopardizing key attributes of qualitative 
research. However, he also notes that developments in software flexibility have also enabled these links 
not to be lost and also that the capacity to make new cross-sectional links can facilitate the identification 
of patterns and associations. 
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categories which corresponded to particular features of the movement dynamics as 
reflected in the participant interviews. This use of framework method did not seek to 
resolve the plurality of perspectives, but reflected the diverse ways human rights 
discourse and digital and social media were understood in the unfolding movement 
mobilization process. This restricted the development of more abstracted analytical 
models to interpret the movements, but it kept analysis and findings on the 
movements grounded in the plural dynamics of the mobilization and its context. 
 
My initial approach to classifying data was to label references to human rights 
discourse and digital and social media according to how different societal fields related 
to the mobilization processes. This meant labelling sections of transcripts in relation to 
four dimensions: a) wider society, b) in the news media environment, c) in institutional 
attitudes, and d) in internal social movement approaches. I then considered these 
features in terms of how they were understood as enabling and constraining 
mobilization according to uses of human right discourse and digital and social media.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wider society 
Institutions/ 
powerholders 
Within Social 
movement 
Media 
environment 
Human 
rights 
Digital and 
social 
media 
Constraining Enabling 
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Table 2: Initial framework for organizing research data. 
 
This allowed the context of the mobilization, particularly the constraining and 
facilitating features to emerge more strongly in relation to human rights and digital and 
social media. However, this classification system gradually evolved with the iterative 
process of reading and rereading interviews to identify what the interviewee was trying 
to say in relation to the research questions. This led to a gradual shift away from this 
more structural view of the constraining and enabling features of the context to an 
analysis focuses on the narrative or sequential processes involved in the mobilization 
and the contributing/limiting features of human rights discourse and digital and social 
media. This reflected how participants understood the emerging meaning and 
significance of the movements as they engaged with the world and coalesced into a 
political force. It also revealed how human rights discourse and digital and social media 
were understood as particular but not defining features of this process.  
 
This analysis developed on the basis an organic process, with several false steps in 
which ideas for interpretive schema failed to adequately reflect the data. For example, 
at one point I focused on dimensions of the emancipatory potential of human rights 
discourse and compared these to emancipatory ideas in relation to digital and social 
media, but the data showed that interviewees did not consider human rights or digital 
and social media in these more theoretical or idealised terms. They were much more 
engaged with their practical uses and implications and how these related to the day-
to-day of the contentious politics of the movements.  
 
As a result, the narrative analysis of the movements was better suited to reflect how 
movements engaged with human rights discourse and digital and social media. The 
seven categories in the table below are the cross-sectional themes adopted to analyse 
the movements’ practices in the subsequent data chapters. These are then developed 
fully in discussion chapter nine.  
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 Human Rights discourse Digitally networked 
communications 
environment, particularly 
social media 
 
Context 
  
 
 
Trigger event 
  
 
 
Movement Networks 
  
 
Movement mobilizing  
narrative/frames 
  
 
Participant agency 
  
 
Articulation of plural 
movement actors 
   
 
Challenges and threats  
  
Table 3: Thematic framework to analyse features of social movement mobilizations. 
 
4.3.2 Transcription and data management  
I managed the research data according to the Policy on Good Research and Innovation 
Practices (GRIP) to ensure its integrity and security during fieldwork in Mexico and in 
the UK. 
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The digital audio recordings and typed-up notes of interviews were stored on a 
password protected laptop and google drive storage provided by University of 
Sheffield. The identities of the participants were anonymised by use of coded 
abbreviations. Other digital materials gathered during the course of research, such as 
relevant media and social media outputs, were also held in password protected 
storage.  
 
The interviews were transcribed in full on my return from Mexico, but not translated 
into English. The transcriptions were stored digitally on password protected laptop and 
in the cloud. I kept a fieldwork journal in note form which I referred to throughout the 
process of data analysis. The laptop and journal were stored at my home in a secure 
location.  
 
I have ensured that all data is preserved in digital format and is available for peer 
review. The University of Sheffield will receive all research data in digital form as 
stipulated in GRIP guidelines and abiding by the UK Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA). All 
data related to the project will be destroyed after 10 years. 
 
 Ethical Consideration 
Ethical considerations underpinned the research. I followed the guidelines and polices 
of the University of Sheffield: ‘Ethics Policy Governing Research Involving Human 
Participants, Personal Data and Human Tissue’ and ‘Policy on good Research and 
Innovative practice’ (GRIP). I consulted closely with my supervisors in preparations for 
and during my fieldwork in relation to ethical practice. I also drew on my own 
experience in Mexico and as a human rights researcher to assess safety and security 
issues as well as maintaining respectful relations with contacts and participants in the 
research. 
 
I was particularly sensitive to the importance of ensuring that my activities did not 
cause harm, albeit unintended, to potential participants or myself as a result of 
participating in research. I chose not to approach potentially vulnerable participants 
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who were direct victims or relatives of victims of grave human rights violations in order 
to avoid possible re-traumatization or misunderstanding about the scope of my 
research – given my previous activist research role. The few exceptions to this rule 
were based on an assessment that their status as activists had reduced their 
vulnerability to re-traumatization as victims or survivors, and that that they were not 
at risk of misunderstanding my role. This decision-making involved consultation with 
trusted NGO experts who had long relationships with the potential participants and 
who understood their process of reintegration after the trauma of becoming victims 
and their experiences as activists.  
 
In all cases where I felt that interviewees either knew me in my previous role with AI 
or might have known of me, I was careful to explain the difference in the research I was 
undertaking and asked to be informed of any concerns that occurred to the participant 
resulting from their involvement in the research. I have not so far received any negative 
or concerning feedback.  
 
In order to ensure the prior informed consent of participants I prepared an information 
sheet and consent form in Spanish which I shared and discussed before the meeting. 
We then arranged to conduct the meeting in a safe and convenient place and time for 
the participant, usually a public space such as a café or the offices of an NGO in daylight 
hours. Prior to starting, I presented the information sheet and consent letter in detail, 
checking to ensure that participants understood the nature of the research, their role, 
the confidentiality of information obtained and how it would be used. The information 
sheet explained the commitment to anonymise all contributions with the exception 
that should I wish to make any direct quotes I would seek further authorization (I 
subsequently determined that I would maintain all quotes as anonymous for 
consistency and to avoid unnecessary identification of particular participants). I also 
informed them of the audio recording and their right to halt and withdraw from the 
meeting at any point and for materials obtained thus far to be destroyed. In the event, 
this was never necessary. On this basis, they granted their written consent, signing the 
form provided.  
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All but one of the interviews during the fieldwork were carried out in Mexico City – the 
other took place in Puebla. Due to my previous experience of working in Mexico, I was 
aware that violent crime is a feature of daily life. However, many parts of Mexico City 
remain relatively safe and interviews were only conducted in those areas participants 
and researcher considered were sufficiently safe. I considered travelling to Guerrero 
state to interview participants involved at local level in the Ayotzinapa 43 movement, 
but given the serious violence affecting the state and potential risks for those involved 
in human rights defence work or political activism, I decided to conduct interviews in 
Mexico City when available participants were visiting the city. I travelled to Puebla for 
an overnight stay to interview one participant, but this raised no additional security 
concerns. 
 
My experience as human rights research also ensured I was aware of and took 
precautions to avoid risks to my personal safety during the fieldwork. For example, I 
avoided taking taxis on the street, being out unnecessarily at night and kept away from 
more unsafe neighbourhoods. I remained in regular email and skype contact with my 
supervisors throughout the fieldwork, updating and consulting with them on my 
activities, plans and precautions.   
 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated how the methodology adopted was consistent with my 
constructivist outlook and the research questions. This involved an interpretative 
approach to knowledge about the social world, particularly the contested and 
negotiated dynamics of meaning-making in and around social movements. I 
acknowledge my reflexive position in relation to the research, but also point out how 
this positively contributed to the quality of the research practice and data. The 
qualitative design was based on 30 semi-structured interviews exploring different 
participant practices and perspectives, probing their subjective feelings and thoughts 
which rooted the data in their intersubjective understanding of the socio-political 
context. The selection of movements forms a nexus of contention around features of 
Mexico’s flawed democratic transition, and root the data in the meaning of these 
challenges to powerholders. The range of recruits also represented diverse forms of 
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participation in and observation of these social processes. However, I also acknowledge 
that the constraints of a single researcher with limited resources and time inevitably 
restricts the scope of the data gathering. The process of transcription, rereading and 
organization of data enabled familiarization. This was the basis for developing a flexible 
inductive analysis to address my research questions, keeping close to the thick 
descriptions of the data and the meaning-making of the movements. I also repeatedly 
checked back against the data to ensure the coherence and correspondence of the 
analysis and was also challenged by my supervisors. These measures ensured a 
systematic and reflective methodology to develop a framework analysis attuned to the 
qualities of the data. As a result, the findings of this research remain rooted in the 
context and the experiences of participation in the three social movements.  
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 Chapter  
The social movement case studies 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter describes in more detail the cycle of contention and repertoire of actions 
(McAdam et al. 2003; Tilly 2004) of each movement, locating these within the socio-
political context and reflecting on some of their significance and impacts in Mexico’s 
partial democracy.194 It looks at the multiple contextual uses and understandings of 
human rights discourse in relation to each movement. This includes serving as a 
normative aspiration; as a critical tool for understanding and recognising abuses of 
power and neglect; as an orienting set of skills and practices; as legitimised legal 
framework for engaging state responsibilities and attracting international solidarity, as 
a grassroots self-asserting claim to challenge injustice, but also as a co-opted 
technocratic and expert discourse to simulate institutional compliance and steer 
movements into demobilizing negotiation.  
 
In relation to digital a social media, the chapter outlines particular features of the news 
environment and practices involved in each movement. This includes the process of 
rapid mobilization, dissemination of alternative narratives, leverage of mainstream 
media and the development of emotional and connective engagement of participants 
(Bennett et al. 2013; Papacharissi 2015), but also the growing range of counter uses of 
digital media to undermine the movements.  
 
 Movimiento por la Paz con Justicia y Dignidad (MPJD)  
The MPJD emerged April 2011 to challenge the crisis of violence and human rights 
violations which had spread across the country as a result of Calderón’s ‘war on drug 
trafficking’. It was a solidaristic response triggered by a personal tragedy caused by the 
violence. This turned into a collective effort to reassert democratic and civic values of 
                                                        
194 The accounts of each movement are based on contemporary media reports, fieldwork interviews, the 
movement materials available on line as well as academic and human rights literature.  
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human rights through networked support for the thousands of stigmatised victims 
abandoned by the state. The movement changed the national political dynamic, 
asserting the victims’ claims for respect and dignity. However, it struggled to develop 
an organizational and strategic cohesion to reflect the more transformative aspirations 
of the diverse movement elements as well as resist the demobilizing effects of 
institutional engagement.  
 
On 28 March 2011, the bodies of six murdered men and a woman were found in a car 
in Temixco, a town near Cuernavaca, Morelos state. The authorities routinely 
suggested such killings were the result of turf wars between rival drug gangs, with little 
further information to contest this assumption of criminal involvement of the dead or 
disappeared. However, in this instance news rapidly spread in the media that one of 
the victims was 24-year-old Juan Francisco Sicilia Ortega, son of national poet and 
public intellectual, Javier Sicilia. He was a regular contributor to the left-wing daily La 
Jornada and weekly Proceso magazine. Friends and sympathisers spontaneously 
established a memorial shrine (ofrenda) to his son in Cuernavaca on the same day and 
held a 500 strong candle-lit march the next day demanding justice and an end to the 
violence. This was an instinctive response based on latent outrage and civic impotence 
at the spreading violence, human rights violations and omission of the authorities, 
which seemed to rely on stigmatising the victims rather than holding perpetrators to 
account.  
 
These early improvised responses, including expressions of outrage on social media, 
gained a visible direction and leadership on 1 April when Javier Sicilia called Mexicans 
onto the streets to demand justice and an end to the violence.195 On 3 April, Proceso 
magazine published a Javier Sicilia article, ‘Estamos Hasta La Madre (We’ve had it up 
to here), and declaring, ‘Ya Basta!’ (Enough!), echoing the slogan of the 1994 Zapatista 
                                                        
195 Javier Sicilia had been out of the country at the time of his son’s killing, with the initial actions 
mounted in his absence. On his return, he established a protest presence in central Cuernavaca refusing 
to leave until the authorities made advances in the investigation. He also publicly stated that he could 
no longer write poetry, symbolically silenced by the tragedy, but also an act of resistance against 
impunity.    
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rebellion.196 He called for a march of National Emergency on 6 April and for citizens to 
unite in a Network for Peace and Justice (Red por la Paz y Justicia). On 6 April, 9 days 
after the discovery of the Juan Francisco’s body, 40,000 people protested on the streets 
of 20 Mexican cities and in various locations around the world. Digitally networked 
connectivity played an important role in organizing these initiatives and recruiting 
widely distributed participants. 
 
The group of supporters around Javier Sicilia, such as Pietro Ameglio, were leading 
advocates of progressive grassroots catholic social activism. However, they were not 
digitally adept, but they encouraged wide participation, including of younger activists 
and sympathisers to use digital skills to promote the incipient movement and create 
the basic infrastructure of digital support.197 As Treré & Cargnelutti (2014) have noted, 
digital networking assisted recruitment, coordination and information sharing, which 
reinforced the mobilizing sentiments of the movement. However, use of interactive 
web 2.0 features, including deliberative practices, associated with new forms of digital 
counter-power movements (Castells 2009a) did not feature strongly in the practices of 
MPJD. 
 
Online and offline network connections widened as Javier Sicilia’s street protest gained 
media and social media attention. Other relatives of the killed and disappeared as well 
as activist sympathisers, artists and public intellectuals travelled to Cuernavaca to show 
their support. This included well-known human rights activists such as Emilio Álvarez 
Icaza, who was the former Human Rights Ombudsman for Mexico City. Human rights 
NGOs with links to these activists and Javier Sicilia, such as Centro National de 
Comunicación Social (CENCOS) and Servicios y Asesoría para la Paz (SERAPAZ), also 
became involved. Trade Unions in dispute with the government provided support as 
did progressive students, some religious representatives and faith-groups. In line with 
resource mobilization theory, these actors contributed organizational and resource 
                                                        
196 He received support from scores of artists in a public letter in La Jornada newspaper. Subcomandante 
Marcos, a Zapatista leader, also published a public letter of support. 
197 For example, Javier Sicilia was assisted in posting YouTube messages critiquing the ‘war’ and calling 
for civil society mobilization. 
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capacity as well as mobilization and communications skills to enable a small 
spontaneous show of solidarity to develop into a movement with national scope and 
impact. 
 
In May, taking inspiration from the peaceful civic resistance repertoire of Gandhi and 
Martin Luther King, Javier Sicilia and the Network for Peace and Justice led a three-day 
National March for Peace to Mexico City. This symbolically translated the provincial 
protest onto the national stage. In front of approximately 100,000 people in Mexico 
City’s Zócalo, Sicilia made a passionate call for civil society to unite to renew the nation:  
 
‘hagamos un silencio más de 5 minutos en memoria de nuestros 
muertos, de la sociedad cercada por la delincuencia y un Estado 
omiso, y como una señal de la unidad y de la dignidad de nuestros 
corazones que llama a todos a refundar la Nación. Hagámoslo así 
porque el silencio es el lugar en donde se recoge y brota la palabra 
verdadera, es la hondura profunda del sentido, es lo que nos hermana 
en medio de nuestros dolores, es esa tierra interior y común que 
nadie tiene en propiedad y de la que, si sabemos escuchar, puede 
nacer la palabra que nos permita decir otra vez con dignidad y una paz 
justa el nombre de nuestra casa: México’ (Sicilia 2011a). 198 
  
This poetic and emotive discourse can be interpreted in terms of Gamson’s (1992) 
framing elements for a mobilizing narrative: 1) naming the injustice of society under 
attack leading to the death of loved ones 2) labelling criminals and the state as 
responsible, 3) invoking the ‘we’ consciousness of unified suffering of ordinary citizen 
victims and civil society, and, 4) identifying the solution as re-founding society on the 
basis of peace and dignity (Johnston et al. 2005). The spiritual intensity of his language 
                                                        
198 ‘let’s be silent for 5 minutes in memory of our dead, of a society besieged by criminals and a negligent 
State, and as a sign of the unity and of the dignity of our hearts that calls on everyone to refound the 
nation. Let’s be like that because the silence is a place which gathers and produces the word of truth, it 
is the deep depths of emotion, it is what makes us brothers and sisters in the midst of our pain, it is that 
interior mutual ground that is no one’s property, and which if we know how to listen, can give birth to 
the word that allows us to say once again with dignity and a just peace, the name of our house: Mexico’ 
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strived to engage his audience beyond the traditional discourse of politics, invoking the 
normative aspiration of peace and respect and making civil society, not the institutional 
order, the active agent of transformation.  
 
This was articulated in a National Pact for Peace and Justice which focused demands 
on the immediate needs of victims, but also a range of structural deficits of Mexico’s 
violent and partial democracy. 199 This broader agenda addressing the causes, not just 
the consequences of the violence. This encouraged diverse actors to participate 
directly, including solidarity activists hoping for structural change not only justice for 
the victims.  
 
The next stage of the movement was to physically connect diverse networks and show 
to the wider public those regions and people most affected by the violence: where 
victims had no voice and were made invisible to the rest of society due to the violence 
and media self-censorship. On 4 June, a civil society convoy of coaches and cars set off 
from Cuernavaca on the ‘Caravana del Consuelo’200 following the ‘ruta de dolor y de 
horror’201 (Sicilia 2011c) across the north of Mexico. This was part of the process of 
reframing the idea of the victims and forging links between them and with solidarity 
groups and human rights NGOs such as CADHAC and FUNDEC.202. A coach of journalists 
also accompanied the convoy to ensure national and international media coverage. 
The caravan was both expressive performance as well as strategic movement network 
building exercise, focusing public attention on the experience of the victims but also 
bringing multiple new actors into the movement and showing the potential of civic 
activism.203 Social media was used to keep the convoy’s activities in the public eye and 
                                                        
199 These were the six-points of the National Pact for Peace and Justice: 1) truth and justice for the 
victims; 2) replace the ‘war’ strategy with a focus on citizen security; 3) combat corruption and impunity; 
4) target money laundering and financial infrastructure of organized crime; 5) implement measures to 
address youth crisis and steps to reconstitute social cohesion; 6) strengthen participatory democracy 
and democratization of the media (Sicilia 2011a).  
200 Caravan of Consolation 
201 ‘Route of pain and of horror’ 
202 See section 2.9 for refence to these NGOs. In movement network terms, this process was a bridging 
and brokering exercise (Gallagher 2012) 
203 Later there were other caravans. This included one in September 2011 to Mexico’s southern states 
and one in August 2012 to the USA, which engaged in “citizen diplomacy” in coordination with a wide 
range of partner organizations to highlight the different dimensions of the US support for Mexico’s 
 132 
also help as a deterrent from potential attack. During stops, relatives of the 
disappeared and killed presented their cases to the caravan volunteers and some spoke 
on public platforms. They recounted emotional testimony of the personal impact of 
the violence, including refusal of public officials to investigate and, in some cases, of 
state agents directly implicated in abuses.204 In this dramatic process, the diverse range 
of victims and their demands for justice became the increasingly central frame of the 
movement narrative. 
 
Besides the mainstream media coverage of the caravan, digital activists updated 
Twitter Facebook including with links to YouTube footage of events and the testimony 
of leading movement victim-activists. Despite this innovative use of new media in some 
actions, the MPJD, with the support of CENCOS which assumed the primary external 
communications function of the mobilization, adopted a relatively traditional media 
strategy. It focused on securing positive mainstream media coverage to advance its 
strategy. As such, webpages and official social media platforms primarily served to 
drive information to the mainstream media and to provide a resource of movement 
audio-visual materials.  
 
As networks of human rights activists and lawyers became increasingly involved in the 
movement, including the caravans, human rights discourse served to make specific 
claims against the state. This appeal to human rights discourse served to identify the 
responsibility of the state for police and military abuses, but also the acquiescence or 
negligence of the state in failing to prevent or investigate abuses committed by non-
state actor criminals. This had the effect of treating victims of both sorts of abuse as 
human rights victims through the state’s denial of their right to protection, truth, 
access to justice and remedy (MPJD et al. 2011).205 This strengthened the relatives’ 
                                                        
“drugs war” and its impact on the civilian population, enacting dramatic artistic performances to 
represent the violence and the collusion of US institutions. 
204 The caravan to the north struggled to register and process more than 700 reports of abuses it received 
from family members 
205 Most previous civil society responses to crime and violence focused on insecurity, advocating 
traditional hard-line anti-crime measures by the state (Villagrin 2013), but did not adopt a human rights 
approach. An exception to this were campaigns against gender-based violence by feminists and human 
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right to demand justice not solely on behalf of their family member who was the direct 
victim. As a result, victims of diverse forms of violence could invoke the same rights to 
make their claims, regardless of the suspected perpetrator.206 Human rights NGOs 
participating in the MPJD used this approach to engage Mexico’s international 
responsibilities and reframe the violence to encourage international actors to better 
understand the state’s role. This increased pressure on the authorities to rethink their 
policy as well as to address the individual justice needs of the victims, particularly the 
right to truth and remedy. The latter became increasingly central to the movement as 
it demanded a General Law on Victims to instantiate the rights of victims of the 
violence.207 
 
However, this increasing focus on the victims also implied a narrowing of the MPJD 
identity, agenda and strategy. This raised unresolved tensions in the deliberations of 
the plural actors and groups which had initially participated in the movement coalition. 
These tensions led Javier Sicilia and Emilio Álvarez to assert a relatively narrow strategic 
leadership to commit the movement to early negotiations with the government. This 
quite traditional leadership was at odds with more horizontal, participatory and 
autonomist ideas of some of the movement participants.208 However, the primary 
                                                        
rights NGOs which focused on discrimination and the state’s lack of due diligence in terms of prevention 
and punishment of crimes.  
206 This largely avoided privileging one group of victims over another which had often divided groups of 
victims and approaches to justice and the state. It resisted the institutional logic that blamed the violence 
solely on unidentified criminal forces opposed to the state, which in turn legitimated militarised public 
security responses which produced new cycles of violence and human rights violations.  
207 The Calderón government resisted recognising human rights standards in relation to victims of 
criminals established in the proposed General Law on Victims. It considered this would imply the state 
was liable to some extent for crimes committed by non-state actors. But in many respects, this was 
precisely the point of the MPJD due to the state’s almost complete failure to prevent or punish either 
non-state actor or state actor violations. The reality for most victims, regardless of the perpetrator, was 
that they were denied truth, justice and reparations by the negligence or collusion of the state. 
Recognising their legal status as victims of human rights violations, in theory, instantiated the state’s 
responsibility to guarantee a range of rights which had previously not been recognised in relation to 
relatives of victims of non-state actor criminal violence. In addition, recognising the state’s liability also 
highlighted the interpenetration of criminal and state-actor interests which underlay much denial of 
access to justice. However, recognising this reality of intertwined relationships of criminal networks with 
a range of state actors called into question the very basis and wisdom of Calderon’s policy of militarised 
‘war’.  
208 These horizontal organizational features appeared more clearly in the Arab Spring, 15-M and Occupy 
movements, often facilitated by digital and social media practices of activists, but also ideological 
commitment to participatory practices (Castells 2013). 
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constituency of the MPJD were ordinary, usually older, citizens, both victims and 
solidarity activists, often with strong religious convictions. Most were not, at least 
initially, embedded in wider activist networks or practiced in digital and social media 
communications or focused on self-consciously developing new forms of political 
subjectivity to challenge the partial democracy. Their priority remained their cases not 
the configuration of the movement or its wider ideological orientation.  
 
On 23 June 2011, the Government of Felipe Calderón held high level Peace Dialogues 
with the MPJD, including several victims and diverse civil society participants in the 
movement.209 For the first time victims took centre stage in the national debate about 
the violence. The talks established four working groups covering the range of issues in 
the MPJD agenda, but only the victims-focused working groups made progress 
resulting in some government commitments.210  
 
Three months later, despite the government’s failure to fulfil its promises, the MPJD 
leadership agreed to new talks. However, on this occasion the government unilaterally 
invited representatives of civil society organizations allied to its own public security 
strategy, such as ‘Alto al Secuestro’. The government attempted to steer the public 
debate away from the MPJD’s agenda and re-legitimize the traditional crime fighting 
strategy of the ‘war’. Many MPJD relatives condemned the talks as a government 
public relations exercise. There were also increasing indications that the administration 
was trying to divide the movement by providing support to certain groups of victims 
and not others. 
 
                                                        
209 The Dialogues were held at the symbolic venue of Chapultepec National Palace under intense media 
attention.  
210 Refer to footnote 199 for the Pact for Peace. The other two structural working groups focused on the 
wide range of complex factors contributing to the violence, including democratic deficits, failed to make 
substantial progress. 
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In response to the government’s divide and rule tactics, refusal to recognise the rights 
of all victims, and the urgent need to secure concrete results for the relatives, the MPJD 
focused on lobbying the federal legislature to approve the proposed General Law on 
Victims. In April 2012, the campaign resulted in Congress approving the draft bill. 
Despite this, President Calderón refused to enact it, but in January 2013 the newly 
inaugurated PRI president, Peña Nieto, signed the bill into law.211 However, the wider 
political demands of the movement to address the drivers to the violence had been 
sidelined and the plurality of participating actors declined. Unlike some social 
movements, rather than tear itself apart, the MPJD gradually lost organic momentum. 
This allowed many of its key actors, such as regional groups of victims and relatives of 
the disappeared, to emerge. They increasingly adopting digital and social media in their 
own right to raise their profile. They continued to mobilize to press their particular 
demands against powerholders and coordinate with other groups and NGOs.212     
 
Some scholars have argued that the MPJD advocacy resulted in important and 
unprecedented public sphere deliberations with public policy outcomes, particularly in 
relation to the Peace Dialogues (Monsiváis Carrillo et al. 2014), citizen security and the 
General Law on Victims (Garza 2015). However, others argue that these institutional 
gains were illusory, drawing victims into a labyrinthine bureaucracy and weakening the 
                                                        
211 In 2013, the MPJD began to lose momentum for a variety of reasons. These included: a) personal and 
organizational exhaustion after two years relentless activism, b) the apparent success at securing its 
legislative objective, but also doubts about the impact of the new legislation, c) a new political agenda 
under the Peña Nieto government which avoided the polarizing language of “war” and superficially 
acceded to victims’ demands, d) victims’ need to focus attention on their own cases and the psycho-
social, judicial and economic situations, and e) increasing fragmentation of the movement and the 
difficulties of sustaining the coalition of different groups.   
212 From 2016, many of these groups participated in the Movement for our Disappeared in Mexico 
(Movimiento por Nuestros Desaparecidos en Mexico) which in in 2017 successfully secured congressional 
approval for a new law on enforced disappearance (Diario Oficial de la Federación 2017). 
On 28 November 2011, the danger faced by relatives seeking justice was illustrated 
when one of the MPJD’s most vocal activists, Nepomuceno Moreno, was gunned 
down. He had participated in many high profile public platforms, including the Peace 
Dialogues, to  demand justice for his disappeared son.  
 136 
movement’s contentious and agonistic demand for justice and social change (Estévez 
López 2015). Movement leaders have also reflected on these dynamics. For example, 
Pietro Ameglio (Ameglio 2016) highlighting the moral strength of the movement, but 
also some of its organizational and tactical weaknesses, particularly the lack of more 
horizontal decision-making and its unconditional engagement with the state. However, 
Javier Sicilia while stressing the moral force of the victims’ voice, has also pointed to 
the dilemma of peaceful social movements in Mexico’s partial democracy; in particular, 
the unavoidable trap of engaging with a legal system manipulated to serve elite 
interests and an electoral game that never delivers: ‘sólo tenemos esa ley para 
enfrentar el desastre. Es ella o nada’213 (Sicilia 2016, p17). The subsequent data chapter 
explores some of these complex dimensions in relation to the movement’s uses of 
human rights discourse and digital and social media. 
 
 YoSoy132 
The YoSoy132 student movement was a different type of mobilization. It irrupted in 
the middle of Mexico’s presidential election race in May 2012, challenging the 
seemingly predetermined return to power of the PRI. The movement has been 
analyzed as part of a global explosion in horizontal social media practices, facilitating 
participatory democratic protest (González Villarreal 2013; Rovira Sancho 2014). This 
is recognized as having a significant, but not decisive, impact on the presidential 
elections and on subsequent media legislation (Garcia et al. 2014). Its emergence was 
facilitated by increasingly embedded social media practices (Treré 2013), connecting a 
distributed and socially stratified student generation. This in turn enabled the rapid 
organization of actions online and offline (Meneses Rocha 2015) as well as the 
development of a collective identity (Garcia & Treré 2014, Treré 2015). The movement 
passed through several different stages, from its initial spontaneous outpouring of 
indignation at the political and media establishment, to expressive online and offline 
connective political performance, to mass deliberative experiment, to targeted public 
actions to increase the fairness of the elections, to efforts to construct a 
transformational national popular movement, and finally to becoming the object of 
                                                        
213 ‘we only have the law to stop the disaster. It is that or nothing’. 
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police repression and fractious fragmentation (Estrada 2014; Olivier et al. 2015). Above 
all, the movement was a convergence of young adults, enthused by the enactment of 
dynamic and creative protest, trying to transform how to do politics (Fernández 
Poncela 2014; Rovira Sancho 2014) in Mexico’s partial democracy as a post-Zapatista 
(Modonesi 2014) deliberative mobilization (Puyosa 2017). 
 
Scholarly focus has addressed its innovative digital media practices and the shifting 
political dynamics of an ideologically plural student movement. However, it has paid 
less attention to the role of human rights discourse in the mobilization process and also 
how uses of digital media constrained as well as facilitated the mobilization process. I 
selected YoSoy132 to explore these dimensions in more detail, particularly in contrast 
to the other two movements which are more clearly focused on victims of grave human 
rights violations. However, YoSoy132 can also be seen as an important element in the 
longer cycle of contention challenging democratic deficits. This was facilitated by 
interconnected networks of activists who participated in all three movements, learning 
new adaptive skills and practices in the process. In addition, like the other 
mobilizations, the trigger event and context are crucial to understanding its 
emergence. They are also key to understanding the mobilizing narrative and the focus 
on deliberative engagement aspiring to forms of political and social change beyond the 
traditional realm of human rights claims-making.  
  
YoSoy132’s trigger event occurred on 11 May 2012 when the PRI presidential 
candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto, held a hustings event at a major private catholic 
university in Mexico City, la Universidad Iberoamericana (henceforth, La Ibero). During 
the meeting, the candidate was heckled by members of the student audience. Banners 
included calls for him to face justice for human rights violations committed during his 
governorship of the State of Mexico (2005-2011). Rather than ignore the taunts, the 
candidate decided to respond, vigorously justifying the 2006 police operation in San 
Salvador Atenco which resulted in the sexual torture of women detainees.214 As the 
                                                        
214 The sexual violence was committed as part of a police operation under the governor’s authority and 
repeatedly covered up (Amnesty International 2006). As of 2018, the case was awaiting judgement 
before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
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chants against him increased, Pena Nieto left the hall. The university radio covering the 
event live, claimed (incorrectly) that he had fled humiliatingly into the toilets. Students 
used smart phones and social media to inform friendship groups. As Peña Nieto left 
hurriedly, a large crowd chanted: ‘Atenco no se olvida’, which was filmed by scores of 
mobile phone users and immediately posted and circulated via Twitter, Facebook and 
YouTube. The footage was also rapidly broadcast on independent digital media outlets, 
such as Aristeguinoticias, raising the incident to national news item.  
 
The Peña Nieto candidacy and his public image had been choreographed during several 
years by sympathetic media coverage, particularly by Televisa and TV Azteca (Tuckman 
2012a), in preparation for his candidacy for the presidency. This had successfully 
secured him a 20-point lead in the polls with less than 2 months till the election. 
However, the humiliating audio-visual footage from the Ibero for the first time publicly 
exposed his brittle vulnerability and inability to cope with a routine hustings protest.215 
This was then compounded by an authoritarian and inept response by PRI party 
officials and allied media. The officials were given prominent airtime on TV and radio 
to smear the protesters not as legitimate Ibero students, but as external political 
agitators who should face criminal investigations. PRI newspaper networks published 
articles reporting that Peña Nieto’s visit to the Ibero was a ‘success’ despite an ‘intento 
orquestado de boicot’ by thugs.216 Young PRI social media activists, known as Ectivistas, 
then posted social media messages attacking the Ibero students. However, this 
counter-framing strategy inadvertently confirmed the PRI’s online and offline efforts 
to discredit legitimate protests through its traditional authoritarian manipulation of the 
media.  
  
                                                        
215 An important additional element was that the protest took place at one of Mexico’s elite private 
universities, whose students were mainly upper- and middle-class children of the elite, popularly 
presumed to be unpolitical or sympathetic to the PRI candidate. This also suggested that support for 
Peña Nieto was not as strong as his media allies routinely portrayed.  
216 This is a quote from the largest selling newspaper network across the country, Organización Editorial 
Mexicana (OEM): ‘Y en la imagen del día… el “Éxito de Peña Nieto en la Ibero”, según OEM’, Sopitas.com, 
12 May 2012 
http://www.sopitas.com/158068-y-en-la-imagen-del-dia-el-exito-de-pena-nieto-en-la-ibero-segun-
oem/ [Accessed 8 June 2018]. 
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Taking advantage of this PRI misrepresentation of the student protest, Ibero activists 
used social media to post a counter-video on YouTube: ‘131 alumnos de la Ibero 
responden’.217 This asserted their right to reply against the delegitimization of the 
protest by the PRI and the media. The students identified themselves and displayed 
their Ibero student ID cards. The video was circulated in student social media networks 
and retweeted in solidarity. The student activists also deliberately directed it via 
Twitter to high profile journalists and political commentators whose retweets urged 
followers to support the Ibero students.218 The hashtag, #YoSoy132, was born as 
Twitter users around the country and internationally identified themselves personally 
with the 131 students, symbolically joining the Ibero students by identifying themselves 
as the 132nd student, asserting their right to freedom of expression against PRI 
authoritarianism. The #YoSoy132 hashtag went viral becoming a global trending topic 
for 6 days on Twitter (Mauleón 2012), creating a wider sense that something significant 
was happening among digital and social media users.  
 
On 16 May, Ibero students met with peers from other private universities, establishing 
the Coordinadora Interuniversitaria (Interuniversity Coordination Group). They 
announced a street protest on social media to take place on 18 May from different 
campuses to demonstrate against Televisa. The protest attracted only a few hundred 
mainly private university students, but it was livestreamed on the web by participants 
enabling students around the country to watch the unusual protest targeting the media 
rather than the state or government.  
 
On 19 May, an ‘Anti-Peña’ march took place in Mexico City involving a host of different 
groups and individuals.219 It had originally been announced on Twitter in early May, but 
                                                        
217 R3CR3O, 2012, 131 alumnos de la Ibero responden [Online video] Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&v=P7XbocXsFkI [Accessed 30 May 2018]. 
218 For example, well know political commentator, Denise Dresser, retweeted a link to the film to her 
250,000 followers. 
219 Earlier in May 2011, using the hashtag #MarchaAntiEPN, calls had circulated on Twitter for an ‘Anti-
Peña’ street demonstrations to take place on 19 May. This had received only limited attention prior to 
the Ibero protest. Afterwards, the ‘Anti-Peña’ march hashtag was increasingly retweeted (González 
Villarreal 2013) becoming the first major street event of diverse groups to publicly demonstrate rejection 
of the PRI candidate.   
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the upsurge of YoSoy132 provided an extra impetus to participate and publicly show 
rejection of the PRI. Many individuals and groups self-identified as YoSoy132 in the 
march, creating social media feedback loops confirming growing collective 
participation under the banner of YoSoy132. The march featured an exciting and 
carnivalesque protest repertoire.  
 
On 23 May, YoSoy132 supporters gathered in central Mexico City for an act of cultural 
exchange on the basis of a social media invite. The number of young people from public 
and private universities as well as schools rapidly grew into a mass spontaneous 
demonstration. It was a euphoric encounter of a diverse generation recognizing its own 
shared identity and interest in acting collectively, in spite of class and other social 
differences.  
 
At the event, a representative of the Coordinadora Interuniversitaria read out the first 
statement of the movement, listing demands and calling on young people to build a 
new Mexico. It rejected the political and economic status quo and affirmed the 
movement was not aligned to any political party.220 It also framed its initial demands 
in terms of respect for the right to information and freedom of expression as well as 
political rights in terms of an effective democratic vote. However, as the movement 
expanded, incorporating diverse ideological positions, a fuller human rights framework 
and analysis was not developed as part of the movement narrative.221 The increasingly 
heterogenous demands of the movement reflected a wide range of interests and 
beliefs (Salazar Villava et al. 2013). Human rights issues were a reference, but primarily 
in relation to impunity for past abuses and to denounce new acts of harassment against 
activists.222 However, the mobilizing narrative of the movement, with the exception of 
                                                        
220 Animal Político. 2012. ‘“Yo soy 132”: Declaratoria y pliego petitorio’. Available at 
http://www.animalpolitico.com/2012/05/declaratoria-y-pliego-petitorio-de-yo-soy-132/ [30 May 
2018]. Annex 1. 
221 Particular human right claims were included as part of a range of demands such as the right to health. 
The presidential candidates were also asked about their approach to human rights during the webcast 
debate, but this was in relation to a dimension of policy rather than a central demand.  
222 Some YoSoy132 activists, particularly at state level, suffered harassment and on occasions were 
attacked by PRI supporters. These incidents were documented and denounced by the Comité Jurídico y 
de Derechos Humanos of YoSoy132.   
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the right to freedom of expression, was not an appeal to human rights discourse to 
legitimize claims-making. In fact, as the YoSoy132 aspired to become a radical 
transformative movement after the elections, human rights virtually disappeared from 
the movement discourse. This ambivalence towards human rights discourse is 
addressed in more detailed in chapter seven.        
 
On 26 May, the students met in the symbolic Tlatelolco square, where their 
predecessors had been repressed in 1968, to debate the movement.223 Deliberations 
included widening participation to include students of the much larger public university 
sector. On 30 May, a mass meeting was held at the public Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México (UNAM), the traditional centre of student activism. Student 
representatives from universities around the country attended. This established the 
basic agreements of the wider student movement, including representation and 
organizational processes such as the formation of the Asamblea Nacional 
Interuniversitaria (ANI).224 It included one brief explicit reference to human rights only 
in terms of the right to reply and the right to health.225 The UNAM, due to the size of 
each of its faculties, was granted weighted representation on the ANI, shifting the 
internal balance of power toward the student corpus in Mexico’s largest public 
university, including its various left-wing activist groupings. The ANI confirmed the 
movement was horizontal, plural, peaceful and participatory; without leaders, but 
rather rotating spokespeople chosen in the student assemblies of individual colleges 
and faculties.226 The ANI established 15 working groups to deliberate on the 
increasingly wide range of social and cultural issues, activities and demands.227  
 
                                                        
223 A feature of the movement from the outset was deliberative and participatory democratic processes. 
These included spontaneous or rapidly convened meetings in public parks to debate the situation and 
forge agreements about the movement’s meaning, organization, identity, objectives and tactics.  
224 National Interuniversity Assembly 
225 Grupo Fórmula., (2012). ‘Presenta #YoSoy132 resolutivos de primera Asamblea Nacional, Grupo 
Formula [online], 31 de mayo. [viewed 18 June 2018] Available from: 
http://www.radioformula.com.mx/notasimp.asp?Idn=247039&idFC=2012 (See Annex 2). 
226 Local grassroots social movements from around the country also sought support from the ANI for 
their causes. 
227 Amongst these were working groups on media plurality and the participation of Mexican co-nationals 
living abroad as well as the formation of brigades of students to work the streets explaining the 
movement and its concerns about the election process and media manipulation.  
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Social media facilitated groups sprang up in towns and cities across the country and 
abroad, self-identifying as YoSoy132. This process supported coordination of state level 
and international public protests, formulation of region-specific demands and selection 
of delegates to attend assembly meetings. Using digital and social media, activists 
shared documents and audio-visual materials of protest actions, events, posters and 
other initiatives, feeding into the sense of a dynamic and creative movement engaged 
in a form of politics that defied the traditional party system as well as the factionalism 
of usual left-wing political activism.  
 
The movement’s daily actions, including production of myriad online materials, 
interviews with articulate spokespeople, street performances, road blocks and other 
creative public space actions.228 As a result, even national media sympathetic to the 
PRI candidate covered the movement. However, this frequently included counter-
framing criticisms, such as the movement’s refusal to name leaders, accusations of 
being a front for the left-wing presidential candidate’s campaign and criticizing the 
satirical attacks on Peña Nieto as lacking the seriousness of proper political debate.229  
 
YoSoy132’s exciting intervention in the election campaign dented the dominant and 
dull media narrative shaped by the mainstream media, opening up debate about 
Mexico’s democracy, the candidate and the role of the media itself. It contributed to a 
significant reduction in support for Pena Nieto (Díaz-Domínguez et al. 2014; Garcia et 
al. 2014). However, it did not prevent his victory in the 1st July election. This caused 
                                                        
228 In the international media, this was often represented as “Mexico’s Spring”, mirroring the Arab 
Spring, 15-M in Spain and Occupy Wall Street 
229 In fact, YoSoy132 activists were engaged in range of activities. This included meeting with 
representatives of the Ministry of the Interior to demand that TV networks broadcast presidential 
debates, which at least one network had so far declined to do. The movement also demanded the 
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) allow another debate involving the movement. The IFE refused, but a 
second debate was broadcast by the networks due to the pressure generated by the movement. Also, 
YoSoy132 set about organizing its own presidential debate, which was broadcast live on the web on 19 
June. All the candidates took part, except Peña Nieto who refused the invitation. The movement was 
unable to secure agreement from TV networks to broadcast the event. However, this direct participation 
in the election process was criticized within the movement, particularly by those elements in the UNAM 
which pursued autonomist strategies and rejected electoral politics (Gun Cuninghame 2017). In addition, 
on election day thousands of YoSoy132 volunteers acted as polling station monitors, registering 
irregularities and recording video footage which was uploaded in submissions to the electoral authority. 
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consternation and disillusionment among many YoSoy132 activists who had been 
convinced of the movement’s power to transform the outcome of the elections.230  
 
Afterwards, the movement attempted to consolidate its national organization and 
incorporate other local social movements and agendas in order to develop into a 
transformational national popular movement. However, the political opportunity 
context which had facilitated its creation had changed with the impending return of 
the PRI to power. The wide and fragmented demands of the movement sought to 
address multiple social, political and economic issues and contexts, but this lacked the 
focus the elections had provided or the optimistic sense of contributing to an unfolding 
political drama. Digital and social media had provided both the means and form for 
agile reactive protest in the electoral context, enabling a plural chaotic dynamism 
which contrasted with the conservative mainstream media. However, digital 
technology was less useful with efforts to develop a more structured political and social 
movement based on shared identity and objectives. In addition, the increasingly 
bureaucratic and closed culture of the ANI and disagreements between different left-
wing groups consumed its energy, alienating the less ideologically committed, who saw 
the resurgence of sectarianism and ‘asambleísmo’231 associated with traditional 
student politics. The plural dynamism, perhaps its articulating spirit, that featured in 
much of its online and offline repertoire, began to dissipate and lose momentum.232  
 
On 1 December 2012, YoSoy132 activists as well as many other social and political 
groups protested against the inauguration of Peña Nieto. The massive police operation 
resulted in violence and the arrest of over 100 protesters. Despite evidence of police 
                                                        
230 The apparent failure of the election strategy strengthened the case of the more autonomist wing of 
the movement that rejected engaging with the election as a trap (Gun Cuninghame 2017). 
231 This is the dominant form of participation and decision-making based on long meetings to discuss 
and agree issues, but which can also become increasingly time consuming and dominated by skilled 
political operators.  
232 The defections of spokespeople to the media establishment and distrust provoked by actual and 
suspected dirty tricks operations by the intelligence services to undermine the movement also had their 
impact on movement moral (Villamil 2013).232 More practically, the end of university holidays also meant 
less time to spend in long assembly meetings and activism. In fact, YoSoy132 organizational meetings 
carried on into 2013, but failed to overcome internal disputes, leading to the collapse of the national 
level structure. However, individual groups across the country continued to operate under the logo of 
YoSoy132.  
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abuses, the new government, and much of the mainstream media, used the violent 
incidents to promote counter-framing narratives to discredit the movement.233 In the 
following months, many YoSoy132 activists focused on human rights issues related to 
the detainees, including gathering evidence of their innocence to secure their 
release.234  
 
Despite the rapid demobilization of YoSoy132 at national level, in 2013 the new 
government enacted a telecommunications reform bill increasing media plurality. 
YoSoy132 had contributed to this process by successfully focusing public attention on 
media diversity and democratic accountability (Treré 2013).235 The movement’s wider 
ambitions had failed but it had made a significant impact on the elections, shaking 
Mexico’s partial democracy though its dynamic and iconoclastic use of digital and social 
media as well as street protest in which human rights discourse was embedded but 
rarely explicit. In addition, the networks of YoSoy132 activists at home and abroad 
which had fragmented in the cycle of demobilization, continued to support diverse 
social and political issues or passed into a period of public latency (Della Porta et al. 
2006) and small group discussion (Treré 2015a). However, these were submerged 
networks of activists with a political consciousness formed in the YoSoy132 
mobilization and adept in digital and social media activism. As such, they formed part 
of the political opportunity structure and culture of adaptive practice, that rapidly 
reconfigured in response to the Ayotzinapa disappearances.  
 
                                                        
233 The instrumental use of the public security and justice system to detain leaders or activists of 
movements on the basis of fabricated evidence was a feature of PRI governance which continued during 
the transition years, particularly at subnational level, including in the State of Mexico under the 
governorship of Peña Nieto. The prolonged detention of activists frequently forced movements to focus 
on securing their release in protracted and unfair judicial proceedings rather than pursue their original 
demands. The authorities have frequently used the detainees as bargaining chips to engage in covert 
political negotiations to demobilize protests, sometimes co-opting leaders with official posts and 
resources and also agreeing to lesser demands (Amnesty International 2007b).   
234 For example, establishing a website to collect mobile phone footage taken by protesters and other 
witnesses of evidence of police abuses committed during the detentions, including arbitrary arrests and 
excessive force. 
235 Several YoSoy132 participants went on to be active on digital rights, playing an important role in civil 
society lobbying to improve the draft legislation.  
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 Ayotzinapa 43 
The enforced disappearance of 43 young men in the town of Iguala, Guerrero state, in 
September 2014 caused national and international outrage and was a critical moment 
in exposing the institutional and democratic deficits of the Peña Nieto government as 
well as the wider political system. The crime and subsequent social mobilization has 
been analysed in terms of a ‘social drama’ changing Mexican’s understanding of their 
country (Santos Díaz et al. 2015) and as a crisis in political representation (Navarro 
2015). The crime confirmed the worsening national humanitarian and human rights 
crisis (Gómez 2015) as well as shining a light on the individual lives of the victims and 
the struggle for justice (Paula Mónaco Felipe 2015). Roberto Gonzalez Villarreal (2015, 
p170) invokes Negri and Hardt’s ‘collective intelligence’ of the ‘multitude’ (Hardt et al. 
2005), facilitated by digital and social media, to account for the seemingly spontaneous 
contagion of outrage that fuelled collective mobilization. Sergio Tamayo (2015a; 
2015b) considers the collective civil society response to Ayotzinapa - in contrast to the 
institutional and political crisis it exposed – as a sign of a renewed of political culture 
and civic engagement, but which also challenged the capacity to sustain non-violent 
protest. The movement enjoyed wide support beyond activist networks, particularly in 
Mexico City (Fernández Poncela 2015) and its development nationally and 
internationally owed much to the hybrid use of the internet and social media (Gutiérrez 
2015), including increasingly plural independent and alternative digital media outlets 
(Observatorio estudiantil de medios de Comunicación 2014). But these dynamics also 
revealed the vulnerability of digital and social media to new threats intended to 
undermine activism (Finley 2015). Despite this variety of approaches to the movement, 
none have addressed the complex movement dynamics in relation to the role of human 
rights discourse alongside digital and social media practices.  
 
The trigger event for the social mobilization was the dramatic and brutal enforced 
disappearance of the 43 young men studying at a rural teacher training college, ‘Raul 
Isidro Burgos’, in Ayotzinapa, Guerrero state.236 On the night of 26 September 2014, a 
                                                        
236 The rural teacher training college (normal rural) is located in Ayotzinapa, Guerrero state, one of the 
poorest regions of Mexico. It is among the few remaining rural teacher training colleges which date from 
the Revolution and its ideals. They maintain an ethos of educating young men from poor, often 
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group of the students teachers had travelled to the town of Iguala in the same state, 
where they were repeatedly attacked by municipal police operating with a criminal 
gang, Guerreros Unidos. The police and gunmen detained and disappeared 43 young 
men, shot and killed six other civilians - including three more students - and wounded 
a further 40. These events took place despite the heavy presence of Federal Police and 
the military in the town who were aware of the attacks. In the aftermath, more than a 
hundred suspects were detained, but the reasons for the attack, the failure of federal 
forces to stop it and the fate of the disappeared has not been clarified. The Federal 
government repeatedly claimed to have resolved the case arguing students were 
mistakenly caught in a turf war between rival drug gangs; that they were killed and 
their bodies burnt, and only local corrupt officials were implicated along with gang 
members. However, international experts (GIEI 2015a, 2015b; OACNUDH 2018), NGO 
lawyers and journalists demonstrated that these conclusions were not supported by 
the evidence. The reason for this cover-up has not been established but has fuelled 
suspicions of wider collusion between drug-traffickers and federal institutions 
(Hernández 2017). Despite the efforts of the Peña Nieto government to distance itself 
from the crimes, the narrative of state responsibility was a key element in the collapse 
in the administration’s public credibility (Meneses Rocha et al. 2016).    
 
A feature of the Iguala events was the complex and hybrid ways that information 
filtered into the public sphere of the attack and the role of diverse actors in reporting 
                                                        
indigenous, peasant backgrounds, to serve in local rural communities as teachers. This model of 
committed socialist education has been increasingly marginalized and underfunded as Mexico has 
adopted market driven economic reforms. In colleges like “Raul Isidro Burgos”, left-wing ideology and 
collective action are nurtured by a strong student committee and their union, the Federation of Socialist 
Peasant Students of Mexico (FECSM). The college is also associated with Mexico’s tradition of radical 
insurgents; for example, in the 1960s and 70s Lucio Cabañas, was a former student and teacher, who 
went on to lead an armed opposition group, Party of the Poor (Partido de los Probres). In recent years, 
there have often been clashes with the authorities over their poor-treatment, lack of funding and other 
social causes. Commandeering private buses to mount protests - which was the purpose of the visit to 
Iguala on 26 September - and make road blocks as well as fundraising at motorway toll booths are part 
of the routine practices of normalista students in Guerrero to exert pressure on the authorities and 
sustain the impoverished college and students. The authorities and bus companies grudgingly endure 
these activities. However, in 2011 police shot and killed two Ayotzinapa students during a protest, 
increasing tensions and demands for justice. The college students have frequently been demonised in 
local and national mainstream media as retrograde and rebellious troublemakers (revoltosos) (Padilla 
2009). 
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and framing them in terms the crisis of violence and human rights violations which the 
Peña Nieto government had attempted to exclude from the political agenda. Confused 
reports from residents, surviving students, and local journalists began to circulate on 
radio and social media, including audio and visual footage of the night of the attack. By 
the next day, tweets and posts, were circulating denouncing the involvement of police. 
State and national media began to report the killings and that more than 50 students 
had disappeared. The hashtags #Iguala, #Ayotzinapa and #TodosSomosAyotzinapa 
enabled information to circulate rapidly among media and solidarity networks. 
Independent and alternative media portals covered the emerging news, ensuring 
diversity of coverage and undercutting the federal government’s attempt to shape the 
narrative. International correspondents were also quick to focus on the drama. This 
range of coverage helped provoke shock and indignation. This tapped into the wider 
sense of a human rights crisis.237  
 
On 27 September, relatives of the disappeared students travelled to Iguala and 
Ayotzinapa to look for theirs sons. These were victims themselves struggling to 
understand what had happened. Lawyers from a local human rights NGOs, Centro de 
Derechos Humanos de la Montaña ‘Tlachinollan’ gathered information, particularly to 
identify which students remained disappeared. The Centro Tlachinollan had worked 
with the Ayotzinapa students previously and enjoyed their trust.238 It took several days 
to clarify that 43 students had been detained and disappeared by police. National 
human rights NGO, Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez (Centro 
PRODH), supported this process, disseminating independent information of the attacks 
and disappearances.239 These respected civil society organizations ensured early 
challenges to the federal government’s efforts to keep the issue at local level. They also 
                                                        
237 The visual image of one of the murdered victims whose disfigured body displayed horrific signs of 
torture caused widespread shock. 
238 As a human rights researcher I visited the Ayotzinapa college in 2011 with Centro Tlachinollan human 
rights defenders. We gathered testimonies from student teachers who had been attacked during street 
protests in the state capital, Chilpancingo, which resulted in the two students being shot dead and more 
than 20 others suffering torture and other ill-treatment.  
239 The international renowned Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF) also assisted in the 
process of exhumation and identification of remains of bodies discovered in clandestine graves around 
Iguala. 
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distributed credible information to their pre-existing national and international human 
rights networks. Above all, the relationship they developed with the parents of the 
disappeared students enabled them to work together to sustain human rights 
demands. 
 
The mobilizations began almost immediately, based on pre-existing network relations 
with local social and political groups in Guerrero and teaching unions. From 27 
September relatives, students and unions carried out street protests, occupations of 
local radio stations, roadblocks and strikes across Guerrero state demanding the return 
alive of the disappeared.240 On 30 September in Mexico City, trade unions in a dispute 
at the National Polytechnic Institute adopted the parents’ demands. On 2 October, the 
commemoration of 1968 Tlatelolco student massacre in Mexico City enabled surviving 
Ayotzinapa students to network directly with counterparts in the student movement 
in the capital.241 This led to a Day of National Action on 8 October called by the parents 
and the Ayotzinapa student committee. Calls for the protest were circulated among 
rapidly reconfiguring digital activist networks, many of which had participated in 
YoSoy132. The appeal was also taken up by a broad range of unions, collectives, human 
rights NGOs, grassroots groups as well as the Zapatistas and their networks (González 
Villarreal 2015). The need for coordination of efforts to support the parents led more 
than fifty NGOs and groups to form a solidarity platform based in Mexico City. On 8 
October there were coordinated protests in more than 64 towns and cities across the 
country and globally, with parents of the victims the focus of attention. The protests 
attracted significant international media interest at the scale of mass civic challenge to 
the authorities.  
 
The central focus of the mobilization was on the parents and their disappeared 
students. These victims were ordinary poor indigenous people from heartland Mexico, 
who had become victims of the violence gripping the country because of the collusion 
                                                        
240 There were more than 25 demonstrations in six cities across Guerrero before 2 October. 
241 The Ayotzinapa delegation of students that had travelled to Iguala on 26 September were tasked with 
commandeering buses to enable the student cohort to travel to Mexico City for the annual 
commemoration the 1968 Tlatelolco student massacre on 2 October.  
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between the authorities and drug gangs. In terms of framing analysis (Gamson 1992; 
Johnston et al. 2005), the ‘we’ were ordinary people; students, young people and 
parents. This was set against the ‘them’ of the corrupt and abusive state in collusion 
with criminal gangs. At the head of the state was Peña Nieto, whose efforts to limit 
culpability to local officials only suggested a deeper evasion of responsibility.242 The 
movement demanded the return alive of the disappeared, and the full investigation of 
the crime, including the dignified treatment of the parents. Digital and social media 
helped promote and share this emotive narrative, capturing the diversity of the global 
mobilization, but also the dignified resistance of the parents (Meneses Rocha et al. 
2016).  
 
The infrastructure of coordination of the mobilization developed various strands which 
reflected the plural participation and internal movement debates, but also the 
challenges of articulation. On 10 October an Interuniversity Assembly was formed in 
Mexico City as a student platform to coordinate solidarity actions distinct from the 
NGO solidary platform. On 15 and 24 October, the Asamblea Nacional Popular, 
(ANP)243 was convened in the Ayotzinapa college to bring together traditional left-wing 
political and social organizations and trade unions, predominantly in Guerrero, to lead 
protests.244 Digital and social media uses were less embedded in ANP activists 
practices, which were more aligned with the radical contentious political culture of 
Guerrero, including assembly decision-making and protest practices of strikes, road 
blocks and occupations of municipal town halls, and sometime clashes with the 
police.245 Some actors in the ANP also aspired to a more radical agenda against the 
Peña Nieto structural reforms, hoping to use the mobilization as an opportunity to 
                                                        
242 By November 2014 there was a rapid accumulation of other scandals affecting the government, 
particularly the ‘Casa Blanca’ case which implicated the president and his family in corruption. These 
reinforced the narrative of a PRI administration engaged in traditional graft, protection of vested 
interests and impunity, fatally damaging the its public relations image of national renewal and 
modernization.  
243 Popular National Assembly 
244 Acuerdos de la II Asamblea Nacional Popular en Tixtla, Guerrero. 2014. Available at: 
http://mexico.indymedia.org/spip.php?article3409 [Accessed 4 June 2018]. 
245 The included incidents involving violence; for example, on 13 October some protesters set on fire 
government offices in Chilpancingo, Guerrero. 
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force concessions and potentially the fall of the government. Despite these differences, 
the parents remained the unifying focus of the mobilization. 
 
On 22 October the first ‘Global Action Day’ involved more than 100,000 people 
marching in Mexico City and tens of thousands more in Guerrero and in other states as 
well as in 30 different countries. A series of Global Action Days followed in which 
protests were led by the parents and involved mass student strikes as well as solidarity 
actions in cities around the world.  
 
On 7 November, the Federal Attorney General held a press conference to present the 
government’s ‘historic truth’ of the official investigation. The conclusions were that the 
students had been detained by municipal police, handed over to criminals, then shot 
and their bodies burnt at a rubbish dump in Cocula, near Iguala. This version of events 
was based on testimony obtained from detainees. However, the official version 
received a sceptical response, particularly the reliability of the testimony and the 
absence of other evidence.246 Under questioning, the Federal Attorney General 
abruptly ended the press conference, saying ‘ya me cansé’ (I am tired). This expression 
was rapidly converted into a graffiti slogan and a hashtag #yamecanse ridiculing the 
government and its investigation. The hashtag was promoted on Twitter by activists, 
quickly turning it viral. This resulted in anonymous BOT attacks seeking to undermine 
the hashtag’s trending status which was attracting international media attention as an 
expression of popular rejection of the government’s handling of the case (Verkamp et 
al. 2013; Alberto Nájar 2015; Finley 2015; Suárez-Serrato et al. 2016).247 The Twitter 
battle became part of the contentious struggle to shape the narrative and resist 
obscure forces using cyberwarfare tactics to support the government.   
                                                        
246 Mexico’s investigative authorities have a long tradition of using torture to extract false confessions 
from suspects in order to prosecute cases and secure unreliable convictions. Despite repeated calls for 
an end to these practices, they persist (Amnesty International 2014; UN Human Rights Council 2014a). 
Independent forensic investigations also demonstrated that the mass incineration of the victims was not 
scientifically possible in the manner claimed in the government’s ‘historic truth’.  
247 These various studies have not proven the origin of the BOT attacks, but they illustrate the intentional 
strategy of contaminating the hashtag with BOTs, resulting in Twitter removing it from its trending lists. 
However, activists simply created a new hashtag, #yamecanse2, for example, which was also then 
attacked. Interestingly, this game of cat and mouse itself gained media attention, as activists reported 
on the process of BOTs seeking to undermine the online protest.    
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The attempt to present the investigation as concluded also increased street protests. 
These different pressures propelled the government to accept the technical support of 
the IACHR. On 18 November, the Grupo Interdiscipinario de Expertos Independientes 
(GIEI) was formed to assist the search for the students and to scrutinise the official 
investigation.248  
 
Government allied media outlets and commentators strongly promoted its ‘historic 
truth’ and other counter-framing narratives attacking the Ayotzinapa students. Peña 
Nieto suggested that incidents of violence in some demonstration were intended to 
destabilise the country.249 In December, the increasing levels of protester and police 
violence and two months of constant street protests gradually led to reduced 
participation in protests.250 In addition, the growing presumption in public opinion, 
fostered by the government’s ‘historic truth’, was that the 43 had been killed. This 
made it more difficult to sustain the urgency of the mobilizing demand for their return 
alive.251  
 
This also coincided with the ANP exercising increasing hierarchical control over the 
national and international protest movement from Guerrero. The ANP provided a vital 
base of committed social movement activists. However, this sidelined many 
participants and groups who were less militant, but had been involved informally and 
organically through the NGO Coordination platform or Interuniversity Assembly, 
                                                        
248 CIDH. (2014). ‘CIDH oficializa acuerdo de cooperación técnica sobre estudiantes de Ayotzinapa, 
México’. Available at: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2014/136.asp [Accessed 4 
June 2018]. 
249 Palomec. J (2014). ‘Peña Nieto denuncia “afán orquestado para desestabilizar al país’. Animal Político, 
Available at: http://www.animalpolitico.com/2014/11/pena-nieto-advierte-de-afan-de-desestabilizar/ 
[Accessed 5 June 2018]. 
250 The largest Global Action Day took place on 20 November. As the demonstration ended, a small group 
of masked men attacked the national palace leading to more than 30 arrests. On 1 December, another 
march also involved violent incidents. Despite the parents disassociating themselves from the violence, 
the incident was widely reported in the mainstream media threatening to delegitimise protests in wider 
public opinion. 
251 For political, social and human rights activists, as well as the families, this remains a key demand to 
hold the authorities to account, but for ordinary citizens the likelihood that the 43 students were dead 
reduced the urgency or meaning of participating in the protests.     
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including more digitally oriented activists. In 2015, protests continued in Guerrero, but 
participation in the Global Action Days on 26th of each month declined. Nevertheless, 
a permanent protest encampment remained outside the offices of the PGR and other 
limited street and online actions kept the case visible.252  
 
In the course of 2015 and 2016 the federal government negotiated on separate issues 
to demobilize several social organizations and trade unions which had participated in 
the movement. This reduced the organizational capacity to mount large scale protests. 
It also contributed to a reduced radicalism and diminished transformational ambitions 
as protests reduced in scale. Yet, this also re-centred attention on the particular 
demands of the families.  
 
These demands were focused on supporting the work of the GIEI to enable an impartial 
and substantiated critique of the official investigation. In 2015 the GIEI published two 
reports which identified grave flaws in the official investigation, including the scientific 
impossibility of aspects of the government’s ‘historic truth’. The experts proposed 
continued lines of enquiry which official investigators had not followed or had dropped. 
These included clarifying the role of the army, a renewed search for the disappeared, 
investigation of allegations of torture of suspects and an enquiry into the manipulation 
of the investigation by senior officials (GIEI 2015b, 2015a). In response, the 
international experts came under increasing attack from government supporting 
newspapers and commentators, including personalised smear campaigns to 
undermine their professional credibility and demands for their mandate not to be 
renewed.253 Human rights defenders working with the parents and students were also 
subject to smear campaigns in the media and threats. The Federal Government refused 
to repudiate the attacks, in effect tacitly endorsing them as part of a strategy to 
delegitimise the GIEI’s critical findings. In spite of the government’s public promise to 
                                                        
252 As part of my field research I observed a street demonstration outside the Supreme Court to mark 26 
March 2016 as well as the encampment outside the PGR offices. 
253 It also subsequently emerged that the experts and human rights lawyers working on the case had 
also been subject to digital surveillance using the government bought Pegasus software (Article 19 et al. 
2017). 
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act on the GIEI findings, it repeatedly failed to ensure a full investigation of the 
disappearances, including the involvement of federal authorities (Villegas et al. 
2016).254  
 
Despite these obstacles, in 2018 the parents continued to demand truth and justice 
with the support of NGO partners and the coalition of national and international 
solidarity groups.255 The movement was smaller, organized around the legal strategy 
of the human rights NGOs and the mobilizing support of grassroots social movement 
activists and networked student and Zapatista support groups. There were also 
multiple artistic projects supporting the parents’ struggle for justice that travelled 
nationally and internationally, engaging the public imagination and keeping attention 
on the case. There was no longer the capacity to mount mass protests, but there was 
sufficient support to enact smaller coordinated protests on key dates as part of the 
ongoing advocacy strategy. In this context, digital and social media was used more 
strategically to activate networks when necessary and maintain information flows on 
the struggle of the families. In addition, the parents of the 43, some of whom had taken 
up social media to promote their continuing demands, also increasingly took part in 
joint activities with other groups of families searching for their disappeared, including 
those that emerged from MPJD. The families of the Ayotzinapa 43 also played an 
important role in supporting wider demands for a national law on enforced 
disappearances and a national search mechanism to locate the thousands of 
disappeared. In September 2018, the families also entered into discussion with AMLO’s 
transition team regarding the establishment of a Truth Commission for the case.    
 
The Ayotzinapa 43 mobilization passed through several different stages; from raw 
spontaneous emotional response to the crisis of violence and human rights violations 
                                                        
254 In March 2018, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a highly critical 
report of the official investigation of the Procuraduría General de la República (PGR), endorsing the 
findings of the GIEI (OACNUDH 2018). In June 2018, a federal Mexican court took the unprecedented 
step of ordering a Truth Commission to reinvestigate the case as the investigation by the PGR had not 
been prompt, effective, independent or impartial.  
255 However, developing a mobilizing narrative to include dimensions of the GIEI technical legal 
recommendations was also complex, making it more difficult to foster broad based participation beyond 
the more visceral appeal of the parents and their struggle.   
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embodied in the enforced disappearance of 43 young men; to mass horizontal 
collective mobilization in solidarity with families and demanding the transformation of 
the State; and then to smaller more vertically organized political mobilization 
supporting the legal strategy of the human rights NGOs. Digital and social media 
featured as part of the mobilization process and the wider media environment. 
Throughout the families remained central to the cohesion and identity of the 
movement. While the movement’s aims have still to be fulfilled, the case and the social 
mobilization had a profound impact on the credibility of the PRI government, 
contributing to its electoral defeat in July 2018, and evidencing the capacity of civil 
society actors to challenge the institutions of Mexico’s partial democracy. It is these 
dynamics, and the particular understanding of the uses of human rights discourse and 
digital and social media that is explored in the case study chapter.  
 
 Conclusion 
The three movements all emerged in the aftermath of human rights violations, 
manipulative responses by powerholders and shared public indignation. They relied on 
organizing actors reaching out to sympathetically oriented networks, generating 
protest and solidarity actions online and offline challenging the conduct of institutional 
actors and demanding forms of social transformation. This cycle of plural independent 
civic action in the face of injustice, violence and powerholder impunity did not 
necessarily achieve the specific objectives of each movement, but significantly 
impacted the public sphere through political contention. Different academic studies 
have examined aspects of each movement, particularly in relation to the organizational 
configuration and political impacts. However, this research argues each represented a 
plural assertion of citizenship based on the moral legitimacy of civil society to resist the 
‘legitimation crisis’ and abuses of Mexico’s partial democracy. Intrinsic to this process, 
though not necessarily explicit or central, was the mobilization of human rights 
discourse and digital and social media as part of the repertoire of collective action 
whose dynamics and meaning are explored in the following case study chapters. 
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Movement for Peace and Justice with Dignity (MPJD): data 
analysis and findings 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the qualitative data gathered in interviews with 
participants in the MPJD, other social activists who collaborated with the movement 
and journalists who followed it closely. The first section of the chapter analyses how 
increasing embeddedness of human rights discourse enabled widespread recognition 
of the national crisis as well as shaping the movement orientation through the 
involvement of networked human rights activists. It also explores how human rights 
discourse was mobilized to reinforce the concrete claims-making and agency of victims. 
However, the findings suggest that human rights discourse was not understood as the 
primary mobilizing frame or narrative (Gamson et al. 1996; Della Porta et al. 2006) of 
the movement. In addition, human rights discourse only facilitated an initial and 
inadequate articulation of plural actors in the movement. The human rights strategy 
adopted helped to secure institutional concessions around greater recognition of the 
rights of victims, but not to sustain the plural engagement of civil society actors in the 
struggle for more substantive social and political transformation to address the 
violence and underlying democratic deficits.  
 
The second section examines the media and social media environment in which the 
MPJD emerged, struggled to forge a collective identity and secure change through 
collective action. This finds that digital media disruptions of the media ecology by 2011 
were enabling more diverse voices to reach growing audiences which could no longer 
be ignored by mainstream media (Couldry et al. 2003). The MPJD was a relatively 
traditional movement reliant on central leadership and SMO support to secure 
mainstream media coverage. However, the strategic use of digital and social media 
significantly contributed to lowering communications costs (Earl et al. 2011) and to 
rapid extension of networks. Social media platforms also helped communicate and 
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share the expressive aspects of the movement narrative and identity focused on the 
victims (Papacharissi 2015). Despite the increasing potential for individualised 
horizontal digital participation in counter-publics, the MPJD social media practices did 
not reflect widespread digital deliberative or connective action features (Bennett et al. 
2013) more associated with subsequent movements. Activists also struggled to 
appreciate and quantify potential threats posed by digital media, but there was 
increasing awareness of the importance of digital and social media skills in contentious 
social mobilizations.  
 
In the case of both human rights discourse and social media uses, the evidence 
indicates how practices were rooted in the social and political context, with activists 
using adaptive approaches, including critical self-reflection, to enhance the 
mobilization and understand its different dimensions.  
 
 Context and trigger event   
The increasing recognition of the crisis of violence and human rights violations affecting 
the country predated the trigger event, but this enabled Javier Sicilia’s initial response 
to find a receptive national audience. Human rights discourse featured as part of this 
diagnostic, but was not its main frame of reference.  
 
For all those interviewed, by early 2011, the escalating crisis provoked by Calderon’s 
‘war on the cartels’ was increasingly visible. The ‘war’ was not only not reducing 
criminality, but militarization had spread violence to many regions. There were local 
civil society efforts to denounce disappearances in Chihuahua, Coahuila and Nuevo 
Leon, student mobilizations against militarization, demands for communities displaced 
by the violence to receive support in cities like Ciudad Juarez and calls for investigations 
into killings of journalists and human rights activists. These initiatives were fragmented, 
reflecting the challenges of civil society actors to find routes to collectively challenge 
the multidimensional violence in a partial democracy.  
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In most parts of the country the victims of the violence, including relatives, were 
unheard and stigmatised. However, interviewees recognised how the killing of Juan 
Francisco Sicilia proved different. In part, as it immediately resulted in spontaneous 
local community expressions of grief and solidarity. But above all, as Javier Sicilia used 
his status as a trusted national figure and public intellectual to act as a figurehead for 
a national civil society movement. In this context, the crisis affecting the country was 
already visible in the form of widespread criminal violence and human rights violations 
by police and military. The trigger event enabled these latent and fragmented critical 
perspectives to find a collective form and take shape in the MPJD. This was focused on 
the positive message of rebuilding dignity and accountability on the basis of the 
normative aspiration of human rights, not populist demands for more hard-line 
security measures. 256   
 
Three interviewees felt that the incipient MPJD attracted wide support as it was the 
first organized civil society attempt to draw together different critical interpretations 
of the violence and democratic deficits underlying the crisis into something like a 
coherent grievance analysis: ‘había varias movilizaciones en momentos importantes de 
las victimas pero fue hasta el Movimiento por la Paz con Javier Sicilia que se logró 
colocar una mirada más del origen del problema’.257 But this was not only a rational 
critique of the violence but one imbued with emotional and moral resonance of a 
‘moral shock’ (Jasper 1997). Javier Sicilia’s personal protest included a wider plea to 
civil society to rebuild democracy: he called for the people to restore: ‘el amor, la paz, 
la justicia, la dignidad y la balbuciente democracia que estamos perdiendo’ (Sicilia 
2011b). This explicitly pointed to the failures of the democratic transition and the crisis 
of values that the war had produced. Human rights discourse featured as a legitimised 
and recognised marker for understanding the failure of the democratic transition, and 
projecting the idealised society that collective action could build. However, he spoke 
in terms rooted in national spiritual renewal and the moral qualities of the people and 
                                                        
256 In 2008 there had been anti-crime mobilizations supported by civil society groups allied to the federal 
government, promoting even harder-line security policies. 
257 ‘There had been earlier protests by victims at important moments, but it was the MPJD with Javier 
Sicilia that managed to publicly position an analysis more about the origin of the problem’(LT/PA/IMJ). 
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civil society (in contrast with the failures of institutions and abuses by powerholders), 
not the discourse of human rights. This motivating ideal only changed partly with the 
emergence of the support networks and SMOs rooted in the national human rights 
movement which shaped the movement’s nascent infrastructure and orienting 
practices.   
 
 Orienting networks and human rights discourse 
Different networked actors and social movement traditions, which included important 
human rights dimensions, had a shaping influence on the MPJD. Human rights 
discourse was adapted to more clearly address the situation of victims of the violence, 
but it only remained one dimension of the plural networks which participated in the 
movement. 
 
When Juan Francisco Sicilia was killed, his father was out of the country. The initial 
public actions were organized by the network of family, friends, associates, artists and 
sympathizers with longstanding activist traditions: ‘Cuernavaca es muy coyuntural… 
tiene una tradición de lucha social muy vieja… con asesinato de Juan Francisco Sicilia 
se reactivan muchas cosas’.258 Personal ties played an important role in the recruitment 
process: ‘mi compañera y mi jefa, son de las que llevan flores… lo que se convirtió en 
una ofrenda y ahora es una memorial de víctimas… y eso es mi involucramiento 
inicial’.259 Local activists also had links to a wide range of other networks, including 
human rights activists but also church-based progressives. For example, Pietro 
Ameglio, activated his network of students and contacts: ‘recibí una llamada de Pietro 
Amelgio, un catedrático que conocía. Había atendido uno de sus talleres sobre la no–
violencia. Me invitó a participar’.260 Simultaneous, to these traditional face-to-face, 
phone and email networked contacts, the internet and social media rapidly facilitated 
contact between diverse distributed actors concerned at the violence in Mexico and 
                                                        
258 ‘Cuernavaca is very receptive to the political climate… it has a very long history of social struggles... 
with the murder of Juan Francisco Sicilia many things were reactivated’(IK/CSS/NGOCP). 
259 ‘my partner and boss were among those who laid flowers… which became a memorial and which is 
now a victims’ memorial… that was my first involvement’(IK/CSS/NGOCP). 
260 ‘I received a call from Pietro Amelgio, a professor I knew. I had been in one of his workshops on non-
violent resistance. He invited me to participate’ (RG/CSS). For previous reference to Pietro Ameglio, see 
section 5.2. 
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inspired by Javier Sicilia’s call. This process forged new contacts as well as enabling 
coordination and feedback on actions, involving citizens across Mexico but also in the 
US, Europe, Japan and other parts of Latin America to participate in the first large 
demonstrations. 
 
When Javier Sicilia started his protest, he was joined by friends, victims and supporters 
from Mexico City and beyond. This included Emilio Álvarez Icaza and the human rights 
NGOs, CENCOS and SERAPAZ. All were embedded in the national human rights 
movement, but also had links to grassroots social movement activism. This increased 
the MPJD brokerage261 capacity with other human rights and diverse social activist 
networks, including transnational actors and groups. They also brought the movement 
material resources, as well as the organizational and communications skills; acting as 
social movement organizations (SMOs) (McCarthy et al. 1977). This rapid inclusion of 
skilled and well-known human rights activists provided the resources necessary to 
facilitated mobilization, but also oriented the movement towards human rights 
discourse, which Javier Sicilia had only referred to in general terms in his early 
statements.   
 
However, human rights discourse was not a simple fit for the increasingly plural 
participants in the movement. For example, most of the rapidly incorporating victims 
into the network had limited knowledge and experience of human rights discourse. 
Their priority was the return of their abducted relatives and for the perpetrators of 
killings and disappearances to be held to account by whatever means. This was 
sometimes expressed more in terms of revenge: ‘recuerdo mucho la radicalidad en el 
discurso de [xxxx]… Es brutal… no pasa por los derechos humanos, sino agarrarlos [los 
sospechosos]… más la lógica de linchamiento’.262  
 
                                                        
261 Brokerage is “the capacity to connect sectors of a movement who hold different stances and world 
views” (Diani & McAdam 2003, p14). 
262 ‘I really remember how radical XXXX’s discourse was. Brutal… it wasn’t really human rights, rather 
just seize them (the suspects)… it was more a logic of lynching’(MP/NGOCP). 
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This reflected popular sentiment that endorsed violent action against criminal suspects 
without regard to human rights, particularly given the state’s routine failure to detain, 
prosecute and convict perpetrators. This was also a sentiment fostered in parts of the 
popular media. In this context, human rights protections were frequently perceived as 
an obstacle to making criminals ‘pay’. As a result, the demands of victims of non-
political ‘ordinary’ crime, as opposed to victims of human rights violations committed 
by state agents, had often not seemed to coincide with state-centric focus of traditional 
NGO approaches to human rights claims-making. The MPJD faced the challenge of 
overcoming these different perspectives, which included innovating and reorienting 
human rights discourse to more clearly integrate the experience of all victims of violent 
crime. This implied not only focusing on the state as perpetrator, but also invoking the 
state’s responsibility to protect through the effective prevention, investigation and 
punishment of non-state actor criminals.263 Nevertheless, tensions continued between 
human rights discourse and the approach of some victims. 
 
Another feature of the complex set of network connections of the movement was how 
the solidarity supporters were drawn from a wide range of contexts and struggles. 
These included diverse political activists and collectives, such as the Zapatistas, 
students mobilized against militarization and left-wing anti-system activists. Some of 
these actors were ambivalent about human rights discourse. There were also many 
faith-oriented individuals or groups who identified with Javier Sicilia’s catholic 
humanist activism. These networks also enjoyed multiple connections to international 
solidarity networks, including the global human rights movement, trade union sector, 
church activists as well as the Mexican student and migrant diasporas. These plural 
national and international groups shared solidarity with the victims and a rejection of 
                                                        
263 Such approaches existed, including regional efforts to rearticulate human rights protections as a 
means to better uphold citizen security in the context of widespread criminal violence (Comisión 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) 2009). However, human rights NGOs and the international 
human rights movement remained more actively focused on cases in which state agents or their proxies 
were implicated in violations, rather than the failure of the state to protect citizens from abuses by third 
parties. Work on gender-based violence gradually changed this outlook and NGOs such FUNDEC and 
CADHAC increasingly adopted this this approach by 2009 in relation to the wider violence.  
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the ‘war’, but did not necessarily hold the same political beliefs or tactical vision, 
including about the role of human rights.  
 
As a result, while key network actors around Javier Sicilia were embedded in the human 
rights movement with a range of experiences and skills orienting the mobilization, 
many other actors, particularly the victims, were not straightforwardly committed to 
human rights approaches beyond their immediate usefulness. As a result, human rights 
discourse was only one dimension of the mobilization process. 
 
 Framing peace, injustice, dignity for victims 
This section examines collective action frames (Della Porta & Diani 2006; Snow et al. 
1986; Gamson & Meyer 1996) adopted by the MPJD. These were primarily based on 
the raw experience of the victims, rather than human rights discourse. As such, they 
facilitated a direct emotional connection and solidarity. It also enabled different 
dimensions of the human crisis affecting the country to receive public attention in a 
language rooted in domestic reality. Human rights discourse provided an underlying 
support for this narrative, but it was not the primary mobilizing frame.  
 
Despite the orientation of several key movement actors toward human rights 
discourse, most participants and observers did not view it as a human rights 
movement. They did not consider the movement’s collective action frames as human 
rights focused, either in terms of developing identity for recruitment or to target public 
opinion to ‘mobilize consensus’ (Tarrow 1998: p6). Instead, the injustice and ill-
treatment suffered by the victims and the need for all parties to stop the violence was 
the primary mobilizing narrative of the movement. The movement appealed to the 
moral legitimacy generated by the suffering of the victims and their individual cases in 
order to highlight how the violence was affecting ordinary people and how the state 
was either involved or not fulfilling its duties and stigmatising victims.  
 
As one volunteer activist, who became an SMO digital communications staffer, 
observed: ‘Todo ese lenguaje de derechos humanos lo teníamos en la cabeza… Pero lo 
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que caracterizó el movimiento fue el cambio del discurso, porque no era el discurso de 
una ONG tradicional. Era el discurso de las víctimas’.264  
 
This approach also reflected a different quality of the movement; that it was primarily 
focused on the subjective experience of the victims in their own voices. This facilitated 
emotional identification in terms of sympathy with victims but also a sense of shared 
anger at their treatment. The emotional expressiveness of these frames (Jasper 1998; 
Flam et al. 2007; Goodwin et al. 2009) was important for movement recruitment 
among victims and solidarity supporters as well as for developing credibility with the 
wider public and a practical sense of addressing the violence:  
 
‘ese discurso no se conocía en México. Era difícil responder, porque le dio 
una superioridad moral al discurso del movimiento. Que no se estaba 
hablando de lo que es correcto o incorrecto; o del teórico… establecido en 
algún tratado…Era hablar de la experiencia... Justamente este discurso de 
derechos humanos, lo teníamos consciente… Pero salió influido por el dolor 
de las víctimas. No se decía que el gobierno mexicano está obligado respetar 
los derechos humanos. Es que hay un problema de violencia, y en el caso de 
María Herrera es tal, tal y tal’.265 
 
Victims spoke in their own words, including Javier Sicilia in his poetically charged 
language, expressing their own pain and anger. This more direct representation of the 
experience of victims became a key feature of the movement; a form of ‘bearing 
witness’ (Kurasawa 2009) to validate and communicate their claims - much of these 
testimonies were available and circulated on social media. For many of those 
participating in various roles in the movement, they understood this as different from 
the traditional human rights NGOs engaged in advocacy campaigns or litigation. The 
latter frequently involve activists and lawyers speaking on behalf of victims of 
                                                        
264 ‘All that language of human rights we had in our heads… but what characterised the movement was 
the change in discourse, because it was not the discourse of the traditional NGOs. It was the discourse 
of the victims’(EG/CSS/NGOCP). 
265 ‘that discourse was not known in Mexico. It was difficult to respond to, because it gave a moral 
superiority to the movement discourse. It was not speaking about what was correct or incorrect; or 
about theory... established in some treaty… It was speaking about experience… yes we were conscious 
of that humans rights discourse… But what emerged was influenced by the pain of the victims. It wasn’t 
about saying that the Mexican government didn’t respect human rights… more that there is a problem 
of violence, and in María Herrera’s case it is this, this and that’ (EG/CSS/NGOCP).   
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violations or focusing on law or institutional reform, deploying technical legal terms 
about the obligation of the state to uphold international human rights law. This was 
viewed as the typical use of human rights discourse to frame a narrative as part of 
strategic lobbying or case work. 
 
The sense of innovation and culturally rooted moral superiority of the discourse of 
victims contrasts with negative views of MPJD participants and journalists that I 
interviewed toward the explicit and centre-stage use of human rights discourse to 
mobilize support. This was regarded as technical, legalistic and alienating for most 
ordinary people: ‘El tema de derechos humanos no es muy atractivo’ and ‘a la mayoría 
gruesa de la gente no tiene una noción de que son los derechos humanos y para que 
sirvan’.266 However, interviewees also acknowledged the role played by Emilio Álvarez 
Icaza as the movement figure most identified with the public framing of movement 
concerns in terms of human rights discourse, which was particularly targeted at 
international human rights bodies and institutional actors.  
 
Another aspect of centre-staging the experience of victims of the violence, regardless 
of whether they were victims of state violations or non-state actor criminal gangs, was 
to expose the similarities in their experiences. This included the discrimination, 
humiliation and abandonment they suffered at the hands of the state. Framing the 
struggle by and for the victims in terms of truth and access to justice, the movement 
overcame some of the divisions that had previously hindered relations between 
different groups of victims.  
 
The caravans of victims and activists also engaged the movement with a wide range of 
victims and contexts. This brought to public attention a hidden reality affecting 
ordinary people in neglected regions besieged by violence. The caravans also provided 
a dramatic setting in which victims from many different walks of life could 
spontaneously come forward to recount their cases and seek support: 
                                                        
266 ‘The issue of human rights is not very attractive” and ‘a large majority of people don’t have any idea 
of what human rights are and what they are for’ (XK/J). 
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‘En las caravanas, instalaban mesas y llegaba gente y empezaba a decir, nuestro 
desaparecido se llama tal, lo desaparecieron tal día, lo vi la última vez… es decir 
llegaba cualquier ciudadano’.267   
 
This also illustrated how victims were different from traditional conception of victims 
of human rights violations, who were usually associated with state repression of 
political or social activists. These victims were drawn from a wide cross-section of 
society, not usually involved political activism. In this context, focus on the experience 
and identity of the victims as ordinary people resonated culturally in a way that human 
rights discourse did not. The caravans shifted the focus of the movement strongly 
behind ordinary non-political victims and reframed the reality of the violence as a 
national emergency: ‘el MPJD logró colocarlo como tragedia nacional… lo más 
importante que logró… dar las victimas voz… empoderarles’.268  
 
This does not mean that human rights talk was excluded from the public discourse and 
actions of the MPJD, particularly those focused on international and institutional fora. 
However, it was not understood as a central feature of the collective identity or 
mobilizing narrative. In particular, the movement wanted to avoid the narrow legalistic 
and elite approach often identified with the practices of some human rights NGOs.  
 
 Human rights and victim agency  
‘I think that is where we had impact… empowering victims… giving them 
knowledge to understand how their rights were violated so they could argue with 
the government which of their rights it was violating’269  
 
                                                        
267 ‘During the caravans, they put up tables, people would arrive and would begin to say, our disappeared 
relative is called such and such, he was disappeared on this day, I saw him for the last time… that is, just 
ordinary citizens’ (RM/J). 
268 ‘the MPJD managed to frame it as a national tragedy… the most important thing it achieved… was to 
give voice to the victims… empower them’ (VX/CSS). 
269 Original in English (TV/SA/NGOP). 
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Despite human rights not featuring as the primary narrative of the movement, 
according to many participants, human rights approaches facilitated the analysis by 
victims of their cases and their treatment by the state. This enabled victims themselves 
to formulate concrete claims in terms of the state’s failure to fulfil its obligations.  
 
The engagement with different types of victims, particularly during the caravans, 
enabled many to come into contact for the first time with social activists and NGOs as 
well as other victims already actively working on their own cases. This has parallels with 
Merry’s (2006b) process of ‘vernacularization’ of international human rights to local 
contexts. Human rights discourse can facilitate victims understanding their cases and 
what they can legitimately demand from the authorities, enabling them to look beyond 
what police, prosecutors and judges say they are doing to carry out domestic law – 
assertions which victims often feel powerless to challenge. Instead, human rights 
discourse establishes a universal standard with which to challenge the conduct of local 
officials. In the MPJD’s case, this facilitated an analysis of cases that identified specific 
failings in the duty to protect and investigate as well as search for the disappeared – 
even when there was no evidence that perpetrators were state agents. This did not 
guarantee results, but it re-enforced the status of demands of relatives for official 
action and to expose non-compliance. This gave a more concrete dimension to the 
claims against the authorities and reduced the relative inequality of power between 
public official and petitioning citizen.270 
 
A solidarity activist who participated in the caravans observed how the movement 
played an important role promoting: ‘otra mentalidad entre las víctimas, no de 
venganza pero de justicia, y de que se acabe la impunidad… que realmente pague por 
su delito… de la justicia retributiva y a la justicia restaurativa’.271 However, this process 
was not necessarily smooth or universal: ‘es una batalla interna de estos tipos de 
                                                        
270 As a human rights researcher, I observed on several occasions the transformation of victims from 
passive traumatized petitioners of the justice system to active and demanding rights-holders vocally 
claiming their rights from state officials who were unaccustomed to answering for their actions or 
inaction. 
271 ‘a different mentality among the victims, not of vengeance but of justice, to end impunity… so that 
those really responsible pay for their crime… from a retributive justice to a restorative justice’ (VK/SCC). 
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espacios …es de tratar de convencerles que los derechos humanos son algo positiva en 
la vida’.272  
 
Despite these challenges, many victims vocal in the movement went on to form their 
own groups and collectives, becoming vigorous advocates of the rights of victims and 
the search for the disappeared. This suggests the ‘translation’ or ‘socialization’ process 
played an important role in making human rights relevant and useful to the victims as 
well as helping develop their own political subjectivity as part of their long-term 
struggle.273  
 
Interestingly, the strengthened agency and confidence of these groups of victims has 
also frequently challenged traditional approaches to human rights. For example, in the 
face of continual official resistance to carry out timely and effective searches and 
exhumations to locate and identify the disappeared, many victims’ groups have 
developed their own autonomous practices of citizens’ search parties to locate and 
expose clandestine graves. This proactive approach not only exposes the state’s 
negligence and misconduct, but also challenges the typical logic of international human 
rights law which is focused on state action to fulfil legal obligations, not citizens 
fulfilling those functions. Victims’ groups decided they could not wait for a complicit 
state to act. This innovative approach to citizen agency is indicative of how victims 
groups have developed into active agents challenging both the state and human rights 
experts to make human rights meaningful in the context of a negligent or captured 
(although apparently democratic) state.274   
 
                                                        
272 ‘It is an internal battle in those spaces… it’s about trying to convince them that human rights are 
something positive in life’ (AS/NGOP). 
273 However, it is important to stress that this was not socialization by elite international human rights 
lawyers, rather local activists sharing their knowledge and relatives engaging directly with the process 
of demanding to review their case files with the authorities and supported by local NGO activists. 
274 This example is important as it illustrates that socialization is not necessarily in one direction as 
human rights experts are also forced to incorporate these citizen-led initiatives into demands for 
measures to improve access to truth and justice which take into account the configuration of a ‘captured’ 
State. 
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Despite human rights discourse not being foregrounded in the movement framing 
narrative, its adoption as part of claims making processes by victims was felt by most 
interviewees to be one of the lasting contributions of the MPJD. This also reflects how 
human rights discourse can have expressive and value functions for movement 
participants, which cannot be reduced to instrumental purposes targeted at 
powerholders. However, its role in enabling the articulation of plural movement actors 
was more ambiguous. 
  
 Human rights discourse in movement articulation   
Among interviewees there was a range of understandings about the role played by 
human rights discourse in the movement, particularly in relation to strategic 
objectives. On the one hand, this reflected its function as legitimized discourse 
enabling a minimum level of consensus between the separate elements of the 
movement coalition, but on the other, the trap implied by a focus on institution-
building inherent in human rights advocacy strategies. 
 
According to interviewees, the MPJD coalition was made up, at least initially, of these 
different groupings: a) victims (including direct and indirect victims), b) social 
movement activists committed to grass roots autonomous social mobilization 
processes, c) human rights activists and human rights NGO staff, d) left-wing political 
activists of various hues, e) individual or small group civil society solidarity 
sympathizers, including faith-based supporters, academics, artists, public intellectuals 
etc.  
 
These different groups of actors represented various interests, beliefs and outlooks, 
many overlapping. The victims were primarily focused on the securing advances in their 
individual cases, confronting the authorities in order to achieve these ends. The more 
ideologically left-wing political activists understood the movement as an opportunity 
to confront the neoliberal Calderon government, particularly its ‘war against the 
cartels’ and militarization. Social movement activists shared much of this political 
analysis, but were more concerned with constructing a broad movement capable of 
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mobilizing citizens in agency affirming contentious collective action. This sector also 
recognized the importance of taking up the cause of the victims of the ‘war’ while also 
demanding the structural transformation of Mexico’s captured democracy. Human 
rights activists tended to focus on those aspects of the conflict which generated specific 
human rights violations, such as disappearances and the use of the armed forces in 
policing functions. The few local human rights NGOs in regions affected by violence 
were focused on accompanying relatives in their truth and justice demands. Solidarity 
activists were also committed to the struggle of the victims for truth and justice, but 
were less ideological and more focused on symbolic support in protests and other 
expressive events.275 The range of these actors and interests challenged the capacity 
of strategic coordination, cohesive identity and sustaining a minimum common agenda 
- Jasper’s ‘dilemma of movement extension’ (2014). 
 
In April 2011, Javier Sicilia’s call to action raised great expectations among social activist 
participants:  
‘ese momento fue de la mayor confluencia... se juntaron las expectativas de un 
movimiento contra la guerra... con lo que estaba generando entorno al 
Movimiento por la Paz y encima de eso, la agenda de la situación nacional, por 
eso los 6 puntos que sacó Javier Sicilia en el Zócolo llegaron a crear de pronto 
expectativas muy altos, porque esos 6 puntos se asumió como la agenda de todo 
el mundo… como esa primera gran expectativa que esto iba a cargar, el gran 
movimiento, hablaba de movimiento de movimientos.276 
The six points of the Pact for Peace served as the basis for the agenda of the Peace 
Dialogues with the government, which some have argued were a deliberative civil 
society engagement with democratic process (Azola 2012).277 However, the agenda 
                                                        
275 The emergence of the movement also led to the adherence of other groups not directly related to 
Calderon’s ‘war’, but focused on different forms of abuse of power and impunity, such as the families of 
the 49 children killed in the ABC nursery fire in 2009 and the Huichol indigenous community protest 
about extractive industry threats to their ancestral Wirikuta site. 
276 ‘That was the moment of greatest confluence… expectations of a movement against the war joined 
together… with what was being generated around the movement for peace, and above all, an agenda 
for the national situation, for that reason the 6 points that Javier Sicilia announced in the zocalo began 
to create high expectations, because those 6 points were taken up as the agenda of everyone… as the 
first great hope that this agenda was going to forge a great movement, a movement of movements’ 
(EX/NGOP). 
277 Refer to footnote 199 for details of the six points. 
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soon narrowed to limited human rights reforms focused on institution building, 
marginalizing efforts to address structural causes of the ‘violence’. As a result, the more 
transformative agenda proved difficult to ground in the political reality, particularly the 
urgent need to obtain results for desperate victims, the lack of internal movement 
consensus and government demobilization tactics. In the face of unresolved discussion 
between different movement actors, movement leaders exercised executive control 
over the objectives, strategy and tactics of the movement. According to three 
interviewees, this style of hierarchical decision-making dissatisfied more radical social 
movement and political activists, and ultimately some victims’ groups. As a result, 
various more left-wing political groups and social activists stepped back from the 
movement. However, the leadership decision also ensured a pragmatic focus on the 
needs of victims, the core movement constituency, resulting in the prioritization of 
institutional human rights demands.    
 
Many of the participants in the movement had differing views on these choices and 
their implications. For example:  
‘la puesta de Javier y Emilio, en esa conducción siempre fue por el dialogo… 
hablaban con todo el mundo, con las autoridades, con la gente de derecha… para 
posicionar el tema de las víctimas’.278  
‘No one said it was going to be democratic and the poet has a very particular way 
of doing his own thing. It was very centralised around the poet. A lot of things 
were discussed but eventually things had to go’.279  
‘Creo que ese debate no existía, y constantemente podías notar como había 
incomodidades, como que se notaba que era un debate que se tiene que dar, 
pero que no existía… en el contenido de que significa hablar de derechos, que 
significa luchar… esa reflexión no se dio, sino se resolvió en el día a día y las 
formas de organización’.280 
                                                        
278 ‘Javier and Emilio’s bet, in their leadership, was always for dialogue… they talked to everyone, with 
the authorities, with the people on the right… in order to position the issue of the victims’ (FX/NGOCP). 
279 Original in English (TV/CSS/NGOCP). 
280 ‘I don’t think the debate really existed, you could constantly sense discomfort, as if it was a debate 
that you knew there should be but which didn’t happen… what it meant to talk about human rights, 
what it meant to be in the struggle… there wasn’t really that reflection… instead things were just 
resolved in the day to day activity of the movement and the organizational practice’ (QT/NGOCP). 
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This suggests that many of these tensions, particularly around approaches to human 
rights and other agenda issues, were not openly addressed in the movement, despite 
being unresolved and contentious. They remained just below the surface, secondary 
to the constant daily pressure to generate and sustain the mobilization.  
 
This led to an increasingly pragmatic focus on the needs of victims in terms of human 
rights: ‘cuando ya se traduce en exigir cuentas, investigaciones… tiene que entrar 
necesariamente… los derechos humanos’.281 The focus on human rights came to the 
fore in the roundtable discussions of the Peace Dialogue with the government, then in 
the drive to secure the General Law on Victims:  
‘estratégicamente se terminó colocando (las exigencias) en derechos humanos, 
porque cuando tienes que hablar con el Subsecretario de Gobernación terminas 
hablando de derechos humanos, al final es el discurso políticamente correcto 
para entablar un diálogo.282   
 
However, interviewees with more political and social activist backgrounds in the MPJD 
remained sceptical about this narrowing focus on human rights to articulate the 
movement’s demands. These concerns appeared on several levels. Firstly, human 
rights discourse was perceived as technical and legal. From this perspective, a human 
rights focus tended to result in legal disputes involving lawyers and professional NGOs, 
marginalising the claims-making and the agency of victims themselves and social 
activists committed to grassroots collective action.283 Secondly, the advocacy of formal 
legal protection of human rights often seemed to ignore the underlying political 
realities which meant such legal protections would not be upheld by institutions 
                                                        
281 ‘when it comes to translating into demands for accountability, investigations… human rights 
necessarily have to enter’ (XK/J). 
282 ‘Strategically they ended up using human rights to frame demands, because when you have to speak 
to the Deputy Interior Minister you end up speaking about human rights, in the end it is the politically 
correct discourse for entering into dialogue’ (QT/NGOCP). 
283 In the case of the MPJD, the hundreds of individual cases gathered during and after the caravans 
challenged the very principle of individual case accompaniment as neither the movement nor local or 
national NGOs had the capacity to take on all cases, and the selection of individual test cases also risked 
privileging certain victims to the exclusion of others, increasing movement divisions. The MPJD 
leadership sought to avoid becoming a traditional NGO which implied legally representing certain victims 
and not others.   
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captured by vested interests. This reflected the risk of focusing on legal instantiation 
to the exclusion of the political struggle necessary to ensure the actual enforcement of 
human rights (Goodhart 2013). Thirdly, the technical human rights approach had the 
virtue of appearing politically neutral, especially for attracting international NGO 
support (Bob 2005) and appealing to the media: ‘para hacer que los medios de 
comunicación no nos tachan de rojillos’.284 However, it also hindered a more politically 
integrated critique of the underlying drivers to human rights violations, such as 
inequality, poverty, corruption and the unaccountable power of political and economic 
elites.  
‘lograron al interior armar muy bien con todas las organizaciones de derechos 
humanos... entonces las organizaciones de derechos humanos pudieron hacer 
clic muy rápido, …podrían participar de forma más clara en el Movimiento por la 
paz. Pero al momento de hacer una reflexión más estructural acerca de lo que 
estaba pasando con la violencia en México, y cuáles eran las relaciones entre 
narco y el Estado y la impunidad y tal, yo siento que el lenguaje de los derechos 
humanos fue una traba’.285 
 
However, another participant understood that human rights discourse enabled the 
movement to specify concrete objectives in favour of victims that avoided more 
nebulous and unrealistic political demands. In discussions with the government, ‘todo 
era derechos humanos’.286 However, even those who believed that human rights 
discourse offered the most effective means of advancing the movement’s commitment 
to victims were concerned when proposals under discussion in the Peace Dialogue 
working groups became embroiled in technical legal discussions about institutional 
reforms.  
 
Two interviewees considered that the Dialogues’ process unwittingly allowed the 
agenda to be shaped by the government. The primary political pressure of the 
                                                        
284 ‘ensure that the media did not smear us as lefties’ (QT/NGOCP)  
285 ‘Internally they managed to organize it well with all the human rights NGOs… so that the human rights 
NGOs could “click-in” really quickly… so that they could participate in a clear way in the MPJD. But on 
making a more structural reflection about what was happening with the violence in Mexico, what were 
the connections between the narcos and the State, and impunity etc, I felt that the language of human 
rights was a hinderance’ (QT/NGOCP). 
286 ‘everything was human rights’ (FX/NGOCP). 
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movement was generated by and through the victims, therefore the government’s 
priority was focused on providing ‘administrative’ responses to their demands or by 
trying to co-opt subgroups of victims to weaken the movement. In retrospect, one 
interviewee observed how this also changed the plural transformative identity of the 
movement: ‘Poco a poco, todas esas agendas se iban centralizando, y al final el MPJD 
se volvió en un movimiento de víctimas’.287  
 
Human rights discourse provided a degree of internal consensus among diverse social 
actors, encouraging victims’ agency through legitimised claims-making against the 
state and enabling the movement to promote a model of institution building in the 
General Law on Victims. However, as technical legal expertise increasingly came to the 
fore in this institutionalisation process, so the mobilization focused on law reform and 
advocacy strategies at the cost of more contentious collective action. It could be argued 
that the result was a successfully approved law, but insufficient civil society 
mobilization to sustain contentious pressure on the authorities to invest the political 
will and resources to ensure its effective implementation.  
 
Exhaustion and increasing internal divisions reduced the mobilization after the success 
of the law. An SMO participant interviewee summarised some of these tensions, 
including around the purpose and natural life-span of the movement:  
‘Me pregunta era que es un movimiento social… te conviertes en una ONG y 
trabajas en la agenda o desapareces. Si tú contribución es haber dejado la 
discusión de la situación de las víctimas, de la ley, de la guerra contra las drogas, 
haber visibilizado la desaparición, eso es tu contribución. Me parece que nadie lo 
tenía claro entre los movimientos y los familiares que a veces no se encontraba, 
porque el familiar busca su familiar y quiere justicia, y los otros estaban 
reflexionando sobre la política pública’.288 
                                                        
287 ‘Bit by bit, all the agendas were centralizing, and in the end the movement became a victims’ 
movement’ (EX/NGOP). 
288 ‘My question was what is a social movement for… you become an NGO and work the agenda or you 
disappear. If your contribution is to establish discussion about the situation of victims, about the law, 
about the “war on drugs”, to make visible disappearances, that is your contribution. It seems to me that 
no one had that clear in the movement and among the families which sometimes fell out, because a 
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Another SMO activist reflected on the challenges of focusing exclusively on the rights 
of victims without recognising the broader political dimensions of the struggle and the 
role of solidarity activists: ‘Siento una falta de politización y que de pronto es 
insostenible frente al actor-movimiento donde poco a poco se fue excluyendo con ese 
lógica a todos aquellos que no eran víctimas y no sentían parte del proceso’.289 
According to this perspective, the focus on victims which had been the primary frame 
and driving force of the movement, also began to contribute to its fragmentation as 
the empowered victims’ groups began to exert their own agendas.  
 
Javier Sicilia and Emilio Álvarez Icaza’s control over the political and communicative 
strategy of the movement ensuring its coherence and consistency. However, it also 
limited the capacity of emerging actors to participate more fully in the decision-making 
and representational roles, including other victims: ‘El poder concentrado mucho de la 
imagen en Javier y Emilio hizo difícil la segunda etapa del movimiento, que era que las 
víctimas tuvieron mayor poder’.290 The movement structure and the focus on human 
rights strategies formed part of this centralised approach, which ensured short-term 
effectiveness, but also contributed to longer-term instability as movement actors 
evolved and ceased to be satisfied with these constraints.  
 
This section has shown how human rights discourse served to bridge some of the 
competing perspectives of different movement actors and ensured a practical set of 
demands to negotiate with the state focused on the needs of victims. However, this 
also narrowed the scope of the movement’s contentious mobilization to challenge the 
status quo, reducing it to legitimised political negotiation in which human rights 
expertise and law played an increasingly dominant role. This approach neither 
                                                        
family is looking for their loved one and want justice in their case and the other (parts of the movement) 
are focusing on public policy’ (FX/NGOP). 
289 ‘I feel there was a lack of political consciousness which suddenly became unsustainable for movement 
activists - little by little they were being excluded with the logic that anyone who was not a victim no 
longer felt part of the process’ (GL/NGOP/CSS). 
290 ‘The power concentration in the image of Javier Sicilia y Emilio Alvarez Icaza, made the second stage 
of the movement difficult, that was that the victims should have more power’ (IK/CSS/NGOCP).  
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reflected the ideal of deliberative consensus or ‘agonistic’ pluralism, but a more 
pragmatic and reactive movement agenda shaped by the movement’s leadership and 
the political opportunities. In this context human rights discourse only provided a 
minimum articulating axis, which struggled to meet the expectations and hopes of the 
plural movement actors. This only increased as the movement prioritised human rights 
oriented institution-building, rather than more structural causes to the violence and 
democratic deficits. These are part of the dilemmas that many social movements 
confront, but it also suggests particular limits to the use of human rights discourse as a 
‘lingua franca’ for movement articulation and political strategy.  
 
 Digital disruptions of media environment  
This section examines the media and social media context at the time of the emergence 
of the MPJD which helped foster receptivity in sections of the public toward the 
movement. It then explains how the configuration of the movement was focused on 
traditional influencing strategies in relation to mainstream media, rather than engaging 
with the pluralising digital news sphere or promoting more horizontal and deliberative 
practices of movement participants. Nonetheless, digital and social media practices 
were recognised as significantly contributing to the rapid circulation of information, 
coordination and emotional expressiveness. However, these practices remained a 
relatively low priority for the movement leadership as did digital security issues.  
 
 Trigger event in a pluralising and critical environment 
In 2011, the disruptive effects of digital and social media uses were only beginning to 
make themselves felt on the mass media environment in Mexico. Interviewees 
believed that the mainstream media, particularly the TV and radio, continued to 
present the government’s simplistic narrative of the violence which frequently 
stigmatised victims. However, rising levels of violence and reports of human rights 
violations were leading to increasing coverage by international and independent 
domestic media outlets on the impacts of the violence, particularly the growing 
number of relatives and victims whose testimonies did not tally with the official 
representation of the situation. There were also an increasing number of alternative 
digital news platforms and blogs, as well as community-based social networking 
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activity, providing alternative information on the security situation and reports of 
human rights violations. In addition, there were some limited civil society initiatives 
questioning the government’s policy, such as the ‘No más sangre’ protest and slogan 
by political cartoonists in January 2011 (Proceso 2011) which gained media attention.  
 
This changing political and media opportunity structure media (Tarrow 1998; 
Cammaerts 2012) increased the potential for alternative critical voices to access 
coverage (Couldry 2010). The greater plurality in the media environment, fostered by 
access to and availability of a variety of independent and critical digital information 
sources, facilitated a growing sense that the government’s ‘war’ was causing, not 
solving a national crisis. Interviewees from the movement and the media considered 
that the development of this interpretative frame, and the need to find ways for civil 
society to challenge the government’s policy, did not originate with narrative framing 
of the MPJD. Rather, that it had pre-figuratively taken shape in the months prior to 
March 2011, creating a latent receptivity to the ‘moral shock’ (Jasper et al. 1995) of the 
MPJD trigger event. As a result, news about the killing of Juan Francisco Sicilia, the swift 
solidarity of local networks and the public response of Javier Sicilia, rapidly spread 
across media and social media platforms, resonating with a receptive and primed 
audience.  
 
 Strategic approach to the media 
Despite emerging at the time the Arab Spring, the MPJD did not reflect the more 
distributed leadership and horizontal communications practices evident in aspects of 
these movements (Gerbaudo 2012; Castells 2013). Its leadership and SMO support 
were closely linked to the national human rights movement, reflecting a pragmatic and 
strategic approach to resource allocation to maximise mainstream coverage to 
influence national and international public opinion (Bob 2005; Brysk 2013). Digital and 
social media uses supported this strategy and García González (2016) argues this 
helped develop and sustain the movements collective identity, including among 
distributed sympathisers. However, there is less evidence of more expressive and 
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value-oriented practices reflecting the potential of digital and social media to facilitate 
participation and deliberation to develop and sustain movement identity. 
 
Javier Sicilia’s national stature also meant that unlike most victims he immediately 
attracted mainstream media attention. As a poet and trusted public intellectual, he 
was also able to articulate expressively his family’s personal tragedy and the demand 
for moral renewal through collective action. His privileged position with national and 
international media, was also strengthened by the involvement of Emilio Alvarez Icaza 
– one of only a handful of human rights activist with a national media profile. This 
provided an opportunity to overcome traditional mainstream media’s negative 
coverage of social activism and the routine stigmatization of victims of the violence. In 
this wider media context, digital and social media practices were seen primarily as a 
means of increasing the information flows to leverage mainstream coverage: 
‘Éramos muy consiente que existía un cerco mediático, por muchas causas, por 
falta de interés o falta de sensibilidad de reporteros y redacciones hasta bloqueos 
específicos directamente del gobierno federal o gobiernos locales. Pero bueno, 
en los hechos había una limitación que la información del movimiento llegara a 
medios nacionales. Era muy difícil. Tenía que ser a través de estrategias de 
CENCOS, que era el contacto con medios, o a través de desbordar la información, 
que fuera de tal magnitud ese desbordamiento de información, que los medios 
nacionales fueron obligados a hacernos caso. Si los medios internacionales se 
volteaban hacia el movimiento, entonces los medios nacionales se verían 
obligados. Bueno, eso pasa en México desde los 60s. Entonces las redes sociales, 
yo siempre fui muy atento a quienes seguían la red, los medios internacionales, 
sabían que los medios nacionales no hablaban del tema, entonces por buscar 
información, seguían las redes sociales del movimiento’.291 
 
                                                        
291 ‘We were very aware that there was a media barrier, for many causes, because of a lack of interest 
or lack of sensibility on the part of journalists and outlets, but also due to specific embargos imposed 
directly by the federal or local governments. So, in reality there was a limit on the information of the 
movement that would be covered by the national media. It is really difficult. It had to be via strategies 
of CENCOS, which was the point of contact with the media, or by producing an information overload, 
that it was of such magnitude that the national media felt obliged to pay attention to us. Well, that is 
how it has been in Mexico since the 60s. So, in social media, and I was always really aware of who was 
following the networks (of activists), the international media knew that the national media would not 
talk about the issue, so to get information they followed the movement networks on social media’ 
(EG/CSS/NGOCP). 
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Movement organizers also understood the strategic importance of obtaining diverse 
media attention; not just from traditionally sympathetic left-wing newspapers, but also 
from conservative print media and government supporting TV and radio networks. 
Alternative digital media outlets were not considered a priority as they remained small 
and their audience presumed to be already drawn from the activist support base of the 
MPJD. In part, this approach was based on the assumption that alternative media 
would cover the movement anyway, without needing to be courted like mainstream 
journalists, but also because of the risk of ‘preaching to the choir’ associated with 
alternative media. An SMO media worker observed: ‘Pensaba que si llegamos a hacer 
cosas con los medios alternativos, nadie nos iba a ver... en eso fui super claro. Hubo 
una persona… que preguntaba... “y los medios alternativos?” y yo lo que le dije fue, 
pues, “organícense”’.292 
 
Despite this approach, other less senior SMO activists involved in movement 
communications, acknowledged the struggle to sustain a balance between 
overwhelming demands of mainstream media while trying to give space to develop and 
sustain movement identity with social media networks and alternative news platforms:  
‘Había una comunicación que era complicado y muy estratégico. Por un lado, 
tienes que crear comunidad en redes sociales o apuntando a los medios libres, y 
por el otro, el acoso de la prensa oficial, la Televisora, medios nacionales’.293 
 
However, the strategic attention on the mainstream media, particularly by the 
movement leadership, also created tensions with alternative media outlets and 
journalists who sometimes felt their role was undervalued. This encouraged some of 
these journalist-activists to view the traditional political strategy and hierarchy of the 
MPJD as incompatible with more radical emancipatory practices of autonomous social 
movement activism. Nevertheless, these outlets and independent digital media 
                                                        
292 ‘I thought that if we did stuff with the alternative media, no one would see... in that I was really clear. 
There was a person… who asked… “What about the alternative media?” And I said to him, well, they 
should organize it themselves’ (FX/NGOCP).   
293 ‘Communications were complicated and very strategic. On the one hand, you have to create 
community in social media or directed at alternative media, and on the other, the relentless hassle of 
the official press, television and national media’ (MP/NGOCP). 
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platforms provided important coverage of the movement, particularly focusing on the 
personal journey of victims, from marginalised isolation to the agency of rights-
demanding citizens. The experience of covering this organic social movement activity 
also contributed to alternative media practices; stimulating and rooting their critical 
narrative of the violence affecting the country in the experience of ordinary people not 
hitherto involved in social or political activism. As such, working with the MPJD, 
particularly with victims, was an important validation and spur for the process of 
developing and diversifying the alternative digital media field to support grassroots 
mobilization processes, which itself contributed to the subsequent movements.   
   
The primary use of digital and social media to increase impact with mainstream media 
was not only due to a lack of appreciation by the leadership of its other potential, but 
also reasonable doubts about its effectiveness. This was particularly so given the then 
still limited adoption of social media platforms nationally in 2011. For example, Twitter 
use was relatively exclusive and its influence difficult to gauge. This required a cautious 
approach: ‘nuestro público era… bastante limitado. No podía permitirnos de tener fe 
en la herramienta’.294 It was not strategic to overinvest scarce resources in these 
platforms. 
 
These internal debates about the value and meaning of social media were reflected in 
ambivalent leadership attitudes. For example, Javier Sicilia reportedly dismissed 
Twitter as a ‘cacophony of voices’, but at the same time was persuaded to recognize 
that it was a tool that the movement should not ignore. He authorized a trusted 
associate to Tweet in his name on the @mxhastalamadre account. 
 
So, while the use of digital and social media featured in movement communications 
with an official website, Facebook page and movement linked Twitter accounts as well 
as YouTube channel, the resources to maintain and regularly update these platforms 
was never a priority (The exception to this was shortly before and during major 
                                                        
294 ‘our audience [on Twitter] was… pretty limited. We couldn’t allow ourselves to trust it as a tool’ 
(IK/CSS/NGOCP). 
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strategic movement public actions, such as the caravans). As a result, with the multiple 
pressures of sustaining the movement and doing myriad tasks, SMO staff never had 
capacity to adequately curate these digital platforms. At one point there was a proposal 
to allow volunteer ‘punks’ to update the pages and posts to enable CENCOS staff to 
focus on other pressing movement work, but this failed. This was partly due to the 
apparent lack of technical and professional capacity, but also movement leaders’ 
unwillingness to cede operational control to volunteer groups who were not 
sufficiently trusted to maintain strategic coherence or protect the reputation of the 
movement.  
This lack of autonomy or decentralized decision-making hindered a more connective o 
hybrid social media practices, but this was also consistent with a traditional 
communications strategy focused on positioning movement messages in the 
mainstream media:   
‘Con la mayoría de las decisiones entorno a la comunicación, intentábamos que 
no salieran a la discusión general. Como es esta cosa de querer evitar la 
participación... pero sí hay ciertos temas si logras mantenerlos más cerrados 
puede ser más efectivo’.295  
However, these were not the only media and social media practices involved in the 
movement.  
 Mobilizing networks and emotional engagement 
The use of social media by social movements to lower costs of and accelerate 
information sharing with distributed networks to coordinate activities and amplify 
offline and online actions was discussed in section 2.6 (Shirky 2009; Earl et al. 2011; 
Treré et al. 2014) This featured in the MPJD. Early movement organizers I Interviewed 
confirmed the importance of social media platforms for spontaneous linking up of 
different groups and individuals who located each other through online reactions to 
Juan Francisco’s killing and Javier Sicilia’s call to action: 
                                                        
295 ‘The majority of decisions around communications, we tried to avoid putting out for general 
discussion. It is that thing of wanting to limit participation… but there are certain issues that if you 
manage to keep them closed you can be more effective’ (MP/NGOCP). 
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‘A partir de mi enojo [en Twitter] mi ubican otras personas, comenzamos a 
organizar la primera gran marcha... entre otros tuiteros y yo... logramos 
coordinar y convocar a marchar a nivel nacional. Hicimos un blog. Bueno yo no lo 
hice sino lo referenciaba... en el que llamábamos para que nos mandaran la 
información de su ciudad, donde iba a ser la marcha, desde donde a donde, a qué 
hora. Y la gente comenzó a escribirnos como si fuéramos convocantes, pero en 
realidad solo intentamos coordinar. Entonces hicimos una tabla con la 
información que nos iban dando. Y hubo marchas en prácticamente en todo el 
país, comenzó a haber gente que nos decía que vamos a marchar en Japón, en 
Francia, en Canadá en el sur de EE.UU., en Argentina en Brasil. Fue el germen de 
lo que volvería a ser la gran Red por la Paz (y Justicia)’.296 
This capacity to reach out and create networks took less digitally attuned activists by 
surprise. But they rapidly learnt in the process of participating some of the particular 
features of digital social networking that could support mobilization, particularly 
helping to identify like-minded others though emotional expression: 
‘Yo no había encontrado mucho sentido en Twitter en un inicio. No se me hacía 
atractivo. Con el asesinato de Juan Francisco me enojé. Me enojé mucho... y pues 
mi enojo no tenía donde sacarlo, entonces lo saqué a través de Twitter, es cuando 
encontré el sentido. Este sentido visceral de Twitter… a partir de mi enojo mi 
ubican otras personas’.297 
These more personal, expressive uses of social media were at odds with the purely 
instrumental and institutional approaches which SMO activists adopted as part of the 
movement’s communications strategy. As a result of this changing sensibility, three 
interviewees felt the official movement webpage, Facebook and Twitter accounts were 
inadequate as they failed to exploit the more personal, informal and spontaneous 
features of the medium: 
                                                        
296 ‘From my anger [on Twitter], various people located me, we started to organize the big march… 
between other Twitterers and me… we managed to coordinate and call a march at national level. We 
did a blog, well, I didn’t do it but I referenced it… in which we called for people to send information on 
activities in the city, where the march was going to be, from where to where, at what time. And people 
began to write us as if we were the conveners, but in reality we were just trying to coordinate. And there 
were marches in practically the whole country, and then there were people saying there was going to 
be marches in Japan, France, Canada and the south of the USA, Argentina, Brazil. It was the seed of what 
would be become the great Network for Peace (and Justice)’ (IK/CSS/NGOCP). 
297 ‘In the beginning Twitter hadn’t made much sense to me, it didn’t attract me. With Juan Francisco’s 
murder I got angry. I got very angry… but my anger had no release, so then I started putting it out on 
Twitter, that is when it started to make sense to me. That visceral sense of tweeting… from that people 
began to find me on Twitter’ (IK/CSS/NGOCP). 
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‘un trabajo casi de robot… publicamos un boletín y publicamos el enlace en 
Twitter. Pero al ser una cuenta medio institucional… no teníamos esa frescura de 
estar opinando… era pegar un título, pegar un enlace y un hashtag’.298 
Given the inflexibility of official pages and accounts, activists working on organizational 
communications preferred to use their own individual accounts to express more 
spontaneous and unconstrained ideas in relation to the movement, including to 
moderate and respond to feedback directed at the movement accounts. These more 
intuitive emotional approaches to social media practice and adaptive skills learning 
remained largely on the fringe of movement communications activities.  
  
However, all interviewees recognised the important contribution of different digital 
and social media platforms to the movement, particularly as the different uses of these 
platforms were beginning to be better understood. For example, YouTube served as an 
important platform and archive for victims to ‘bear witness’ to their experiences. These 
clips served mainstream media outlets, but also acted as a resource for individuals and 
groups to experience and share this emotionally charged testimony, without needing 
to rely on tradition media outlets for the editorial framing and dissemination. The 
increasing adoption of Twitter also made this a useful means to follow in real time 
MPJD events and Javier Sicilia: 
‘Twitter fue fundamental. Era uno de los momentos de explosión de Twitter. 
Siento que Twitter es una herramienta muy centrada sobre personajes, entonces 
el Twitter de Javier Sicilia (@mxhastalamadre) fue una explosión.299  
In contrast to the official movement account, @mxlapazmx, the account associated 
with Javier Sicilia could be used by the designated activist to be much more expressive 
in line with his poetic and emotional discourse:   
‘mi principal, en esa primera etapa, fue un poco traducir a Javier... intenté decir 
lo que quiso decir Javier… en 140 caracteres… @mxhastalamadre, fue muy 
                                                        
298 ‘it was almost robotic work.. we published a press release, published the link in Twitter. But being a 
semi-institutional account… we didn’t have the freshness to be posting comment… it was paste a title, 
paste a link and hashtag’ (QT/NGOCP). 
299 ‘Twitter was fundamental. It was the moment of the explosion of Twitter. I feel that Twitter is a tool 
which focused on personalities, so Javier Sicilia’s account exploded’(QT/NGOCP). 
 182 
humano y comprensible, y que permitiera ver ese dolor…. y que permitiera una 
conexión con la realidad’.300 
Those involved in this type of social media practice often learned from more 
experienced digitally adept activists, for example from activists with ContingenteMX.301 
They showed the importance of more spontaneous and raw expressiveness to engage 
users and encourage participation.  
 
The projection of the movement’s narrative and identity, based around the experience 
and demands of victims, was focused on the mainstream media, but social media 
platforms provided an important means of reinforcing this strategy. They also more 
directly engaged the growing number of social media users domestically and 
internationally in a plural support network. This strong emotional narrative, not 
primarily based on human rights discourse, appears to have suited to the expressive 
potential of social media, leading to an increasing awareness of the importance of 
affective dialogue and individual engagement of potential participants among more 
digitally-minded activists. 
 
 Connective action and agency 
Connective action features were present to a limited extent in the movement practice, 
but the increasing adoption of social media gradually facilitated more autonomous 
types of involvement, and enabled victims to develop their own agency and practice.  
 
The MPJD’s traditional organizational structure, age-group of its core constituency and 
strategic prioritization of mainstream media probably contributed to the lack of more 
horizontal deliberative communicative practices (Castells 2013; Juris et al. 2013) or 
connective action features (Bennett et al. 2012). However, these types of practice were 
                                                        
300 ‘My principle at the start was to translate Javier… I tried to say what Javier wanted to say… in 140 
characters… @mxhastalamadre, it was very human and understandable, it allowed you to see that 
suffering… and enabled a connection with the reality’ (IK/CSS/NGOCP). 
301 ContingenteMX is a diverse group of digital activists in Mexico who were early adopters of social 
media, particularly Twitter, as a tool of non-institutional political and social activism. They encouraged 
the wider use of social media platforms as part of the repertoire of actions of civil society engagement 
with political and human rights issues.   
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not completely absent, particularly during the initial emergence of the movement and 
major events, such as the Caravans, when social media use was at its most 
effervescent, but still considerably less than the subsequent movements. 
 
According to interviewees, the weakness of the movement’s internal deliberations and 
information sharing, particularly for those distant from Mexico City, was discussed as 
an obstacle to more fluid internal dialogue. There were plans to establish an internal 
communications network, but this never materialized, partly due to lack of resources, 
expertise and priorities, but also because of distrust of the commercial networking 
platforms and lack of knowledge about other possibilities.302 As a result, victims and 
activists outside Mexico City sometimes felt themselves to be insufficiently 
represented in the movement, reproducing a traditional social and political tension in 
Mexico between the centre and regions.  
 
Interviewees involved in movement communications also reflected on the lack of focus 
on developing the communicative agency of many of the victims who had been 
empowered in the movement-building and rights-claiming stages described earlier. 
Some victims adopted social media practices as they became increasingly aware of its 
potential, but this was an ad hoc process of association with younger activists:  
‘al principio él no entendía lo que pasaba con las redes sociales, yo lo mostraba 
y lo mostraba, y luego decía “eso lo mandas a Tuiter”… desde el 
desconocimiento, pero apreciando la importancia del fenómeno, me decía, “eso 
súbelo”, y yo lo decía “súbelo tú”. Luego se hizo gran tuitero’.303  
However, the digital profile of victim activists and collectives of victims began to appear 
more strongly as the movement itself began to subside: ‘fue hasta que se vieron 
                                                        
302 For example, Facebook was considered too insecure for potentially sensitive internal communications 
and other more secure closed platforms such as Whatsapp or Telegram were either not widely used or 
were not yet available. 
303 ‘In the beginning he didn’t know what social media was about. I showed him again and again, and 
then he used to say, “send that to Twitter”... From a total lack of understanding, but appreciating its 
importance, he used to say, “post that”, and I would say, “you post it”. In the end, he became a great 
tweeter’ (IK/CSS/NGOCP). 
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obligadas y quedaron solas, empezaron’.304 As distinct victims’ groups emerged from 
the shadow of the movement, they gradually adapted to the need to use digital and 
social media to project their own cases and strategic demands, learning from others 
how it could benefit their actions and develop their networks. 
 
Despite the limited deliberative and connective action features of MPJD digital and 
social media practice, there was an increasing awareness of their importance as 
organizational tools to develop the mobilization, and also as part of individual and small 
group contributions to the collective endeavour.    
 
 Insecurity and social movement activism 
MPJD participants faced serious threats to their security, particularly relatives seeking 
information on the fate of their loved ones. Despite the growing recognition of the 
importance of digital and social media for the movement - including increased 
adoption of social media by victims - the MPJD largely avoided addressing the security 
implications of such digital activism.  
 
In spite of concerns about the potential security vulnerabilities of digital 
communications - as a medium of surveillance against activists or to channel threats 
and instigate harassment - the MPJD did not develop movement practices for raising 
awareness or limiting exposure to digital threats. Interviewees from SMOs and 
volunteer activists reflected on the measures they adopted individually to reduce 
overall risks, particularly physical dangers. However, there were no specific 
considerations given to digital threats. Only longstanding NGOs had pre-existing basic 
cybersecurity measures as part of their human rights work. As with most forms of 
contentious activism in Mexico, activists assumed they would be subject to forms of 
surveillance from the outset, but with little clarity about how to evaluate or respond 
to particularities of digital vulnerability.  
                                                        
304 ‘It wasn’t until they were forced to, when they were on their own, they began to [use social media]’ 
(IK/CSS/NGOCP). 
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This very limited concern is in part explained by scarce resources and the lack of 
technical means to quantify risk. But mainly movement leaders faced more immediate 
threats than those posed by digital and social media use – for example, Javier Sicilia 
was accompanied by official bodyguards to protect him from physical attack during 
most MPJD actions. In this context, the mixture of pragmatism and determined 
commitment of many activists meant that digital security issues were largely ignored – 
though as observed previously, measures were taken to restrict the type of internal 
information communicated on commercial platforms, particularly in relation to specific 
security-sensitive cases. In addition, the movement leaders were not directly active on 
social media as others acted in their name.   
 
However, social media was used to reduce imminent physical security threats, rapidly 
alerting activists, the media and key officials in specific situations. For instance, during 
the caravan to the north, police escorts failed to materialise leaving the convoy 
exposed to attack in one of the country’s most dangerous regions. Social media 
activists on the caravan alerted their national and global networks via Twitter to 
pressure the authorities to provide immediate protection. This reactive and improvised 
use of social media to raise security concerns reflects how social media has often been 
used by human right NGOs globally in advocacy activities. 
 
The limited attention paid by the MPJD activists to the vulnerabilities of digital 
communications, also reflected the leadership focus on communications purely in 
terms of reaching mainstream media to influence the public sphere. As interviewees 
observed, this left other features of digital and social media practice relatively 
undeveloped. However, they also recognised this reflected the particular stage of 
adoption of social and digital media in Mexico which was in a process of rapid change: 
‘sí creo que desaprovechamos oportunidades a nivel de redes… esto es relativo porque 
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el mundo de tuiter era muy pequeño, entonces no había tanta oportunidad de usar 
ciertas técnicas que se dieron luego, como con YoSoy132’.305 
 
 Conclusion  
The interviews with MPJD and observers show the different ways that human rights 
and digital and social media were mobilized as part the collective action process and 
how these were understood to contribute to the movement. These reflections often 
did not place human rights discourse or digital and social media as central to the 
movement’s meaning or practice, but as contributing important dimensions to the 
contestatory challenge to powerholders.  
 
On the part of human rights discourse, the widely shared sense that the ‘war’ was 
resulting in a human rights crisis provided a pre-figurative receptivity to the trigger 
event and Javier Sicilia’s call to civil society. This also enabled the rapid incorporation 
of skilled and resourced human rights practitioners to support the logistics and human 
rights analysis of the crisis, which in turn shaped the subsequent development of the 
movement. However, the mobilizing narrative that made the movement compelling 
and meaningfully nationally was the focus on the victims and their experiences, rather 
than human rights discourse. Nevertheless, the latter played an important role in 
legitimising the claims of victims and enhancing their agency in relation to the State. 
Human rights discourse also served as a minimum framework of convergence for plural 
solidarity support. Yet this function also contributed to a gradual decline in the plurality 
of the movement participants as it prioritised human rights oriented institution-
building negotiations with the authorities, marginalizing more transformative agenda 
aspirations.   
 
The MPJD communications practices were primarily focused on strategically 
influencing the mainstream media. However, there was also increasing recognition of 
                                                        
305 ‘I think we didn’t take advantage of opportunities at the level of social media... but it is relative, 
because the world of Twitter was really small then, so there was not so much opportunity to use certain 
techniques as happened later, like with YoSoy132’ (IK/CSS/NGOCP). 
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the importance of digital and social media, not just to lever mainstream media but also 
to support movement-building processes. These included facilitating movement 
recruitment and coordination, as well as projecting the movement’s key emotional and 
identity dimensions to distributed digital networks. However, the MPJD did not 
develop wider participatory or dynamic connective practices featured in the 
subsequent movements nor did participants reflect widely on security aspects of social 
media activism. Above all, the increasing engagement with diverse independent digital 
media platforms gradually facilitated the emergence of a range of voices of victims to 
challenge the official narrative of the conflict and the invisibility of the victims.  
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YoSoy132: data analysis and findings 
 
 Introduction 
YoSoy132 was selected as a sample case, in part, because it was not a human rights 
movement in a traditional sense. By that I mean focused on defending the rights of 
victims of grave abuses. However, like the other two movements, it emerged in the 
specific socio-political context of discontent with Mexico’s democracy and governance, 
but was particularly characterised by its use of digital and social media communications 
in its expressive and strategic repertoire of online and offline actions. These features 
of practice provide important contrasts and comparisons with the MPJD and 
Ayotzinapa 43.   
 
Scholars have analysed YoSoy132 in terms of digitally enabled communication 
facilitating social mobilization (Rovira Sancho 2012; Garcia et al. 2014; Meneses Rocha 
2015) and plural and critical voices challenging the dominant narratives of the 
mainstream media (Rovira Sancho 2014) and deficient democracy (Salazar Villava et al. 
2013). The chapter examines how participants understood some of these practices, 
particularly as the movement evolved into a more traditional social mobilization in 
which human rights discourse only featured in the background. It also considers 
aspects of digital communications practices in relation to reducing coordination costs 
(Earl et al. 2011), transmitting emotion (Papacharissi 2015) and facilitating connective 
action (Bennett et al. 2013), but also how some of these dynamics were temporary and 
increased security concerns.  
 
 Democratic discontent and human rights discourse in trigger event 
Human rights discourse featured strongly in the emergence of YoSoy132 as a reference 
point for refocused attention on the PRI’s record of authoritarianism and lack of 
accountability for human rights abuses. It also served as the initial rallying cry for the 
mobilization to protect such rights as freedom of expression, association and access to 
information.  
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The 2012 presidential election campaign appeared to interviewees to have been pre-
programmed by political and economic elites to ensure the victory of the PRI candidate, 
Enrique Peña Nieto. For many sections of the population critical of the political 
establishment, these elites took for granted their ability to dictate the outcome of the 
election due to their control of the mass media, including the carefully crafted media-
friendly image of the PRI candidate (Tuckman 2012a). This assumption also appeared 
to be premised on the anticipated passivity of the majority of the electorate. The media 
airbrushing of the PRI’s image seemed designed to encourage forgetfulness, to lull the 
populace to vote the PRI back into power or induce demobilizing resignation. One 
YoSoy132 participant felt this assumption of passivity was particularly used to frame 
and patronise the youth or student generation, so-called millennials, facing their first 
presidential election process: ‘el mensaje muy posicionado [en los modios]… que en 
México la juventud era apática… no tenía interesa en la política, no le interesaba el 
futuro’.306 However, this also appears to have reinforced feelings that the mainstream 
media was manipulating the political process by trying to frame the supposedly self-
regarding qualities of a generation to ensure its lack of participation.  
 
The return of the PRI meant the return of the hegemonic political party responsible for 
among other wrongs, gross human rights violations for which it had never been held 
accountable. As three interviewees observed, their parents had told them about the 
PRI’s long period of authoritarian rule and human rights violations, such as the 1968 
Tlatelolco student massacre. However, there were also more recent emblematic 
instances of gross human rights violations and impunity by PRI administrations during 
the democratic period under state level governors, particularly the administration of 
Enrique Peña Nieto in the State of Mexico.307 For many, Enrique Peña Nieto becoming 
                                                        
306 ‘the strong message [in the media]… that in Mexico the youth were apathetic… that they weren’t 
interested in politics, that they weren’t interested in the future’ (GF/S). 
307 For instance, the repression of a peasant movement in San Salvador Atenco in 2006 which resulted 
in the sexual torture of 31 women detainees (Amnesty International 2006; Centro Prodh 2017). Peña 
Nieto’s state level administration was also notorious for failing to prevent and punish gender-based 
violence, particularly disappearances and killings of women (Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y 
Promoción de los Derechos Humanos 2012). 
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president represented the worst of the PRI and thus an even greater threat to Mexico’s 
partial democracy: ‘En derechos humanos, ya había un discurso fuerte de lo que 
significaba el PRI… fue uno de los principales motivos de la protesta contra Peña, fue 
el germen’.308 Human rights discourse was a widely recognised and legitimated critical 
analysis of the abuses committed by state officials, particularly the PRI. 
 
On hearing of the planned visit of the PRI candidate to the Ibero, small groups of 
students discussed in person or via Facebook and Whatsapp groups possible protest 
actions. When wider student networks witnessed the protest online, on radio, then on 
TV, it chimed strongly with the sentiments of others who had until then been relatively 
isolated or silent about their concerns regarding the electoral process and the return 
of the PRI:  
‘lo que hizo esos chicos no es más que muchos queríamos hacer, mostrar 
rechazo, “no queremos esto”. Porque en ese momento, la idea de manifestar el 
rechazo contra un candidato, una elección, era muy novedosa, es decir rechazo 
organizado, rechazo masivo’.309 
 
The crass response to the protest by PRI officials and allied media to delegitimise the 
student demonstrators only increased the sense of outrage and solidarity with the 
protesters. It also highlighted the biased role of the mainstream media in the PRI 
campaign. This provided the opportunity for agile tech savvy students among the 
protesters to rapidly organize the digital video response on YouTube and promote it on 
Twitter. This ‘David vs Goliath’ response demonstrated renewed youthful resistance to 
PRI efforts to suffocate freedom of expression and association in the online medium. 
This also enabled online supporters to express their sympathy by promoting the video, 
which as it went viral became a news story covered by independent and alternative 
media, then mainstream media. Throughout this process different aspects of human 
                                                        
308 ‘human rights already provided a strong discourse about what the PRI really meant… it was one of 
the principle motives for the protest against Peña [Nieto], it was the seed’ (ES/S). 
309 What those guys did is nothing more than what most of us wanted to do, to show rejection, “we don’t 
want this”. Because in that moment, the idea of demonstrating rejection of the candidate, the election, 
was really new, that is organized rejection, massive rejection’ (GF/S).  
 191 
rights discourse featured in the iconography of the initial protest, but also in the first 
articulated demands against the manipulation of the political process: 
‘Lo que detona la protesta es recordarle a Peña el caso de Atenco... En particular 
la brutalidad…fueron cuestiones transversales en el movimiento… ‘Atenco no 
más represión’… Acteal, Aguas Blancas y otros casos que fueron invisibilidades y 
otra parte empezaron a tratar el derecho a la información y la democratización 
de medios, cuestión importante para los derechos humanos, como un derecho 
importante… el derecho al voto libre, a la democracia… todo en pro de un país 
más justo’.310 
 
Reawakening recognition of the PRI and Peña Nieto’s responsibility for past human 
rights violations as well as the PRI alliance with the mainstream media, particularly TV 
and radio, to limit protest and freedom of expression tapped into discontent and 
frustration with Mexico’s democratic process. This was an opportunity for young 
people who felt powerless and taken-for-granted by the political establishment to 
assert their political identity. Despite human rights discourse featuring strongly in the 
context and interpretation of the trigger event, it did not develop as a central narrative, 
partly due to the experience and orientation of the underlying movement networks. 
 
 Networks orientation and skills 
A feature of the initial networks that coalesced in the nascent YoSoy132 was the role 
of friendship or affinity groups among students as well as the relative inexperience of 
many of these individuals and groups in terms of political and social activism. Unlike 
the MPJD, there was limited contact with traditional human rights NGOs. However, this 
distance from established political and social activist networks enabled early 
innovation, particularly in the free flowing use of digital and social media embedded in 
urban youth networks (Treré 2013; Meneses Rocha 2015). The students drew 
inspiration from the horizontal, more leaderless, models of plural grassroots 
participatory mobilizations of Occupy and 15-M, the anti-authoritarian inspiration of 
                                                        
310 ‘What detonates the protest reminding Peña about Atenco… in particular the brutality… these were 
transversal questions for the movement… “Atenco - No more repression”… Acteal, Aguas Blancas and 
other cases made invisible.. and another dimension was addressing the right to information and the 
democratization of the media, an important question for human rights, like other important rights… the 
right to a free vote, democracy… all in favour of a more just country’ (MS/S/DA). 
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the Arab spring and autonomist resistance of the Zapatistas. As with these movements, 
human rights discourse featured as a-taken-for-granted set of principles, but was not 
the driver to network connectivity or the primary focus of their demands.   
 
Pre-existing digital social activists, such as those in ContingenteMX, also showed 
immediate support for the student protest and video response, spreading it across 
their digital activist networks and contributing to the viralization of #YoSoy132. These 
activists also supported efforts to turn initial online solidarity into street protest. Key 
progressive journalists also profiled the Ibero protest and subsequent video online, 
acting as network bridges to wider youth networks nationally and internationally. 
These were actions focused on profiling the protest and encouraging participation, not 
concerned with articulating a technical human rights discourse. 
 
Interviewees also believed the embeddedness of digital communications in the social 
friendship networks facilitated a smooth transition between online to offline public 
action for students who had never been involved in activism before but wanted to 
support the Ibero students and show their rejection of the PRI candidate:  
‘Yo veía que la gente que quería participar prácticamente nunca había estado en 
una manifestación. Vi que mucha gente de mi escuela… dijo yo quiero ir, quiero 
ir. Estudiantes del Tec. de Monterrey, queriendo ir a una marcha contra Pena 
Nieto era totalmente inédito para mí.311 
 
The political inexperience of the initial organizing networks based in the private 
universities of the Ibero, Tecnológico de Monterrey, ITAM and others, appears to have 
been an advantage, facilitating an enthusiastic, technologically adept, and politically 
open mobilization.  
 
                                                        
311 ‘I saw that the people who wanted to participate, had practically never been on a demonstration. I 
saw that many people in my faculty… said “I want to go, I want to go”. Students form the Tec[nológico] 
de Monterrey (an elite private university) wanting to go on a march against Peña Nieto was totally 
unprecedented for me’ (GF/S).   
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Two interviewees with more experience of street protesting acknowledged feeling 
sceptical when seeing the first street demonstration against Televisa. In particular the 
use of a loud hailer by protesters to keep participants on the pavement while marching 
rather than in the road was considered laughable and indicative of the middleclass 
naivety of the organizers. A routine conservative accusation made against 
demonstrators was that they violated the rights of road users. This was frequently 
utilized to justify police use of force and arrests. For more experienced activists, this 
precautionary approach seemed like fruitless pandering to a hard-line tactic to 
delegitimise democratic protest. However, these sceptics also noted that the 
innovation of the protest style also attracted participation from wider student 
networks. As a result, even among more experienced left-wing activists, there was 
recognition of the value in enacting different styles of protests to reach new networks 
and participants. This also had the advantage of avoiding mainstream media ignoring 
the protests or framing them as the usual marginal political trouble-makers.  
 
Many initial network links were with social activists involved in the global justice or 
‘alter-globalization’ movements, particularly Spain’s 15-M movement:  
‘Se vincula al 15-M internacional por varias razones. Yo tenía varios amigos de 
15-M que habían vivido en México, pero habían regresado a Barcelona y resulta 
chateando por Twitter no sabía que eran mis amigos que contactaron a 132 
internacional. Por otro lado, Barcelona y Madrid tenían grupos de 132, la gente 
de Barcelona asistió a varias reuniones de Indignados… se hizo más fuerte… 
reunión 15-M internacional y 132 Barcelona y con nosotros de acá.312  
 
These contacts, including with Occupy Wall Street, helped shape the early movement, 
particularly its pursuit of plural, horizontal, autonomous and participatory democratic 
processes and an aversion to leadership figures and organizational hierarchies – such 
as featured in the MPJD and other more traditional social movements. It also chimed 
                                                        
312 ‘For various reasons we linked up with 15-M international. I had friends in 15-M that had lived in 
Mexico then returned to Barcelona and it turns out, while chatting on Twitter, I didn’t know it, that my 
friends had contacted 132international. Also, Barcelona and Madrid had 132 groups. The people from 
the Barcelona group participated in Indignados meetings… that made them stronger… meeting with 15-
Minternational and 132 Barcelona and us here [in Mexico]’ (CQ/S). 
 194 
with disillusionment at Mexico’s superficial representative democracy in which civil 
society participation and deliberation were marginalised or co-opted by an electoral 
system dominated by self-serving political parties.  
 
Another reason for human rights discourse not featuring strongly in the YoSoy132 
network relations, was that the initial protest had not resulted in grave human rights 
violations, so activists were not focused on exposing serious abuses or demanding 
justice for victims – the traditional basis for adopting human rights demands and 
seeking the support of human rights NGOs. As a result, organic connections with 
human rights NGOs to document abuses and seek redress were not a priority.  
 
An exception to this was when YoSoy132 later established the Comité Jurídico y de 
Derechos Humanos313 to document reports of harassment and attacks against activists 
around the country. The Committee was set up with the support of the Comité Cerezo, 
a human rights NGO based in Mexico City with links to student activism. However, this 
NGO focused on technical support rather than facilitating wider network links to 
human rights NGOs or promoting the adoption of human rights discourse to articulate 
the movement agenda and demands. In fact, activists I interviewed considered the 
world of social movements and human rights to be separate spheres of activism; the 
former engaged in political contention and aspiring to social transformation, the other 
depoliticised, legal and technical, not the discourse of social mobilization.    
 
In the second stage of YoSoy132, large numbers of public university students joined 
and the Asamblea Nacional Interuniversitaria (ANI) became the complex deliberative 
sphere of movement decision making. In this process, the networks of traditional left-
wing student activists, particularly from the UNAM, exerted greater influence in terms 
of practice and ideology. These networks of political activists were more closely 
associated with autonomist anti-capitalist activism, focused on grassroots assembly 
practices. The plurality of the movement continued, but its identity became more 
clearly a counter-hegemonic project of anti-neoliberal national transformation. This 
                                                        
313 Law and Human Rights Committee 
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moved the demands of the movement beyond the initial call for respect for freedom 
of expression, information and association and a fair electoral process. In fact, more 
radical autonomist participants rejected the focus on the elections (Gun Cuninghame 
2017). In this context, of increasingly transformative social agenda, the more 
institutionally oriented understanding of human rights discourse was not relevant: ‘La 
verdad es que ni siquiera nos sentamos en algún momento para que se dio [el debate 
sobre derechos humanos]… creo que mucha era por presentir… que [el movimiento] 
era más amplio’.314 
 
Interestingly, in this transition, anti-PRI liberal and conservative activists on the right 
who had also participated in the early loose networks, ceased to participate as the 
movement articulated a more clearly anti-neoliberal autonomist position.  
 
In summary, the mobilizing movement networks were not human rights oriented. 
Instead the individuals, friendship groups and collectives had multiple motivations, but 
shared the desire to manifest a high-spirited political rebellion against the PRI and the 
media in which human rights provided a launch pad but not the primary connection 
across networks. 
 
 Mobilizing frames and collective identity 
A reason human rights discourse did not develop as the primary mobilizing narrative 
or identity basis of the movement was in part due to the politically engaged focus of 
the movement on elections. The political neutrality claimed by human rights discourse 
was not seen as useful in the challenge to the Peña Nieto candidacy and the fairness of 
the electoral process. Above all human rights discourse did not seem to reflect the 
exuberant iconoclastic rejection of the political establishment or demands for social 
transformation.  
 
                                                        
314 ‘The truth is we never sat down at any time to [debate about adopting human rights]… I think we 
sensed… that [the movement] was much wider (XV/S).  
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Framing analysis often suggests an instrumental use of discourse by movement leaders 
to motivate participation and influence public opinion (Gamson & Meyer 1996; Snow 
et al. 1986). In the case of YoSoy132, this appears clearly in the promotion of the Ibero 
YouTube video, which drew on human rights discourse to frame the threat to freedom 
of expression and association by an assertion of these rights by students themselves. 
However, as the collective identity of the movement took shape, this narrative was 
replaced by a more emotional proactive process of mutual recognition (Melucci 1996) 
based on a shared rejection of the status quo and commitment of plural actors to enact 
political participation, deliberation and protest.  
 
Like Occupy and 15-M, part of the ideology of YoSoy132 was as a plural movement 
made up of individuals, groups and collectives; a deliberative space that enabled 
diverse ideological positions and interests to express themselves and resist a reductive 
identity or narrow set of strategic institutional demands. For two interviewees, the 
process of participating was almost spiritual, a form of pre-figurative politics (Polletta 
2002), transforming the self as political subject to transform society.  
 
Unlike the Occupy movement which adopted a classic collective identity frame ‘we are 
the 99%’ implicitly identifying the ‘us’ against the 1% ‘them’ (Johnston & Noakes 2005,) 
of global capitalism, YoSoy132’s narrative frames were rooted in local solidarity and 
the national political context. The name of the movement, YoSoy132, asserted an 
individual and collective solidarity and desire to act with others in a rather vague but 
determined rejection of local political and economic domination.  
 
For the participants I interviewed, there was little consensus about YoSoy132’s main 
framing narrative, collective identity or meaning. For two, it was an ‘anti-Peña’ 
movement. However, there were debates about adopting an explicit anti-Peña position 
which some felt risked undermining the movement’s claims not be aligned with any 
particular political party. This position was expressed most clearly in a public statement 
on 23 May 2011 proclaiming that the movement neither supported nor rejected 
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particular presidential candidates.315 Despite this public assertion, all interviewees felt 
that at the centre of the movement’s identity was opposition to what the PRI candidate 
represented.  
 
In relation to human rights, participants more closely connected with the initial protest 
actions, saw the movement as adopting aspects of a rights-based discourse: ‘La agenda 
era casi protestar. Contra la manipulación mediática, entonces cambio la agenda de la 
memoria de todo lo que había hecho el PRI, de Atenco… evolucionó al derecho a la 
comunicación, la información veraz’.316 This concept of democratisation of the media 
was an important and popular movement demand. In effect, it meant ensuring the 
right to access a diverse and plural media responsive to public sphere concerns. 
However, the formulation of a non-coercive regulatory framework to ensure such a 
media environment remains a major challenge in all forms of democratic governance, 
including in the discourse of human rights.317 It is in this context, that there is no readily 
translatable and legitimated set of human rights demands to break up dominant media 
                                                        
315 ‘“Yo soy 132”: Declaratoria y pliego petitorio’, Animal Politico, 23 mayo 2012, available at: 
https://www.animalpolitico.com/2012/05/declaratoria-y-pliego-petitorio-de-yo-soy-132/. Accessed on 
20 February 2018. See annex 1.  
316 ‘The agenda was almost just to protest. Against media manipulation, then it changed from the 
memory of all of what the PRI had done, such as Atenco … it evolved into the right to communication, 
to correct information…’ (ES/S). 
317 The traditional liberal conception of rights discourse restricts state control of media flows, while 
assuming the competitive market will ensure plurality and diversity (see Lawson 2001) rather than 
becoming dominated by monopoly economic interests. International human rights standards struggle 
to frame obligations that overcome these imbalances, for example Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) affirms, ‘this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or 
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice’. In 1993 the UN established the 
Special Rapporteurship on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression to monitor and report on freedom expression worldwide. The rapporteur gradually 
developed work on the principles of access to information and the public’s right to know. Another United 
Nations agency, UNESCO has also developed standards on freedom of expression, but addressed access 
to information and media ownership and plurality more directly, particularly in relation to Latin America 
(UNESCO 2017). Regionally, the American Convention of Human Rights (1969) mirrors the ICCPR 
obligations as does the work of the regional Special Rapporteur. However, the IACHR Declaration on the 
Principles of Freedom of Expression (2000) and accompanying interpretations address the issue of media 
ownership more directly, explicitly requiring regulation to prevent monopolist practices and ensure 
media “diversity and plurality” which is not subject to coercive pressure of state advertising. The IACHR 
has also established principles on diversity, including in relation to state responsibility to ensure 
availability of community radios. However, these regulatory safeguards are not sufficient to guarantee 
diversity and plurality, so others have argued that the minimum framework of rights based on freedom 
of expression is insufficient to establish and maintain a democratic media (Martens et al. 2014). 
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corporate power other than through effective and impartial regulation. However, 
formulating the demand in such technical and institutional terms was not the basis of 
a mobilizing narrative to inspire participation in collective contentious action. This was 
particularly so when the limitations of partial democracy meant the apparatus to 
decide and implement regulations lacked credibility.318 Instead YoSoy132, rather than 
adopting a rights discourse in relation to the media concentration, focused on enacting 
media democratization, raucously affirming the right to freedom of expression, using 
digital and social media as well as theatrical street protest to ridicule corporate media 
power and its alliance with political elites.  
 
The majority of interviewees felt that while some aspects of the human rights 
framework featured in the movement discourse, it was never a comfortable fit; neither 
sufficiently user-friendly nor representative of the iconoclastic political thrust of the 
movement:  
‘Para mí fue más que íbamos más allá de los derechos humanos. Sí se hizo uso de 
las herramientas, de ciertas cosas, dentro del discurso del movimiento… pero no 
fue un discurso tan manejable para nosotros, más por el lado técnico. Y más por 
la visión, era un movimiento anti-Pena, no encajaba tanto.319 
 
Human rights discourse was seen by interviewees to either occupy or claimed to 
occupy according to human rights NGOs a terrain beyond political struggle. As a result, 
this apparent political neutrality seemed less relevant for engaging in politicised 
contentious collective action - even if it was not aligned with particular political parties. 
This points to understandings of human rights discourse as a technical legal tool to 
assert justice claims against the state, but of limited relevance in more explicitly 
political struggles about the character of democratic culture. In the case of YoSoy132, 
the targets of the movement were powerholders, such as political parties, politicians 
                                                        
318 Despite this, several YoSoy132 activists went on to become skilled civil society digital rights advocates 
and played a role in lobbying around media regulation in 2013 and 2014.  
319 ‘For me it is because we went further than human rights. Yes, we made use of the tools, of certain 
things, within the movement discourse… but it wasn’t really a discourse that was easy for us to use, 
mainly because of its technical side… and above all because of the vision… it was an anti-Peña 
movement, so it didn’t really fit (XV/S). 
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and the media, and their role in undermining the democratic process. This contrasted 
with the traditional perceived use of human rights discourse to target the state and its 
institutions as responsible for repressive abuses or failing to protect citizens.  
 
This also suggests that there are risks to the strategy of the human rights movement 
arguing that universal human rights are neutral non-political standards (Ignatieff 2003), 
above political ideologies or interests. They can be seen as less relevant in domestic 
political struggles for democratic consolidation, the very terrain where human rights 
need to be meaningful if they are to take root. This is discussed further in chapter 9.   
 
On the other hand, one interviewee considered that human rights discourse, though 
not a collective action frame, formed part of the internal dialogue and the underlying 
direction of the movement, including featuring in specific election actions such as in 
questions to presidential candidates about human rights issues:  
‘fue una discusión siempre presente… democracia y derechos humanos…con 
discursos más refinados, menos refinados… de pensar en el largo plazo pensamos 
en derechos humanos… La agenda que 132 llevó para el debate presidencial, para 
mí, es el debate presidencial que más ha abordado los derechos humanos.320 
 
However, two interviewees felt there was a strong reluctance to adopt a more explicit 
human rights focused agenda as this would have resulted in a process of 
institutionalisation and negotiations with authorities which would have destroyed the 
movement:  
‘ese sentimiento que vamos a acabar sentado en una mesa, dialogando si nos 
cumple una petición específica… creo que hubiera quedado allí, roto uno más... 
nos damos cuenta de que no, que nuestra participación era otra, que no requería 
necesariamente tenerlo como interlocutor, sino que íbamos a construir algo, 
mucho más nuestro, más de las calles además’.321 
                                                        
320 ‘It was a discussion that was always present – democracy and human rights… with more or less refined 
discourses… thinking in the long term we thought about human rights… the agenda that 132 took to the 
presidential debate… for me it was the presidential debate that most addressed human rights’ (GF/S). 
321 ‘the feeling that we were going to end up seated at a table, dialoguing with [the authorities] about 
fulfilling a specific petition… I think we would have got no further, leaving another movement broken… 
we realised that, no, ours was a different type of participation… we didn’t need to have the [authorities] 
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Modonesi (2014) refers to YoSoy132 as ‘postzapatismo’, but the Zapatistas were a key, 
if challenging, inspiration for many participants: ‘El zapatismo era como referente... 
como máximo… pero como podemos… pues está bien el zapatismo en la montaña pero 
aquí estamos en la ciudad, era un constante reflexionar, no lo teníamos claro’.322  
 
These ideological and identity struggles occurred within the movement, but 
interviewees felt the key mobilizing identity frames were about exciting, emancipatory 
shared participation, online and offline; as part of developing individual and collective 
political subjectivities:  
‘El elemento de cohesión más importante era la alegría tal cual de saber que 
había gente que sentía como tú… como co-procesar… estas preocupaciones 
diferentes …pero era una alegría muy fuerte de ver tanto jóvenes en la calle, 
haciendo una marcha como quiso’.323 
 
In many parts of the country outside Mexico City, the risks of organizing were real as 
PRI activists were an intimidating threat, particularly in PRI dominated states. So, 
breaking the isolation of individuals or small groups by participating in shared online 
and offline activism was an important feature of the movement. Interviewees believed 
the expression adopted by 15-M, ‘no estás solo en tu indignación’, resonated widely in 
Mexico, motivating those who rejected the PRI and the status quo of partial democracy 
to act across the country and internationally. The idea of self-recognition of a 
generation, waking from slumber and inspired by the legacy of past student struggles, 
was also part of this narrative.  
 
                                                        
as an interlocutor, instead we were going to construct something, much more ours, also more in the 
streets’ (XV/S). 
322 ‘Zapatism was the main reference point… the maximum… but how could we… well, Zapatism was fine 
in the mountains, but here we are in the city, that was a constant point of reflection… we didn’t have it 
clear’ (XV/S). 
323 ‘The most important element of cohesion was the actual happiness knowing there were people that 
felt like you… co-processing… these different concerns… but it was also a joy to see so many young 
people in the streets, demonstrating in the way they wanted to” (GF/S). 
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However, two interviewees also acknowledged that another motivating aspect of 
participation was less high-minded. The social melting-pot of class and gender visible 
on digital media coverage of demonstrations raised the possibility of meeting affluent 
and attractive young men and women from private universities. Like other social 
movements, the liberating social and cultural atmosphere played a not insignificant 
role in attracting participants less concerned with collective identity or deliberating the 
movement’s political project.    
 
This suggests that despite the initial trigger event drawing on embedded 
understandings of human rights discourse in student generations, these were not 
developed explicitly as part of YoSoy132’s collective identity and mobilizing frames. 
Human rights frames served to position and legitimise initial demands, but were seen 
as too technical and limiting to reflect the more transformational, plural and political 
identity of the movement. As one interviewee observed: ‘un movimiento social va más 
allá de los derechos humanos, lo que busca es una transformación de la sociedad’.324 
 
 Participant Agency 
The act of participating in public demonstrations, which sought to invoke but also break 
with the traditional protest repertoire, particularly through the use of digital media, 
drew more people than expected and reinforced the sense of participating in 
something different and important. This participation was not based on individualised 
adherence to a collective identity, but small groups of friends or collectives joining in 
an explicitly plural mobilization process. The protests were a mass dynamic assertion 
of the right to freedom of expression, not a technical legal claim for justice. 
Contributing to these early unscripted events, meant to ‘meterse en una 
conversación’325 with new people and groups from different social and political circles. 
There was excitement at becoming politically conscious through a sense of collective 
engagement and creating new forms of collective action.  
                                                        
324 ‘A social movement goes beyond human rights, what it is looking for is a societal transformation’ 
(XV/S). 
325 ‘get involved in a conversation’ (XV/S). 
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When speaking in movement forums or to the media, the horizontal plural and 
participatory nature of much of the practice felt empowering to participants, enabling 
some to speak and define what they wanted to say in their own terms but under the 
inclusive banner of YoSoy132. Echoing Melucci’s (1996) understanding of the dynamics 
of New Social movements, this focused on strengthening a sense of personal autonomy 
and shared values as an integral part of a common idealistic project bringing diverse 
social sectors together:  
Decíamos, las cosas tienen que cambiar, desde la manera que nos relacionamos, 
que construimos nuevas cosas, tal era mucho la utopía, mucho romanticismo, era 
mucho romper con el discurso del líder que va a venir para hacer algo para que 
cambie todo. Dijimos, no, esto tiene que ser de todos, todos tenemos que 
vincular, es así en la primera asamblea en las Islas de la UNAM... pues gente de 
todos los movimientos.326 
 
As a learning environment, for many movement participants it was a new way of ‘doing 
politics’; they felt it to be a personally transformative process, impacting their decision-
making and future life choices. One interviewee cited a friend’s characterisation of the 
psychological process of struggling ‘contra el pequeño Pena Nieto que todos nosotros 
llevamos dentro”.327 For interviewees, even recognising in retrospect the limitations of 
YoSoy132 and its subsequent demobilization, there was unanimous appreciation of the 
contribution that their involvement played in their personal development and political 
consciousness. Several YoSoy132 activists ultimately formed or joined human rights 
NGOs, alternative media platforms and other forms of collective social activism as a 
direct result of their experiences in the movement. These in turn would contribute to 
the Ayotzinapa 43 mobilization. This suggests that while human rights claims-making 
or demands were not central to the movement’s identity, the awareness of and actively 
                                                        
326 ‘We used to say, things have got to change, from the way we relate to each other, the way we 
construct new things, there was a lot of utopianism, much romanticism… it was about breaking with the 
discourse of the leader that will come and change everything. We said, no, this has got to be done by 
everyone, we have all got to join together, it was like that in the first assembly in the UNAM, people 
from all the different movements’ (XV/S). 
327 ‘against the little Peña Nieto that we all carry inside’ (XV/S). 
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exercising of rights through participation was a key aspect of feelings of agency and 
personal political development.  
 
 Movement articulation 
The configuration of the YoSoy132 coalition shifted in the course of the mobilization. 
There was a transition away from an initial articulating discourse of freedom of 
expression and media democratization to a more radical emancipatory left-wing 
agenda aspiring to social and political transformation (González Villarreal 2013; Gun 
Cuninghame 2017). In part, this move reflected the distrust and perceived limitations 
of human rights discourse felt by many radical activists as well as the desire to unite 
disparate social actors around a radical pluralist transformative agenda.  
 
All interviewees recognised the movement as plural and as changing in character over 
time. In chronological order, these specific periods included: 1, online viral protest; 2, 
private university led street demonstrations; 3, unified university deliberative 
movement; 4, nationwide student movement; 5, broad-based popular movement 
seeking to include various different social actors and agendas; and lastly, 6, the reduced 
movement in defence of detainees. The rapidly changing profile also reflected the 
participation at different stages of different ideological groups:  
‘Yo digo que eran varios movimientos porque teníamos mucha gente adentro con 
motivos distinto para estar presentes… objetivos distintos… mecanismos 
distintos para alcanzarlos… Por eso la diversidad… lo pro-violencia… los no-
violencia… los pragmáticos… los electorales… los de la izquierda… los liberales… 
de derecha… de centro… libertarios anti-estado… anarco-comunista.328 
 
The deliberations between these different actors were extremely challenging. 
Participants spent many hours in public parks, ‘sin baños, luces y internet’ (BS/S), then 
in university buildings, debating and deliberating to establish minimum common 
                                                        
328 ‘I would say that it was various movements because there were people inside with different reasons 
for participating… different objectives… different methods of achieving them.. that was the diversity… 
those in favour of violence… those against violence… the pragmatists… the electoralists… those on the 
left… the liberals… the right… the centre... the anti-state libertarians… anarcho-communists (BS/S). 
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agendas which adequately reflected the growing diversity of the movement and 
sustain its mobilizing momentum and identity.  
 
On 23 May 2012, some of the early activists issued a limited declaration which stated: 
‘nuestros deseos y exigencias se centran en la defensa de la libertad de expresión y del 
derecho de información’.329 However, by 30 May, the accords reached in the first ANI 
meeting focused on the electoral process, education policy and commitment to 
develop the movement to address a range of social justice issues.330  
 
Interviewees felt that the shift in discourse reflected the increasing influence of student 
activist groups of the UNAM promoting a more structural left-wing critique of the 
socio-economic and political injustices in Mexican society. Many of these groups 
distrusted rights discourse as a neo-liberal or neo-imperial ideology (Marx 1844; 
Douzinas 2007) or, at best, too institutional to overcome the concentration of power 
in Mexico’s partial democracy. Human rights oriented activism was seen as superficial, 
emotional and transient, lacking ideological rigour and commitment:  
‘Los derechos humanos depende del ánimo del movimiento… muchas de las 
personas que se suman a estos movimientos no quieren ser militantes, pero se 
conmueven… son expresiones muy infantiles para mi gusto de la política popular: 
“participo pero solamente un ratito”’.331 
 
In this context, anti-neoliberal Zapatism provided a more important lingua franca and 
model to bridge ideological divides as well as to maintain plural and participatory 
involvement.332 However, this also implied commitment to participate in long 
deliberative assemblies, where those most accustomed to such practices, gained 
                                                        
329. ‘Our desire and demands are focused on the defence of freedom of expression and right to 
information’, See Annex 1. 
330 See annex 2. 
331 ‘Human rights depend on the mood of the movement… many of the people who join those 
movements don’t want to be real activists, they are just excited by it… I think they are just childish 
expressions of popular politics: “I am participating, but just for a bit”” (MS/SA). 
332 These deliberations also reflected divisions in relation to engaging with the electoral process as part 
of democratic participation or seeing this as an electoral trap which would undermine the movement’s 
radicalism (Gun Cuninghame 2017). 
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greater influence. Two interviewees acknowledged feeling bewildered and 
detachment from the arduous practices of student ‘asambleismo’: ‘Había procesos que 
no entendíamos de todo, y para los de la UNAM eran muy naturales. De toda la larga 
tradición que tienen de colectivos, de luchas estudiantiles’.333  
 
This structured deliberative stage seemed relatively divorced from the dynamic and 
agile activism of the initial mobilization and which continued to some extent in tandem. 
On the other hand, there was also respect for these hard-earned participatory 
democratic processes of student activism and the hope of participants that the 
traditional factionalism of left-wing activism could be avoided.  
 
It is also important to note that the plural and horizontal character of the movement, 
including multiple committees, individual college assemblies and associated 
collectives, meant that many participants and groups carried out actions online and 
offline with only limited reference to the extensive deliberative processes of the 
movement assemblies. These activities included mounting the presidential debate, 
election monitoring, disseminating information in neighbourhoods, and developing 
state level agendas. Others focused on a range of issues, including socio-cultural ideas 
and policy agendas, still others worked on coordinating actions globally with the 
spreading network of adherents. As a result, the ideological discussions to articulate 
the movement identity and project were not necessarily at the centre of anti-Peña 
actions undertaken autonomously by many activists and groups. This plurality of action 
forms was perhaps a stronger feature of the movement practice than the deliberative 
processes to articulate a radical agenda, including ambitions to establish a national 
movement of movements in the post electoral climate.  
 
Despite descriptions of the movement as post-Zapatista, deliberative and human-
rights based (Puyosa 2017), these do not adequately reflect the evolving mixed identity 
and practice of the movement. Human rights demands expressed some of the initial 
                                                        
333 ‘there were processes we didn’t really understand, and for the UNAM they were completely natural... 
from their long history of political collectives, of student struggles’ (ES/S). 
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concerns of the movement, but these were rapidly displaced by a more radical 
horizontal counter-hegemonic agenda. In this context, human rights discourse was 
taken for granted, but backgrounded as insufficiently transformative and too neutral 
for a movement contesting the meaningfulness of the political process. As such human 
rights discourse only supported the initial emergence of the movement, but did not 
facilitate the articulation of its heterodox participants. The deliberative process of the 
assemblies played an important role in this process, yet they also remained secondary 
to the autonomous plural online and offline actions and political debate that 
participants engaged in as part of the mobilization and developing political 
consciousness. In effect, human rights discourse was taken-for granted as a bare 
minimum, but not considered sufficiently radical or transformative to express the 
cultural and social change the movement sought to enact.  
 
In contrast to this backgrounded role of human rights discourse, digital and social 
media practices were key to YoSoy132’s mobilization process.  
 
 Disrupting the media  
An innovative feature of YoSoy132 was its attack on the dominance of private media 
corporations accused of moulding Mexico’s political culture (Tuckman 2012a), 
particularly during the election cycle. The movement sought to highlight and disrupt 
this dominance through networked social media mobilization and street protest 
demanding freedom of expression and media democratization. Its multiple forms of 
activism also promoted, reinforced and contributed to developing alternative digital 
news platforms, increasing the range of voices covered.  
 
YoSoy132 emerged in direct reaction to the perceived role played by national media 
corporations, particularly Televisa and TV Azteca, in shaping the political narrative 
around the elections, shepherding the return of the PRI to power. Activists felt a strong 
sense of breaking free of this elite imposed news narrative and using digital and social 
media to expose a more complex reality: ‘es romper con el discurso monolítico, puedo 
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enterarme de lo que está pasando en mi realidad, no lo que pinta los medios... es una 
realidad mucho más compleja’.334 
 
Part of this process of making the movement visible beyond the private universities 
was through online livestream coverage of participants, circumventing the exclusion or 
mediation of TV news networks (Cammaerts 2012). This enabled a form of dynamic 
unfiltered citizen reportage capturing the drama of the protests: 
‘El hecho de que rompieron con la forma clásica de hacer activismo fue 
trascendente… pero lo más trascendental fue que todo el mundo lo vio… sin la 
edición de nadie… esos chicos que reportaron en vivo - andaba en bici – tenía su 
canal – se dedicaba a ser reportero… su forma de hacer reportaje no profesional… 
era interesante… no era el clásico reportaje… aquí vemos… simplemente pone la 
imagen… “ven los que estoy viendo”, nada más’.335 
 
This direct unmediated contact with the early movement actions seems to have 
enabled a range of social media and internet users to witness the events live online, 
experiencing the protest from the perspective of someone participating, not as framed 
by mainstream media. As observed above, the response of more seasoned activists was 
not uniformly positive to these protest practices, but they attracted interest among a 
university generation at ease with smart phone enabled social networking which in 
turn facilitated participation in public space events.   
 
However, the extended participation was not achieved solely through student social 
networks. It was also brokered by independent progressive journalists with an 
increasing public profile and large online followings whose retweets extended 
participation and transfer of coverage to mainstream media. This hybrid (Chadwick 
                                                        
334 ‘It’s about breaking with the monolithic discourse, I can find out what is happening in my reality, not 
what the media presents… it is a much more complex reality’ (KQ/S). 
335 ‘The fact that they broke with the classic form of doing activism was really important… but the most 
important thing was that everyone saw it… without anyone editing… those guys that reported live… one 
went around on his bicycle… he had his own [livestream] channel… he made himself a reporter… his way 
of doing non-professional reporting was interesting… it wasn’t classic reporting.. “here we see”… he just 
put up the image… “see what I am seeing” nothing else’ (MS/SA). 
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2013) shift between media platforms and networks enabled a small online protest to 
rapidly reach multiple networks and audiences.   
 
The early street protests against mainstream TV channels also gained international 
media interest, focusing on the quality of Mexico’s democracy and the role of large 
media corporations. This coincided with international media excitement over social 
media enabled protest, as exemplified by the Occupy and 15-M movements. The 
attention also forced mainstream Mexican media corporations, albeit reluctantly and 
dismissively, to cover the emerging movement, allowing student representatives to 
voice their criticisms. For activists who took on spokesperson roles, social media was 
crucial in opening up this coverage by mainstream media which was an exciting and 
unsettling experience:  
‘Y también cuando los medios tradicionales comenzaron a retomar, cuando te 
buscan, te piden en la Tele entrevistas… hay interés en ver lo que está pasando… 
chistoso… después de tantos años de… toda una campaña de Peña Nieto, y luego 
tu eres la voz que están buscando para escuchar o para saber y allí me parece fue 
en lo que ayudaron las redes sociales’.336 
 
However, the relationship with the traditional media was frequently tense. Participants 
observed how some: ‘medios buscaban crear liderazgos para luego criticar y exponer 
que no había proyecto’.337 At the same time, the movement’s suspicion of the mass 
media in general and the claim not to have leaders - despite the high visibility of certain 
spokespersons - created friction even with sympathetic journalists trying to cover the 
story. 
 
Movement participants argued that the mainstream media was arrogant; believing 
itself entitled to be courted by those seeking to promote a political message, while 
                                                        
336 ‘When the traditional media started to cover the story, when they looked for you, when they asked 
for TV interviews… there is interest in what is happening… it was funny… after so many years… the whole 
Peña Nieto campaign… and then you are the voice that they are looking for, to listen to and to find out… 
that is where I think social media helped’ (XV/S). 
337 ‘the media tried to create movement leaders in order to then criticise them and ridicule them for not 
having a political project’ (HS/J). 
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imposing a negative editorial frame to undermine independent social mobilizations. 
YoSoy132 attacked this process as undemocratic, using social media and creative 
protests to generate an alternative narrative outside the framing control of the 
mainstream media. In this narrative, the legitimacy of the media, particularly private 
TV networks and PRI aligned news and radio, was called into questioned. Some activists 
drew self-consciously on the theory of self-communicating networked individuals 
(Castells 2007) challenging centralised mass media production to shape the views of a 
passive consumer society.338 
 
By challenging these traditional media practices, activists felt a sense of emotional 
engagement, innovation and agency as autonomous political subjects: 
‘la parte de democratización de los medios relacionada con la forma de hacer 
política y hacer narrativas, creo que allí es una de las cosas con que yo más mi 
quedo… pusimos sobre la mesa una narrativa distinta, una narrativa que nos 
nació de la alma, del enojo, del sentimiento de escucharnos, frente una narrativa 
completamente impuesta, creada como muy de formato, ... , una obra de teatro 
ya creada, y tu estas allí como espectador y de repente reventamos esa 
posibilidad’.339 
 
The student movement was also widely covered by emerging alternative digital media 
platforms, reinforcing the sense of an increasingly diverse and disrupted media 
environment. In addition, the experience of movement participants, particularly their 
role in developing a critical stance toward the political and media establishment, 
legitimated and contributed to the growing ecology of independent and alternative 
digital news platforms which the movement explicitly supported.340   
                                                        
338 Despite its relatively small viewing figures and technical glitches, the student organized debate 
between presidential candidates, enabled the creative use of livestreamed internet and participatory 
questioning of candidates. This showed the potential for independent activists to use digital media to 
produce and transmit complex issues in a highly managed electoral media climate. 
339 ‘the part of media democratization related to the means of doing politics and of constructing 
narratives, I think those are the most important things I am left with… we put a different narrative out 
there, a narrative that was born in the soul, of anger, of the feeling of needing to be listened to, as 
opposed to a completely imposed narrative, a format… a piece of scripted theatre in which you are the 
audience, and suddenly we blew that up’ (XV/S). 
340 For example, the collective of students in the Ibero involved in the 11 May 2011 developed an 
alternative digital news portal, Masde131 which accompanied social mobilization processes, such as the 
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 Social media, reducing costs and developing identity 
YoSoy132 interviewees believed digitally enabled networking via social media 
platforms enabled the free flow of information, coordination and recruitment in line 
with literature on cost reducing affordances of digital and social media (Shirky 2009; 
Earl et al. 2011). This included facilitating the rapid shift from online to street protests. 
However, the dynamics of social media use by activists also reflected social divisions. 
This initially favoured the social capital of middleclass activists with developed media 
skills and resources, rather than political commitment to contentious mobilization. The 
range of frequently chaotic and creative activities which newly emerging YoSoy132 
groups engaged in did not necessarily contribute to the movement’s public actions or 
objectives, but played an important role in fostering participation and identity. This in 
turn contributed to a legacy of skilled adaptive activists and networks versed in the use 
of social media to promote social causes, including human rights issues.  
 
All interviewees shared surprise at the rapid shift from spontaneous online protest in 
support of the 131 YouTube video to enthusiastic street action: ‘nadie pensaba que iba 
a saltar de las redes a las calles’.341 However, many also recognised that this surprise 
was due to not realising quite how embedded digital social networking on multiple 
platforms had become in the lives of the student generation of 2012. In fact, social 
media platforms, particularly in the economically advantaged private universities, 
simply provided the most obvious means of sharing information and interest in 
participating in protests as part of their online and offline social networks. 
 
For longer standing student activists, the rapid shift from online protest to street 
collective action was also a surprise, because efforts to use social media strategically 
to promote protests on political and social issues had never previously resulted in such 
interest and participation. However, activists also noted the freshness of the YoSoy132 
                                                        
families of Ayotzinapa, seeking to develop alternative information narratives allied to social causes and 
human rights issues.  
341 ‘Nobody thought it was going to jump from social media to the streets’ (XV/S). 
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online and offline protests. These were novelly focused on media power and involved 
students who didn’t look like the usual left-wing activists of the UNAM. There were 
imaginative and funny protest slogans and memes, such as: ‘Televisa te idiotiza, TV 
Azteca te apendeja’.342 Social media provided an obvious medium to make visible this 
different approach and then for those interested to make contact with organizers or 
just simply show up with their friends at the next announced demonstration.  
‘Las convocatorias estuvieron días ahí arriba, lo que generó visibilidad y la 
posibilidad de participación. Había gente que preparaba sus propias asambleas 
sin preguntar a nadie, luego llegan con sus preocupaciones, y luego nos buscaban 
gente de Jalapa, Querétaro, así. En redes lo veían todo, la protesta del 11 de 
mayo, las marchas en el DF y estábamos en comunicación... pero por pasos. Un 
# visibiliza pero te comunicas por Facebook, te enteras, te llegas y estás. Hay otra 
forma de comunicación. Si ayudó extender la convocatoria a casi todo el país, 
donde surge 132 en lugares que no imaginarías, luego siguieron trabajando. Eso 
fue debido a la visibilización en redes, no en TV. Esa gente genera sus colectivos 
y su trabajo, vienen de allí las convocatorias y luego llegan a las asambleas’.343 
 
Social media use enabled information to circulate rapidly across the country and 
internationally. The humorous and iconoclastic imagery of the early actions also 
enabled such use to embolden local organization and creativity to develop plural 
collectives and actions in tune with their own generation and locality, using the 
different forms of communication most suited to or available in their environment. This 
was not confined to social media use, but also turning from digital to analogue as part 
of street activities:  
‘la gente quiere tener identidad no lo que trae desde hace 50 años… pues ahí 
descargamos en CDs. de lo que estaba sacando 132, compilamos en DVD y 
folletos, para distribuir en físico… no necesitamos tener un diseñador 
                                                        
342 ‘Televisa makes you an idiot, Tv Azteca makes you stupid’ 
343 ‘The protest announcements were online for days, which generated visibility and the possibility of 
participation. People organized their own assemblies without asking anyone, afterward they came along 
with their list of issues, people from Jalapa, Querétaro etc would look for us. They had seen everything 
on social media, the protest on 11 May, the marches in Mexico City and then we were in 
communication… bit by bit. A hashtag visibilises, but you communicate by Facebook. You find out, you 
get in touch, and there you go along, and you are involved. It’s another way of communicating. Yes 
[social media] helped to extent the protest invites to almost the whole country, to where 132 sprung up 
in places you wouldn’t believe, and then they kept up activism. That was due to the visibilization on 
social media, not the TV. Those people created their own collectives and work, it was the 
announcements that reached them, then they came to the assemblies’ (GL/SA). 
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matándose… entramos a la red para ver lo que subían hoy… si no nos gustaba lo 
modificamos un poco pero no era hacerlo todo… mucha creatividad… para todos 
los gustos.344 
   
The majority of interviewees felt that that the process of convening protests or 
activities changed radically to the extent that activists stopped producing physical 
information materials. However, one interviewee observed that the array of online 
announcements made it impossible to draw attention to their particular assembly 
activities. They decided that physical posters in the faculty were more effective. This 
indicates how social media formed part of the web of communicative practices, but did 
not end traditional organizational practices.   
 
Another feature of social media use observed by interviewees, was how it tended to 
favour the better resourced and skilled middleclass students, who also benefitted from 
the confidence of their social and cultural capital. This enabled them to rapidly produce 
high quality audio-visual materials, to articulate the meaning and objectives of the 
movement in new and energizing terms and rapidly develop a wide social media 
following. Interviewees contrasted this agile and witty use of social media with some 
of the more ideologically-loaded and less tech-savvy productions of the traditional 
centres of student activism. As a result, these new digital and social media activists 
helped attract early and wide participation, beyond traditional student activism circles. 
It also perhaps reinforced the social advantages enjoyed by a certain sector of relatively 
privileged new activists. However, interviewees recognised that these skill-sets and the 
adaptive approach to the technology established a new benchmark in terms of the 
quality and appeal of action materials distributed by social activists on digital and social 
media as part of mobilization processes.  
 
                                                        
344 ‘People want their own identity, not the same one as the last 50 years… So, we downloaded onto CDs 
what 132 was producing, then we made DVDs and pamphlets to physically distribute… we didn’t need 
to have a designer working away.. we went online to see what had been produced that day… if we didn’t 
like it we modified it a bit, but it wasn’t the same as doing the whole thing… there was a lot of creativity… 
for all tastes’ (MS/SA). 
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The facilitation of individual and group involvement in the mobilization by social media 
was a dynamic but also a chaotic process, much of which did not necessarily contribute 
concretely to movement actions, but seems to have fostered spaces of identity and 
agency where people felt that they were actively contributing to and developing their 
own collective actions:   
‘era un desastre, era una locura… haciendo documentos… pero de verdad, esos 
documentos de los Path - salvo los que estaban en la Coordinadora Universitaria 
donde tenían reuniones presenciales - mezclaban las lógicas, era eso, el 
Whatsapp, el grupo de Facebook, el Path… teníamos un montón de grupos de 
Facebook, grupos por asamblea, por comisión, por tarea, por subcomisión de la 
comisión, por mesas de trabajo, teníamos 300 grupos de Facebook por persona, 
hicieron una locura. Eso era inmanejable, pero servía… por algunos servía para 
sentirse parte del movimiento, hacían su Path, su documento colaborativo, lo 
publicaron y ya tenían un posicionamiento público, pero para esos chavos eran 
las herramientas que les servían para su propio proceso organizativo. Sí juntaban 
las cosas y sí era muy distinto’.345 
 
This climate of creative chaos facilitated by the ease and low cost of social media, was 
in line with the horizontal, democratic and plural ideology of the movement, enabling 
forms of individualised and small group participation and deliberation without the 
traditional requirements of organizational commitment and discipline. This served as 
an energising fluid space of expressive collective collaboration, sociality and movement 
identity, but did not necessarily contribute to concrete actions, strategic objectives or 
longer term movement cohesion. Nonetheless, the embeddedness of digital and social 
media, which the mobilization reinforced, facilitated the rapid participation in online 
and offline actions, particularly through the sharing of sentiments.  
 
                                                        
345 ‘it was a disaster, it was madness… making a document... the truth was that those Path documents - 
except for the ones that were done by the University Coordination Council where there were physical 
meetings - mixed different logics, it was like that, Whatsapp, Facebook groups, Path… there were loads 
of Facebook groups; groups for the assembly, for commissions, for tasks, for the sub-commission of the 
commission, for working groups, we had 300 Facebook groups per person, it was madness. It was 
unmanageable but it worked… for some it served to feel part of the movement, they did their Path, their 
collaborative document, then published it and they had a public position, for those guys the tools worked 
for their own organizing processes. Yes, it got things together and yes it was very different’ (GL/SA). 
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 Affect transmission 
Feeling and sharing anger played an important role in the mutual recognition of 
incipient movement actors reflecting the importance of shared emotions in the 
mobilizations (Gamson 1992; Jasper 1998). Interviewees recognised how important 
social media was in this process of engaging distributed actors, propelling them to 
come together in public spaces to meet and share:  
‘Las redes sociales en el caso de 132 permitieron transferir esa indignación, tal 
vez experimentada de forma individual, en un fenómeno de movilización mucho 
más amplia. Y una cosa importante, cuando esa indignación individual, se 
identifica con otra indignación y otra, y eso nos lleva a encontrarnos, ya no es la 
mera indagación, sí está ocurriendo algo más. Gran parte de que la gente se fue 
a la calle fue por conocerse y disfrutar’.346 
 
According interviewees with previous (and subsequent) experience in using social 
media for activism, digital communications platforms played an important role in 
transmitting shared outrage, solidarity, hope and humour. This emotional engagement 
was an important factor in spurring individuals and small groups to go onto the streets 
in large numbers and turn what had been a digitally networked experience into a 
physical coming together in public spaces (Gerbaudo 2012). The self-communication 
across networks between friendship and social groups, unmediated by mass media, 
appears to have helped validate the authenticity of this common sentiment shared by 
a generation refusing to submit to political apathy or media manipulation.  
 
For one slightly older digital activist, who supported YoSoy132 on Twitter, and who had 
participated in online activities of the Arab Spring and 15-M, digitally networked social 
movements like YoSoy132 were necessarily emotional, effervescent and short-lived. 
However, this understanding of digitally enabled movements as almost uniquely 
emotional was the exception among interviewees. Other participants, while 
                                                        
346 ‘In the case of 132, social media permitted the transfer of that indignation, perhaps felt on an 
individual form, into the phenomenon of a much broader mobilization. And an important thing, when 
that individual indignation identifies with another indignation and another, that leads us to come 
together, now it is not just mere indignation, something more is happening. One of the main reasons 
why people went on to the streets was to get to know each other, to enjoy themselves’ (EL/HRNGO/DA). 
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recognising the importance of social media to share outrage, humour and other 
emotions, believed the experience of mobilization was more integrated between 
online and offline elements: a transformative political engagement and social 
experience with lasting impact on personal values as political actors. This reflected 
Melucci's (1996) ideas of the expressive collective identity of New Social Movements 
(see section 2.4.3) For example, one participant observed: ‘una de las cosas más 
bonitas de 132, fue mucha también de relaciones afectivas, entender eso como una 
forma de hacer política… definitivamente transformó nuestras vidas’.347  
 
Most interviewees recognised the importance of shared emotions and the expressive 
sentiments of the movement, but they did not attribute these to features specifically 
to social media – unlike the older cyberactivist. According to their view, the technology 
platforms were useful, powerful tools, which reduced barriers to communication, 
avoiding the mediation of mainstream media, but they did not intrinsically generate 
emotional empathy. Nonetheless, the accounts of involvement through social media 
networks, including following events on livestreaming platforms, strongly support 
Papacharissi’s (2015) argument that digital and social media can strengthen the 
communication of affect and shared identity, supporting participation in online and 
public mobilization.  
 
These processes are not necessarily related to facilitating the shared recognition of 
political sympathies. They can also be about encouraging increased expectation of 
possible of offline social relationships. For example, interviewees recognised that part 
of the power of social media communication was overcoming traditional barriers of 
social class and the potential to participate in wider social networks. One interviewee 
noted how the anonymity and glossiness of social media networking facilitated 
engagement, encouraging involvement because, ‘en Facebook todo el mundo se ve 
mejor’.348  
 
                                                        
347 ‘One of the most beautiful things about 132, was a lot about emotional relations, understanding this 
as a form of doing politics… it definitively transformed our lives’ (XV/S). 
348 ‘Everyone looks better on Facebook’ (MS/SA). 
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In summary, social media was widely regarded as having facilitated connections and 
motivation amongst those who had not previously been involved in protests. However, 
while activists often did not attribute this to particular affordances of social media, 
their accounts supported this feature of digitally enabled communication already 
embedded in fragmented social relations. In particular, the process of identification 
and sharing of emotions contributed to the excitement at the possibility of converting 
digitally mediated relationships into physical gatherings to enact protest but also 
human sociality. However, this also raised questions about the durability of emotional 
identification to sustain contentious struggle.  
 
 Connective action 
This section considers YoSoy132’s developing communicative culture, particularly the 
extent to which it represented individualised connective action (Bennett & Segerberg 
2013) as opposed to reliance on more traditional collective identity (Gamson 1992; 
Melucci 1996) or social movement organizations (McCarthy et al. 1977; Tarrow 1998; 
McAdam et al. 2003). The analysis suggests that some connective action features were 
present, particularly during the early stages of mobilization, but these were gradually 
replaced by more hybrid approaches. 
 
Among all interviewees, there was a feeling of surprise that the Ibero incident had 
turned into a social media event then mainstream media news. This rapidly turned into 
a sense of opportunity and potential, but without a clear collective identity or direction. 
This sense of spontaneous identification with and sharing of previously latent or 
unexpressed personal and/or small group sentiments, was echoed by four early 
movement participants. This included suddenly recognising the widespread shared 
interest, including from abroad: ‘La verdad es que no nos habíamos dado cuenta del 
potencial hasta cuando abrimos ese lugar [Facebook page], porque nos empezó a 
escribir gente de todos lados… Ellos se habían enterrado por la misma forma que 
nosotros’.349 
                                                        
349 ‘The truth is that we hadn’t realised the potential until we opened that [social media] space, because 
people started to write to us from everywhere… They had heard about it in the same way as us’ (CQ/SA). 
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Social media enabled the movement to rapidly and organically take shape via these 
individual or small group social network affiliations but also through distributed links 
brokered by online independent journalist. This facilitated multiple individualised or 
small group horizontal contacts and interactions, particularly attractive for a 
generation suspicious of hierarchical leaders and political organizations: 
‘Primero, permitió una plataforma descentralizada de decisión, que tiene sus 
pros y sus contras, muchos movimientos con el mismo nombre… esa idea. 
Además, un movimiento, que cuando se escucha la palabra centralización se 
espanta, igual cuando escucha la palabra lideres la rechaza… la frase ‘formen un 
partido’, la rechaza… incluso cuando nos imponen métricas de éxito/fracaso, 
también las rechaza… las redes sociales fueron para dar… o generar… 
comunicación… contra-speech’.350 
 
This suggests an open plural online sphere enabling decentred oppositional 
contributions and deliberations unconstrained by formal limitations of a defined and 
hierarchical organized movement. For interviewees, these features encouraged wide 
participation without requiring participants to share beliefs or values beyond the 
commitment to oppositional free speech. However, few interviewees identified these 
multiple online conversations as deliberative in the Habermas (1996) sense of 
establishing consensus through communicative rationality, rather they were more 
reflective of energised disputatious counter-publics (Fraser 1990), excited at sharing 
and discussing in an open action-oriented critical conversation.   
 
In this context, social media contributors claimed self-asserted authority to articulate 
the meaning of the emerging movement. The test of the legitimacy of each 
contribution rested on peer approval or disapproval; The former leading to 
recirculation among networks, the later, to no recirculation: ‘veías carteles diciendo 
YoSoy132 movimiento a favor de la verdad. La persona que hizo eso no tenía que decirlo 
                                                        
350 ‘Firstly, it enabled a decentralised decision-making platform, which has its pros and cons, many 
movements with the same name… that sort of idea. Also, a movement that when it hears the word 
leadership, rejects it... including when metrics of success and failure are imposed from outside, they are 
also rejected… social media gave… or generated… counter-speech’ (GF/S). 
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a nadie, si eso era el concepto adecuado... Se detenía (sic) a soltar esa idea… a ver si 
moría o si tenía éxito.351 
 
Bennett & Segerberg (2013) argue this is a form of individualised ‘connective action’. 
However, in the case of YoSoy132, participation was not necessarily individualised, but 
in many instances was also based on small groups of friends or collectives of activists, 
some of whom pre-existed the emergence of the movement and others who came 
together as part of the process. As Gerbaudo & Treré (2015) show, these micro groups 
often communicated between themselves on different social media platforms, such as 
closed messenger platforms like Whatsapp, as part of identity sustaining processes. 
They also participated more visibly as individuals in wider open movement networks 
on platforms like Facebook or Twitter. In addition, many of these social media practices 
were part of a wider communicative culture which included physical meetings and 
assemblies to discuss ideas and plans, as well as to validate the trustworthiness of new 
adherents.  
 
Nonetheless, the rapidity and spontaneity with which participants could feel 
themselves part of the movement, particularly through the use of digital and social 
media, was understood by most interviewees as a feature of the movement. However, 
this was not always seen as positive, particularly for those with longer-standing 
commitment to social and political activism. These interviewees tended to question 
the underlying commitment of the neophyte social media participants: ‘hacíamos 
broma: “Quiero hacer movimiento, abro mi grupo de Facebook, de Whatsapp luego un 
Path, luego manifiesto, y ya miembro” Eran como los pasos’.352 
 
                                                        
351 ‘you would see an online poster saying “YoSoy132 - a movement in favour of the truth”. The person 
that put it up didn’t have to seek permission from anyone about whether it was the right idea… they 
could just put the idea out there, … to see if it flopped or had a successful response..’ (GF/S). 
352 ‘We used to joke about it: “I want do movement activism, I just open my Facebook group, then 
Whatsapp then a Path document, then I protest, and now I am a member”. That was how it was seen’ 
(GL/SA). 
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More long term political activists also noted that the enthusiasm of people 
participating in street actions through social media lacked the commitment to a longer 
term political project:  
‘Pero también tuvo esta debilidad, la gente decía porque me organizo si veo lo 
que van a proponer en redes, entonces cuando termina la marcha y queríamos 
consolidar una estructura, la gente nos decía, “pues todo lo van a sacar en redes”, 
sí, pero la idea es juntar… “bueno, ya veo en redes”’.353 
 
This appears to support some of Gladwell’s (2010) weak-tie slacktivism criticisms. 
However, the reluctance to get more involved in offline organizing may also indicate 
an unwillingness to become embroiled in procedural and ideologically debates 
frequently associated with student activism. In this context, digital and social media 
facilitated selective participation without excluding the less politically committed who 
might not have participated otherwise. Interviewees recognised social media networks 
enabled large numbers to join in public protests without necessarily sharing beliefs or 
identity values. This facilitated plural participation, enhancing the size and visibility of 
the movement, but also challenging its longer term viability.  
 
Another feature of individualised or small group social media activism that participants 
recognised was the horizontal nature of communication. The anonymity of much 
communication and absence of defined leaders or dominant SMOs was a movement 
ideal facilitated by the social media networking. However, activists acknowledged that 
certain actors in the networks and assemblies had more influence. There was a 
continual tension between the need to guard against the creation of powerbrokers, 
while at the same time, to enable adept individuals to represent the movement 
effectively to communicate messages and reach wider networks. As one activist 
observed digital and social networking does not necessarily avoid traditional practices: 
                                                        
353 ‘It also had this weakness, people said why am I going to get involved in organizing if I can see what 
is being proposed on social media, so when we finished a march and we wanted to consolidate 
organizational structures, people would say to us, “well, everything is going to be on social media”, [we’d 
reply] yes, but the idea is to get together… [but they would respond], “well, I’ll just see on social 
media”’(MS/SA). 
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‘Pues hay muchas cosas, muchas vicios de los medios normales que pueden trasladarse 
a las redes – tiene que tenerlo en cuenta’.354    
 
Interviewees working in the media and the majority of activist interviewees pointed to 
the run-up to the elections as the most effervescent and creative period of YoSoy132 
activism, especially the use of social media. However, two activists involved in 
coordination and movement articulation, particularly with internationally distributed 
networks, observed that some of the network relations and systems to share 
information, report back on actions and plan new events became more organized and 
effective after Peña Nieto’s election victory when the network relations were more 
settled. This suggests that while the initial effervescence of connective action 
facilitated early participation and motivation, the more structured or hybrid 
approaches (Bennett et al. 2013) enabled the movement to sustain strategic practices. 
In the latter context, social media operated as a more conventional communications 
technology, reducing costs by facilitating information sharing and coordination to 
reinforce identity, but less charged with emotion and connective energy.     
 
However, efforts to establish a more stable organizational culture also reflected the 
ANI’s attempt to create a national popular movement based on more traditional social 
movement practices. This meant making organizational decisions about procedures, 
structure, strategy, identity and objectives; all processes which sat less easily with the 
decentred and individualised or small group activism that characterised and inspired 
the early mobilization.  
 
This attempt to consolidate a national movement with an organizational structure also 
reflects the difficult transition stage of a social mobilization in which SMOs were largely 
absent. It had emerged spontaneously in a specific political context, but struggled to 
develop ongoing contentious action around a broader identity in another political 
                                                        
354 ‘There are many thing, many vices in traditional forms of communication which transfer onto social 
media – you have got to keep it in mind’ (XV/S). 
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context, increasingly distant from the source of its upsurge and it original mobilizing 
networks.355   
 
This evidence suggests that a form of digitally enabled connective action was present 
in the early spontaneous mobilizations. However, this was not necessarily based on 
individualised action frames, but also included small group participation, creating and 
sharing information across affinity sub-networks. This underlay the process of 
developing a loose collective ‘we’ based around a generation of students alienated by 
Mexico’s partial democracy and media manipulations. However, this initial connective 
mobilization stage rapidly shifted to a hybrid formation, involving negotiations about 
the movement identity to reflect the plurality of ideologies, beliefs and aspirations of 
participants. This also reflected the challenge of developing an organizational practice 
and identity to carry the movement beyond the immediate electoral context and the 
return of the PRI to power.  
 
 Security 
Security concerns for participants in YoSoy132, particularly those related to social 
media and other digital communications platforms, were a low priority for most 
activists. There was awareness and suspicion about possible surveillance and threats, 
but this did not lead to major changes in practices, at least until 1 December 2012: ‘En 
general nos costó entender la protección. Siempre la poníamos en segundo plano. En 
digital, tres veces más. Todo ese discurso de que las redes son lo máximo, invisibiliza 
los riesgos o vicios’.356 
 
                                                        
355 It is also important to note that on and after 1 December 2012, when repression and fear of repression 
increased, social media communications once again featured strongly in defensive activist practice of 
those who continued to identify with the movement, particularly gathering and exposing evidence of 
police abuses against protesters. In this context, the reactive and more spontaneous communicative 
dimensions of social media and web platforms proved useful for activists to gather and disseminate 
evidence of human rights abuses from witnesses to challenge the official and mainstream media 
representation of the protesters.     
356 ‘In general, we found it difficult to understand the issue of protection. We always put it second. Three 
times more so in relation to digital security. All that discourse about social media being the maximum… 
it invisibilises the risks and the bad aspects’ (XV/S). 
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This also appears to reflect a long standing tradition in Mexico, including in the 
democratic era, that social and political activists are subject to surveillance, 
intimidation and even attack by authorities or other powerholders. Therefore, the 
danger posed by digital surveillance of social media or other digital threats is only one 
dimension of a wider, often unquantifiable climate of pressure. Despite this, at least 
two interviewees took minimum precautions, mainly focused on limiting information 
flows on open networks to maintain tactical advantage: ‘Es inútil intentar esconderse. 
Tomamos algunas medidas a nivel local para no te ganen en la preparación de eventos 
y acciones. Es decir, intentar evitar que los enemigos locales tienen toda la 
información’.357 Another interviewee working on international coordination 
recognised the challenges of working with networks of distributed activists with no 
direct contact. This included trying to distinguish between possible infiltrators, 
automated accounts and authentic activists.  
 
Gómez and Treré (2014) suggest that the vague ‘paranoia’ expressed by some 
YoSoy132 activists in relation to security risks arising from use of social media confirms 
a purely emotional rather than rational response to threats of using commercial 
platforms (p505). However, this privileges a Rational Actor Theory account of decision-
making, ignoring the complex interplay of reason and emotion involved in weighing up 
risks, particularly where reliable information on the nature and scale of the threat is 
unavailable. As a result, the more hedged and sometimes paranoid approach suggested 
by my interviewees reflects a not unreasonable, nor purely emotional, evaluative 
process, particularly for young people not schooled in political activism or 
cybersecurity.      
 
After 1 December 2012, YoSoy131 and affiliated collectives became increasingly aware 
of their vulnerability and began to change their social media practices to protect 
against interception: ‘El primero fue abandonar el Facebook para comunicarme. 
Queríamos tener un grupo de Facebook, pero cerrado. Empezamos a hacer la 
                                                        
357 ‘It is useless to try and hide. We took some precautions at local level so they weren’t forewarned 
about the preparation of events and actions. That is to say, trying to stop your local enemies having all 
the information’ (MS/S). 
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comunicación encriptada. Todavía no entramos al software libre, pero la mirada es 
para allá. También hemos tenido que diseñar protocolos, por la represión que hubo’.358 
 
This increasing sense of insecurity resulted in reflections on the balance between 
internal security and making information publicly available for mobilizations and other 
forms of public action. These considerations reflected a shift away from the more fluid 
spontaneous connective action of early YoSoy132, when social media’s democratizing 
affordances were venerated over potential threats. Revelations of intelligence service 
infiltration and manipulation of the movement (Villamil 2013) contributed to this 
increased awareness.359 This vulnerability also had a chilling effect on more 
deliberative exchange of ideas on open social media platforms.  
 
YoSoy132 activists who have continued activism have tried to ensure that security is 
strengthened through mutual support networks based on relations of trust and 
cooperation between a range of independent actors, which are not exclusively online: 
‘Creemos que la parte importante de seguridad es la formación de redes, otra 
forma de relacionarse… volvemos al principio… aprender entre nosotros que 
tenemos que cuidarnos… no importa si eres medio libre o periodista tradicional 
o de movimiento social… todos estamos pendientes de todos… conformar estas 
redes, informando… o teniendo acuerdos si hay un ataque que pasa’.360 
 
Despite frequent concerns expressed by some activists about their vulnerability to 
digital security threats, precautionary measures were limited and ad hoc. This appears 
due to lack of more visible digital security threats against activists at the time - 
excluding trolling and BOTs. The absence of solid information to adequately evaluate 
                                                        
358 ‘The first thing was to stop using Facebook to communicate. We wanted to have a Facebook group, 
but a closed one. We started to use encrypted communications. We are still not using Free Software 
programs, but we are heading in that direction. We have also had to design protocols as a consequence 
of the repression’(ES/S). 
359 Refer to example b, in footnote 175.  
360 ‘We believe that the important part of security is the formation of networks, another means of 
relating to each other… going back to basics… learning among ourselves that we have to protect each 
other… it doesn’t matter if you are an independent media outlet, a traditional journalist or a social 
movement… we are all looking out for each other… making networks, providing information… making 
agreements about what to do in the case of an attack. (CQ/SA). 
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risk made it a lesser priority than keeping communication flows open as much as 
possible, particularly as information did not include unlawful content. After 1 
December 2012, these attitudes changed. In effect, only when the vulnerability of 
social media became more evident and threatened its usefulness, did the development 
of security measure become a greater priority. This conclusion also suggests that in a 
context of semi-authoritarian practices against activists, measures to limit digital 
vulnerability may contribute to a reduction in fluid open networking and deliberative 
practice, in favour of more cautious strategic communications, thus reducing the 
connective action potential of digital and social media. 
  
 Conclusion 
This research found that most participants and observers did not consider YoSoy132 
be a human rights movement. In part this was because such movements were 
understood in terms of classic defensive mobilizations to demand justice from the state 
for victims of grave abuses. Nonetheless, human rights discourse and practice featured 
in various aspects of the mobilization. Firstly, YoSoy132 drew on human rights 
discourse to mount and interpret the trigger event, then affirm it through protest. 
However, the mobilizing narrative was not primarily human rights focused. In part, 
because human rights norms were a taken-for-granted standard in student 
generations, but also because more experienced human rights practitioners were not 
central to the movement networks to facilitate more creative interpretations. The 
commonly held view was that human rights discourse was a minimum, institutional 
and technical discourse, not adequate to reflect a plural movement with contentious 
political demands. This only increased as the movement developed its more counter-
hegemonic transformational collective identity. In the democratic deliberation 
processes of the movement, human rights discourse served as a minimum point of 
reference for most plural coalition actors, but others considered it an ideology of liberal 
individualism and insufficiently radical or emancipatory. As such, it enabled initial 
convergence, but was insufficient to act as an articulating discourse to reflect or 
express the plurality of transformational aspirations of the movement. The one area 
where human rights discourse was seen to feature was in its traditional defensive 
mode to denounce civil and political rights abuses against activists. However, 
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participation in online and offline actions was itself seen as an affirmation of the right 
to freedom of expression; activists realising their agency and developing political 
consciousness without necessarily adopting the discourse of human rights.  
 
YoSoy132 could not have emerged in its particular dynamic configuration without the 
increasingly embedded use of digital and social media among university students. This 
reflected and reinforced a growing plurality and hybridity of digital and social media 
information sources; enabling different critical voices and narratives to circulate and 
challenge dominant mainstream narratives. This digital environment provided a fertile 
terrain for activists to promote the movement trigger event. It also reduced costs and 
barriers to sharing materials and coordination as well as fostering identity through 
shared emotional responses and the desire to participate in the sociality of street 
actions. These more horizontal and connective features initially reduced the need for 
a more defined collective identity and allowed a plurality of interests and beliefs to co-
exist. However, participation was not solely on the basis ‘individualised action frames’ 
(Papacharissi 2015, p71) or ‘networked individualism’ (Wellman 2004) but also through 
pre-existing small groups identities or collectives. However, the looser network 
formations which facilitated the initial mobilization were not sufficient to sustain the 
movement deliberations or development, particularly as more established political 
ideologies gained influence. The movement increasingly adopted more traditional 
offline organizational processes to engage in direct deliberations and identity 
formation, reducing the specifically digital dimensions of the mobilization; making their 
use more strategic and less spontaneously expressive. Reliance on digital and social 
media raised vague security concerns, but did not lead to major modifications in the 
open fluidity of activist communications until confronted with overtly repressive 
measures. In conclusion, the enabling features of social media were key to the 
explosive initial configuration of YoSoy132, but these were insufficient to establish a 
more organized mobilization. The process of organizational consolidation also then 
contributed to reducing some of the more mobilizing and expressive features of the 
movement which digital and social media activism had facilitated.  
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Ayotzinapa 43: data analysis and findings  
  
 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the data gathered in relation to the practices of the social 
mobilization in support of the families of 43 forcibly disappeared students from the 
Ayotzinapa teacher training college.  
 
The Ayotzinapa 43 mobilization was selected as a case study due to several factors. 
Firstly, the crime and the subsequent movement exposed the scale of collusion 
between organized crime and all levels of the state. This reinforced human rights 
discourse as a meaningful critique of Mexico’s partial democracy, but also exposed its 
limits in terms of its role in a plural mobilization process. Secondly, the contribution 
made by the ‘networked opportunity structure’ (Cammaerts 2012) which had 
developed during earlier social mobilizations, including the increasing embeddedness 
of digital communications in civil society activism. Thirdly, the evolving hybrid solidarity 
mobilization drew on new and old repertoires of collective action (Tilly 1978), but was 
primarily rooted in the particular social context. Lastly, the contribution made by 
increasingly diverse and hybrid digital and social media practices which facilitated 
aspects of contention, including the diversifying online news media environment. The 
chapter examines how movement participants and observers understood these 
elements; their significance for the movement’s disruptive and transformative 
potential as well as the limiting effects of human rights discourse and digitally enabled 
mobilization in relation to social movement dynamics.  
 
 Human rights crisis made visible 
In 2012, the new PRI government failed to seriously address violence and impunity, 
with the human rights situation and the role of security forces coming under increasing 
scrutiny. This facilitated the interpretation of the enforced disappearance of 43 
Ayotzinapa students not only in terms of outrage at the crime, but also as a gross 
human rights violation implicating the state directly in the crisis. This combination of 
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moral shock and human rights discourse assisted a rapid shift from trigger event to 
mobilization. It also facilitated a focus on concrete human rights demands in support 
of the parents of the students which contrasted with the government’s empty 
institutional human rights discourse.  
 
Grave human rights violations, including killings, abductions and enforced 
disappearances involving state agents, took place under the Calderon and Peña Nieto 
administrations. The MPJD had partially undermined the government and media 
representation of the victims as involved in crime. National and international NGOs and 
IGOs had also evidenced the scale of disappearances and stigmatization of victims 
(Human Rights Watch 2011; Amnesty International 2013; Centro Prodh 2013; UN 
Human Rights Council 2014b). This information indicated a scale of hitherto 
unacknowledged abuses and threat to ordinary citizens arising from the violence and 
militarisation. However, interviewees felt the PRI had effectively imposed a national 
media agenda focused on its structural reforms and modernisation, marginalizing the 
significance of continuing violence. It also effectively demobilized potential early 
critical opposition from the MPJD by offering institutional concessions such as enacting 
the General Law on Victims. However, cases such as Tlatlaya (Human Rights Watch 
2014) evidenced military extrajudicial killings and official collusion in the cover-up. This 
was also reflected in information available on independent and alternative digital 
media platforms indicating continued criminal violence and security force abuses. As a 
result, the events in Iguala were part of a recognisable pattern but on a scale that 
‘generó una especie de shock en la población’361. This ‘moral shock’ (Jasper 2014b) was 
rapidly followed by other high profile cases exposing corruption and impunity at the 
heart of the PRI administration, shattering the veneer of democratic renewal crafted 
by the PRI and its media allies.362 
 
This shift in attitude was not solely due to public appreciation of the scale of the crime 
and the responsibility of police agents, but also an emotional response to the victims, 
                                                        
361 ‘it generated a form of shock in the population’ (GZ/NGOP) 
362 See footnote 125  
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particularly the parents. They represented blameless ordinary Mexicans, from 
extremely poor and indigenous backgrounds. They were victims of a predatory state 
indistinguishable from organized crime. The dignity and determination of the parents 
to find their sons and challenge the government was a quality noted by all interviews. 
This suggests Tilly’s social movement mobilizing qualities of ‘Worthiness, Unity, 
Numbers and Commitment’ (Tilly 2004, p4).  
 
However, the shock of the crime was also the threat it implied to ordinary citizens not 
involved in organized crime. The families of the victims stressed this point which 
contrasted with the official narrative of the violence, adding an additional urgency to 
the call for solidarity:  
‘me parece que uno de los grandes estímulos [para participar] fue la solidaridad, 
pero también fue el miedo que nos embargó, a decir, en medio de qué país 
estamos viviendo? De alguna manera se vieron amenazadas las personas’.363 
 
The evident involvement of security forces also showed that insecurity did not only 
derive from criminal gangs targeting other gangs, but also state agents working with 
them; the agents that were supposed to be protecting citizens in fact also posed the 
greatest threat to them. In this context, human rights discourse clearly located 
responsibility with the state, rather than the odd ‘rotten apple’ of individually corrupt 
police:  
‘con Ayotzi es la parte de la responsabilidad del Estado, no nada más por no haber 
prevenido sino por participación directa… lo que sentía, más socialmente, antes 
había un rechazo al discurso de derechos humanos como en “seguro en algo 
estaba involucrado”. Evidentemente va acompañado con todo una maquinara 
mediática que lo impulsaba. Ese sentimiento social, me parece, que fue una de 
las cosas más fuertes que rompió Ayotzinapa, que fue darle por completo la 
vuelta. Después de eso había la presunción de que el Estado... como participante 
                                                        
363 ‘… I think solidarity was one of the great incentives [to participation in the mobilization] but it was 
also fear that seized us, that is to say, what kind of country are we living in? In some ways, people felt 
themselves threatened (GZ/NGOP). 
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activo, el empezar a ver la complejidad de estas relaciones y actores, crimen 
organizado, gobierno y lo demás, que nos da miedo.364 
 
The significance of human rights discourse was confirmed in the aftermath of the crime 
as the complicity and/or collusion of municipal, state and federal authorities was 
evidenced by independent and international media, undercutting government efforts 
to shape the narrative. The humiliating treatment of the families and the official efforts 
to keep the blame at municipal level authorities, provided further ‘moral shocks’.365 In 
contrast to this conduct, local human rights NGOs documented in detail the case and 
respectfully accompanied the parents and surviving students.366 The International 
Interdisciplinary Group of Experts (GIEI) involvement ensured that the mobilization 
enjoyed technical and internationally legitimised human rights support grounded in 
multilateral institutions and focused on concrete human rights objectives such as the 
right to truth and justice.367   
 
                                                        
364 ‘With Ayotzi, it’s about the responsibility of the state [for the crime], not only by failing to prevent it 
but because of its direct participation… It felt like, before, socially speaking, there was a rejection of 
human rights as in [the often repeated phrase about the presumed criminality of victims] “he must’ve 
been involved in something”. Evidently that was promoted by the whole media machine. That social 
attitude, I think, was one of the strongest things that Ayotzinapa broke…it turned it completely round. 
Afterwards there was the presumption of the state… as a direct participant… of beginning to see the 
complexity of relations and actors, organized crime, government and the rest… that so frightens us’ 
(XV/NGOP). 
365 An example of this was initial attempts of state authorities on 5 and 6 October 2014 to present bodies 
found in clandestine graves around Iguala as (incorrectly) belonging to the missing students. This 
information was rapidly circulated on digital and social media, provoking public outrage. This fuelled 
participation in first major demonstration in Mexico City on 8 October 2014.  
366 This in turn facilitated the intervention of renowned international NGOs, such as the Argentine 
Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF), and IGOs, such as the Inter American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR). 
367 As one interviewee observed: ‘El trabajo del GIGI es clave. La confianza que ha depositado ahí es 
única, hasta más que con algunos de nosotros… sobre todo por la variedad de las visiones de los padres… 
eso ha ayudado que la vía institucional de exigir a las instituciones… que ellos que tienen que dar 
respuesta… Todavía les hace sentido... es una pieza clave… Que ha logrado que sigan juntos… que está 
poniendo en línea de fuego su reputación’ (The work of the GIGI is key. The trust placed in them is 
exceptional, including more than in some of us [human rights activists]…above all because of the variety 
of perspectives of the parents.. it has helped to ensure an institutional path for making demands on the 
institutions… so that they have to give answers…[This process] still makes sense [to the parents]… it is a 
key element… it has ensured that [the parents] have remained united… that [the members of the GIEI] 
are putting their reputation on the line) (QE/NGOP). 
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The use of human rights discourse by legitimised actors increased recognition of the 
human rights crisis, facilitating the understanding underpinning the mobilization. It 
also ensured the mobilization was not limited to traditional social movement 
contentious practices – which were perceived as more political, with the potential to 
lead to physical clashes with the authorities as a means of securing concessions from 
powerholders. Interviewees from both traditions considered that these popular 
mobilization practices were often at odds with the more legalistic human rights 
strategies, but that the Ayotzinapa 43 mobilization bridged some of this divide through 
an increased recognition of the relevance of human rights claims-making.    
‘En México hace tiempo que no había tanta expresión de indignación y tanta 
movilización no corporativizada... y en la expresión de esta indignación, había 
más componentes de derechos humanos que antes. Pues eso puede ser que es 
más socializado el discurso de derechos humanos hacia sectores que antes no 
fraseaba en esos términos sus demandas de justicia’.368  
 
In conclusion, despite government efforts to marginalize human rights concerns, these 
had increasingly featured in understanding the ongoing violence and its impact on the 
population. As information of the atrocity of Iguala circulated, including the role of the 
state, the trigger event was interpreted as both outrage against ordinary Mexicans but 
also in terms of the wider human rights crisis placing everyone at risk. The involvement 
of skilled national and international human rights practitioners provided substantive 
evidence to expose government efforts to close the case and helped sustain the 
mobilization, particularly its focus on concrete human rights demands. This process 
also further embedded human rights discourse as a critique the government and 
Mexico’s partial democracy.   
  
                                                        
368 ‘In Mexico, there hadn’t been such an expression of indignation for ages, of organic social 
mobilization… and in the expression of that indignation there were more human rights elements than 
before. That could be because human rights discourse had been more socialised with those sectors 
which previously would not have framed their justice claims in those terms’ (XE/NGOP). 
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 Networked activists orienting action  
The social mobilization in support of the Ayotzinapa 43 took shape rapidly, due in large 
part to the reconfiguration of supporting social networks. This was facilitated, but not 
determined by increasingly embedded use of digital communications. Many network 
actors had a range of skills and resources, some developed over decades of 
involvement in various political and social organizations and others more recently 
acquired as part of looser global justice and digital activism.  
 
Networks overlapped at several different points but were primarily made up of: 
student activists; militants from trade union and socio-political organizations; human 
rights NGOs, global justice activists; independent civil society actors and international 
solidarity activists. Each of these contributed different sets of skills and ideological 
approaches but formed an ‘interconnected networked environment in which social 
movements operate’ (Cammaerts 2012, p.119). Human rights NGOs played an 
important, but not monopolizing role in orienting the response to the trigger event 
with the families. This included mobilizing their human rights associated networks and 
involving international actors to legitimise and strengthen the claims-making of the 
families.  
 
One of the first networks to be activated in response to the Iguala attack was the trade 
union representing rural students teachers, FECSM. An organization with a radical 
resistance history with links across trade union and students networks, as well as socio-
political organizations committed to left-wing causes, including the Zapatistas and their 
support networks. This was the early focus for the surviving students who saw human 
rights organizations as important but secondary in the networking and mobilization 
process: 
‘[FECSM] tiene relaciones con los sindicatos, de todo tipo, allá en Guerrero y 
otros estados... por las relaciones también saliendo de 2011... además para el 2 
de octubre se entablaron muchas relaciones con muchas organizaciones, incluso 
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obviamente con las de derechos humanos... que a su vez convocaron a sus 
contactos... de inmediata se formó una red amplia de información.369 
 
The Iguala attack occurred during a period of intense mobilization of dissident 
teachers’ unions in protests and strikes against reforms to the education sector. Some 
of the Guerrero chapters of the unions were at the forefront of militant opposition to 
federal government policy. This provided an opportunity for the convergence of plural 
interests: ‘Esos mismos días estaban sesionando para el paro. Llegó esto, entonces lo 
incorpora como parte de su pliego… así fueron muchas cosas que lograron en 
paginarse’.370 The political and social grassroots organizations in Guerrero would 
gradually take on a primary role as part of the Asamblea Nacional Popular (ANP), which 
would assume the leadership and coordination of the movement.371 
 
In Guerrero, networks which emerged around the families were seen by interviewees 
as essential to providing a solid, but not monopolising human rights orientation to the 
movement. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, parents of the disappeared were 
invited by the surviving Ayotzinapa students to remain on the campus until their 
children were returned alive. A parents’ committee was also established almost 
immediately. Local human rights NGOs, Centro Tlachinollan and Centro de Derechos 
Humanos Morelos y Pavón, had existing relationships of trust with college students. On 
this basis, parents were encouraged to trust Centro Tlachinollan to document the case 
and support their families’ fight. Centro Tlachinollan’s strong relationship with the 
Mexico City based NGO, Centro PRODH also enabled it to develop relationships with 
the students and parents as well as press the case at national and international level. 
These local contacts relied on sets of pre-existing networked relationships and direct 
                                                        
369 ‘[FECSM] has relations with trade unions of all types, there in Guerrero and other states… including 
relationships resulting from 2011 [when Ayotzinapa students were previously attacked by police]… 
additionally, on 2 October relations with many other organizations started up, including obviously 
human rights NGOs… which in turn called on their contacts… immediately a wide information network 
was formed’ (SK/V/SA). 
370 ‘During those same days, [the unions] were meeting to organise the strike. [Ayotzinapa] happened, 
so they just incorporated it as part of their demands.. many things just came together in this way’ 
(QE/NGOP). The protests in Mexico City also coincided with a major dispute at the National Polytechnic 
Institute, which initially adopted the demands of the Ayotzinapa families. 
371 See section 5.4 for more detail. 
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meetings to develop core movement agreements, rather than digital communications. 
Centro Tlachinollan and Centro PRODH both had resources and extensive experience 
in litigation at national and international level, including accompanying victims over 
many years in their struggles for justice. Both NGOs had developed national and 
international reputations as well as support and solidarity networks.372 On the basis of 
these existing relations, the international human rights networks were rapidly 
activated in the immediate aftermath of the crime. These networks and their 
rootedness in existing relationships and localities were key to the rapid mobilization. 
‘hubo muchos factores en como ese movimiento creció… en parte es porque al 
día siguiente, estaban [un representante de Tlachinollan y el Centro Morelos], 
documentando, lo que se podía documentar, pero acompañando los chavos en 
ese momento... salió la información desde el primer momento. La otra como tal, 
La Normal como tal asumió todo el ritmo… es que los padres vivían ahí y la 
mayoría siguen viviendo ahí, en La Normal o en las periferias de La Normal. Eso 
significa un nicho… que permitiera a todo el mundo llegara para conocer lo que 
estaba pasando y como están las familias’.373 
 
But the solidarity mobilization drew on wider networks than human rights NGOs. In 
Guerrero, longstanding political and social activist organizations and unions quickly 
joined the movement, supporting the students and parents, but also pressing their own 
social and political agenda. In wider national and international networks, YoSoy132 
activists were some of the first to respond to the call for action, reactivating latent 
capacity. The involvement of YoSoy132 activists and Zapatista supporters, with active 
or latent international networks, enabled the swift participation of allied international 
activist oriented toward counter-hegemonic global justice causes. This contributed to 
the rapid global participation in solidarity actions. These networks of activists also 
provided resources to disseminate information on actions and increase their visibility 
                                                        
372 As an international human rights researcher and campaigner, I worked closely with both organizations 
over several years. 
373 ‘There are many reasons why the movement grew… in part it is because the very next day [a 
representative of Tlachinollan] and the Morelos y Pavón Human rights centre were there documenting 
what they could, but also accompanying the students… the information got out from the first moment. 
The other thing, was that the Rural College, took on the whole rhythm… the parents were living there 
and the majority are still living there, in the college or nearby. That means a space… which enabled the 
whole world to go there to get to know what was happening and the situation of the families’ 
(QE/NGOP). 
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– a contribution not necessarily appreciated by nationally focused activists. As one 
former YoSoy132 activist observed: 
‘creo que 132 Internacional logró un trabajo fuerte de red y de unión, que para 
mí fue importante porque… sin eso Ayotzinapa no hubiera sido tan movido… 
porque la red ya estaba hecha, si bien cuando ocurre Ayotzinapa las cuentas 
estaban en desuso... pero nunca las perdimos, cuando pasa Ayotzinapa 
activamos la cuenta, toda la gente todavía está ahí, para difundir y lo que hubo. 
En ese momento nosotros teníamos grupos 132, 132twiteros, 132traductores… 
Aunque aquí no se valoró, todo lo producida, boletines etc. fue traducida, página 
de Wikipedia. La base nos sirvió mucho para eso’.374 
   
In early October the spontaneous involvement of different individuals, friendship 
groups, collectives, networks and NGOs in Mexico City led to the need for more 
coordination. A civil society Plataforma de Solidaridad was established. This enabled 
face-to-face debate amongst the different activists and organizations, action planning 
and initial contact with the parents. Collectives of artists and others approached the 
Platform to propose solidarity and cultural actions, seeking contact with and 
authorization from the parents. For example, a YoSoy132 activist observed:  
‘Había confianza... con todo lo que habíamos hecho con 132 hasta Ayotzi, 
entonces fuéramos invitados a la plataforma de solidaridad… también hicimos 
iniciativas propias... la iniciativa Rexista… fundamentalmente es producto de 
132’.375 
 
This patchwork of plural spaces and organizational forms linking across multiple 
networks, assisted by the increasingly widespread use of social media platforms, 
enabled a relatively spontaneous and fluid response to the trigger event and ensuing 
                                                        
374 ‘I think 132 International achieved strong action in terms of networks and unity, which was important 
for me because… without that Ayotzinapa wouldn’t have been so active… because the network was 
already there, even though when Ayotzinapa occurred the [social media] accounts were not being 
used…, we never lost them, but when Ayotzinapa happened we reactivated the accounts, and everyone 
was still there, to disseminate and everything else… At the time we had 132 groups, 132twitter, 132 
translators….Even though it was never really appreciated here [in Mexico] everything that was 
produced: press releases etc was translated… the Wikipedia page. The base support helped us a lot with 
that’ (CQ/SA). 
375 ‘there was trust… based on everything we had done with 132 until Ayotzi, so we were invited to the 
solidarity platform… we also had our own initiative... Rexista… fundamentally a product of 132’ (GF/SA). 
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public sphere debate.376 Human rights NGOs played an important role in supporting 
the families and students, and orienting an aspect of the actions toward human rights 
discourse. Despite this, most interviewees considered that the networks involved in 
the mobilization were not focused on human rights discourse and neither was this the 
primary mobilizing frame.  
 
 Framing injustice and human rights in a plural movement  
This section examines the movement’s primary framing narratives (Snow et al. 1986; 
Tarrow 1998; Brysk 2013). These were focused on the 43 missing students and 
emotional solidarity with the parents. The human rights framework contributed to 
targeting these demands at state responsibility, but human rights language has often 
been left implicit. The plural nature of the movement also meant other more political 
demands were at times incorporated into the agenda, widening the narrative frame. 
In this context, human rights NGO accompaniment played an important role in 
sustaining the focus of the movement.  
 
All interviewees considered the parents were at the emotional centre of the social 
mobilization, eliciting a widely felt urge to share and identify with their suffering:  
‘lo que provocó Ayotzinapa en el corazón y la emoción de la sociedad mexicana 
fue radicalmente distinto con lo que pasó con los otros procesos. Lo que se veía 
era la empatía con el dolor, ver como sufrían los papas… me impresionaba en las 
primeras marchas, los papas iban caminando, y la gente se detenía para verlos y 
lloraban y lloraban, no lo había visto… Es tan fuerte lo que pasó que sienten una 
interpelación individual de su persona, y necesitan mostrar que están con los 
papas’.377  
 
                                                        
376 A national survey in November 2014 indicated that 98% of the population had heard of the 
demonstrations, 46% were in agreement with them, and 8% had participated (Paramétrica 2015). 
377 ‘what Ayotzinapa caused in the heart and emotions of Mexican society was radically different from 
other social processes. What you saw was an empathy with their grief, seeing how the parents suffered... 
the first marches left an impression on me, seeing the parents were walking, the people stopped to 
watch them and cried and cried. I hadn’t seen anything like it… it is so terrible what happened that 
people feel an individual internalised questioning and need to show their support for the parents’ 
(GL/SA/NGOP). 
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The rooted genuineness and suffering of the parents contrasted with negative 
perceptions of the government: ‘le ganamos la narrativa a presidencia en ese momento 
porque la legitimidad de las papas es muchísimo’.378 This psychological and emotional 
response to the parents was identified by all interviewees as crucial to attracting 
participation beyond the usual social and human rights activist networks. On occasions 
this inspired participation in protests by middleclass office workers and solidarity 
actions by local working class neighbourhood groups.  
 
Another key element was sustaining the belief in the responsibility of the state in the 
face of the authorities’ constant efforts to steer public opinion toward the sole 
responsibility of criminal networks and isolated corrupt officials. The refusal to accept 
these evasions was expressed in the #yamecanse twitter battle (see page 150), and 
perhaps most succinctly in the hybrid public and social media ‘Fue El Estado’ action by 
the group, Rexista (a mixture of ‘Banksy and Batman’ according to a participant). 
Activists wrote ‘Fue El Estado’ (It was the State/the State did it), in huge letters across 
Mexico City’s central square during a mass demonstration, then used social media to 
circulate the photo taken from an overlooking building.379 The choreographed event 
amplified a movement slogan, converting it into a subversive viral image of Mexico’s 
iconic central square. It rapidly moved from social networks to national and 
international media and became graffiti and a chant used by protesters around the 
world. This provocative statement neatly drilled through the convoluted aspects of 
state responsibility in a federal political system - regularly used by government officials 
to dilute responsibility, excuse impunity and justify non-compliance with human rights 
obligations. In effect, it accused the whole institutional system of Mexico’s democracy 
of the commission, omission and cover-up of the Iguala killings and disappearances.380  
 
                                                        
378 ‘At that moment we won the narrative against the president’s office because the legitimacy of the 
parents is so strong’ (RX/NGOPC). 
379 Rexista. 2014. Available at: http://rexiste.org/post/107326632417/pinta-monumental-fue-el-estado-
en-el-zócalo-de [Accessed 5 June 2018]. 
380 It also infuriated government officials by accusing the whole State of responsibility. 
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Another important element of the framing narrative was the demand for the 
reappearance alive of the 43 students, represented in the chant and slogan of 
movement events, ‘Vivos se los llevaron, vivos los queremos’.381 On the one hand, this 
demand reflected the natural desire of the parents, but it also reinforced a key element 
of international human rights law in relation to enforced disappearances which 
considers such crimes as ongoing until the whereabouts and fate of the victims are 
reliably established. This has remained an important means of resisting the logic of the 
government’s claim to have established the ‘historic truth’, which was used as a 
counter-frame to argue the young men were killed and the case resolved, thus ending 
the obligation to treat the crime as continuous and the investigation unfinished. Once 
again, human rights discourse was only implicit in this rallying movement demand, 
which instead was focused the raw emotional plea of the parents for the return of their 
loved ones. 
 
Despite the relatively clear human rights justice dimension of these demands, at times 
during the movement, these were also coupled to wider political demands of partner 
organizations, such as trade unions in industrial disputes. These political objectives 
varied, but primarily focused on attacking the legitimacy of the government as well as 
making claims on other social issues. For some of the more traditional left-wing actors, 
human rights demands served as a means of heightening their political leverage in their 
disputes, focusing particularly on Peña Nieto and calling for his resignation. Two 
interviewees recognised this dimension in some of the protests, but argued that they 
were marginal compared to the bulk of those supporting the mobilization which 
remained focused on the parents’ core demands. However, this also threw up 
contradictions between narrow human rights demands and more transformational 
political aspirations of the heterogenous protests:  
Yo recuerdo en las marchas hubo gente que respondió al grito de fuera EPN, y 
[otros decían] que no eso, es política, lo que queremos son los 43. Los que 
tomaban postura de que el movimiento debe trascender los 43 eran los que 
tenían esa formación política de larga data en los movimientos históricos, el resto 
– los otros grupos: la sociedad civil no organizada o la organizada, con estas 
                                                        
381 ‘They took them alive, we want them back alive’. 
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nuevas maneras de ver estos procesos. Aquellos decían que no politicemos etc. 
Yo los entendía porque era difícil decir “Fue El Estado” al mismo tiempo de decir 
que no es un mensaje politizado. Necesitaba cuidado para explicar la complejidad 
de la situación’.382 
 
Olvera argues that among the multiple actors participating in the Ayotzinapa 43 
movement, some with radical aims, there were opportunists undermining the moral 
cause of the families and the broad mobilization (Olvera 2016). The ambiguity of some 
of these more political agendas, also left the movement exposed to counter-frames by 
the government and its media allies, presenting the families as manipulated by radical 
groups.383  
 
Central to sustaining the underlying focus on human rights demands and avoiding more 
direct political confrontation was the continued accompaniment by national and 
international human rights organizations: ‘el hecho de que las familias se mantiene 
firmes, que trajéramos los forenses argentinos, luego los expertos de la Comisión 
Interamericana, le dio un tono distinto al movimiento, un movimiento que supo 
acompañarse’.384 However, this support of human rights NGOs and discourse did not 
act as the explicit mobilizing narrative, rather as a reinforcing element.   
 
In summary, the movement’s mobilizing narrative focused on the families’ suffering 
and uncompromising search for their disappeared children, the responsibility of the 
state and the refusal to accept manipulation of the case. The families and students 
                                                        
382 ‘I remember in the demonstrations that there were people calling for Peña Nieto to go, and [others 
said] no, that is political, what we want is the 43. Those that took a position that the movement should 
go beyond the 43 were those with a long standing political formation in the historic social movements, 
the rest – other groups, organized and unorganized civil society, with their new way of understanding 
these processes, they said, let’s not politicise this etc. I understood them both because it was difficult to 
say “It was the State” at the same time as saying that it wasn’t a politicised message. It needed care to 
explain the complexity of the situation’ (GZ/NGOP). 
383 The violence in some demonstrations, which several interviewees believed to have been caused or 
provoked by government hired thugs/undercover security officials (a common practice over Mexico’s 
protest history) also contributed to this counter-framing strategy. According to some interviewees, this 
played a role in reduced participation in protests in 2015 and 2016. 
384 ‘The fact that the families stayed strong, that we got the Argentine Forensic scientists involved, then 
the IACHR experts, that gave the movement a different tone, a movement that knew how to be 
accompanied’ (SK/SA). 
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framed their demands in their own rooted terms which helped mobilize support. This 
was reinforced by skilled use of human rights discourse, but the mobilization was not 
reduced to the parameters or meaning of this discourse and at times parts of the 
movement went beyond this to promote a wider transformative agenda.   
 
 Agency 
This section examines how activists with expertise in human rights and social media 
supported the emerging agency of some parents and students developing complex sets 
of relationships. In this process the perceived usefulness of human rights and social 
media, both in strategic and expressive terms, were factors shaping the extent to which 
they were integrated into practice.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the surviving students and relatives of the 
killed and abducted, demanded information, justice and the return of the disappeared. 
By 29 September, the parents of the victims had formed their own organizing 
committee at the Ayotzinapa college. Most of the families had little experience of 
political organizing or demanding action from the state, but drew on the culture of 
resistance present in the experience of indigenous and peasant farmers in rural 
Guerrero as well as the radical socialist activism of the college. Human rights 
approaches were initially alien, particularly in the midst of their immediate clamour to 
find the students. According to interviewees, Centro Tlachinollan played an important 
role in making human rights approaches meaningful for the families while respecting 
their autonomy and decision-making:  
‘es diferente acompañar a los estudiantes que acompañar a los papas…entonces 
los padres de familia no conocían a Tlachi (sic), son de otras zonas del estado… el 
tema de derechos humanos no estaba en su agenda… era como un reto 
acompañar, fijar, organizar o ayudar a que se organizaran, pero también con toda 
la información que les llegó de 10,000 lados’.385 
                                                        
385 ‘It is different accompanying students to accompanying the parents… at that time the parents didn’t 
know [Tlachinollan], they are from different regions of the state… the issue of human rights was not on 
their agenda… it was a challenge to accompany, to organize or help them organize, but also because 
they were receiving information from 10,000 different sides’ (QE/NGOP). 
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Centro Tlachinollan representatives stayed at the college alongside the students and 
parents building trust and confidence. At least one was a lawyer who had grown up in 
the region and came from similar backgrounds to the students and victims. The human 
rights NGO representatives held ‘reunión tras reunión’386 with the families, 
encouraging them to organize themselves, explaining what was happening in legal 
terms and how they might be able to help with the authorities and human rights 
mechanisms. This process of ‘socializing’ human rights, according to two interviewees, 
was premised on providing the families with reliable information and explaining the 
value and limits of human rights approaches. This was also part of a process of the 
parents developing their own decision-making in relation to the case and the 
mobilization.  
 
As noted in section 2.3.3, this process of ‘vernacularizing’ human rights is necessarily 
complex and ambiguous (Merry 2006b). There are differences of status, experience 
and knowledge between local activists with human rights expertise and those whose 
rights are affected from socially disadvantaged communities without prior knowledge 
of human rights discourse.387 Establishing a relationship based on trust and respect is 
essential to make human rights approaches meaningful and useful for those affected, 
enabling them to develop their own understanding and agency in the formulation of 
human rights claims388. It is also important for withstanding counter-framing strategies 
which seek to undermine the relationship. In the case of the parents of the Ayotzinapa 
43 and the NGOs, Centro Tlachinollan and Centro PRODH, this relationship was key to 
the movement in instrumental and expressive terms. The NGOs remained conscious of 
                                                        
386 ‘meeting after meeting’ 
387 That is not to say that victims or communities are passive recipients of expert help, as local 
communities often develop human rights approaches and activism without necessarily relying on 
external experts (Speed 2007), but at some point in this process there is usually an information exchange 
with external actors with knowledge of human rights discourse which facilitates the interpretation of 
local grievances and injustices in the universalist terms human rights. 
388 This is not always the case as human rights experts can also instrumentally abuse this relationship, 
undermining rather than strengthen victim/survivor agency, as such the ‘vernacularization’ of 
international human rights discourse can have ambiguous results (Goldstein 2012).   
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this complex relationship, ensuring the voices of the families and their demands were 
not usurped by the NGO experts: 
‘en conferencias de prensa de Ayotzinapa, me encanta escuchar las familias – de 
hecho cada vez más ellos mismos usan los términos de derechos humanos... 
cuando es el lenguaje que escuchan, está bien… pero me gusta cuando hablan de 
lo que viven y más político… y por otro lado, cerrar con lo otro, del Prodh o Tlachi 
con las exigencias de derechos humanos. Me parece importante que existan las 
dos y no se subsumiera el uno por el otro, porque es la posibilidad de un reclamo 
más política, más social.’389 
 
This study has not attempted to analyse these relations in depth as they remain 
sensitive and complex (see section 2.3.3). However, some features of the human rights 
NGO accompaniment of the parents indicate a continuing relationship of trust after 
more than four years. For example, one of the key human rights lawyers who has 
accompanied the parents from the outset remained at the college and close to the 
families, as do other representatives of Centro Tlachinollan and Centro PRODH. As a 
student survivor observed:  
‘Sin los abogados no hubiéramos hecho nada. Sí hay ongs de derechos humanos 
de todo tipo. Estamos acompañados de organizaciones independientes que 
tienen reputación de estar con las personas, como Serapaz, el Prodh, Tlachi… 
asumen los retos que eso implica ... llevar el caso’.390 
 
As the central focus of the mobilization, the parents and surviving students have played 
important roles in public events and advocacy. These are focused on engaging the 
mobilization narrative around the families and their struggle rather than adopting 
explicit human rights discourse – though after years of struggle families have gradually 
                                                        
389 ‘In press conferences on Ayotzinapa, I really like listening to the families – in fact, each time they use 
human rights terms more... when it’s the language they hear, well that is okay… but I like it when they 
talk about what they are living, when they are more political… and then finish with the other side, from 
the Prodh or Tlachinollan, with the human rights demands. I think it is important that there are both 
sides and that one isn’t subsumed into the other, because that is the possibility of making a more 
political, more social demand’ (XV/SA/NGOP). 
390 ‘Without the lawyers we wouldn’t have done anything. Yes, there are human rights NGOs of all types. 
We are accompanied by independent NGOs with a reputation for standing with the people, like 
SERAPAZ, PRODH, Tlachinollan… they shoulder the challenges of what it really means… to take on the 
case’ (SK/V/SA). 
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incorporated aspects of human rights discourse into the narrative of their struggle. 
However, their agency is most clearly manifested in their public role in movement 
actions, using their own voice in domestic and international settings to sustain support 
and target powerholders. For example, meeting senior government officials and 
holding press conferences as well as solidarity tours to the USA and Europe to sustain 
global support and attention on the case. These activities have also included increasing 
use of social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, to communicate directly 
with support networks and promote the ongoing actions of the movement. 391 Such 
processes have been relevant for keeping the voice of the parents at the centre of the 
struggle for justice.  
 
These campaigning skills have often been developed with the assistance of other 
activists supporting the movement. For example, one of the students who survived the 
Iguala attack was assisted spontaneously by former YoSoy132 activists to develop an 
active social media profile on Twitter and Facebook. This has helped him play an 
important nodal role in circulating information on actions and responding to counter-
frames, developing the identity of the solidarity support networks:  
‘Antes [mi uso de redes sociales] era muy personal. Creo que fue diciembre 2014 
que las organizaciones que se dedican a difundirme… se propusieron mi cuenta 
de Facebook y Twitter… me dieron ensayos como hacerlo. Era muy necesario… 
una pequeña capacitación... cuando me topaba con ellos’.392  
 
He continued to receive support from other activists, enabling him to regularly update 
accounts. Human rights NGOs also supported him, helping filter mainstream media 
contacts and develop messages in line with demands of the parents. His social media 
profiles expressively represented his participation in the movement and relationship 
with the families as well as providing strategic support for the movement.  
                                                        
391 For example, on Facebook: ‘Padres Y Madres De Ayotzinapa’ and on Twitter: ‘@DonMarioAyotzi’; 
@Omarel44.  
392 ‘Before [my use of social media] was just for personal stuff. I think it was in December 2014 that the 
organizations promoting information on me… suggested I get Facebook and Twitter accounts… They 
gave me lessons on how to do it. It was really necessary… a little training... whenever I bumped into 
them’(SK/SA).  
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In contrast to this visible role on social media of some of those directly affected, human 
rights lawyers working with the families have not used personalised social media 
profiles, preferring the official NGO social media accounts, press conferences and 
traditional media interviews to communicate strategic institutional positions and 
information in relation to the case. This reflects traditional NGO advocacy practices as 
well as concerns about resources, institutional messaging and security of more open 
and dynamic social media practices.    
 
In summary, as part of the process of developing a national and international 
mobilization, key actors played roles in shaping the approach, actions and the 
messages. At the heart of this process were the parents and students of the college 
and human rights NGOs. According to interviewees, human rights NGOs respected the 
interests of the disappeared and their relatives and the organising processes of the 
students and families. These negotiated relationships contributed to the developing 
agency the parents and students, enabling a meaningful use of human rights discourse 
and social media to be integrated into the parents and student led contentious 
mobilization but without subsuming them into a narrow human right framing narrative.  
 
 Dynamics of the movement coalition and human rights discourse 
This section examines some of the complex shifting dynamics of the movement 
coalition which facilitated and constrained the mobilization, particularly the extent to 
which human rights discourse enabled the articulation of the different actors involved.  
 
When indignation turned to action at the beginning of October 2014, there was a wide 
range of different social and political groups, collectives and individuals that answered 
the call to protest: 
‘La gran novedad de Ayotzi, fue de que ya no se pudo tener bajo una dirigencia 
sino fue una solidaridad desbordada de tal manera que todas las personas que 
participaban en las acciones no se preguntaron acerca de quien se convocaba o 
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no, sino se unificaban en torno de la exigencia primordial que fue la apariencia 
con vida’.393 
 
This did not exclude intense discussion about strategy and movement identity in 
meetings. However, the spontaneous participation of multiple actors focused on the 
parents, ensured that potential divisions were set aside in favour of the demand for 
the return of the 43. At the same time, in Guerrero the parents’ and Ayotzinapa 
students’ committees were organizing and reaching out to different sectors to join the 
mobilization. This included more traditional interest based socio-political organizations 
with long traditions of militant grassroots left-wing struggle. Students, particularly in 
Mexico City, also joined the mobilization under their own assembly. Some students 
practiced YoSoy132 styles of political contention, while others pursued more 
traditional variations of Marxist and autonomist political activism, supporting the 
families but also aspiring to political and social transformation.  
 
Two interviewees felt that there were in fact two movements: one based in the political 
culture of Guerrero and the other the loose configuration of organizations supporting 
the parents. For another interview it was more about understanding the character of 
traditional social movement organizations which were based on forms of popular 
counter-power political struggle in which human rights claims were valued in terms of 
their instrumental leverage:  
‘los movimientos sociales tienen una lógica de una disputa de un proyecto de 
relación de poder / contra poder, de hegemonía y contra hegemonía, entonces, 
por los movimientos sociales más allá de que son por la vía de los derechos 
humanos… los derechos humanos pueden ser una herramienta en todo caso, 
puede ser útil’.394  
                                                        
393 ‘The really new thing about Ayotzi was that it wasn’t possible to have it under a single leadership, 
instead the solidarity was overflowing to the extent everyone who was participating didn’t bother to ask 
about who was convening [the actions], rather they just unified around the essential demand for the 
return alive of the young men’ (GZ/NGOP). 
394 ‘social movements have a logic of dispute over a project in relation to power/ counter-power, of 
hegemony and counter-hegemony, so for social movements, beyond whether they are in favour of 
human rights or not … it is that human rights can be a tool in a particular instance, they can be useful’ 
(GL/SA/NGOP). 
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This tension between the wider political and social agenda of some actors and the more 
limited human rights demands focused on the enforced disappearances was a feature 
of the movement. At times this appeared to offer an opportunity of articulating a mass 
movement in favour of political and social transformation. However, as human rights 
activist observed, human rights discourse could not articulate or represent these 
different agendas:   
‘Creo que parte de los aprendizajes de Ayotzinapa es que la agenda de derechos 
humanos es muy contra-mayoritaria, no es una agenda… es decir, no es la agenda 
que va a mover socialmente, que va a generar una cohesión social, un 
movimiento de transformación. Es un punto que entró en una agenda más 
amplia, más compleja de reivindicación social’.395 
  
The complex nature of the movement coalition and the multiple actors involved was 
partly resolved when the parents’ committee named the Guerrero-based Asamblea 
Nacional Popular (ANP) as the coordinating body of the political solidarity movement. 
This had the advantage of strengthening the role of political organizations with long 
experience of organising and sustaining protest movements and contentious political 
struggle. The disadvantage was that the ANP was not an organic heterogenous 
organizing committee facilitating the involvement of plural actors and networks of civil 
society across the country and internationally. Initially, despite tensions, the 
coordination platform based in Mexico City co-existed with the ANP. However, by 
January 2015, the platform dissolved leaving the ANP responsible for the protest 
agenda.   
‘Muchos de las organizaciones que lanzaron proyectos, pasaban [por la 
plataforma] porque nos hiciéramos el enlace con las papas... entonces, eso 
ayudaba... venían para la reunión con todo el mundo, una base mínima de 
                                                        
395 ‘I think part of the lessons of Ayotzinapa is that the human rights agenda is very counter-majoritarian, 
it is not an agenda… what I mean is it is not an agenda to generate social mobilization, that is, to generate 
social cohesion, a movement of transformation. It is one point that entered in a wider more complicated 
agenda of social demands’(QTX/NGOP). 
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participación. Pero cuando se fue la coordinación a la ANP… pues ahí se perdió 
totalmente… toda esa gente se fue desapareciendo’.396 
 
The protest wave by this time was subsiding after the intense early months. Two 
interviewees with experience in national or Mexico City focused activism considered 
the role taken by the ANP as a step backwards. According to this perspective, the ANP 
undervalued the logistical complications of organizing national and global solidarity 
networks from Guerrero, but also undermined the plural identity of the mass 
mobilization in favour of a more ideological aligned and overtly anti-Peña Nieto 
political agenda.397 This chimed with the counter-framing strategy of the pro-
government media and perhaps contributed to a reduced participation in public 
actions, particularly by those less politically aligned. The ANP also reflected a return to 
a more hierarchical leadership, in which the autonomous participation and creative 
contributions of individuals and collectives, whether offline or online, was subject to 
more bureaucratic control:     
‘uno de los sentimientos que nos coincidimos con las nuevas generaciones es que 
no coincidimos con los caudillismos; sea autonomista o reformista. Es que hay 
una dirección que no satisface las nuevas generaciones. Eso fue algo que maduró 
mucho en el 132’.398   
 
Nevertheless, as another interviewee with long experience in political and social 
activism observed, the traditional organizations were endorsed by the parents and 
they also provided a strength of organizational capacity, experience and commitment 
that the more agile, individualised and context inspired activists could not have 
sustained: ‘claro cuando no hay estructura no se puede sostener por mucho tiempo…. 
                                                        
396 ‘Many of the organizations started projects [as part of the mobilization], they came via us [at the 
Platform] because we had contact with the parents… so it helped… they would come to the meeting 
with everyone else, a minimum of participation. But when the movement coordination went to the 
ANP… after that we lost that dimension completely… all those people began to drift away’ 
(GL/SA/NGOP). 
397 However, another interviewee argued that this point of view also represented the traditional 
assumptions of Mexico City based social and political leadership. 
398 ‘One of the feelings that we share with the new generation [of activists] is that we don’t accept 
autocratic leaderships, regardless of whether they promote autonomy or reform. That type of leadership 
doesn’t fit with the new generations. That is something that matured with YoSoy132’ (GZ/NGOP). 
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Ayotzi tiene más estructura… tiene cuadros políticos… gentes que se ha formado… Es 
distinto a los otros movimientos en ese sentido.’399  
 
The capacity to resist demobilizing pressures and continue the struggle, even on a 
reduced level, is a vital resource. This is particularly so in the context of a government 
skilled at weathering non-institutional public sphere pressures through a variety of co-
option and repressive measures. In the case of Ayotzinapa 43, after four years of 
struggle, there is a continuing capacity to endure and reinvigorate mobilization at 
strategic moments, which the other two movements in this study struggled to sustain. 
This is in part due to the continued commitment of longstanding political organizations 
as well as human rights NGOs, but particularly the parents. 
 
A feature of building and sustaining of social movement coalitions is the balance 
between wider public appeal and ideological passion (Marx Ferree et al. 2000). In the 
Ayotzinapa 43 mobilization, the plural non-partisan participation initially posed a real 
challenge to the authority of the government on the basis of concrete human rights 
demands. However, the more politicised agenda of socio-political organizations 
diminished this dynamic and reduced some of the plural features of the movement. On 
the other hand, the organizational capacity and political commitment of some of these 
political organizations also helped sustain the public actions of the movement in the 
long struggle against the powerholders of Mexico’s partial democracy in pursuit of 
concrete human rights demands.  
 
 Disrupted media environment  
By 2014, the diversifying and increasingly hybrid (Chadwick 2013) media environment 
made a range of different channels of information widely accessible and relevant to 
the Ayotzinapa 43 mobilization; from individualised social media production to 
international news media portals. This facilitated the circulation of a variety of digital 
                                                        
399 ‘Of course, when there isn’t a structure you can’t sustain [the movement] for long… Ayotzi has more 
structure… it has political militants… people with political knowledge… it is distinct from the other 
movements in that sense’ (IP/PA/J). 
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materials in the immediate aftermath of the Iguala attack, forcing mainstream media 
to adjust its coverage, enabling different narratives to develop and official counter-
framing strategies to be challenged in the increasingly plural coverage.   
 
Despite different perspectives, interviewees shared an understanding that increasingly 
diverse and hybrid uses of digital and social media by various actors at local, national 
and international level, were important to prevent the government imposing its 
narrative on the events in Iguala: ‘el flujo de información creció y no hubo manera en 
que el estado pudo frenarlo y allí las redes sociales fueran vitales. Y a los medios de 
comunicación buscando credibilidad, o likes o views, no les quedó más remedio que 
cubrir todo’.400  
 
The information posted on social media, recirculated and commented on, included 
citizens posting audio and visual footage of the events of 26 September and their 
aftermath. Among these were Ayotzinapa students using their smart phones to record 
and post moments of the attack; local journalists in Iguala posting early reports and 
images. The second wave of postings included human rights NGOs, unions and other 
solidarity actors distributing information to their networks not mediated by 
mainstream outlets. This encouraged international media to travel to Guerrero and 
report directly. The international attention fed back into national media reshaping 
mainstream coverage and facilitating the process of mobilization:  
‘creo que los medios internacionales le dieron mucho más impulso, porque los 
medios locales, los guerrerenses ahí, al ver que estaba la prensa extranjera 
tuvieron que meterse. Si no hubiera cubertura de prensa internacional, los 
medios nacionales no hubieran hecho tanta difusión tampoco. Eso contribuyó a 
las redes sociales, a las convocatorias, al impacto en sí mismo’.401 
 
                                                        
400 ‘The flow of information grew and there was no way for the state to curb it and social media was 
vital. And the mainstream media seeking credibility or ‘likes’ or ‘views’ didn’t have any alternative than 
to cover everything’ (MG/NGOP). 
401 ‘I think that international media gave it a real push because the local media, those in Guerrero, on 
seeing the foreign press, felt they had to get involved. If it hadn’t been for the coverage of international 
press, the national media would not have focused on it so much. That contributed to social media 
attention, to the call to protest, to the impact [of the mobilization] itself’ (SK/SA). 
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Another feature of material generated and distributed on social media by activists and 
organizations accompanying the families as well as alternative media journalists, was 
the capacity to develop narratives focused on the lives of missing students and the 
parents. In the latter case, not simply as victims of human rights violations but also as 
protagonists in their own personal struggle against powerholders. Such narratives 
drew on Mexico’s cultural and political traditions, including social solidarity and 
resistance. They were particularly useful for reaching less politicised sectors of the 
population or with little interest in human rights discourse: ‘el plus era de ir ganando 
narrativas a las personas que no son politizadas, a las personas que no conocen ni 
siquiera de derechos humanos, pero además gente que hizo suya la lucha para 
Ayotzinapa a través de las redes sociales’.402 
 
The increasing embeddedness of Twitter in the political news cycle also meant that this 
platform could be used rapidly with networks of followers to respond to misleading or 
incorrect governmental statements; rapidly contradicting official positions with direct 
information. This in turn was covered by independent and alternative news portals, 
and also reached parts of the independent print media. This limited the impact of 
institutional counter-framing tactics to undermine the parents’ demands, the character 
of the movement and international experts: ‘Se puede lograr con medios tradicionales, 
pero por un lado la inmediatez [de Twitter], y de que sea tal cual la voz de las familias 
y no tiene que estar allí luchando para que salga en un periódico el día siguiente. Ayuda 
mucho’.403 
 
Another feature of the media coverage was the rapid attention given by new 
independent digital news sites, such as Animal Politico and Aristeguinoticias, with a 
record of investigative journalism. As an interviewee who worked with one such outlet 
observed, these media had developed less bureaucratic processes to ensure rapid 
                                                        
402 ‘An advantage was winning the narrative battle with people who were not politicised, people who 
didn’t even know about human rights, but also people who took up the struggle for Ayotzinapa via social 
media’ (RX/NGOCP). 
403 ‘You can manage to do it with the traditional media, but it is the immediacy [of Twitter] and it is 
actually the direct voice of the families, and at the same time you don’t have to be battling away to try 
and get it covered in the next day’s paper. It helps a lot’ (XV/SA/NGOP). 
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publication of reports and a determination to cover stories in-depth which the 
uncritical mainstream media avoided. This included giving a voice to those directly 
involved, rather than relying on official government statements to represent events.  
 
Alternative digital news platforms, such as Desinformémenos and Subversiones, also 
travelled to Guerrero to cover the story with first hand material. These alternative and 
independent digitally-based journalists avoided the approach of some traditional 
media which were widely regarded as lacking consideration for the victims or scruples 
about editorial manipulation to reduce damage to the government. As an NGO worker 
observed, a difference in the case of Ayotzinapa 43 was strong relations with some 
independent journalists: ‘muchas periodistas eran muy cercanos con las familias y 
estudiantes… ayudó mucho en distribuir información. Tienen una relación mucho más 
cordial que los tradicionales con los padres y estudiantes. Por eso lograron amplio 
contacto’.404 
 
According to alternative media, this involved a change of approach: ‘nuestro cambio 
de estrategia se debe a que consideramos fundamental que alzamos la voz de las 
familias’.405 This included spending a long time in the Ayotzinapa college developing 
long-term relationships of trust.406 Participant Interviewees welcomed the explicit 
commitment of some alternative media outlets to redress imbalances of power of 
marginalized or vulnerable communities normally misrepresented or ignored by 
sections of the mainstream media.407 However this view was not always shared by 
some movement participants, particularly those working on the legal and advocacy 
aspects of the cases:   
                                                        
404 ‘Journalists, very close to the families and the students, helped a lot in the distribution of information. 
They have much warmer relations than the traditional media with the parents and the students so they 
got a wide range of coverage’ (QE/NGOP). 
405 ‘Our change of strategy was due to believing that it was fundamental to amplify the voice of the 
families’ (LT/J). 
406 Former YoSoy131 activists form the Ibero who had converted their group into an alternative media 
portal (www.masde131.com) also covered the story directly, building on their recognition as part of 
YoSoy132. 
407 However, this view was not shared by some print journalists with a track-record of covering social 
and human rights issues, who considered that it was not possible to combine fact-finding and political 
positioning. They identified this as the weakness of the more politically committed alternative media 
portals. 
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‘es que los medios no convencionales han convertido en medios militantes. Y a 
nosotros que nos dedicamos a casos, no necesitamos medios militantes, sino 
medios no convencionales que cubran información con pautas de neutralidad. Es 
que no son un contrapeso en términos de incidencia comparados con los medios 
convencionales’.408 
 
This reflected the understanding of those participants focused on strategic influence 
of political and judicial authorities where the mainstream media, particularly TV, 
remained the key to shaping a persuasive news narrative. These human rights experts 
were less focused on the role played by some alternative media in developing and 
reinforcing social movement identity. This illustrates the complex, and not necessarily 
harmonious processes of expressive movement building and technical legal advocacy. 
It also suggests that certain types of media in a plural environment perform different 
functions in relation to different aspects of social movement mobilization, which are 
not always recognised by the different movement actors.  
 
This also reflected varying attitudes regarding the extent to which mainstream media 
continued to dominate the political agenda or whether alternative and independent 
media more closely connected to social movements had changed this dynamic. As one 
more positive activist observed regarding this informational struggle: ‘es un espacio 
que no lo tiene ganado allá ni ganado acá. Allá tiene capacidad económica, pero acá 
tenemos creatividad’.409 
 
The media environment is in an ongoing process of reconfiguration, with increased 
diversity of informational flows. However, the dominant media interests remain 
powerful with a continued shaping influence over the political agenda. Nonetheless, 
the pluralizing media environment and hybrid practices resulting from increasing 
adoption of digital and social media, meant new media actors provided different 
                                                        
408 ‘there are non-conventional media which have become militant media. And those of us that work on 
cases, we don’t need militant media, rather non-conventional media which cover the information on the 
principles of neutrality. They are not a counterweight in terms of advocacy compared with the 
conventional media’ (QTX/NGOP). 
409 ‘it is a space that hasn’t been won either by this side or theirs. There they have economic resources, 
but here we have creativity’ (XE/NGOP). 
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approaches to journalism, some of which strengthened the voices of Ayotzinapa 43, 
but not primarily through the discourse of human rights. Despite these changes, 
movement advocacy strategy remained focused on the mainstream media. There was 
tension between this instrumental approach and expressive movement building 
involved in engagement with alternative new media. The latter also relating to uses of 
digital and social media to sustain contentious collective mobilization.  
 
 Social media, organization, participation and contention  
This section considers aspects of social media practices of the movement and how 
participants believed these contributed to mobilization and contention. It also reflects 
on how the increasingly embedded use of digitally networked communications reduces 
costs of information sharing and coordination, facilitating more individualised or small 
group participation. However, it also identifies how different approaches to digital and 
social media, particularly in relation to its more dynamic and spontaneous affordances, 
creates tensions around strategic and expressive practices.  
 
The Ayotzinapa 43 mobilization drew on networks and skills developed in earlier 
mobilizations which used digital communications, including social media platforms, to 
reduce barriers and costs to information sharing and organizational coordination. This 
enabled disparate national and international actors to identify one another and carry 
out synchronised public protest events, uploading and recirculating audio-visual 
reportage of actions, demonstrating support and reinforcing mobilization, fostering a 
sense shared endeavour and collective identity (Treré et al. 2014).  
 
However, the surviving Ayotzinapa students, parents, political organizations and some 
human rights NGOs were not initially attuned to the more fluid features of digital and 
social media to facilitate plural mobilization. The lessons of YoSoy132 were important 
to overcome this, enabling more individualised and small group spontaneous 
involvement in protest. For example, the adoption of web-based flyers on social media 
and other digital platforms, that did not identify the convening organizations in calls to 
participate in protest events:  
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‘ya entendimos cómo funciona la comunicación, porque nos dimos cuenta de que 
en años anteriores en las articulaciones había mucha discusión acerca de quien 
convocaba o no. Recuerdo que había veces que ayudaba poner quienes 
convocábamos, pero tanto en 132 como Ayotzi, aprendimos mucho, que no tiene 
que llevar el branding de quien convoca, sino sin branding todo el mundo se 
apropia, que la siente suya. En Ayotzi, no usar el branding ayudaba muchísimo 
para que las personas lo apropiaran de forma… más rápida’.410 
 
As different networks, groups and individuals decided to participate in the actions, the 
absence of an organizing entity convening the actions enabled collective offline and 
online participation to develop rapidly without implying endorsement or commitment 
to any particular organization. 
‘Es no tener necesariamente un espacio que centralice, que tú lanzas información 
a las redes, que no llevan quienes convocan o lo hacen, porque... es una 
información que te ayuda a tomar postura, en el caso de Ayotzi, ayudaba para 
decir, “yo estoy participando”… participaré compartiendo esta información 
relacionado con las convocatorias de las acciones globales’.411 
 
Other interviewees observed how this mobilization, not based on organizational 
affiliation, allowed a wider spectrum of social actors to feel part of the mobilization 
through social affiliations which encouraged others to join in: 
‘por medio de las redes sociales se hizo un llamado a la comunidad en general… 
de ver las editoras de [revistas] sociales… marchando, y poniendo en su timeline 
e invitando la gente a la marcha. Ahí es cuando te das cuenta de que las redes 
sociales pueden ser la diferencia’.412 
 
                                                        
410 ‘by then we understood how communication worked, because we had realised in the previous years 
that when coordinating actions there was a lot of debate about who was convening or not. I remember 
there were times that it helped to say that we were calling for the action, but with 132 and Ayotzi we 
particularly learnt that the message didn’t have to carry branding about who was calling the protest, 
instead without branding everyone could appropriate it, they could feel it was theirs. In Ayotzi, not using 
branding really helped people appropriate it... much quicker’ (GZ/NGOP). 
411 ‘It’s about not necessarily having a centralising space; that you can put information on the web which 
doesn’t state who is convening or who has made it, because… it is information that helps you take a 
stand… in the case of Ayotzi, it helped people say “I am participating”… I will participate sharing this 
information about the calls to take part in the global actions’ (GZ/NGOP). 
412 ‘There was a call made via social media to the community in general to participate… to see editors of 
society magazines marching and putting it on their timelines, inviting people to join the march… That is 
when you realise that social media can make a difference’ (MG/NGOCP). 
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The distribution, creation and circulation of information about protests surpassed 
efforts to register the variety of solidarity actions, but this overflowing production and 
reproduction of audio-visual clips of actions around the globe encouraged further 
participation: ‘se generó la impresión de que estaba en todos lados y entonces eso hizo 
que hubo manifestaciones espontaneas con gente que quería hacer algo, 
manifestaciones en la comunidad…’.413 
 
For one activist, this risked participation becoming purely modish; only lasting as long 
as support for Ayotzinapa 43 protests remained fashionable. However, for two others, 
even if participants only joined in online activity, this swelled the sense of something 
important happening, providing diverse avenues to show authentic support and 
amplify the mobilization.  
 
Interviewees also considered the integration of online and offline activity as another 
important lesson of Ayotzinapa 43. Previously some traditional social activists had been 
dismissive of digital protest and activism, but their combination in Ayotzinapa actions 
helped illustrate how they could be mutually reinforcing, not Gladwell’s (2010) dead-
end ‘clicktivism’. This view was rooted in a belief that social media was increasingly 
embedded in daily communicative practices in many different social spheres, as such 
it was a dimension of social reality not an alternative environment. This perspective 
was more prevalent among younger generation interviewees whose social activism 
had developed with their use of digitally enabled communications.  
 
The Rexista collective represented this integrated approach to activism, illustrated in 
their ‘Fue el Estado’ action and promotion of the #yamecanse hashtag trending topic 
BOT battle (see page 150). These contentious expressive events were a combination of 
opportunity and orchestration which temporarily shifted social media from a site of 
information exchange and coordination to a scene of participation and contention, 
                                                        
413 ‘it generated the impression that [the mobilization] was everywhere, which in turn inspired 
spontaneous demonstrations by people who wanted to do something, protests in local communities… 
‘(GL/SA/NGOP). 
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challenging institutional efforts to marginalise the movement.414 The efforts of 
independent social media analysts to expose the manipulation of Twitter virality to 
undermine online protest (Finley 2015) itself became news about the anti-democratic 
methods employed in the service of the government.  
 
The process of instrumentally maximising these opportunities was not without 
difficulties, particularly coordinating actions with longstanding SMOs with routinized 
procedures not based on fluid digital networks. Interviewees from human rights NGOs 
reflected on the constraints of instrumental communications practices which 
continued to be shaped by traditional priorities such as press conferences and 
authorised spokespersons. They noted the lively but unresolved discussions within 
organizations on how best to take advantage of dynamic social media features with 
greater agility and spontaneity, but without creating excessive risks to the reputation, 
strategy and identity of the movement.  
 
Two interviewees were critical of organizational processes of NGOs and other 
movement actors that seemed to thwart attempts to utilize the more organic features 
of social media platforms and virality. One referred to the ‘terrible bureaucracy’ of such 
NGOs which deterred involvement of activists with more horizontal emancipatory 
approaches and attributed these seemingly outdated hierarchies to the desire of some 
NGOs to preserve their gatekeeper power (Bob 2005) and prevent the emergence of 
new political actors. However, another activist coordinating global networks, who was 
also critical of centralising features of the national movement and NGOs, nevertheless 
felt there was autonomy of action which enabled her to maximise network potential in 
the global mobilizations.  
 
Despite the range of perspectives of movement participants in relation to digital and 
social media uses in the mobilization, there was unanimous recognition of their key 
                                                        
414 In the case of #yamecanse, its impact was illustrated by the deployment of counter-attack BOTS, 
presumed to have been organized by government agencies or sympathisers, designed to undermine the 
trending status of the #yamecanse hashtags, and thus, remove them from the trending issues reported 
on by global media (Alberto Nájar 2015; Suárez-Serrato et al. 2016). 
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role in facilitating information sharing and coordination, enabling feedback loops to 
reinforce offline as well as online participation. This process was aided in part by more 
individualised participation associated with social media activism (Bennett et al. 2013; 
Castells 2013), but also by avoiding organizational ‘branding’ which facilitated plural 
participation of less politicised individuals and small groups. This reflects the adaptive 
approaches of activists to these platforms and previous mobilization experiences. 
However, it also indicates how horizontal and expressive practices can find themselves 
in tension with more vertical approaches to strategic communications.  
 
 Transmission of affect 
Digital and social media platforms played an important role in facilitating collective 
emotional identification with the parents, engaging a direct sense of outrage and 
sympathy, as well as the need to share these feelings with others.  
 
Social media did not generate these emotions but the directness of communication 
with the individual user and the potential for interaction helped focus and articulate 
expressions of these feelings. This frequently provided an entry point for identification 
and participation.  
‘con Ayotzi nos dimos cuenta de que el paradigma está cambiando; entendemos 
los problemas estructurales, pero parece que tiene que ser dirigida hacia las 
víctimas directas… lo importante es que te interpele... tu derecho… hay una cosa 
en redes que es más orientada al ‘yo’, me atrevo decir... En Ayotzi, era lo que [a 
los padres] les pasó a sus jóvenes, pudiera pasar a cualquiera de nosotros… Eso 
determina mucho como la gente responde en redes sociales, si no le interpela, 
no necesariamente se detiene a leerlo o darle clic, y mucho menos ir a la calle. Sí, 
funcionó la fórmula de las redes sociales a la calle en el caso de Ayotzi, porque el 
caso mismo conmovió por sí mismo… cuando la vida está en riesgo, las redes 
cobran más fuerza. Les toca a las personas’.415 
                                                        
415 ‘With Ayotzi we realised the paradigm was changing; we understand the structural problems, but it 
seems you have got to focus actions on direct victims… the important thing is that it must personally 
concern you… your right… the thing about social media is that it’s more oriented toward the “I”, I think… 
In Ayotzi, it was about what happened to the children of the parents, it could be any one of us… that 
determines a lot how people respond on social media… if it doesn’t address them directly, they don’t 
necessarily stop to read or click, let alone go out on the street [to demonstrate]… the formula of social 
media to the streets worked in Ayotzi because the case itself was emotionally moving… when life is at 
risk, social media is more powerful… it directly affects people’ (GZ/NGOP). 
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Three interviewees considered that the shocking nature of the case was transmitted 
through the direct and fragmented social media information flows, as opposed to the 
curated coverage of mainstream media. This facilitated a raw empathy and a 
receptiveness to calls to support the families. This manifested itself as a personal need 
to join in the public demonstration and show personalised support for ‘los y las papas’. 
Social media helped arouse this sentiment beyond traditional social activist networks. 
In part this was due to the increasing use of livestreamed audio-visual material on 
different platforms such as YouTube and Vimeo. This provided access to key events and 
showed the public actions and dignified desperation of the parents, enabling a sense 
of intimacy and direct emotional engagement unavailable in traditional media 
coverage: ‘la gente siente incluida en una transmisión por internet, comentan que yo 
soy con los papas, diles que estoy con ellos’.416 Following online provided a means of 
emotionally identifying with the parents but also sharing that emotion in a way that 
simply joining in mass protests might not have achieved.   
 
However, it is important to note that an aspect of this direct communication afforded 
by digital and social media was the sense that the emotions of the parents were 
authentic, not manufactured to elicit a response: ‘la cuestión es que este mensaje se 
dio innato. Las madres de Ayotzi ni los estudiantes nunca pensaron que necesitaba la 
empatía de la gente.’417 Social media was effective at conveying that intensity of 
emotion, but only because those expressing it were seen to be acting naturally in 
response to what they were suffering. That is also perhaps why government counter-
framing tactics focused on suggesting the parents were being manipulated in order to 
undercut this authenticity. 
 
One digital activist believed social media communications, particularly Twitter, can 
express a collective emotional mood in relation to specific issues. As a result, he 
                                                        
416 ‘people feel included in the transmission by internet, leaving comments that they are with the 
parents, asking us to tell the parents that they are with them’ (RX/NGOCP). 
417 ‘the point is that the message was expressed innately. Neither the mothers of Ayotzi nor the students 
ever thought that they needed people’s empathy’ (MG/NGOP). 
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gathered sample Twitter data in relation to particular events, and applied an 
interpretative methodology to assess the emotional temperature of network activity. 
In the right climate, this in turn suggested possible symbolic action or triggers to 
translate sentiment into street mobilization. The effectiveness of this method, which 
echoes Negri and Hardt’s ‘multitude’, is difficult to assess, but it indicates how some of 
those involved in online activism are keen to instrumentally maximise the emotional 
transmission potential of social media communications, particularly Twitter. However, 
this also raises the potential for manipulating sentiment and undermining the 
authentic emotional communication which it seeks to harness.418  
 
Several scholars argue that digital and social media practices can facilitate emotional 
engagement in political issues (Dahlgren 2009, 2013; Papacharissi 2015; Wessels 2017). 
This is an important element of the process which motivates individuals and small 
groups to participate in collective action (Goodwin et al. 2009). The Ayotzinapa 43 
mobilization featured these digital communications practices. Firstly, digital networks 
helped make the traumatic event and its consequences directly accessible not only as 
text, but also via audio-visual material. This immediacy encouraged networked 
individuals and small groups to share their responses, including feelings that the attack 
on the students constituted a threat to them and their loved ones. Secondly, it 
simultaneously provided an avenue to demonstrate individual and collective support 
for victims and rejection of the conduct of the state. This constituted a form of 
movement identity, but without requiring knowledge of human rights or other political 
discourses. This helped create a diverse community willing, albeit temporarily, to take 
to the streets in large numbers to express their shared anger and solidarity, and to 
demand institutional action. This transmission of emotion is also closely related to the 
connective action features of the movement. 
 
                                                        
418 This also feeds into debates about manipulation of social media for marketing purposes or to promote 
“fake news” to influence public opinion and, for example, voting intentions in elections. 
 259 
 Connective action  
The early plural effervescent mobilization of Ayotzinapa 43 was facilitated by uses of 
digital and social media, attracting wide individualised and small group participation. 
This reflects aspects of ‘connective action’ identified by Bennett & Segerberg (2013). 
However, this was followed by the gradual reduction in plural connective action in 
favour of organizational consolidation which prioritised more traditional collective 
action and political identities. This change reflected the short-lived cycle of connective 
mobilization, which was insufficient to develop the type of strategic or sustained 
contentious action necessary to challenge entrenched semi-authoritarian 
powerholders.  
 
The energy unleashed through digitally facilitated ‘unbranded’ participation helped 
surpass recent experiences of public mobilization in support of social causes in Mexico, 
both domestically and in terms of international solidarity actions. However, unlike 
Bennet and Segerberg’s (2013) focus on individualised participation in connective 
action, this also seems to have been facilitated by the involvement of intermediary 
groups of individuals linked by political, social and geographic affinity, discussing and 
deciding to participate in the wider mobilization. This meso-level of deliberation and 
expression, whether conducted through traditional forms of face-to-face or phone 
communication, Whatsapp groups or other closed social media platforms, seemed to 
provide a relatively safe, limited sphere for engaging with the issues, sharing emotional 
responses and deciding to express these sentiments through participation in larger-
scale collective actions. This also reflects how digital and social media was increasingly 
integrated into the range of communicative practices of daily relationships, particularly 
for younger urban generations.  
 
However, this dynamic period of diverse effervescent involvement in protest online 
and offline gradually abated, partly due to the shifting dynamics of movement 
organizational consolidation.419 Participants and observers noted that as the ANP 
exercised increasing control over coordination of the movement, the more connective 
                                                        
419 It also reflected the cycle of mobilization (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004). 
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and plural aspects of the mobilization diminished. This also reflected aspects of the 
ongoing digital divide as most Guerrero based socio-political organizations tended to 
have less embedded use of digital and social media, relying on traditional forms of 
organization, recruitment and protest.  
 
This reversion to a more centralised ideological decision-making, at odds with looser 
individualised or small group creative participation, appears to have contributed to the 
reduction in this connective online action in favour of more hybrid and traditional 
forms of collective action (Bennett et al. 2013). However, most interviewees also 
believed that this reflected the limits of digitally-enabled ‘weak-tie’ (Granovetter 1973; 
Gladwell 2010) connective action as a mobilizing practice, particularly in a context of 
partially democratic institutions prepared to resist popular civil society protest with a 
semi-authoritarian practices to preserve their power.420  
 
One interviewee reflected on the limits of this digitally supported mass connective 
mobilization as a necessarily ephemeral process: ‘creo que eso de los movimientos tan 
amorfos, tan grandes… No son manejables… son por las nubes… el resultado del 
choque de muchas fuerzas y se acabó’.421 
 
Another digitally oriented activists saw this protest process as an end in itself and the 
struggle for more structural outcomes a trap; where the creative rush of digitally 
enabled mobilization is its own validation: ‘sé que son efímeros, son emocionales, no 
van a decir nada estructurados, un manifiesto… pero creo que es la oportunidad de ver 
nuevos actores… nuevos temas… y es algo que no aprecian las organizaciones’.422  
 
                                                        
420 On the one hand, the state was sufficiently strategic to talk with the parents and human rights NGOs 
and also avoided major incidents of outright repression which could have galvanised support for the 
movement and provoke international condemnation. On the other hand, it used traditional methods 
such as surveillance, threats, intimidation and smear campaigns in the media as well as discreetly 
negotiating the demobilization of parts of the movement coalition. 
421 ‘I think the thing about such amorphous, such huge movements… they are not manageable… they 
are like clouds… a result of a clash of many forces and then they end…’ (GF/SA/DA). 
422 ‘I know they are ephemeral, emotional, they are not going to say anything structural, a manifesto or 
such like, but I think they are an opportunity to see new actors… new issues… and that is something the 
organizations don’t appreciate’ (EI/DA). 
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But activists with experience in different social movements considered this digitally 
enabled connective action stage as inadequate to mount concerted collective action: 
‘lo que se generó era el fenómeno de convocatoria, y eso es diferente de generar 
organización desde las redes’.423 
 
Most activists also pointed to the limitations of social media platforms as a forum for 
carrying out internal movement deliberations between the different organizations and 
ideologies to negotiate movement agreements and articulate a common platform.424 
This suggests that in rooted partially democratic situations, where movements face 
difficult internal and external threats, the deliberative features of digitally enabled 
counter-publics (Castells 2008) have been overstated.   
  
The shift to ANP coordination of the political movement and the role of human rights 
NGOs articulating the human rights demands alongside the parents, gradually changed 
the mass plural mobilization character of the movement. This does not mean that 
digitally networked communications ceased to play an important role in the 
mobilization, but in more hybrid instrumental terms and less expressive of dynamic 
mobilization. They focused on the cost reduction features of coordination and 
information sharing as well as leveraging the mainstream media. The movement also 
became more reliant on traditional socio-political organizations and student activist 
groups to sustain routine public actions in support of the families. Those less 
committed to these organizational structures reverted to latency or were only 
intermittently involved in line with the changing political opportunity environment. In 
this context, the transient virality of digital networked mobilizations worked against 
sustaining the Ayotzinapa 43 mobilization at the centre of the public agenda.  
 
As a result, the majority of interviewees acknowledged, in line with Resource 
Mobilization Theory, the importance of organizational resources, instrumental 
                                                        
423 ‘what was created was a phenomena of successfully calling people out to protest, but that is different 
from generating organization through social media’ (EX/NGOP). 
424 ‘Las redes sociales no nos dan para realizar esos debates y entender los diferentes grupos’ ‘Social 
media just isn’t useful for debating and reaching agreements between the different groups’ (GZ/NGOP). 
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capacity and political commitment of human rights NGOs and some political 
organizations to sustain contentious collective action. Despite expressing concern that 
the hype around digitally enabled activism risked underinvestment in these traditional 
social movement practices, these interviewees also recognised the contribution of 
connective digital participation to the initial expressive and horizontal dynamism of the 
movement.  
 
In conclusion, embedded digital and social media practices supported the early 
effervescent expressive stages of collective action, attracting new plural participation 
and strengthening the movement local and globally. However, in a context of partial 
democracy temporarily influencing public sphere debate is not enough to transform 
the political agenda, let alone to change institutional conduct or to address structural 
grievances. As a result, these affordances may have limited effects in the longer term 
for the movement. It may initially obviate the need for more systematic and agreed 
organizational structures, identity formation and decision-making, but it cannot 
replace these traditional features if contentious collective action is to be sustained.  
 
 Security threats 
In the Ayotzinapa 43 mobilization, there were digital and social media security threats, 
including surveillance (Article 19 et al. 2017) against those involved in the movement, 
particularly dealing with sensitive issues or with a public profile. As a student activist 
observed, ‘la decisión de abrir la boca después de lo que pasó el 26 [de septiembre], 
no se toma a la ligera. Había riesgos’.425 In this context, digital security was only one 
dimension of wider security threats confronting human rights and social activists as 
well as journalists in Mexico’s partial democracy.  
 
Interviewee activists considered the primary digital threat to be covert digital 
monitoring – even though their communications contained nothing illegal. They 
viewed such intrusions as primarily aimed at intimidation and gaining access to 
                                                        
425 ‘the decision to open your mouth after what happened on the 26th [of September], you don’t take 
lightly. There were risks’ (SK/SA). 
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movement plans and actions. However, the ‘leaking’ of decontextualized private 
communications by security agencies to government aligned media was also 
considered part of a counter-framing tactic used to try to discredit movement actors. 
Most interviewees felt that it was impossible to defend against such interventions, 
manipulations and intimidation due to the record of official impunity which, in effect, 
encouraged such shadowy illegal actions. Participants attributed many of these 
practices to the key state agencies, such as the Federal Attorney General’s Office (PGR) 
or Secret Service (CISEN) and the Defence Ministry (SEDENA) which have a record of 
conducting surveillance and intimidation operations against human rights and social 
activists. These concerns proved to be correct.426  
 
According to movement participants, the susceptibility of open networks to monitoring 
by third parties meant activists already considered platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter were not appropriate for debates about the movement identity, strategy and 
tactics. For this type of activity face to face meetings were the preferred option. 
However, end-to-end encryption provided initially by Telegram, then Whatsapp, meant 
closed network platforms also provided an increasingly useful environment for small 
group cohesion, discussion and organizational issues.427 Though most activists also 
expressed a lack of confidence in these corporate platforms to protect data from state 
intrusion. 
 
Despite widespread belief that surveillance occurred, there was considerable 
disagreement about whether online profiles, websites and other communications had 
been attacked as part of organized campaigns of harassment or were in fact random 
incidents. The complete impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of digital threats and 
intimidation made it difficult to distinguish between powerholder-sponsored 
intimidation from random incidents of trolling. However, at least one activist carried 
                                                        
426 See footnote 175, example c in relation to the illegal use of the Pegasus spyware.  
427 Treré (2015a) reflects on the importance of these more ‘backstage’ and informal communications to 
sustain the small group cohesion which support the identity of movements. 
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out data analysis of online death threats he received, indicating systematic and well-
resourced use of BOTS to threaten and intimidate (O’Carroll et al. 2017).428  
 
Most activists and human rights NGOs recognised that cyber-protection and 
precautions remained inadequate: ‘la seguridad digital siempre ha sido un problema 
para [nosotros]…’.429 In part, this was due to the costs and time involved in increasing 
security, but also because use of digital communications, such as smartphones, was 
not uniform. Older activists in particular were more reluctant to incorporate these 
devices into their practices. The lack of effective mobile signal and 3G/4G coverage in 
some rural areas diminished the usefulness of some devices, but also the decision not 
to adopt them reduced that particular security vulnerability. Those activists who used 
digital communications and who dealt with more sensitive case information and 
relationships were more likely to restrict or avoid social media platforms.  
 
In summary, despite the existence of apparent democratic freedoms, social activists 
and journalists faced real and documented threats in terms of harassment and attacks, 
as well as surveillance of their legitimate activities and data (UN Human Rights Council 
2017). However, this was only one aspect of a range of real and potential security 
threats. This led to limited modification of some digital and social media practices, 
restricting types of information flows and debates about the movement on open 
platforms. The growing embeddedness of digital communications in the practices of 
social activists meant that there was an increasing, if rather unspecified, awareness of 
the need to increase security measures. Those SMOs with more resources were 
engaged in developing alliances with more skilled and resourced actors to expose 
threats and mitigate risk.  
 
                                                        
428 Documented cases of human rights activists subjected to repeated online death threats, such as the 
case of anthropologist, Rossana Reguillo (Treré 2016) also illustrated the vulnerability of activists. 
429 “digital security has always been a problem for us…’(QE/NGOP) 
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 Conclusion 
The Ayotzinapa 43 mobilization benefited from previous practices, experiences and 
networks, including those involved in other two case study movements. This enabled 
a hybrid movement to emerge and endure. Most interviewees understood the 
mobilization as a spontaneous emotional response to a trigger event which embodied 
the crisis of violence and human rights, directly implicating the state in the 
disappearance of 43 young students and the wider violence. This drew on underlying 
and active discontent with the political establishment and Mexico’s captured 
institutions. The increasingly diverse digital media environment played an important 
role in how coverage of the Iguala events emerged, increasing shock and undercutting 
official narratives.  
 
The victims, particularly their parents, represented the struggle against an abusive 
state. Human rights approaches, skilfully applied by human rights NGOs, provided a 
clear means of converting a raw cry of injustice into concrete and legitimised claims 
against the state. This facilitated international scrutiny and accompaniment which also 
reinforced the agency of the parents. Human rights discourse provided a focus to the 
movement, but the human story of the disappeared men and the struggle of their 
parents was the primary mobilizing narrative. Human rights discourse was secondary 
to this more affective framing narrative focused on traditions of social solidarity and 
demands for return of the forcibly disappeared. This galvanized support for a mass 
social protest movement made up of diverse individual and collective actors, some with 
more radical agendas which were on occasions in tension with narrower human rights 
demands.  
 
The increasing embeddedness of digital communications in national and international 
solidarity networks enabled a rapid scaling up of support actions and participation, 
reducing the obstacles and costs to information sharing and coordination. Digital and 
social media practices also facilitated rapid emotional identification with the cause of 
the victims and the mobilizing narrative. They also supported the early effervescent 
expressive stages of mobilization, based on more spontaneous individualised or small 
group participation. However, the waning of this dynamic period also coincided with 
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the adoption of organizational structures and more centralised movement decision-
making. This reduced plural connective action features in favour of more hybrid 
practices and a more politically committed collective identity. This ensured a durable 
core of organized politicised support capable of withstanding the counter-framing 
tactics of a semi-authoritarian government, even if this partly contributed to a 
reduction in the movement’s wider mobilization and appeal. Increasing recognition of 
the vulnerability of digital and social media to threats, intimidation and surveillance, 
also reduced more open and deliberative practices in favour of selective digital 
advocacy to support movement strategy.  
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Discussion chapter 
 
 Introduction 
The previous three chapters have presented and analysed the qualitative data on the 
three case studies, enabling the development of a thematic framework to analyse the 
different dynamic practices of each movement in relation to human rights discourse 
and digital and social media. This chapter explores these different dimensions in a 
series of discussions on the framework themes spanning the three movements. 
 
Before initiating that process, it is important to acknowledge a number of assumptions 
with regard this overarching discussion. Firstly, the three movements occurred 
consecutively, but also overlapped; each influencing and contributing to the practices 
of the next. In addition, Ayotzinapa 43 and MPJD groups are still active and involved in 
contentious collective action. As a result, a systematic comparison between each 
movement is not possible. Neither is it desirable as the process of reflection and 
interpretation by interviewees of earlier social movement experiences is an integral 
part of the evolving repertoire of practice which this analysis seeks to examine. 
Secondly, the data gathered is the result of interviews in which participants or 
observers reflected on and interpreted their experiences and understanding of the 
movements. As such, the meaning of the movements and their practices as set out in 
the framework analysis is an interpretation of complex socially constructed processes.  
 
The table below brings together the themes in the framework to enable discursive 
reflections on the different and similar practices of the movements. However, these 
are associational rather than causal links and they do not cover all aspects of social 
movement practice. Nevertheless, they provide a map for exploring the constraining 
and enabling features of human rights discourse and digital and social media practices 
in the mobilizations.  
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 Framework 
 Human Rights approaches and 
discourse 
Digitally networked 
communications, 
particularly social media 
Context Violence/impunity/democratic 
deficit/captured state. Non-rights 
protective status quo contrasts with 
institutional rhetoric of human 
rights and democracy. Traditions of 
civil society solidarity, resistance 
mobilizations and human rights 
claims-making. 
Media environment 
dominated by narrow 
mainstream versus 
increasing range of digital 
and social media 
information flow; 
diversifying voices, 
narratives and 
information. 
Trigger event Dramatic/personal/symbolic of 
dysfunctional democracy, injustice 
and official collusion/ provokes 
anger and solidarity. 
Viral spread of 
information undercutting 
official narrative, 
international coverage. 
Networks Networked activists, groups and 
individuals –are human rights 
activists central to movement 
networks? Small group 
participation. 
Embedded 
communications practice 
linking local, national and 
international, reducing 
mobilization costs.  
Narrative frame Human rights important but not 
central dimension, instead personal 
narrative, emotional, expressive, 
indignation and solidarity. 
Communicating emotion, 
sharing indignation, 
expressing solidarity. 
Agency Human rights discourse 
strengthening individual and 
collective agency / solidarity 
participation as agency.  
Victims/survivors 
increasing social media 
use, widening range of 
voices, digital solidarity 
participation. 
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Articulation Human rights as minimum element 
for plural civil society articulation, 
but insufficiently 
transformative/institutionally 
oriented.  
Human rights not just tool or empty 
point of articulation but also 
expressive of values and agency.  
Explosion of voices – 
connective action, 
insufficient for long-term 
strategic struggle, return 
to hybrid/collective 
action of reduced costs.  
Challenges and 
dangers 
Is human rights discourse 
meaningful for movements beyond 
concrete victim claims? Is it too 
institutionally oriented to challenge 
captured state? Can it form part of 
a wider democratic and social 
justice agenda aspiring to social 
transformation?  
Digital downsides – over 
expectation, cannot 
sustain movement 
deliberation, threats to 
activists and 
sustainability of 
mobilization processes. 
How far to restrict social 
media use to limit 
vulnerability? 
 
  
 The role of context  
In this section I discuss the central role of the context out of which the three 
movements emerged in Mexico. This includes: a) the socio-political situation of 
Mexico’s partial democracy and traditions of social mobilization, b) the increasing 
adoption of human rights discourse in the public sphere, and c) the changing media 
and digital communications environment. I argue that the crisis of Mexico’s democracy 
contributed to the trigger events, but also the increasing embeddedness of human 
rights in public discourse and digital and social media in the communications 
environment facilitated the interpretation of trigger events by local, national and 
international publics as particularly meaningful and representative of the wider crisis 
of Mexico’s democracy.  
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9.3.1 Emerging crisis 
By 2011, spiralling criminal violence, impunity and political corruption were increasing 
manifestations of Mexico’s flawed political transition, which had failed to produce 
accountable and effective institutions or social justice (Nassif 2009). Despite the 
existence of formal representative democracy, the power of economic, political and 
criminal networks had become ever more entwined and entrenched in advancing their 
interests at the cost of ordinary Mexican’s struggling to live with dignity (Nieto 2013). 
In contrast, parts of civil society aspired to deeper, more socially just and participatory 
forms of democracy and resistance (Olvera 2016; Pleyers et al. 2017). The mismatch 
between the promise of a rights-protective plural democratic culture and the reality 
dominated by vested interests, corruption, violence and impunity provided fertile 
terrain for some social groups to understand these grievances as forms of ‘social strain’ 
in Smelser’s (1962) language or more tellingly, as a State ‘legitimation crisis’ in 
Habermas’ (1996) terminology.  
 
This context contributed directly to the specific movement trigger events: the killing of 
Francisco Sicilia and 6 others, the enforced disappearance of 43 Ayotzinapa students 
and protests against the economic and media elites returning the PRI to power. Sharing 
an understanding of this context facilitated these singular events being recognised and 
interpreted as emblematic of the wider socio-political crises by diverse actors. 
Understanding the abuse of human rights as part of public sphere concerns was part 
of this interpretive template.   
 
Despite the absence of new national level social movements in the years running up to 
2011 (Olvera 2010), Mexico has long traditions of contentious civil society mobilization. 
These practices are a cultural resource and inspiration for autonomous self-organizing 
collective action, involving both expressive and instrumental challenges to 
powerholder (Stolle-McAllister 2005). As a result, the socio-political strains 
represented by the trigger events also constituted forms of political opportunity 
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(Tarrow 1998; McAdam et al. 2003) to reactivate and innovate the repertoire (Tilly 
2004) of plural grassroots mobilization.  
  
9.3.2 Reconfiguring human rights discourse 
Human rights discourse had come to play an increasingly important political and social 
role in the public sphere in Mexico, but often with ambiguous significance. On the one 
hand, as part of the decades’ long democratic transition, successive governments used 
human rights as a state-legitimizing discourse without radically altering the 
relationship between institutions and citizens. The ineffectiveness of the vast state 
apparatus supposedly tasked with protecting human rights was perceived as an act of 
simulation, undermining the value of human rights discourse. For more radical social 
actors the institutionalization of human rights represented a convenient official mask 
adopted by neoliberal economic and political elites determined to consolidate their 
hold on power, what Baxi (2012a) refers to as human rights discourse to.430  
 
On the other hand, a small but active group of local, national and international NGOs 
used human rights discourse to promote respect and protection of human rights in 
Mexico, particularly civil rights. Some of these NGOs documented and exposed the 
chasm between the official rhetoric and actual compliance with international human 
rights law, mobilizing the international human rights movement to exert pressure on 
the Mexican government. Human rights discourse increasingly became a language 
used by a range of actors, including parts of the national media, to critique abuses of 
power and question the quality of Mexico’s democracy. As part of this process, the 
2011 reforms to the Constitution entrenched international and regional human rights 
legal obligations into Mexican law as never before. But this only slowly began to 
percolate through parts of the judicial system, gradually opening new paths to strategic 
litigation. However, these ideas and legal mechanisms remained beyond the reach of 
most ordinary citizens. 
                                                        
430 In contrast to this institutional instrumental use of human rights to serve the purposes of domination 
he refers to human rights for to express the emancipatory project of grassroots human rights discourse 
challenging domination. 
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Human rights discourse was gradually implanted into some institutional frameworks, 
and NGOs used national and international human rights mechanisms to demonstrate 
non-compliance. Despite this, human rights discourse continued to be widely regarded 
in public discourse, including by those involved in grassroots social and political 
activism, as specialist law and the realm of international actors or elite lawyers. It was 
also often seen as being under attack in parts of the mainstream media for supposedly 
protecting criminals more than victims of crime.  
 
In addition, on the left, some political and social activists and academics were critical 
of human rights discourse as technocratic and cosmopolitan. They tended to view 
human rights NGOs engaged in institution-building with the transition governments as 
elitist and co-opted; as betraying a movement which had its origins in the struggle for 
emancipation of the dispossessed against authoritarian powerholders and the 
neoliberal agenda (Estévez López 2008; Bizberg 2014); and as distant from grassroots 
social movements challenging these economic and political conditions (Estévez López 
2015).431  
 
However, according to different interviewees in this research, by 2010 these positions 
were changing as the crisis provoked by Calderón’s ‘war’ became increasingly visible.432 
There was growing awareness among human rights activists of the need to reconfigure 
their approach to the emerging crisis, to make human rights discourse more 
meaningful for social and political actors engaged in contentious grassroots 
mobilizations in relation to the violence and the failures of political transition. This is 
what Arias and Ponte term the process of ‘re-legitimation’ of human rights as a 
language of struggle (Arias Marín et al. 2015). It is in this context, that human rights 
                                                        
431 I do not share this characterisation of human rights NGOs, but it reflects an important criticism of 
how national and international human rights NGOs responded to the transition process and were drawn 
into institutionalisation processes which delivered few results. 
432 This also reflects my own experiences working with local NGOs documenting disappearances in 2010 
(Knox 2017). 
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discourse acted as an important framework for interpreting the trigger events as 
signifying violations in universal norms of human dignity of victims and a state failing 
to protect its citizens. This repositioned the violence and the state’s involvement. The 
government could no longer sustain the claim of a ‘Just War’ on the basis of 
stigmatizing scores of ordinary Mexicans. Human rights discourse served both as a 
normative aspiration of how the state should act, but also as a concrete tool for 
recognising abuses of power and neglect of state responsibilities. As such, it 
increasingly served in public debate to pinpoint the failures of Calderon’s ‘war’ and 
highlight the lived experience of those suffering its consequences. 
 
9.3.3 Communications landscape 
The rapidly changing media and communications environment with the spread of 
digital technologies facilitated a number of movement processes. While the specifics 
of digital media adoption varied between and within each movement, there were at 
least two dimensions of the wider context that played an important role from the 
outset.  
 
Firstly, there was increasing diversity of internet-based news media coverage at 
national and international level. This included digitally native platforms or established 
media agencies, or blogs and posts by collectives or individuals. This tapestry of news 
and comment of emerging actors was weakening the traditional hold on news 
narratives promoted by Mexico’s dominant mainstream media networks. Digital 
technologies reduced the costs and increased the reach of independent and alternative 
news platforms, and also made access to international news portals instantaneous. As 
a result, management of news narratives by governments was harder to sustain. This 
helped foster a sense that there was greater informational diversity available for those 
interested to find it; that there was growing access to a range of voices of marginalised 
people usually excluded from official narratives. This increased the potential to 
articulate new alternative narratives, as well as to leverage coverage into the 
mainstream media in an increasingly fluid and interconnected media (Chadwick 2013). 
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This was an emerging resource as well as political opportunity for the movements 
which in turn contributed to the diversification of the news environment.  
 
Secondly, the features of web 2.0 technology afford greater potential for autonomous 
sharing and creation of information by individuals and groups. This self-production 
(Castells 2009a), even if not amounting to idealised deliberative fora, enabled 
discussion and sharing of information. This facilitated mutual identification and 
participation in and coordination of movement activities. These practices varied greatly 
within and between the movements, reflecting both the digital divide and other social 
and geographic inequalities. Despite these variations, the embeddedness of digital 
communications in civic life and, in particular, as part of political and social activism 
increased substantially between 2011 and 2016. In this context, individualised (Bennett 
et al. 2012) or small group digitally networked communications provided an important, 
though by no means exclusive, means of participation in movement actions. 
  
The changing features of the media configuration and practices at the time each 
movement emerged did not determine the mobilization’s form, but they played an 
important role in how participants heard about, interpreted, interacted, shared and 
responded to each trigger event and the subsequent mobilization.  
 
 Trigger events 
If the context shaped aspects of the emerging movements, of equal relevance was the 
specific nature of the contingent trigger events and their immediate aftermath in 
shaping the political opportunity (Tarrow 1998) configuration and meaning. This 
included the response of those directly affected, the reactions of the authorities and 
media, and the process by which information spread. These contributed to the 
interpretation of a dramatic event in relation to understandings of the underlying 
context and discontents. In this process, human rights discourse played an important 
but secondary role. In contrast, the increasing use of digital communications meant a 
rapid and layered circulation of information. This facilitated the move from personal 
reaction to sharing the emotions of collective ‘moral shock’ (Jasper 1998) and 
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indignation, then to engagement in civil society actions to express these sentiments 
and challenge both the inevitability of the trigger event and the institutional responses 
toward those affected.   
 
In the case of the MPJD, the rapid discovery that one of the seven murdered people 
was the son of Javier Sicilia transformed an act of routinized criminal violence, into a 
personified horrific event representing the senselessness of the wider ‘war’ and 
violence. This transformation was made possible because of Javier Sicilia’s status and 
the close knit community around him. Javier Sicilia’s early decision to take a public 
stance rather than go into private mourning received wide coverage in the mainstream 
media and new media platforms. However, human rights discourse did not feature 
strongly in his early statements. Instead, he expressed his family’s personal tragedy, 
reflected on the suffering of other victims of the violence, rejected the government 
policy fuelling the violence and demanded justice. This focus on the emotional trauma 
of the violence, not in terms of human rights violations, enabled a rapid identification 
of those already disposed through their understanding of the context to respond to 
Javier Sicilia’s angry cry of ‘Ya Basta’.   
 
The YoSoy132 trigger event was partly the protest at the Ibero, but owed more to the 
subsequent attempts by PRI officials, facilitated by the mainstream media, to 
delegitimise the demonstration against Peña Nieto. The protesters self-produced 
online video identifying themselves and asserting their right to reply, provided a means 
to support the protest vicariously, amplifying it into an act of rebellion against the 
political system. Human rights discourse was used in the initial protest to highlight the 
presidential candidate’s involvement in and tolerance of human rights violations. The 
viral support for the protesters’ video was premised on and expressed the right to 
freedom of expression. However, while these references to human rights provided an 
underlying cognitive framework to validate the student action, the identification with 
the initial protest and desire to join street protests was based on emotional sympathy, 
shared indignation and the desire to make public displays of resistance to the 
imposition of the PRI candidate. In this regard, the multiple uses of digital and social 
media platforms and their embeddedness in student culture were more important 
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than human rights discourse. Digitally enabled networking not only facilitated the 
mobilization, but also became a feature of movement identity, including its agility, 
horizontality, self-production and irreverence. It also showed how quickly social media 
uses could develop emotional responses, which could translate into street action and 
an organized movement. The trigger event was in fact a whole series of events which 
when seen together stirred a generation. However, human rights discourse was only 
an aspect of this drama, whereas digital and social media practices and the sense of 
involvement in plural collective self-defining political participation were both the 
medium and part of the identity of the movement.  
 
In the case of the Ayotzinapa 43, the events of 26 September 2014 were recognised 
quite quickly as human rights violations. This was in part due to the early indications of 
state agent involvement, making traditional human rights discourse apt to frame state 
responsibility for grave abuses against individuals. However, this also required the early 
intervention of credible local NGOs, international media and witnesses. These actors 
helped legitimise the initial accounts of the surviving Ayotzinapa students. The other 
key feature of the aftermath was represented by the group of mothers and fathers of 
the disappeared students, desperately searching for their loved ones in the face of 
official obstruction and incompetence. Their dignified but angry demands quickly 
became a focal point of media, NGO and popular attention as a means of making sense 
of the Iguala events. In this context, human rights discourse was important to facilitate 
an interpretation of the events which focused on state responsibility, but sympathy 
and identification with the victims and their families was key to the early mobilization.  
 
The increasingly pluralised media environment also contributed to this process as the 
events of Iguala emerged in a confusing, fragmented and dramatic manner, tracking 
the efforts of the parents to find their children. This helped created a multi-layered 
informational environment reaching many different actors and networks at national 
and international level, facilitating the rapid interpretation of events.  
 
In conclusion, the trigger events, including their immediate aftermath, were intrinsic 
to the shaping of subsequent mobilizations. The ‘moral shock’ (Jasper et al. 1995) of 
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these events was understood in terms of the personal story of those directly affected, 
including their human and dignified responses. At the same time this contrasted with 
the abusive or inadequate actions of powerholders. In this context, human rights 
discourse was an important schema for interpreting these trigger events, both in terms 
of the betrayed aspirations of the democratic transition and as critical tool to identify 
specific powerholder responsibilities. However, it was not necessarily at the core of 
their emblematic significance and the process of emotional identification with those 
affected. At the same time, the growing prevalence of digitally enabled 
communications meant that when each event occurred there was an increasingly 
plural media environment to refract and disseminate the dramatic dimensions of the 
event to diverse audiences at national and international level. This also limited the 
capacity of powerholders to shape the news media coverage and how the event was 
understood by the public. This initial interpretation of the events prepared the ground 
for network reconfiguration and mobilization.  
 
 Networked mobilization and digital communication 
Digitally networked communication facilitated national and global mobilization in 
support of local context driven movements. Key networked actors in the movements 
shaped their emerging identity and strategy, including the uses (or not) of human rights 
discourse. Activism practices were adapted as part of the growing recognition that 
digital communications could reduce barriers to information sharing and coordination 
by individuals and small groups, enhancing the reach and speed of networked 
participation in movements. 
 
Social networks are an essential enabling dimension of social mobilizations (Diani et al. 
2003); serving as hidden ‘circuits of social solidarity’ (Melucci 1996, p115). Digital 
communications have made it possible for distributed actors and local networks to 
communicate rapidly, theoretically forming global networks of counter-publics with 
the potential to resist hegemonic powerholders (Castells 2013b; Castells 2013a). In the 
three movements, the cross participation of actors in multiple national and 
international networks facilitated global solidarity, but these actions remained centred 
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on national processes rather than the ideas of ‘Alterglobal’ movements addressing the 
injustices of globalization (Farro et al. 2014). In fact, this rooted context was crucial to 
their appeal to national and international solidarity networks.  
 
The multiple networks of actors and groups that responded to the trigger events were 
central to the processes shaping each mobilizations’ identity, strategy and tactics. Key 
actors were either directly affected by the trigger events or rapidly joined in support of 
those affected. Pre-existing relationships based on friendship, trust, beliefs and 
ideology were important to enable this early involvement, often on the basis of face-
to-face or phone call exchanges. The attitude and experience of these actors in relation 
to human rights discourse helped shape how or whether movements adopted human 
rights approaches and linked up with national and international human rights 
networks. That is to say, the nature of the trigger event alone did not determine the 
relevance of human rights discourse, but also the actors involved in the movement and 
how they interpreted and responded to the sets of emerging relations and practices.    
 
It is in this context that Crossley’s (2002; p176) account of the ‘habitus’ of social 
activists (refer to section 2.4.5) serves to understand the complex processes of 
individual engagement and innovation in the practices of social mobilization; where 
past experience and know-how shape approaches, but new circumstances and 
relations also enable intuitive responses in pursuit of aims which are also mediated by 
personal values and beliefs. He suggests a process at once reasoned in terms of taking 
advantage of opportunities, but not narrowly utility calculating or voluntarist; rather, 
complex relational processes in which individuals interact and innovate as part of a 
culture of purposive social mobilization operating through structured social relations.  
 
This account is consistent with the experiences of different actors engaged in the case 
studies. It reflects how the rapid involvement of skilled human rights practitioners in 
the MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43 played an important role in shaping the adoption of 
human rights approaches as part of the movement discourse. This was not simply 
undertaken as a means to an end or applying previously learnt practices to leverage 
international opinion (Bob 2005; Hagan 2010). Instead, they were processes, 
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negotiated and innovated, to develop methods, tactics and strategies that were useful 
and relevant to the movement participants and were consistent with its evolving 
identity and values. This included avoiding human rights becoming the dominant 
discourse of the MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43, but still remaining an important aspect of its 
expressive and instrumental actions.  
 
This was different to YoSoy132, where human rights discourse became increasingly 
marginal to the mobilization after the initial trigger event. This was partly due to the 
nature of the event, but also because the network of young participants were not 
strongly human rights oriented, with prior skill and experience in using the discourse. 
They did not feel that human rights discourse was central to or useful for the 
movement’s identity or strategy; that it was too legalistic and institutionally 
oriented.433  
 
On this basis, the case studies indicate that the local context and trigger events, filtered 
through the adaptive experience and orientation of key actors involved in the enabling 
networks, were major factors shaping each movement’s particular approach to human 
rights. As such, the adoption of human rights discourse by social movements cannot be 
seen in terms of a narrow cost-benefit decision on the basis of the political opportunity 
structure, but one shaped by a series of dynamic variables which suggest a greater or 
lesser fit with the emerging identity and orientation of the movement and its key 
actors.   
 
I now consider how the increasing adoption of digital communications platforms 
extended the networked mobilization practices of each movement, facilitating more 
individualised participation (Farro et al. 2014). Even with the MPJD, the relatively small 
number of activists skilled in the use of digital and social media, facilitated the rapid 
growth in support of the movement. They enabled sympathetic national and 
international actors to identify movement organizers, communicate and participate in 
                                                        
433 This is not to ignore the that human rights discourse featured in some of the actions of the YoSoy132 
groups - for example, in questions posed in the livestreamed debate with presidential candidates.  
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distributed public actions. These practices enhanced the reach of the movement and 
its capacity to communicate with diverse national and global audiences, even if its use 
of web 2.0 deliberative features was limited (Treré et al. 2014).  
 
In contrast, YoSoy132 developed directly out of embedded use of digital 
communications and was more inspired by the digitally facilitated activism of 
‘Alterglobal’ movements. Widespread use of social media platforms not only reduced 
barriers to networked communication and participation, but also facilitated creativity 
in the production and sharing of mobilizing materials, contributing to the movement 
identity and public street actions. Ayotzinapa 43 combined a range of communications 
practices, reaching even wider and more diverse networks at national and global level 
to facilitate solidarity support and participation in actions. At times, these dense sets 
of online and offline connections enabled participation beyond traditional social 
activists, creating positive feedback loops to include less politically engaged individuals 
and affinity groups. Part of this process of evolving practice was that each of the 
movements learnt from earlier experiences, reconfiguring networks and actors 
involved in previous mobilizations to participate in new hybrid solidarity actions.  
 
In this manner, each movement took advantage of the increasing adoption of digital 
communications to strengthen the movement mobilization in the manner suggested 
by Crossley; innovating on the basis of experience, orientation and participation in a 
dynamic culture of civil society contention. This included struggles over the relative 
prioritization to be given digital platforms so as not to exclude individuals and 
communities who were not active online or were without access to digital technology. 
However, even some initially sceptical actors began to appreciate the value of social 
media communications, not just to reach mainstream media, but also to facilitate mass 
mobilization processes and public actions. Despite this growing awareness, very few 
interviewees participating in the three movements considered social media platforms 
served as forums for movement-wide debates and deliberations in the formation of 
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identity and strategy.434 This also suggests that some of the more idealised 
participatory democratic practices associated with digital counter-publics suggested by 
Castells or Hardt and Negri were not strongly present in the three movements - with 
the possible exception of early YoSoy132 activities.435    
 
In conclusion, key networked actors played important roles in shaping the movement 
practices, including approaches to human rights, but these cannot be understood in 
simply instrumental terms. Instead, they are complex relational processes in which 
actors engaged intuitively with the context and other actors, reflecting on their own 
experience and knowledge to contribute to the mobilization process and support those 
affected in a manner consistent with emerging movement values and repertoires. This 
included, but not exclusively, use of human rights discourses and links to the 
international human rights networks. Digital communications significantly contributed 
to the networks of the three movements, though to differing degrees. The increasing 
embeddedness of digital media in the social and political life of individuals, small 
groups, collectives and NGOs enabled a rapid scaling up of networks from small 
affiliation groups close to the trigger event, to configurations of multi-layered national 
and global networks enabling participation in online and offline collective actions. 
However, this networked participation was not solely based on individualised 
participation envisaged in some of the theories of modernity and the network society 
(Beck 2002; Castells 2009a), but also small group affiliations which mediated this larger 
networked participation.  
 
 Narrative framing 
This section explores the principle narrative frames of meaning developed by each 
mobilization in terms of how participants understood the movements and their 
meaningfulness in the socio-political context. I conclude that human rights discourse 
                                                        
434 An exception to this was increasing use of encrypted messenger apps such as Whatsapp and Telegram 
for larger closed group conversations. 
435 Even YoSoy132 deliberations were focused on larger physical assemblies, but smaller group 
discussion among adhering subnetworks as well as international affiliates formed part of the movement 
culture.  
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featured as part of this narrative, but it was only one aspect. More importantly, the 
narrative frames that appealed to potential participants were rooted in sentiment, 
solidarity practices and identifiable national concerns around stigmatization, 
insecurity, injustice and impunity of powerholders. Human rights discourse was 
mapped onto aspects of this narrative, particularly in communications with 
institutional and international actors, but this was not regarded as the mobilizing 
narrative for domestic participation or sympathy. In contrast, digital and social media 
practices contributed significantly to communicating the affective dimensions of the 
movement narrative. This aspect of social media use enabled movements to engage 
more directly with different distributed publics, facilitating immediacy, identification 
and a sense of emotional involvement amongst potential adherents in line with the 
framing narrative of the mobilization.  
 
Framing analysis attempts to identify those aspects of movement discourse which 
foster or fail to foster cognitive frameworks sufficient to interpret trigger events and 
movement actions favourably; to stimulate support and rebut opposition (Della Porta 
et al. 2006). The idea of frames is to develop narratives which ‘resonate’ (Snow et al. 
1986) with audiences in terms of their own cultural and political understandings, but 
also provide new dimensions for interpreting the situation or events, making a target 
‘them’ responsible against which a mobilizing ‘we’ pursue specific demands (Johnston 
et al. 2005).  
 
As observed in section 2.4.2, this analytical tool makes several dubious assumptions.436 
Nevertheless, it remains useful for examining processes by which movements are 
understood by participants and audiences. However, it is important to remember this 
meaning-making is not solely based on ends-driven calculations, but is also part of 
                                                        
436 Among these are the analogy of a frame with a static image to examine a multi-layered and 
multidirectional dynamic processes; like resource mobilization and political process theories it assumes 
a model of utilitarian RAT decision-making by a unitary vanguard movement leadership which 
orchestrates frames of meaning purely to appeal as widely as possible to movement participants, public 
opinion and institutional actors. This suggests a manipulative exploitation of narrative for purely 
instrumental ends without regard to values or beliefs in relation to how narrative frames are negotiated, 
take shape and express values of movements (Marx Ferree et al. 2000). 
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multi-layered dynamic processes which can contribute to complex narratives that are 
identity-expressive and value-consistent with the movement.  
 
In the case of the MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43, participants felt that the mobilizing 
narrative was the voice of the victims; their anger and dignity; their experience of 
suffering at the hands of criminals and the state and their emotionally charged 
demands to the authorities for the return of their loved ones and for justice. These 
represented acts of resistance against stigmatization, official abuses and neglect. This 
narrative was rooted in a shared sense of suffering and injustice based on a common 
understanding of how ordinary people are routinely ill-treated by powerholders in 
Mexico and are left voiceless, powerless and marginalised. In particular, the demand 
for the young men to be returned alive was urgent and vivid. This narrative appealed 
to solidarity and resistance to injustice, but also the fear of spreading violence. The 
accusation of grave human rights violations highlighted the involvement of the state, 
distinguishing it from, but also linking it to, violence routinely attributed to non-state 
actor criminal gangs. This intensified the gravity of the crime and outrage that the state, 
which was supposed to protect citizens, was in fact preying upon them. The specific 
crime of enforced disappearance also invoked the state sponsored abuses of the ‘dirty 
war’ when the PRI was responsible for disappearing perceived political opponents, 
including social activists and students. These human rights elements strengthened the 
case against the state and government. However, participants and observers did not 
believe this was the core mobilizing narrative or frame; or that these human rights 
dimensions constituted the mobilizations as ‘human rights movements’.  
 
This is not to ignore the role of the vocalisation of the suffering of the victims of human 
rights violations as a key element of the repertoire of strategic human rights advocacy, 
which seeks to elicit sympathy and support to influence policy makers (Schaffer et al. 
2004; Brysk 2013). However, these advocacy strategies tend to position personal 
narratives of injustices and suffering within the framework of universal human rights, 
particularly focusing on international human rights law, and what this means in relation 
to the obligations of powerholders. This assumes that the discourse of human rights 
not only legitimises claims in terms of international standards, but it is these standards 
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that gives the claims resonance to mobilize collective action. However, the case study 
participants and observers did not identify this appeal to universal standards as the 
urgent mobilizing narrative for recruiting support domestically, rather it was the 
passionately charged appeal for solidarity and identification with the victims. This 
narrative frame operated on a more psychological and emotional level rooted in 
national political culture, enabling people to recognise and relate to the victims on the 
basis of their own experience and understanding of the context of injustice and 
violence as well as seeing others in their networks express similar attitudes.  
 
The voice of the victims represented raw and human resistance to the status quo 
maintained by political, economic and criminal interests. In contrast, human rights 
discourse served primarily to appeal to those sectors already predisposed to the 
language of human rights norms, such as the national and international human rights 
movement, as well as institutional actors, but not to mobilize plural local and national 
constituencies. Interviewees thought that a narrowly focused appeal to human rights 
discourse would not have been a ‘resonant’ or effective mobilizing narrative for these 
constituencies. They believed that the public viewed human rights discourse as rather 
alien and technocratic. In addition, some social and political groups viewed human 
rights discourse and some NGOs as elitist and institutional; as downplaying or ignoring 
the political dynamics of social movement struggles, preferring to pursue apparently 
politically neutral legal strategies (which in turn were seen to favour powerholders 
given the ingrained bias and institutional weakness of the justice system). As such, it 
was not a discourse which appealed strongly to the traditions of collective resistance 
and grassroots political mobilization against powerholders. For this reason, 
participants believed that the framing narrative was rooted in the local political 
context, recognisable individual and collective emotions and experiences, including 
traditions of mobilization and solidarity with injustice.  
 
Despite this perception that human rights discourse did not resonate widely, it is 
interesting to observe that a recent survey in Mexico found that human rights activists 
tended to believe that public perceptions of human rights were more negative than 
the survey data suggested (Ron et al. 2014). This raises an interesting question about 
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whether in fact more explicit framing of movement narratives in terms of human rights 
discourse could be equally or more effective in mobilizing and recruiting among 
domestic audiences than many activists believe. Either way, it appears to confirm an 
increasing recognition and embeddedness of human rights discourse in social relations, 
particularly in terms of citizenship and state obligations.  
 
In the case of YoSoy132, human rights discourse was rapidly submerged in the broader 
debates of the movement and was not central to its more radical mobilizing narrative. 
In this context, human rights discourse served primarily to validate the right of the 
movement to express itself freely without fear of reprisals and to denounce 
intimidation. The movement was challenging the quality of Mexico’s democracy, 
including the fairness of the media and electoral system, but human rights discourse 
was not felt to be sufficiently relevant. It did not seem to offer a challenge to the status 
quo in relation to democratic participation, social justice, political corruption and the 
hegemony of political and economic elites within Mexico’s partial democracy, 
particularly their control of much of the mainstream media. In this context, human 
rights were largely taken-for-granted as a minimum but insufficient narrative to 
mobilize disparate identities and maximalist aspirations for social transformation. This 
process only increased as the movement took on a more organized structure around 
the UNAM with its culture of left-wing counter-hegemonic resistance activism, 
distrustful of rights discourses.  
 
It is also interesting that movements seeking to enact new ways of ‘doing’ politics, 
particularly involving more horizontal deliberative participation; to challenge the old 
order and the limitations of representative democracy, largely overlooked human 
rights discourse. Is this because human rights discourse, as promoted by the global 
human rights movement, often promotes institutionalisation in domestic law, 
regardless of local context? This approach sees the instantiation of human rights 
discourse in legal protections as, at least in theory, a non-political process divorced 
from domestic political struggles? This may be strategically effective in terms of 
invoking the universal legitimacy of human rights to modify domestic law, but it can 
also result in a form of ahistorical airbrushing of the actual political struggles to claim, 
 286 
define and instantiate rights domestically (Stammers 2009; Goodhart 2013). This 
process of making ‘respect’ and ‘depoliticising’ human rights discourse through the 
predominant focus on legal instantiation also seems to undercut its more radical 
potential for the transformative aspirations of movements, particularly when the state 
apparatus is geared toward simulation of legal compliance.    
 
Another distinguishing feature of YoSoy132 was the absence of grave human rights 
violations in the trigger event. The initial support for the publicly defamed and 
misrepresented students was to show solidarity with their right to protest, but not as 
victims suffering traumatic abuses. As a result, the primary discourse was not focused 
on victims expressing grave injustice as with the other two movements. YoSoy132 was 
a mobilization of a different character whose narrative focused on rejection of the PRI 
and participation in collective self-affirming and irreverent public actions to expose 
Mexico’s democratic deficits and continuing domination by economic and political 
elites. Participating in YoSoy132 was an enactment of freedom of expression and 
association. It communicated transformational hopes which went beyond the typical 
defensive justice claims of victims of state abuses which is most commonly associated 
with the claims-making of human rights discourse. As such, even as a secondary 
narrative, human rights discourse was not regarded as useful to the young 
inexperienced activists or fully expressive of the plural identity of the movement. This 
also suggests that the traditional understanding of human rights discourse, as 
particularly meaningful in instances of state repression against individuals or 
communities, continues to prevail in many sectors of society, limiting its resonance in 
relation to other dimensions of citizen/powerholder inequality, democratic 
participation and social justice.437 
 
                                                        
437 This suggests that despite the efforts of many human rights NGOs, particularly in Latin America, to 
promote conceptions of human rights more clearly engaged with social, economic, cultural and 
environment injustice of partial democracy, traditional understandings of state violations of civil and 
political rights are still the most widely recognised. This is perhaps not surprising given the importance 
of the political struggles against such abuses committed by repressive regimes in the region in the 1970s 
and 80s and some of the gravest abuses of power they represent, such as torture, extrajudicial killings 
and enforced disappearances. 
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I now examine how the expressive dimensions of the movements also coincided with 
emerging features of digitally networked communications, particularly social media. 
This enabled movements to combine the benefits of rapid information sharing and 
coordination, with a growing sense, at least among some activists, of the potential of 
social media to communicate the emotionally mobilizing narrative of the movement to 
local, national and global publics (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Dahlgren 2013; 
Papacharissi 2015).  
 
The MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43 focused on the victims, their emotional ordeal and 
demands. These were shared through social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook 
and YouTube. This was initially facilitated by more digitally skilled activists collaborating 
with the movements, but also increasingly by victims themselves adopting social media 
as part of the mobilization practices. In the MPJD, some activists became aware of this 
feature of networked communication in the process of expressing and sharing 
movement sentiments online, realising that this form of communication reinforced a 
sense of participating in processes even with distributed networks. This was not 
necessarily acknowledged by other movement activists, particularly from older 
generations, who recognised the importance of digital communications as a tactical 
device for leveraging mainstream media coverage, but were less sensitive to other 
more expressive features of social media communication.  
 
In the case of YoSoy132, the rapid circulation of the initial YouTube video via Twitter 
enabled a feeling of involvement in a protest, of recognising and sharing personal 
emotional reactions. In this self-reinforcing process, the excitement of recognition 
itself encouraged further engagement and recognition. These emotional responses 
were important to propel people to participate in early street protests or follow them 
livestreamed, conveying the immediacy and spontaneity of these actions, attracting 
further waves of interest. In the case of Ayotzinapa 43, the use of social media 
platforms by distributed networks nationally and international enabled disparate 
groups to post and share their contributions to public actions. This reinforced the 
identity of a community of support, as well as a creative engagement with the solidarity 
processes which also strengthened emotional identification. By this stage, activists 
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were increasingly aware of the importance of placing the voice of the families and 
others affected at the centre of social media communications, sustaining their 
emotional response to the unfolding situation. In this context, the narrative of the 
victims, rather than details of legal human rights demands, suited the features of social 
media networks, assisting with the process of emotional engagement.  
 
However, the communication of sentiment via social media is not straightforward and 
is open to contestation, manipulation and counter-framing. The impact of circulating 
and sharing emotionally compelling information as part of the process of mobilization 
is dependent on the material being seen as authentic and emotional true, as well as 
reflecting the situation accurately. If perceived as intentionally falsifying the situation 
or emotionally manipulative, then the impact of social media can be reversed, 
undermining mobilization.438 The struggle between movement adherents and 
opponents over social media narratives and manipulation has gained increasing 
attention globally.439 However, participants in the MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43 were less 
aware of these threats, largely presuming the emotional expressiveness of 
communications was reflective of the values of the movement and integral to reasoned 
decisions to participate.440  
 
In conclusion, narrative frames of each movement were focused on the expressive 
emotional responses to the trigger events. The focus on individual personal or 
collective stories was central to fostering a shared identity and disposition to act 
                                                        
438 It can also be used for regressive movements based on emotionally ‘othering’ sections of society and 
closing off identities (Farro et al. 2014).      
439 The debate about ‘fake news’ has emerged since my field research. It addresses the creation of an 
emotive media narrative designed to discredit critical counter-narratives, regardless of whether they are 
based in fact or not. Nonetheless, even this manipulation of news narratives still relies on assertions of 
authenticity and falsity. If the target audience, for whatever reason, comes to believe they are being 
manipulated, then there is the potential for this narrative to become counter-productive. The concern 
regarding ‘fake news’ appears to be that the creation of an emotive narrative that all critical news is 
necessarily false undercuts the potential to expose the manipulations of that narrative on the basis of 
evidence. 
440 This understanding also reflected how emotional engagement of publics as part of contestation and 
mobilization narratives is not in opposition to rational decision-making as envisaged in some social 
movement recruitment theories based on Rational Actor Theory, but an essential element of political 
engagement where sentiment and reason operate together shaping individual orientations and actions 
(Goodwin et al. 2009).  
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collectively against specific targets. The connection between this narrative and the 
values of solidarity and resistance were also important to root the mobilization in the 
struggle to transform Mexico’s partial democracy. Increasingly embedded digital 
communications practices enhanced logistical capacity, but also facilitated this process 
of communicating and sharing movement sentiments to distributed recruits and 
audiences, developing a sense of collective identity. Human rights discourse featured 
in supporting aspects of this narrative frame but was not regarded as the primary 
language facilitating mobilization or emotional engagement. However, it did help 
reinforce the validity of the voice of the victims and their demands for justice, 
particularly in relation to international actors and institutional interactions. Despite the 
importance of these dimensions for the movements, human rights discourse remained 
secondary in comparison to emotional identification with the principle movement 
actors rooted in a shared understanding of the local context.  
 
 Agency 
This section discusses the importance of individual and collective agency in the social 
movements. In particular it explores uses of human rights discourse in the developing 
agency of key movement actors and solidarity participants. In the three movements, 
digital and social media uses began to help enhance these functions, enabling new 
forms of participation and amplifying the visibility of the movement and its key actors. 
However, internal movement processes to facilitate the agency of those directly 
affected by abuses are necessarily complex and sometimes ambiguous, including in 
how the use of human rights discourse is introduced and negotiated by human rights 
activists with those affected.  
  
Setting to one side wider sociological arguments about agency and structure, human 
agency is both the capacity to act autonomously to cause or seem to cause an effect in 
a given social context, but also the subjective sense of authoring or participating in the 
influencing action. The latter reflexive element is intrinsic to the experience of 
exercising control or influence in realising purposive activity – even if the ultimate 
effects are unintended or misrecognised. In the context of this study, agency is the 
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capacity of individuals or groups, often denied power in their social context, to exercise 
a degree of autonomous influence over their lives and constraining circumstances, 
coupled to an awareness of this shaping power. The reflexive sense of directly engaging 
with the political and social context in order to alter it, is central to the development 
of individual and collective political subjectivity and involvement in social movements 
(Giddens 1990; Gamson 1991, 1992). It is also a key dimension of modern conceptions 
of human rights which assert the central importance of individual autonomy, freedom 
and self-realization as part of the process of ‘free and full development of [his] 
personality’ (UN General Assembly 1948) intrinsic to human dignity.   
 
In the three movements, agency was enacted and understood in differing ways, but 
was central to the mobilization process. Human rights discourse, particularly the 
adoption of human rights claims, strengthened this process through those affected 
making concrete demands against powerholders. The international human rights 
framework makes human rights claims a useful means to legitimise local social or 
justice demands in terms of universal standards and obligations. It also enables the 
identification of concrete institutional steps to fulfil these responsibilities. However 
this ‘socialisation’ of international human rights law into a domestic settings, is often 
conceived of as a primarily top-down instrumental process led by expert human rights 
lawyers at national and international level promoting human rights norms to local 
institutional actors (Gordon et al. 2007). In this process, insufficient attention is 
frequently paid to the dynamics of agency of non-institutional actors directly or 
indirectly affected by abuses. An important element of the meaningfulness of human 
rights discourse in social mobilizations relates to victims’ involvement in claims-
making. 
 
The MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43 were movements focused on the victims of grave abuses 
of physical integrity in which state agents were directly involved and/or were 
implicated in failing to prevent or investigate crimes by non-state actors. However, the 
process of the parents and other family members developing their agency to formulate 
demands to remedy this injustice in terms of human rights, was not an inevitable 
process. The support of human rights activists and NGOs played an important role in 
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facilitating the interpretation of individual experience of injustice in terms of violations 
of universal human rights standards. This implied a process of victims often seeking 
support and information from other victims or social activists. In this exchange human 
rights claims came to be understood as a means to strengthen and legitimise demands 
for institutional action by appealing to universal standards not determined by local 
powerholders. This approach avoided exclusive reliance on domestic law, 
strengthening victims’ defence against manipulation of domestic judicial processes by 
powerholders. It also rerouted alternative approaches to injustice which victims might 
have followed, such as vigilante justice or more violent confrontation with 
powerholders, in favour of a mixture of civic action strategies involving legal cases, 
advocacy, direct action and social mobilization. 
 
As observed in section 2.3.3, complex social relations underlie the processes by which 
those with knowledge of human rights discourse and practice, ‘vernacularize’ (Merry 
2006b) it for individuals and communities whose rights are denied or abused. The latter 
may not necessarily be aware of or knowledgeable about human rights discourse or 
how it might apply to their situation and be used by them in their struggle for 
recognition and justice. As Merry suggests, the effectiveness of this process depends 
on the extent to which human rights discourse enables the disempowered to 
reinterpret their own situation as no longer inevitable, to one over which they can have 
some influence. As a result of this process, those directly affected can not only 
recognise the injustice in terms of human rights violations, but can come to formulate 
demands against powerholders to address the situation, beginning to enact their 
agency and political subjectivity in the face of a constraining context and with 
unpredictable results (Goodale 2013). Human rights claims is one but not the exclusive 
means of expressing this political subjectivity.  
 
For a human rights claim to be meaningful, it needs to be formulated in terms of 
exposing the claimant’s constraining social context of unequal power relations and 
disempowerment. This means interpreting the “indeterminacy” or openness of 
abstract international human rights law so as to make it relevant and meaningful in the 
specific context, but still within the conceptual parameters of universal human rights 
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norms – such as the right to non-discrimination and equality - which themselves are 
the subject of ongoing interpretation in international fora (Douzinas 2000,p 259).441 
 
That these demands find echo in the international human rights framework increases 
their potential usefulness to social and political actors acting in a local context. This is 
particularly so in Mexico where the authorities, at least formally, are committed to 
protect internationally recognised human rights which have become increasingly 
embedded in domestic legal, political and media discourses. This strengthens the 
meaningfulness and potential traction of human rights claims with different 
institutions, reinforcing their value for claims makers.  
 
However, this process of disempowered individuals or communities formulating their 
demands in terms of human rights usually involves some form external expert input. 
This interaction implies an imbalance of power and knowledge and is open to 
instrumental use of victims, not necessarily undertaken to enhance their agency. 
Therefore, the manner in which this relationship is negotiated and sustained to develop 
autonomy and agency of claimants, for example, including features such as mutual 
respect, informational transparency and honesty, is key to the process of victims of 
injustice enacting their own agency.  
 
Still, even with a successfully managed relationship, this sense of agency can only 
endure and grow if the value added by routing claims via human rights discourse is felt 
to have some degree of influence over the constraining social context. Without this, 
the empowering aspect of human rights claims-making risks dissipation and 
disillusionment. This is a pronounced risk in partial democracies such as Mexico, where 
the rhetorical use of human rights discourse for state legitimation purposes contrasts 
strongly with the actual political will and administrative measures taken to respect and 
protect rights in practice. The result is that expectations that human rights discourse 
                                                        
441 Though as Scheingold (2010) observes this interpretive process of the indeterminacy of rights law can 
also be used to mount regressive campaigns.  
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can effectively help citizens challenge powerholder abuses or neglect is constantly 
under threat from actual experiences of institutional simulation of compliance.  
 
In relation to the case studies, the MPJD struggled to reconcile the complex field of 
interests of multiple actors, including plural victims, human rights organizations and 
social activists, to sustain a unified and coherent mobilization focused on the plight of 
the victims but also the wider context of violence. Human rights initially featured as 
part of the normative aspiration of the good society to be constructed through the 
collective action of civil society. However, grounding this abstract ideal in concrete 
demands proved difficult. Partly due to these challenges, the leadership around Javier 
Sicilia and Emilio Álvarez took the strategic decision to focus on the immediate needs 
of individual victims in the form of collective demands for institutional support.442 
Despite some victims gaining hitherto denied access to official investigations, this 
institutional engagement and negotiation also increased disillusionment among some 
victims and solidarity supporters as institutions failed to comply in practice with human 
rights obligations. Even the success of instantiating the General Law on Victims, 
seemed to create an institutional trap which exhausted or diverted the agency of 
victims into a bureaucratic labyrinth without improving access to truth or justice. The 
empowering process of mobilization and claims-making was partly exhausted through 
institutional human rights manoeuvring. 
 
However, this disillusion with institution-building did not end the mobilization of most 
victims groups which participated in the MPJD. Instead, many reconfigured into smaller 
dynamic collectives, learning from their experiences of mobilization to focus on their 
own cases and public actions in their regions, including human rights demands, and 
carrying out their own independent initiatives to locate the disappeared. This 
increasing agency was also accompanied by some victims and groups using digital and 
social media platforms to inform about their actions and recruit new participants. In 
this way, the initial agency forged through participation in the mass movement and 
                                                        
442 This decision was also a consequence of the lack of sufficient NGOs and human rights lawyers to 
accompany the hundreds of relatives in the different regions of the country. 
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making human rights claims, facilitated the ongoing agency of these relatives.443 In this 
way, these processes of engagement in human rights claims-making and social 
mobilization had long-term repercussions for the agency of individuals and collectives 
of victims.  
 
The Ayotzinapa 43 movement avoided the institution building of the MPJD.444 Instead, 
with the assistance of supporting human rights NGOs, it remained focused on the 
concrete justice demands of the parents and the state’s abuses, particularly the official 
cover-up. Human rights lawyers played a key role in presenting evidence and 
advocating remedial action. Despite the cynical tactics of the government, this did not 
lead to the demobilization of the families. This is, perhaps, because the voice of the 
families and their demand for justice remained at the core of the movement. The 
agency of the parents, channelled through human rights-based demands, but 
communicated in the political discourse of organized social resistance, has been a 
pivotal feature of the sustained mobilization. As part of this process, some of the 
parents and students adopted digital and social media practices or have been 
supported by others to do so. While it is difficult to assess the contribution of these 
practices to the mobilization, they helped make visible numerous public activities 
involving the parent and their continued struggle. In this way, digital and social media 
were part of the strategic and expressive tools facilitating agency of some parents and 
sustaining the wider solidarity movement.    
 
Another dimension of agency in the MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43 movements was the role 
of solidarity participation. This was perhaps more ambiguous and less central to the 
explicit identity of the movement, but it was intrinsic to the mobilization process. This 
was the sense of self-empowerment felt by many of those who answered the call to 
                                                        
443 Many of these groups also reconfigured into an alliance, Movimiento por nuestros desaparecidos en 
México, helping to secure the national law on enforced disappearances. This also included cooperation 
with the Ayotzinapa families. 
444 This was also due to the focus on a single (though complex) case, which enabled full engagement of 
integral NGO accompaniment. In contrast, the myriad cases in the MPJD movement meant there was 
insufficient skilled and resourced NGO capacity to support all cases. As a result, focusing on institutional 
capacity to support victims theoretically increased their potential to access justice.  
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support the victims. The initial indignation felt at the trigger event found an outlet in 
expressing public support offline and online. By participating in a common endeavour 
in support of ordinary people’s demand for justice against an unjust government, there 
was a feeling for many of involvement in something socially significant which the 
authorities tried to downplay or conceal. This engagement is an aspect of civil society 
participation in democratic processes, with contentious and deliberative dimensions 
supporting the enactment of citizenship in the public sphere. In one sense this is an 
assertion of democratic practice.445 However, more fundamentally it reflects the 
demand for Mexico’s severely deficient democracy to be accountable to its citizens, 
including ensuring respect and protection of human rights. Therefore, contributing to 
this process, even in a small ways, such as retweeting #yamecanse o #fueelestado, was 
also felt to be part of the process of participation to challenge the status quo in support 
of the families and to bring about a more rights-protective democracy. 
 
The agency of those participating in YoSoy132 appears to have operated on a similar 
level. The initial solidarity response to the trigger event was an assertion of individual 
and collective identification with the protesters via social media, then on the streets. 
The rapid scaling up of support and protest nationally and globally demonstrated not 
only an affinity with the original protest, but also a desire to individually and collectively 
enact the right to protest and challenge the political establishment. This was an 
assertion of the political agency for a generation of young people, many of whom felt 
the febrile excitement of debate, bridging social divides and forging new alliances in 
the process of expressing a developing political subjectivity. The autonomous creativity 
of online and street protest, including commitment to horizontal participation and 
forms of democratic decision-making, were also manifestations of this dynamic sense 
of agency (Farro et al. 2014). However, where Farro suggests human rights is the 
natural language of this individualised participation, in the case of YoSoy132, human 
rights discourse seems to have offered little in terms of a challenge to institutions 
which already, albeit superficially, accepted their validity. In the absence of victims of 
                                                        
445 The existence of contentious social mobilizations are often presented by semi-authoritarian 
governments as the tolerance of opposition and as such evidence of a functioning democracy, rather 
than evidence of frustration with partial democracy. 
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grave violations, human rights discourse was not perceived as useful or expressive of 
their plural and transformative agenda and did not contribute to their sense of 
collective agency.446  
 
In conclusion, active and reflexive dimensions of agency are crucial to participating in 
social movements. The use of digitally enabled communications featured as part of this 
agency in all three movements, particularly in YoSoy132, but also by some victims as 
well as solidarity activists in the other movements. The MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43 
focused on victims with little previous social status or knowledge of human rights. 
Human rights discourse facilitated the process of interpreting their situation in a form 
that pinpointed powerholder abuses and responsibilities. Thus, claims could be 
expressed in legitimised human rights terms with the support of NGOs, but also in more 
politically charged forms of expression and action rooted in the parents experience and 
social movement culture. In contrast, YoSoy132 was not focused on such victims or 
embodied injustice, so human rights discourse did not serve to particularly enhance 
agency. For those movements supporting victims of grave abuses, adoption of human 
rights claims enabled a sense of empowerment as political subjects in relation to the 
authorities, wider society and global solidarity networks. It was influenced by human 
rights activists, but not determined by them. This relationship with victims remained 
central to the mobilization process and their sense of autonomy and agency. Despite 
the complexities and ambiguities of such relationships, the adoption of human rights 
discourse as a key part of the demands of the victims appears to have strengthened 
their agency. Nevertheless, the complex nature of these relationships and the 
developing sense of agency of claimants is also a potential area of further research.   
 
 Movement articulation  
Social movements are coalitions of different individuals, groups and organizations with 
varying interests, beliefs, ideologies, resources and practices. The dynamic process of 
                                                        
446 The exception to this was in the case of those student protesters who were attacked or threatened 
by PRI supporters. In these cases, traditional narrow frames of civil and political rights were adopted to 
highlight the threat to the right freedom of expression and association. 
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articulating shared positions, identities and strategies is fraught with tension as well as 
excitement as indicated by the experience of all three movements. The greater the 
fluidity of the articulation process, the wider and more diverse the mobilization, with 
greater potential impacts. However, this also carries the danger of incoherence and 
destabilisation. Jaspers (2014) calls this the ‘risk of over extension’ (p224). Digital 
communications and human rights discourse can both facilitate and constrain this 
process. This sections discusses these dynamics in relation to the movements and how 
this impacted their capacity to sustain focused mobilization, particularly in the 
relatively hostile environment of Mexico’s partial democracy.  
 
The extent to which the process of articulation itself articulates new identities in social 
struggles is part of debates about civil society and social movements in relation to 
democratic processes and progressive social change discussed in section 2.2.3 (Laclau 
et al. 1985; Cohen et al. 1994; Foweraker 1995; Melucci 1996). Articulation means the 
way ideas are expressed, but also the way separate parts are joined and move in 
relation to each other. Both meanings are relevant to understanding the articulation 
of plural social actors in collective action; they relate to the processes of expressing 
and joining their plural interests. This means co-operation, but not necessarily 
agreement or consensus, among multiple civil society actors to take action together 
around some form of shared discourse or agenda.447 Laclau & Mouffe (1985) suggested 
articulation was around a shared approach to enacting radical democratic pluralism 
through agonistic resistance to hegemonic powerholders. This envisages human rights 
discourse as a possible vehicle for the articulation of these plural forces, but leaves the 
features of this use of human rights discourse to the praxis of context-specific 
mobilizations and their emergent political subjectivities. 
   
                                                        
447 In Latin America, new social movement concepts developed in response to the repression of 
traditional class-based political activism and the emergence of grassroots popular movements in diverse 
contexts with plural interests and autonomous identities (Alvarez et al. 1992). The challenge was how to 
articulate these various modes of resistance (Munck 2013). (see literature review chapter for more 
detailed discussion). 
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This radical appropriation of human rights discourse by transformative plural 
contentious mobilizations contrasts with more liberal or social democratic approaches 
to plural civil society. These focus on plural civil society in the form of diverse NGOs 
and associations using the ‘lingua franca’ of human rights discourse as the standard of 
the good society to act together pragmatically and deliberatively to reach consensus in 
the public sphere to exercise forms of social accountability over deficient institutions 
(Habermas 1991; Cohen et al. 1994). In this approach more formal and law-based 
approach, plural promotion of human rights standards in the public sphere gradually 
strengthens the democratic practices of institutions through advocacy, transparency, 
collective social participation and public pressure (Avritzer 2006).  
 
These two understandings of the articulating potential of human rights discourse for 
plural civil society mobilizations were present in the three case studies, exemplifying 
the challenges of developing and sustaining plural movements. The MPJD initially 
raised expectations amongst multiple actors that it could articulate a ‘movement of 
movements’ to challenge the government’s ‘war’ and other social drivers fuelling the 
violence. However, its primary constituency and narrative focused on the stigmatised 
and abandoned victims of the violence. Human rights discourse served as an aspiration 
and to pin point state responsibility for the plight of the victims. However, as 
negotiation and human rights institution-building became the main focus of the 
mobilization, its plural identity diminished, gradually becoming a victims’ movement 
represented by a narrow leadership. This strategic decision was successful at 
maximising resources to challenge the stigmatization of victims. However, it struggled 
to articulate a wider human rights agenda to sustain the movement as a plural 
participatory mobilization, giving way to more traditional political advocacy. 
 
In the case of YoSoy132, human rights discourse primarily featured around the initial 
trigger event and early defensive actions. As it developed into an expressive counter-
hegemonic movement, based on resistance to the political and media establishment, 
the institutional orientation of human rights discourse was of little use to articulate 
different actors committed to forms of radical pluralism. In this context, the inspiration 
was international and local experiences of participatory grassroots resistance to elite 
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global capitalism. While human rights discourse is not incompatible with these ideas, 
it does not clearly add value or reinforce them. It provides only a minimum standard of 
human dignity not a maximizing vision of social transformation. As a result, for most 
activists human rights discourse did not help articulate its agenda or plural constituents 
beyond the initial trigger episodes. 
 
Ayotzinapa 43 represented the combination of skilled human rights discourses 
combined with an expressive political resistance of the students and parents. In this 
context, human rights discourse helped articulate victims, human rights lawyers, 
supporting organizations, international networks and an array of other plural actors. In 
addition, its effectiveness was maintained by not monopolising the discursive approach 
of the movement or displacing the agendas of other key actors which addressed a 
range of social and political issues. However, at times, these wider more politically 
contentious agendas threated to overwhelm the human rights focus. Nonetheless, as 
more radical demands waned with the changing political environment, the discourse 
of human rights and the voice of the parents remained key to the movement’s 
continuing articulation. In this context, the Ayotzinapa 43 represents a more effective 
use of human rights discourse as an important, but not dominant, articulating 
discourse of the movement.448 However, it was still insufficient to articulate or sustain 
a more radical socially transformative agenda. 
 
This evidence suggests that the adoption of human rights discourse enabled initial 
articulation of plural forces in the three movements, but this did not lead to the 
emergence of new political formations capable of forging transformative social 
agendas. Instead, the fragmenting pressures of plural interests and agendas always 
threatened to unravel the limited articulation of the coalition drawn together around 
concrete (not indeterminate) human rights demands.  
 
                                                        
448 This is not to argue that human rights discourse shaped these aspects of the movement, but that 
there was an effective fit in relation to all the different elements. Above all, human rights discourse 
remained effective as the mobilization was focused on a grave but also specific case of human rights 
violations in which the relatives remained consistently active in pursuit of their claims.  
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In relation to digitally enabled communication, in the three movements this provided 
an opportunity to circumvent some of the early obstacles to identity and agenda 
formation, by facilitating more agile participation in movement actions, less reliant on 
ideological convergence among participants (Hardt et al. 2005; Farro et al. 2014). 
Bennet and Segerberg (2013) suggest this form of ‘connective action’ does not require 
the formation of collective identity, a defining feature of social movements for many 
scholars (Della Porta et al. 2006). This enables looser horizontal expressions of 
affiliation with the actions without having to engage in negotiations or endorsement 
of an agenda, identity and strategy. Bennet and Segerberg also propose hybrid forms 
of connective/collective action for movements presenting both aspects of this practice. 
 
Of the three movements, YoSoy132 and Ayotzinapa most reflected features of this type 
of social media articulated participation, whereas the MPJD reflected more traditional 
communicative practices based around collective identity. Both YoSoy132 and 
Ayotzinapa, in their early stages, facilitated participation of individuals and small 
groups in actions in response to trigger events and early calls to mobilize. This initial 
participation, facilitated via digital networks, did not imply membership of the 
movement, identification with particular organizations or even clear political or 
ideological affiliation. This effervescent period witnessed some of the most diverse and 
exciting actions in terms of spontaneous online and offline creativity contributing to 
the upsurge of social mobilization and protest. However, less visibly, core movement 
actors were taking steps to deliberate and decide on the agenda, tactics, identity and 
organizational structures to carry the movement forward. These processes of 
articulation were complex, and not necessarily shared by all movement participants. 
However, they were also important to carry the movements beyond the initial 
connective action stage, particularly in the face of political and media counter-framing 
attacks.  
 
Another aspect of digitally enabled connective action is the assumption that 
individualised modernity (Zygmunt 2000; Beck 2002), means participation is based on 
individual involvement in movement networks, rather than collective identities such as 
class. However, the three movements in this research suggest, at least in the context 
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of Mexico, that small groups or collectives with shared interests based on trust, 
friendship, values and beliefs, frequently acted as intermediary formations, facilitating 
and sustaining participation in wider movement networks and actions. As a result, 
mobilization processes continued to rely on meso-level collective engagement 
processes, not simply individualised connectivity. 
 
Digital connective action logics also suggest distributed individuals can act in loose and 
dynamic collectivities to raise issues with the democratic polity (Dahlgren 2009, 2013; 
Wessels 2017). The capacity of such plural civil society configurations to ‘raise’ an issue 
in the public sphere may be sufficient to produce changes in policy, law and 
administration in a relatively responsive democratic political culture. However, in 
partial democracies with features of semi-authoritarianism and state-capture, 
powerholders are more entrenched and there are more obstacles to influence 
institutional practice.449  
 
In this context, the configuration of temporary connective digital social mobilizations 
struggle to project their influence beyond the short-lived public sphere enactment of 
protest.450 Instead, collective contentious action requires organizational structure, 
including SMOs, global support networks, identity and committed membership to 
sustain and articulate a long contentious struggle capable of enduring counter-framing 
tactics, co-optation and repressive measures. These traditional social movement 
practices (see section 2.4) imply a degree of strategic leadership, identity, discipline 
and resources. Yet these are the very features of mobilization, that more idealised 
conceptions of digitally enabled ‘connective action’ argue are redundant for 
contentious collective action (Castells 2009a). 
 
                                                        
449 In contrast to more authoritarian states, there is a relatively open public sphere. But in reality this is 
often circumscribed by democratic deficits, such as violence, impunity, corruption and clientalism. 
450 A partial democracy, which includes multiple interests within the underlying institutional alliances, 
also remains better positioned to negotiate or diffuse a mass popular protest than an authoritarian state 
without resorting to widespread repression.    
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The experience of the three movements suggest digitally enabled participation can 
facilitate new expressive connective dimensions to movement action. However, these 
can also pose new challenges if they displace or are not supported by more 
consolidated and organized processes to strengthen movement articulation, identity 
and strategy. This is particularly so when operating in partially democratic 
environments. However, these very organizational practices potentially contribute to 
a reduction in the dynamic connective stage of movement action, and hasten the 
transition to more hybrid and traditional forms of practice.  
 
In conclusion, in those instances where trigger events produced or revealed victims of 
serious abuses, human rights discourse became an important means of articulating 
different actors in a broad plural social mobilization around a minimum agenda. 
However, the narrow pursuit of institutional human rights reforms (as opposed to the 
accountability focus of Ayotzinapa 43) tended to reduce the articulating capacity of 
human rights discourse, particularly when not combined with other forms of 
contentious and expressive resistance which reflected the plural dimensions of the 
movement. When human rights discourse worked in tandem with victims, reinforcing 
their voice in claims making, not displacing them and other aspects of the movement 
agenda, human rights discourse supported the articulation of plural actors, but only to 
a limited extent. Additionally, horizontal digitally enabled mobilization initially avoided 
some of the traditional burdens of articulating plural movement actors, by facilitating 
forms of distributed connective action. However, this early mobilization stage was 
temporary and was gradually supplanted by more hybrid or traditional articulation 
processes to build identity and strategy to sustain the movements. These were a 
necessary element to maintain and coordinate collective action against entrenched 
powerholders in a long contentious struggle, but also reduced connective action 
features of the mobilization. 
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 Dangers and challenges  
9.9.1 Digital downsides 
This thesis has shown how digital communications have been used by diverse actors to 
open up the media environment, enabling new voices to emerge and gain visibility. 
This pluralized information setting has been important for facilitating new instrumental 
and expressive aspects of social mobilization processes. However, this changing 
environment has also posed threats to activists. Responding to these has reduced some 
of the contributions that digital communications have made to movements. The 
challenge of identifying and mitigating these risks adds new complexities to social 
mobilization practices, particularly where semi-authoritarian practices continue to 
facilitate attacks on social activists as well as media workers.   
 
The emergence of this diverse information environment was seen by interviewees as 
restricting the traditional capacity of powerholders to shape the news agenda. 
However, this is not necessarily an inevitable nor unstoppable process. The dispute 
about alleged foreign intervention in the 2016 US election process and the Brexit 
referendum also suggest how covert action by states or other major powerholders can 
shape the informational environment on social media, affecting political processes.451 
Several authoritarian governments around the world, such as China, have realised that 
controlling internet activity is possible, increasing the probability of less authoritarian 
governments adopting new tools to shape the online information environment to 
influence domestic political processes.  
 
In Mexico, political elites have a long history of presenting a democratic façade while 
using covert and overt mechanisms to control interest groups, including media outlets 
and news information narratives. Additionally, a weakness of many new independent 
digital media platforms in Mexico is their reliance on non-commercial economic 
models which may be difficult to sustain, particularly in the face of financial or other 
                                                        
451 Though this is not a new phenomenon as states have regularly engaged in diverse forms of covert 
and overt propaganda strategies to influence media framing of issues on the political agenda at home 
and abroad (Edward et al. 1988).  
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pressures. In contrast, the resource advantage of mainstream media networks 
supported strongly by political elites, even during this disrupted period, means they 
continue to exert great influence and have the potential to assert dominance over 
online information flows as well as consolidate their power in traditional broadcasting. 
In this context, international online media continues to play a pivotal role in production 
and reproduction of information on and in Mexico. As a result, the pluralization of 
information spaces and quality of those spaces cannot be taken for granted.    
 
The use of digital communications also poses threats to movements and activists 
besides those outlined earlier in this chapter. There are the risks of reliance on digital 
platforms controlled by capitalist corporations, whose commercial interests do not 
coincide with social movements (Fuchs 2014). These companies control the access to 
and architecture of the technology, influencing online information flows and thus 
impacting social movement practices.452 More worryingly is the willingness of social 
media platforms to cooperate with authoritarian, semi-authoritarian and democratic 
governments in order to shape social media information flows.453  
 
The movements in this study also show how digital and social media platforms can be 
manipulated by those with resources and capability to reduce the visibility of popular 
digital support for contentious issues, such as with #yamecanse on Twitter. Individual 
activists have also been the target of organized trolling campaigns or systematic 
automated BOT attacks, which have included death threats and other serious 
intimidation. NGOs have also faced cyberattacks to steal data, disrupting activities and 
spreading fear about their safety. The lack of action by the authorities to take seriously 
such incidents or investigate and hold to account perpetrators reflects the long 
standing practice of impunity for those responsible for attacks on journalists, human 
                                                        
452 For example, the algorithmic selection of Facebook timeline information has led some SMOs/NGOs 
to pay for their information output to appear on their followers’ timelines. 
453 For example, the recent case of Facebook allegedly colluding with the Philippines’ government to 
control and shape public discourse in favour of the administration and against civil society critiques 
(Lauren Etter 2017) 
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rights defenders and social activists. In this context, digital communications can also 
serve as another route to attack and undermine movements.  
 
The recent revelation that institutions of the state used surveillance software to 
illegally spy on political and social activists is evidence that the digital environment is 
not just an asset for social activists but also a vulnerability. Those civil society 
organizations with capacity are beginning to share expertise in developing knowledge 
and defence against this covert digital targeting, but their relative lack of resources 
means they will always be at a disadvantage. Furthermore, this is only available to 
those groups with organizational capacity. For small collectives or individuals involved 
in social activism, including human rights work, this digital vulnerability is difficult if not 
impossible to avoid. Nevertheless, these threats are part of a wider panorama in which 
social and political activists face or fear a range of physical and psychological threats in 
retaliation for their lawful activities.  
 
In this environment, activists constantly take decisions to act (or not to act) about 
security threats, adjusting (or not) their behaviour to mitigate risks. This can include 
limiting uses of different types of social media and digital communications platforms 
to reduce vulnerability, for example limiting dialogue to closed networks on encrypted 
platforms such as Telegram or Whatsapp. This can also impact the flow of information 
and the potential of social media in relation to mobilization processes, particularly 
more open deliberative practices. In the case studies, digitally enabled 
communications were felt to add new dimensions to the mobilization process, but also 
introduced new risks which activists struggled to gauge and respond to. This is a 
complex balancing act in which suspicions and a certain degree of paranoia play an 
important part in reasonable precautionary thinking, but where there is also a struggle 
against uncontrolled paranoia. In a constantly shifting communications environment, 
these processes are liable to become more complex, both in terms of risks and 
preventive measures. These threats have potentially undermined some of the features 
of digitally enabled communications which thinkers such as Castells have argued can 
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facilitate contentious social mobilization and public sphere deliberations as part of 
emancipatory practices.454 
 
9.9.2 Making human rights meaningful 
The complex features of human rights discourse mean it is in constant tension between 
the self-asserting process of civil society claims-making and processes of legal 
instantiation and institutionalization. The social movements in this research are rooted 
in their local context and their use of human rights discourse is dependent on how far 
it can be made meaningful to reinforce and echo their claims nationally and 
internationally, but without defining those claims solely in terms of legal human rights 
standards. The indeterminacy and openness of human rights discourse facilitates this 
process. However, of the three movements, human rights discourse was used most 
meaningfully to reinforce and validate claims as part of mobilizations which focused on 
concrete, grave abuses, personified in the claims-making of relatives. This suggests that 
despite the openness of human rights discourse to take on new dimensions of social 
justice and inequality, its classic formulation to defend the rights of individuals 
suffering forms of violent abuse involving state responsibility, remains a key part of its 
meaningfulness in mobilization processes. 
 
There are also risks associated with human rights discourse becoming more embedded 
in Mexico’s political and legal culture if at the same time it does not lead to substantive 
improvements in the respect, protection and fulfilment of those rights. If the present 
trend of simulation continues, social and political grassroots actors may regard it 
merely as another tool of institutional entrapment and demobilization. It will cease to 
be regarded as a potential means of enacting plural citizenship and political 
subjectivity. As a result, it may come to be seen as less meaningful, particularly in more 
pre-figurative resistance movements questioning the nature of Mexico’s partial 
democracy and aspiring to more radical transformative social change.  
                                                        
454 The growth in regressive far-right use of digital and social media to mobilize and enact protest and 
contention in Europe and the Americas also illustrates the rapidly changing security dynamics around 
uses of digital and social media in political mobilization processes.  
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The relevance, meanings and uses of human rights discourse are contested and under 
constant review in a range of different fora. However, in practice the merit of human 
rights discourse in domestic settings often relates to whether it is useful to people 
without power asserting their own self-realising demand to change situations they 
believe amount to oppression or abandonment. The self-assertion of injustice and 
demand for remedies from powerholders is itself a vital source of the legitimacy of 
human rights norms (Donnelly 2013). However, this is often concealed in the 
machinery of instantiation in national law and multilateral state sponsored processes 
for developing international human rights law. As Arato and Cohen observe:   
‘The struggle for rights demonstrates that while the state is the agency of the 
legalization of rights, it is neither their source nor the basis of their validity. Rights 
begin as claims asserted by groups and individuals in the public spaces of an 
emerging civil society. They can be guaranteed by positive law but are not 
equivalent to law or derivable from it; in the domain of rights, law secures 
and stabilizes what has been achieved autonomously by social actors.’ (Cohen & 
Arato 1994, 446). 
 
The process of institutionalisation not only ignores the role of these self-asserting 
grassroots claims, but replaces them with legal rights validated by the machinery of the 
state and international actors. As Stammers (2009) suggests, the empowering process 
of originating rights claims can paradoxically become a process of legitimising the state 
and marginalizing the claims-makers. Therefore, part of the struggle for the meaning 
and relevance of human rights is to maintain the claimants of rights at the centre of 
the political process; to reconfigure citizenship and the relationship to powerholders 
without sliding into technical and institutionalised human rights discourses.  
 
In Latin America the adoption of human rights discourse is often associated with the 
struggle to emerge from the repressive years of authoritarian rule, supported by the 
international human rights movement. The ‘socialization’ of rights has frequently been 
conceived of as a process of cosmopolitan international actors and expert local activists 
projecting human rights law to non-compliant states in the Global South in support of 
those suffering repression (Keck et al. 1998; Goodman et al. 2013b). This narrative 
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places the forces of globalization, of which international human rights discourse forms 
part, at the centre of the process. Local social movements are viewed merely as 
vehicles for fostering democratization and the institutionalization of international 
human rights at the national level. However, electoral democracy has not produced 
the promised rights-protective regimes. The institutionalisation of governmental 
human rights discourse has primarily served to legitimize the state while concealing or 
downplaying ongoing patterns of abuses and neglect (Arias et al. 2010a). In relation to 
Mexico, governments of the Global North have until now been content to view this as 
a work-in-progress of an important trading partner loyally following neoliberal 
prescriptions. In this context, human rights discourse risks being debased by its 
institutional association and ineffective legal procedures, leaving the actual plight of 
disempowered or oppressed communities ignored or unaddressed.  
 
The process of such communities or groups coming to see and express their grievances, 
at least partly, in terms of human rights discourse often involves relationships with 
networks of skilled human rights and social activists helping to reclaim the meaning of 
human rights discourse distinct from its narrow institutional formulations. As 
suggested, such relations are complex and not always successful, but they are 
important to the process of those affected reflecting on the value of human rights 
discourse, including its limitations.455 It is through this process that universal human 
rights discourse can be shaped to the particular aspects of their claims making rooted 
in specific social situations to address diverse forms of injustice.456 This process can 
reinforce the claims, but not by reducing them to the purely technical and institutional 
language of human rights. This is part of the process of respecting the context and 
origins of the claims-makers. As this research indicates, social movements emerging 
from these contexts are not primarily perceived as and do not self-identify as human 
rights movements as they are not circumscribed by human rights discourse. In fact, 
                                                        
455 It is also through this process that those affected can become the advocate for their communities’ 
rights and articulate their own particular formulation of rights claims based on their experiences. These 
collective experiences of self-organizing and developing positions toward human rights discourse is part 
of the process of developing political subjectivity and autonomy. 
456 Though the consequences and implications of attitudes and approaches to human rights discourse 
can vary widely as they are appropriated or rejected in local contexts (Goldstein 2007). 
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part of the validity of their claims making is that they originate in complex, rooted social 
processes, which include multiple political, social, economic and cultural dimensions 
giving rise to lived injustices. Human rights discourse is one approach to interpret these 
elements, but not the only one. Its relevance rests on giving a more widely recognised 
formulation to these injustices and aspirations for remedy, but without excluding other 
key dimensions of the mobilization or reducing issues to technical problems and 
institution-building. Navigating these tensions is part of the successful use of human 
rights discourse by social movements. 
 
This may suggest a means-to-end instrumental approach to human rights discourse, 
adopted purely because of its potential traction with powerholders (Hagan 2010) and 
international public opinion (Bob 2005), rather than principled commitment to 
universal human rights regardless of the political context (Sikkink et al. 1993). This in 
some senses is correct. However, there can be a false opposition posed between 
instrumental and value-expressive practices. More relevant is the model of adaptive 
strategic practice, as suggested by Crossley, in which the values of social actors are an 
integral part of the complex relational contributions to movement mobilizations. In this 
context, the use of human rights discourse by social movements can also be expressive 
of the values of universal human rights, but without being defined by them. For 
example, a key value of human rights discourse is its capacity to help expose particular 
injustices by contrasting them with the normative ideal of universal human dignity. As 
Shklar (1990) suggests, this sense of injustice will always overflow potential remedies, 
but human rights discourse can enable particular claims to be formulated in universalist 
terms that are recognised beyond the particularities of the context. This can give the 
claimant a greater sense of their own strength and validity in relation to local 
powerholders. The potential of empowerment and agency for claimants is itself a key 
source of the legitimacy of human rights discourse, rather than the processes of states 
recognising international laws. As such, the instrumental use of human rights discourse 
by those facing injustice and indignity is integral to the values of human rights discourse 
itself. 
 
 310 
This use of human rights discourse worked most effectively in the case of the MPJD 
and Ayotzinapa 43, which were defensive in character, supporting victims. However, 
YoSoy132, which questioned Mexico’s electoral democracy, only partially referenced 
human rights discourse. An important element of the critique of Mexico’s democracy 
is the failure to respect, protect and fulfil human rights in practice. Despite this, human 
rights discourse was not felt to be particularly meaningful, unifying or resonant in the 
mobilization process of YoSoy132. In part this is due to human rights discourse being 
seen as, at least partially, trapped in the flawed institutionalization processes of the 
democratic transition. As such it is taken-for-granted by many social actors, but not 
regarded as a discourse capable of engaging the collective imagination to orient social 
mobilizations toward emancipation or major social transformation – it is seen as 
primarily defensive or minimalist. This points again to the complex sometimes 
contradictory features of human rights discourse and its many uses and meanings in 
plural social mobilizations seeking to address structural democratic deficits.  
 
The effectiveness of human rights discourse for social actors seems to rest on 
reinforcing embodied claims-making of injustice, but not occupying centre stage in the 
imagination of activists or the public; facilitating validation and legitimation, but not 
defining or circumscribing the movement and its aspirations.   
  
 
 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the plural processes taking place in the three social 
movements in order to analyse the enabling and constraining features of human rights 
discourse and digital and social media as understood by those involved. This has 
illustrated how the social movements were dynamic improvised mobilizations based 
on strategic, value-expressive and emotional responses to context specific trigger 
events in Mexico. The integration and use of human rights discourse and digital 
communications varied and was shaped by the configuration of events, actors and 
supporting networks, including the purposive intent of the movement.  
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In relation to human rights discourse, its adoption depended on how it could be 
moulded to usefully support the socially rooted demands of claimants in concrete cases 
of injustice but without monopolising or displacing their voices. Human rights discourse 
particularly facilitated forms of international solidarity, as well as self-affirming agency 
of claimants. It was also seen as important for the movements when it provided a 
minimum framework to articulate plural actors. However, if the agenda narrowed 
exclusively to human rights discourse or focused on institution-building, it diminished 
this articulating capacity. As a result, the meaningfulness of human rights discourse in 
the movements hinged on providing legitimizing support for claims-makers, but not 
seeking to monopolise that legitimacy. It also struggled to articulate the plurality of 
movement actor concerns, particularly the aspiration to transform Mexico’s partial 
democracy.  
 
In relation to digitally networked communications, their social embeddedness and 
malleability meant they were increasingly integrated into the repertoire of social 
movement practices, reducing costs and barriers to information sharing and civic 
engagement. In addition, use of social media facilitated individualised and small group 
sharing of sentiment and emotional responses to trigger events and key movement 
actors. Connective autonomous involvement of distributed networks temporarily 
facilitated effervescent horizontal online participation, but did not displace the need 
for traditional organizational hierarchies and resources to sustain contentious 
collective action. These features of digitally enabled engagement were also facilitated 
by and reinforced the increasingly plural media information environment. Despite 
these enabling uses, social movements continued to face determined opponents, 
sometimes resorting to repressive measures online and offline. As a result, activists 
adjusted online practices, sometimes limiting reliance on connective features of digital 
communications considered vulnerable in contentious mobilization processes. The 
different dimensions of digital and social media practice made important contributions 
to the mobilization process, but they also brought with them new challenges and 
limitations.  
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Conclusions 
 
 Introduction  
I set out in this research to examine how human rights discourse and social media 
featured in the practices of recent nationally focused contentious social movements in 
Mexico. The purpose was to examine the ways in which uses of human rights discourse 
and digital and social media were understood to constrain and enable these 
movements in the process of mobilizing civil society and challenging the status quo of 
Mexico’s partial and violent democracy.  
 
To achieve this, I developed an overarching research question, and three subsidiary 
questions to unpack specific dimensions of the movements’ practices and relevant 
features of the wider context. The questions sought to examine particular aspects of 
these practices, but not as isolated phenomena, rather as integral elements of dynamic 
social processes.  
 
I used qualitative research methods to conduct semi-structured interviews with 
participants in the movements and close observers to develop an interpretivist analysis 
of the key themes which emerged in relation to the research questions and each 
movement. This process was also rooted in qualitative analysis of additional media 
materials relating to each movement’s activities and a close reading of contemporary 
Mexican history, particularly political democratization and violence, developments in 
civil society, institutionalization of human rights norms and the evolving media and 
communications environment.  
 
Before addressing the research questions in detail, I will summarise the background to 
the research as well as some of its strengths and weaknesses.  
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 Background  
This research project emerged in response to Mexican civil society struggles to shift the 
terms of Mexico’s deficient democracy and the failure of the official political or 
institutional order to recognise or address major democratic deficits, such as 
accountability, civic participation, human rights, rule of law, inequality and citizenship. 
Two elements to potentially reduce the disadvantage of civil society in this struggle 
were the practices and significance of human rights discourse and digital and social 
media as part of contentious non-institutional social mobilizations. Literature on 
human rights is wide-ranging but usually focused on international relations (Risse Ropp 
et al. 1999; Forsythe 2012), foundational or ontological status (Grifﬁn 2008; Donnelly 
2013), human rights law (Steiner et al. 2008) or global civil society (Cohen et al. 2000), 
advocacy strategy (Bob 2005; Brysk 2013) and challenging abusive or deficient 
governance (Landman 2006; Levitsky et al. 2010; Freeman 2011). In literature 
addressing civil society counter-publics or non-institutional forms of political resistance 
(Cohen et al. 1994; Stammers 2009), human rights discourse has been suggested as a 
lingua franca of moral principles in a globalised world (Keck et al. 1998; Castells 2009b) 
or as an indeterminate discourse facilitating articulation of plural actors as part of 
radical democratic contentious practice (Laclau et al. 1985) or as a form of 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism developed through deliberative consensus (Habermas 
2010) . However, these approaches rarely examine human rights discourse in terms of 
the multifaceted, sometimes contradictory, practices of social mobilizations focused 
primarily on national contexts rather than on transnational processes of economic, 
social and technological globalization. The approach taken in this project is in line with 
recent sociological and anthropological studies on how human rights are used in 
context (Goodale 2006; Goodale et al. 2007; Goldstein 2012). This empirical research 
method enables a nuanced understanding of the dynamics of practice and their 
implications for the actors involved as well as for wider social relations.  
 
Literatures on digital and social media have often assumed or slipped into deterministic 
approaches to the technology of communications (Fuchs 2014), for example, 
suggesting they generate autonomous counter-publics and protest through new forms 
of horizontal participation (Hardt et al. 2005; Juris 2005; Castells 2013). However, as 
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communications technologies have become increasingly embedded in social relations, 
more grounded studies have considered how diverse media practices contribute in 
different ways to wider hybrid communicative environments and social relations 
(Couldry 2012; Chadwick 2013; Mattoni et al. 2014). This includes exploration of how 
individualised digital media practices can contribute to civic engagement in the political 
process, public sphere and democratic development (Dahlgren 2013; Wessels 2017). 
My research has adopted this approach to examine the different features and 
meanings of digital and social media practices, but in the specific context of social 
mobilization challenging Mexico’s democratic and institutional deficits.   
 
 Limitations and strengths of research  
Human rights discourse and digital and social media are different types of artefact, 
which do not necessarily lend themselves to comparison. However, they are two key 
socially constructed phenomena which have become increasingly important and 
connected in global as well as national societies, and whose meaning and uses are in 
constant flux. They form part of the fabric of practices through which actors engage 
with each other, their environment, powerholders and collectively significant events. 
This makes them particularly relevant to understanding the dynamics of social relations 
and individual agency of social actors in particular societies. These complexities are 
often lost in the binary democratic/authoritarian institutional approach usually 
adopted to examine political societies outside the Global North. In contrast, this 
research generates empirically based data and analysis of the complex dynamics that 
social activists face in partial democracies. In particular, it addresses the process of 
mounting meaningful collective mobilization to challenge entrenched powerholders, 
influence the public sphere and enact autonomous protest, while at the same time 
resisting the multiple external and internal pressures to demobilize or pursue non-
democratic practices. The examination of these processes through the lenses of human 
rights discourse and digital and social media implies a relatively limited field of 
attention, but also sufficiently broad so as to enable engagement with the wider 
dynamics involved in forms of non-institutional social and political contention and 
agency. However, the research does not focus in detail on the institutional responses 
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and impacts of the political, social and legal demands of the movements. These merit 
further investigation, but in this thesis they are dealt with only in brief in the context 
chapters.  
 
I adopted an interpretivist partial-insider methodology to examine the practices of the 
movements and their wider social and political significance. Other ontological and 
epistemological approaches are possible with different methodological implications. 
However, this approach is consistent with my constructivist outlook with regard to the 
social world. This assumes collective social activity cannot be understood 
independently from the meanings and experiences of actors involved or the reflexive 
position of the researcher in relation to the field of study. The advantage of exploring 
the experience, beliefs and understandings of actors directly in the form of interview 
encounters is that it enables social movements to be understood as complex social 
processes. As such, their significance is inextricably embedded in the unfolding 
intersubjective practices of participation and the wider social context, but not 
circumscribed by the intentions and interpretations of individual actors. Also, my 
background in independent research on human rights issues in Mexico enabled me to 
access a range of participants and develop mutual trust. This facilitated a safe 
environment to explore complex and sometimes ambiguous feelings and reflections on 
social mobilization processes. It also aided the development of my own reflexive 
practice as a social science researcher, including the process of recognising and limiting 
the bias that my experience and biography potentially contributed to the analysis.  
 
The conclusions of the study are based on an inductive analysis of a limited data set of 
30 qualitative interviews as well as qualitative content analysis of supporting media 
materials. This data set could have been broadened to include a wider range of 
participant interviewees and from a greater number of locations. However, the limits 
of one researcher, resources and time for fieldwork required me to focus on a targeted 
selection of interviewees and ensure sufficient time for in-depth interviews. The 
interviewee selection process also meant minimising security risks and other potential 
negative ethical impacts. Despite this limitation in the scale of the sample, in the latter 
stages of field work I detected repeating patterns in interviewee responses which was 
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suggestive of ‘data saturation’ (Ritchie & Lewis 2003, p80), implying a solid data set 
with which to analyse the research questions.  
 
As a non-native speaker of Spanish, I potentially missed some of the nuances in 
interviewee responses.457 However, I am a fluent in Spanish with experience of working 
in Mexico. In addition, intense immersion in the limited number of interview audio 
recordings guaranteed accurate transcriptions and ensured deep familiarization with 
the content. This in turn strengthened the recursive process of data recognition, 
classification and comparison (including the testing and rejection of alternative 
interpretive ideas) in the development of an analysis which examined the similarities 
and differences in practice between the case studies across the data set.  
 
The research is rooted in a particular social context, so I have not sought to develop 
highly abstract concepts or a totalizing theory to interpret the empirical data. This 
avoids losing complexity and nuance integral to context specific research which can be 
the cost of greater abstraction in pursuit of generalizability (Flick 2009). As a result, I 
do not claim that the conclusions are universally applicable, but rather generate 
important insights relevant to social and political processes across Latin America. In 
particular, many countries of the region are subject to similar patterns of partial or 
deficient democratic transition (Arias et al. 2010b) and face cycles of contestation by 
dynamic and plural civil society actors (Munck 2013) which use human rights discourse 
and digital and social media as part of their mobilizing practices. As a result, the 
research makes an important contribution to the understanding of these social and 
political processes.  
 
I now discuss my findings in relation to the research questions set out in the 
introduction, starting with the three subsidiary questions 
 
                                                        
457 For example, one interview was conducted in the difficult listening environment of a busy café in 
which the interviewee’s restless young son was keen to gain his mother’s attention. 
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 Discussion of research questions 
10.4.1 What was the role of human rights discourse in claims-making in the social 
mobilizations challenging powerholders and pursing social change? 
 
The research has shown how human rights discourse performs several different roles, 
both internally to the movement but also as part of the wider political culture and 
context out of which the movements emerged and in which they struggled to challenge 
powerholders. These roles include: the increasing recognition of human rights 
standards as they have become embedded into the domestic legal framework and 
public discourse; the adoption of these standards as a schema for interpreting or 
enacting symbolic events triggering the movements; the influence of networks of 
skilled human rights activists shaping movement practices and strategic focus; the 
contribution of human rights discourse to the agency of the claims-making of victims; 
and the openness of human rights discourse to enable the articulation of plural actors 
in collective action. I will now discuss these different roles and their significance for the 
movements. 
 
Resource Mobilization and Political Process theories (see section 2.4.1) stress the 
internal and external structural conditions which facilitate or hinder social 
mobilization. A feature of the environment which has developed during the 30-year 
transition in Mexico is the increasing status of international human rights norms in 
domestic law. This has not meant the implementation of these norms, but they have 
increasingly featured in public discourse and to evaluate the quality of the emerging 
democracy.458 As such, as human rights discourse has become part of the external 
                                                        
458 It is at this stage in the ‘socialising’ of international human rights law that Risse and Sikkink originally 
suggested that states would be shamed into “norm compliance” (Risse Ropp et al. 1999). However, their 
more recent work acknowledges that non-compliance might also be affected by the capacity of the state 
to deliver (Risse et al. 2013). Nevertheless, this approach once again fails to address the thorny issue of 
how political will is constructed in domestic settings, particularly in partial democracies. It prefers to 
focus on administrative weaknesses of a presumed unitary state, rather than consider underlying causes 
for the lack of political will. These relate to more complex internal political and social forces shaping the 
fragmented state and institutional performance in partial democracies, not just administrative 
inefficiency. These features do not necessarily fit the model of liberal democracy in political theory. This 
is where nationally focused social movements, such as the case studies in this thesis, attempt to shift 
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political opportunity structure, it is increasingly available to activists to make claims 
challenging perceived abuses and failures of governance.459 As a result, the trigger 
events of each of the movements were readily interpretable by those involved or close 
support networks, not only as criminal acts or abuses of power in terms of the domestic 
context, but also as breaches of wider universal standards enshrined in human rights 
norms and the principles of human dignity. This did not require a detailed analysis of 
each event in terms of technical legal obligations, but an interpretation symbolically 
pointing to the political, institutional and moral crisis of the existing order and its 
distance from universal normative ideals. This encouraged interpretation of the trigger 
events as emblematic of wider institutional deficits by movement actors, not just 
isolated outrages. For example, the killing of Juan Francisco Sicilia was not presented 
as a human rights case implicating direct state responsibility for the crime, but Javier 
Sicilia’s speeches demanded how the state should act toward victims, articulating a 
normative hope for how society ought to and could work if civil society acted together 
to demand respect for human rights. YoSoy132 used the cultural memory of past 
human rights violations to reawaken public attention to the presidential candidate’s 
record on human rights, then asserted the right to freedom of expression to respond 
to attempts to delegitimise their protest. As such, the increasing embeddedness of 
human rights discourse made it a legitimizing element orienting the interpretation of 
the trigger events towards forms of collective civil society action, which itself is an 
important source of the legitimacy of human rights discourse.  
 
However, it is important not to overstate the increasing prevalence of human rights 
ideas in Mexico, as the discursive use of human rights in the public sphere is mainly 
limited to activists, and a minority of academics, politicians, institutional actors and 
sections of the more critical media – and the understanding of human rights even 
within these spheres is contested. In contrast to this, negative attitudes often prevail 
                                                        
the political agenda, influencing the priorities of the political and economic forces which dominate the 
state and its relationship to citizens.     
459 International human rights norms and discourse have also developed during this period; explicitly 
addressing issues of democratic governances, not solely in terms of traditional minimal liberal 
safeguards of civil and political rights, but also an increasingly comprehensive approaches to issues of 
social justice and inequality.  
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among many public officials and the mass media.460 As such, human rights discourse 
helped turn trigger events into mobilizing catalysts for sections of the population 
already oriented towards its normative aspirations. However, it is not understood as a 
compelling language to engage wide public participation in mass contentious 
mobilization. So while human rights discourse has increasingly become part of the 
fabric of public discourse, it did not particularly ‘resonate’ (Snow et al. 1986, p447) in 
the lives of the majority of the population for the purposes of framing movement 
narratives. 
 
The trigger events of each movement were central to their emergence, providing the 
‘moral shock’ (Jasper 1997, p106) for individuals and small groups to recognise 
previously latent or isolated expressions of anger about democratic deficits, the 
suffering of ordinary people in the violence, disempowerment and a sense of injustice 
(Shklar 1990). However, these sentiments, while supported by human rights discourse, 
did not draw their emotional and purposive energy from human rights discourse. 
According to the interviewees in all movements, the key mobilizing dynamics were 
based on a rawer culturally rooted recognition of embodied injustice, suffering and 
resistance; the desire to manifest outrage and rejection of business-as-usual by 
drawing on the rich traditions of civil society expressive collective action. The point 
here is that the mobilizations emerged relatively spontaneously, not as planned 
strategic coalitions to promote previously agreed advocacy objectives. Human rights 
discourse was an important legitimating interpretive element to understand the events 
and contrast local reality with universal standards. However, this discourse was not the 
primary means of turning the events into nationally significant grievances to inspire 
personal and collective participation.  
 
This conclusion challenges assumptions in some literature which attributes a central 
role to human rights discourse in the mobilizing narrative of social movements 
(Simmons 2009; Brysk 2013). Such an approach is usually premised on the context of 
                                                        
460 For example, alleging human rights lawyers and activists use technical human rights law to protect 
criminals, profiteer from compensation and undermine measures to combat crime and insecurity. 
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authoritarian states where highly constrained local actors seek to instrumentally 
leverage international opinion through use of human rights discourse, which is 
assumed to trigger international solidarity influencing domestic political forces. 
However, this ignores or downplays the importance of domestic mobilizations in their 
own political culture. In the context of partial democracies such as Mexico, movements 
may have the political space to build a significant national constituency and identity, 
which is supported by, but not dependent on, international actors. However, their 
narrative to mobilize domestic support is less dependent on human rights discourse 
and more on emotional and cognitive understandings of the significance of the trigger 
events in terms of the particular society and the individuals affected. In contrast, 
human rights discourse is perceived, including by some social activists, as external, 
alien and technocratic - distant from the frameworks of understanding and action of 
ordinary people. As a result, these domestic focused movements are not simply 
processes for ‘socializing’ the cosmopolitan discourse of human rights into local 
contexts (Goodman et al. 2013b, 2013a), but local contexts setting the parameters of 
the social mobilization in which human rights discourse plays a legitimating, but 
secondary role. This is important as it roots social movements in their local context 
rather than as an offshoot of globalization and transnational advocacy networks.461 
 
In contrast to this limited role of human rights discourse in the mobilizing narrative of 
the three movements, the interviewees - particularly in relation to the MPJD and 
Ayotzinapa 43 - recognised the role of human rights discourse through the skills and 
resources contributed by networks of human rights oriented activists and NGOs. The 
internal dynamics of the movements are not just static resources, but also the adaptive 
and skilled practises of networked actors who influence the strategies and approaches 
of the movements, including facilitating the support of international actors. When 
these networks of activists and NGOs form part of the movement coalition, their 
relative centrality to the movement often shapes the manner and extent to which 
human rights discourse features in their strategic and expressive actions. For example, 
                                                        
461 This is not to argue that international support is not an important factor in legitimating the domestic 
movement and increasing its chances of success, but that the practices and meanings of domestic 
oriented movements and national political process cannot be understood primarily in these terms. 
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the rapid support of human rights activists of the nascent MPJD led to an increasing 
identification of the movement with human rights approaches. In contrast, YoSoy132 
enjoyed the sympathy of human rights networks, but much less active involvement. 
This limited the extent to which a skilled use human rights discourse was available or 
meaningful for YoSoy132 actors.462 However, it is important to note that even when 
human rights discourse featured strongly, such as in the case of Ayotzinapa 43, the 
identity of the movement was not reducible to the approach of human rights NGOs 
participating in the movement. They remained plural social mobilizations involving 
diverse individuals, groups and interests, contributing a range of skills and practices to 
the alliance, and in the case of Ayotzinapa 43, with a mobilizing narrative strongly 
focused on the lived-experience of the parents and students. 
 
Another important role of human rights discourse is its potential to empower victims 
of abuses through the process of formulating specific claims against powerholders in 
terms of human rights norms. By asserting the claimants’ inherent entitlement to fair 
treatment and action by powerholders not contingent on local law and its selective 
application, claimants impose a ‘remedial logic’ (Donnelly 2013, p8) on the state which 
is not wholly determined by the state and its dominant interests. The legitimised 
discourse of human rights also makes the claim concrete and gives it a moral authority 
rarely achieved in direct political confrontation or transactional negotiation with 
powerholders – approaches frequently adopted by traditional popular social 
mobilizations seeking concessions from powerholders. As a result, it has the potential 
to enhance the agency of victims in the process of self-realising claims-making and 
active citizenship, which in turn can reinforce the wider relevance of human rights 
discourse in national public discourse. However, the relationship to expert support for 
claims-making, usually in the form of human rights activists and lawyers, is complex, 
requiring long-term relationships of trust and respect. These face many challenges, not 
least when routes to justice are indefinitely blocked by powerholders and counter-
                                                        
462 For example, international human rights experts could have been approached to address and 
legitimate debates on the issues of media impartiality and diversity in relation to human rights, but this 
technical approach was regarded as offering less than the more direct political attack and satire targeting 
the mainstream media.
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framing narratives are used to delegitimise the relationship. Nonetheless, the agency-
reinforcing role of human rights discourse for victims can be key to the wider meaning 
and identity of the movement. For example, making solidarity participation meaningful 
to show support for the claims-making of victims in the case of MPJD and Ayotzinapa 
43. In a somewhat distinct process, YoSoy132 focused more on the enactment of the 
right to freedom of expression as part of self-actualizing political agency. But in all three 
cases, this sense of exercising or supporting forms of autonomous claims-making 
against organized power was crucial to each movements’ identity and force.463  
 
Lastly, the openness and indeterminacy of human rights discourse has been identified 
as enabling the articulation of plural social claims and identities in heterogenous 
movements engaged in ‘agonistic’ contentious struggle with powerholders in the 
pursuit of more radical forms of democratic practice (Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2005; 
Estévez López 2011). This theoretical position suggests the emergence of new political 
subjectivities in the plural struggle for transformative social justice agendas. However, 
my research found this idealised vision of emancipatory popular social movement 
activism - which was often shared by social activists in all three movements - struggled 
to develop a human rights discourse to generate and maintain a plural articulation 
between the different movement interests, beliefs and ideologies. The most successful 
was Ayotzinapa 43, but the tensions surrounding wider transformative agendas and 
more focused attention on the immediate demands of the families was ultimately 
resolved in favour of the latter; the demands of other social actors became increasingly 
marginalized which reduced the more transformative aspirations of the movement and 
its plurality.  
 
The openness of human rights discourse provides an initial platform for convergence 
of diverse actor interests, but the process of articulating the movement and its 
emerging identity, necessitates relatively coherent and meaningful objectives, 
                                                        
463 The importance of the agency of claims-makers to the meaning of the movement is also the reason 
why counter-framing narratives of powerholders frequently focus on stories which supposedly illustrate 
the manipulation of victims by subversive or mercenary movement actors, instrumentally taking 
advantage of the naivety of victims to advance their own selfish interests.  
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intelligible internally for participants but also externally to engage potential recruits 
and public opinion. As a result, there is inevitably a process of deliberating and trying 
to agree common agendas, strategies, practices in processes more reflective of 
Habermas (1996) than Carl Schmitt.464 This deliberative process was ongoing within the 
movements to a greater or less extent. In the MPJD it was largely curtailed in favour of 
narrow strategic leadership and decision-making, whereas YoSoy132 tried to maintain 
horizontal deliberation and plurality of positions and practices. However, the definition 
of an agenda implies concretizing plural aspirations into more or less specific demands. 
In the MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43, where human rights claims remained central to the 
movement objectives, human rights discourse was no longer open or ‘empty’, but 
particular and specific, focused on the demands of victims.  
 
As a result, the empirical evidence in this research suggests that the articulating 
potential of human rights discourse for plural actors is overestimated. Human rights 
discourse did not remove the need for plural actors to engage in the messy process of 
negotiating objectives, identity and strategy. Human rights discourse can provide a 
minimum self-limiting agenda (Cohen and Arato 1994), particularly when focused on 
the concrete claims of specific victims and communities. However, it does not readily 
reconfigure to compellingly and coherently express the diverse socially transformative 
agendas of plural movement actors. This is particularly so, as the experience of 
YoSoy132 demonstrated, when trying to address the multiple deficits of partial 
democracies (rather than monolithic repressive regimes). These more complex 
agendas oriented toward the specific socio-political context of partial democracies do 
not readily fit within recognised paradigms of human rights practice or commonly 
shared understandings of human rights discourse.465 The hope that human rights 
discourse can articulate these multiple agendas risks overextending the discourse to 
                                                        
464 The proponents of ‘agonistic’ radical democratic practice draw on the political philosophy of Carl 
Schmitt and his critique of liberal democracy.  
465 For example, issues like corruption, media power, criminal violence, state capture and participatory 
decision-making are not easily framed in terms of human rights discourse which is focused on the unitary 
functions of the state. They also raise more clearly political and ideological questions around models of 
representative and radical democracy which go beyond the minimum regulatory principles of citizen-
state interaction set out in human rights principles. 
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displace others, which may generate frustration and discord, destabilising the 
movement coalition.  
 
In addition, human rights objectives are often oriented toward securing formal 
instantiation of rights in law, but paradoxically this risks the demobilizing dynamics of 
negotiation, particularly given the well-founded suspicion that powerholders will not 
substantively implement agreements. As a result, this institutional ‘face’ (Morris 2010) 
of human rights can undermine the articulating potential for heterogeneous 
movements as they are drawn into institutional engagement.466 In the context of 
partial democracy, this raises an important question for social movements. Is human 
rights discourse too self-limiting to communicate the aspiration of more socially just 
and democratic structural change or can human rights discourse work alongside other 
approaches to develop a more comprehensive social agenda to articulate plural non-
institutional social actors?467 Are human rights activists at national and international 
level sufficiently attuned to these nuances and the concerns of other movement actors 
seeking forms of progressive change? These issues require further examination. 
 
There is frequently an assumption that human rights provides a principled discursive 
framework for plural actors to pursue social justice and deepen democratization. In 
part the findings of this empirical research support this understanding, but it also 
demonstrates that the micro and macro dynamics of social movements in relation to 
                                                        
466 Though as two interviewees observed, demobilization, particularly in the case of the MPJD, can be 
understood in the terms of Tilly, McAdam and Tarrow’s structural model of social movements. This 
argues, like Beth Simmons, that politically excluded social groups mobilize to gain access to institutional 
decision-making. When this objective is achieved, and the excluded group sits at the table of power or 
influences the public sphere, social mobilization ceases. However, this appears excessively optimistic 
given the limited impact of the MPJD. The more realistic assessment of the majority of interviewees 
pointed to the important but limited impacts of the MPJD, but above all, the institutional skill of reducing 
social mobilization by granting superficial concessions and dividing movement constituents.  
467 Or as some argue, there should be a retrenchment from this higher aspiration of human rights 
discourse in the face of the global challenge to the principles of universal human rights posed by 
increasingly hostile governments, such as those of the USA, Russia and China (Rieff 2018). This position 
advocates falling back on reduced understandings of human rights based on traditional minimalist 
defensive rights to protect individuals from the worst abuses (Ignatieff 2003), avoiding engagement in 
wider maximalist issues of social justice and democratic practice. However, the effect of this would 
appear to make human rights less relevant to social movements engaged with challenging partial 
democracies.  
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human rights discourse are more complex and carry with them ambiguous and 
constraining implications. As a result, this research has generated a richer 
understanding of the dynamics and meaning of human rights discourse in specific 
culturally rooted processes of social mobilization. 
 
10.4.2  How has the use of digital and social media featured in the practice and 
significance of these social mobilization processes? 
 
This research confirms how the increasing embeddedness of digital and social media in 
social relations in Mexico and globally has become integral to social activism, 
particularly enabling horizontal responsiveness to symbolic events. My findings 
confirm how digital and social media increase movement resources, facilitating 
coordination and dissemination of information, but also how their expressive and 
affective dimensions, enable looser forms of individual and small group participation 
in movement actions. However, it also suggests these features of practice are transient 
and have not substantially shifted the capacity of movements to sustain collective 
contentious action and translate public sphere visibility into more transformational 
impacts in Mexico’s partial democracy.  
 
In Mexico, the ‘mediation opportunity structure’ (Cammaerts 2012) had developed by 
2011 to the extent that individuals, collectives, NGOs, journalists and media outlets 
used digital and social media to create and share a range of information addressing 
socially contentious issues. As a result, when the trigger events took place, networks 
of friends, associates and sympathisers distributed information rapidly, assisting in 
independent interpretation of their significance alongside mainstream media 
coverage. The malleability and openness of digital and social media, coupled to the 
bridging power of actors, such as journalist Carmen Aristegui, to link up multiple 
networks, enabled the rapid circulation of news and comment, contributing to the 
sense of drama and importance of the trigger events. This helped extend and amplify 
their significance nationally and globally, which in turn fed back into social media loops 
to demonstrate growing concern and solidarity.  
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This was rapidly followed by intentional use of digital and social media as a means of 
communicating information and materials on the emerging mobilization. This 
produced positive feedback which facilitated the organization of solidarity actions of 
the incipient movement nationally and internationally. My research on the three 
movements confirms the findings of scholars (Shirky 2009; Bimber et al. 2005a; Earl & 
Kimport 2011) who argue digitally enabled networks lower movement resource costs, 
facilitating and extending coordination and participation in collective actions offline 
and online. However, digital practices of those involved in the three movements did 
not generally support the more idealised claims of interactive and deliberative digital 
counter-publics strengthening citizen-lead democratic practice (Benkler 2006; Castells 
2013). Some interviewees argued that YoSoy132 was different, as social media 
facilitated dynamic involvement in counter-speech. However, the details of this digital 
involvement suggest practices were more expressive than deliberative, as most 
movement debate increasingly took place in small group discussions or in larger offline 
assembly meetings. As a result, movement deliberations in all three cases appear to 
have been more concentrated in smaller closed networked communications or face-
to-face, suggesting a less radical shift from traditional movement paradigm and a 
continuing reliance on established trust networks. Nonetheless, it is also evident that 
digital and social media increasingly formed part of the communicative fabric of the 
movement culture. This facilitated an important sense of expressive agency and 
distributed identity which encourage national and global participation.468   
 
A particular feature of digital and social media use that this research found to 
contribute most strongly to each of the movements and their identity was the 
transmission of emotional mobilizing narratives. This supports Papacharissi’s (2015) 
argument that social media can facilitate identification and sharing of sentiment, 
                                                        
468 The expressive possibilities of social media also encouraged some victims and survivors to adopt 
online profiles in the case of MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43, or to nominate others to act in their stead, to 
communicate with movement supporters to sustain mobilization, enacting their own forms of agency. 
As has been observed in relation to human rights, the agency of claims-makers is an important feature 
of social movements in the development of political subjectivity and individual self-realization. Digital 
and social media made a contribution to this process.  
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helping to inspire and sustain participation. The importance of this is that where human 
rights discourse is seen as too technical and alien to drive a mobilizing narrative, digital 
and social media helped communicate a narrative focused on the emotional responses 
of those affected in their culturally rooted context. This facilitated forms of personal or 
small group identification with the victims in the case of the MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43, 
and in the case of YoSoy132 with the cause of the defamed students. It also enabled 
recognition of others emotionally sharing that same identification, reinforcing the 
legitimacy of individual responses. The quality of immediacy of social media, for 
example online streaming of events, and the capacity to rapidly inform friends and 
associates, and see their responses, made an important contribution to generating and 
sharing sentiments of anger and solidarity. This facilitated the collective emotional 
response to trigger events and to subsequent protest actions, imbuing them with a 
personal and rooted meaningfulness and an urgency to participate in public acts of 
solidarity. This strengthened the sense of agency of those using digital and social 
media, apparently reinforcing participation in public events, rather than weakening it 
as suggested by Gladwell (2010).  
 
These findings confirm the role of affect and emotion in the process of becoming 
politically engaged and participating in collective active. This is not the dry utility 
calculating decision-making of Rational Actor Theory, nor the crowd induced 
irrationality of collective behaviourists nor Habermas’ deliberative construction of 
consensus.469 Instead, it is the complex interplay of cognitive and emotional processes 
of individuals operating within their social milieu, including small groups, and carrying 
with them their own skills and interpretive schema and beliefs to respond imaginatively 
to events in their environment (Crossley 2002). In this context, the research shows how 
the immediacy and connectivity of digital and social media contributed to the plural 
affective processes which motivated participation in movement actions.  
 
This is not to suggest that such processes are exclusively mediated by digital 
communications nor that they cannot be manipulated, but that the complex interplay 
                                                        
469 Refer to the discussion of these different analytical approaches to social movements in section 2.4.  
 328 
of affect and reason is intrinsic to individual and collective political activity. However, 
the uses of digital and social media in helping shape these processes also raises 
questions about the potential openness of digitally enabled networks to emotional 
manipulation for purely instrumental political ends which are not necessarily 
democratic nor rights-protective (Tucker et al. 2017).470 This is potentially an area of 
further investigation.  
 
This research also confirmed how uses of digital and social media facilitated connective 
action (Bennett et al. 2013), reducing the need for movement collective identity or 
‘branding’ to facilitate participation. Loose digital networks enabled diverse civil 
society actors not aligned with particular political or social groups to engage with the 
mobilization. However, this was not necessarily on the basis of individualised 
participation proposed by theorists of modernity (Beck 2002; Castells 2009a) and 
contemporary collective action (Farro et al. 2014). In contrast to these more atomised 
approaches, the three mobilizations also drew on small group affiliations. These 
suggested varying levels of social cohesion and meso-level identity (Treré 2015a) to 
support social mobilization which are not solely based on individualised participation.  
 
The early and more connective action stage of mobilization was effervescent but 
temporary, dissipating in the face of hard and prolonged resistance from 
powerholders.471 In this context, movement resources, such as identity, leadership, 
strategic communications and coalition agenda agreements were necessary to sustain 
contentious mobilization (though these more hierarchical and bureaucratic internal 
processes also probably contributed to reducing connective participation). In this 
                                                        
470 Political propaganda, since its inception, has been premised on engaging emotional responses of 
target audiences in greater measure than more reasoned reflections. Digital political lobbyists have just 
adapted these practices to the scaled up potential of digital and social media platforms, such as in the 
case of Cambridge Analytica (Cadwalladr et al. 2018). The question is then about how open, legal and 
transparent these communicative strategies are in mobilizing support and the extent to which the 
practices and objectives are consistent with such principles as personal autonomy, privacy, equitable 
treatment, informational reliability. 
471 This is not to suggest that more consolidated democracies are necessarily always responsive to the 
pressures of social movements, but there are more channels of influence available than in a partial 
democracy. A feature of partial democracy is the role of political and economic powerholders thwarting 
effective democratic accountability; for example, preventing public sphere agendas developing or being 
translated into institutional practice.    
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phase, digital and social media practices became less horizontal and participatory, 
usually reverting to strategic information sharing and coordination functions managed 
by SMOs coupled to more traditional or hybrid media practices (Chadwick 2013). It is 
perhaps a paradox that while digital and social media enabled and disseminated some 
of the movements’ most expressive features to attract participation, the endurance of 
the movement implied increasing attention to less connective practices and focus on 
the traditional qualities of social movements associated with Resource Mobilization 
Theory.  
 
In conclusion, digital and social media practices featured strongly in facilitating 
information flows and coordination of the three movements. Less recognised is how 
these practices helped transmit and share the socially rooted emotional narratives 
driving mobilization and contention. This was particularly so during the connective 
phase of looser participation, which enabled plural civil society actors and collectives 
to dramatically enact diverse forms of contention, reinforcing the mobilizations at 
national and international level. However, these creative eruptions were short-lived.  
 
In the context of partial democracy, where influencing the public sphere rarely 
translates into changes in institutional practice, more traditional social movement 
resources and practices were needed to sustain contentious mobilization. In this 
second, less vibrant phase, as the movements’ organized for the long haul, connective 
and digitally expressive dimensions diminished. This process also contributed to the 
declining plurality and dynamism of the movement, for example, activists became 
more absorbed with internal democratic processes or developing more centralised and 
strategic advocacy alliances. These processes were less attractive to recruit 
participation, but they were also essential to the long-term endurance of contentious 
struggle.  
 
10.4.3 How did movement practices relate to changing digital news media environment 
and to digital counter-attacks and threats? 
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In recent years, debate about uses of digital and social media has often focused on 
their potential to enhance or undermine democratic practices. This has particularly 
focused on the implications for active citizenship and the public sphere primarily in 
consolidated democracies (Dahlgren 2013; Wessels 2017) or the potential to 
undermine authoritarian regimes by enabling forms of mass collective protest (Tufekci 
et al. 2012; Howard et al. 2013). The first situation assumes a relatively free media 
environment, receptive to public opinion and democratic accountability of 
powerholders, in which digital and social media is an additional means of democratic 
engagement. The second assumes a highly controlled mainstream media environment, 
in which digital and social media provide an alternative channel of information for non-
institutional debate and potentially organizing contentious challenges to 
powerholders.472 In partial democracies such as Mexico, the majority of the 
mainstream media, particularly TV and radio, has served dominant economic and 
political interests, but there is also a significant range of critical media, particularly 
newspapers. These media actors also operate in an environment of pressure and 
attacks of different sorts constraining their practice, particularly at regional level. In 
this mixed context, digital and social media has to some extent disrupted the dominant 
media power, and afforded plural and independent actors the potential to create and 
disseminate a wider range of news narratives. Many of these new actors are open to 
or sympathetic toward the social movements in this research. This more plural media 
environment has enhanced movement mobilization capacity, but use of digital and 
social media has also increased vulnerabilities in the form of digitally enabled counter-
attacks which activists have struggled to effectively quantify and respond to.  
 
In Mexico, the news media environment has been disrupted by digital technologies, 
creating a new ‘media opportunity structure’ (Cammaerts 2012). This included the 
creation and circulation of a range of news and information by popular independent 
and alternative digital outlets, from Aristeguinoticias to SDPnoticias to 
Desinformémenos. This has enabled independent journalists to gain greater visibility, 
                                                        
472 Though this more optimistic form of techno-determinism has been undercut as states have become 
wise to using social media to target activists, turning the supposedly emancipatory tools against them. 
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but also for the voices of diverse citizens, such as victims of the violence and social 
conflicts, to reach different audiences.  
 
The rapidly increasing penetration of digital technology and use of social media to 
access news information has reduced the traditional reliance on the principle TV 
channels. For all interviewees, this change increased the sense of a more plural 
counter-public environment, weakening, though not eliminating, the traditional 
agenda-setting control of the mainstream media.473 In this context of shifting global 
patterns of media production and consumption, the mainstream media could no longer 
commercially afford to ignore alternative digital information circulating widely at 
international or local level on platforms accessible to large sections of the public. As a 
result, information began to move rapidly between platforms and across technologies 
as part of an increasingly complex and dynamic hybrid media environment (Chadwick 
2013).  
 
Since 2011, this has had several implications for social movement practice. Firstly, 
movement leaderships continued strategic approaches to attract mainstream media 
coverage of movement messages and to influence the public sphere. This strategy was 
enhanced by targeting independent and international media outlets to increase 
leverage over national mainstream media. Secondly, the emergence of a range of 
alternative media platforms also facilitated forms of solidarity journalism which more 
or less explicitly supported the movements and promoted the voices of their diverse 
actors. The reach of these alternative platforms in terms of wider public opinion or 
decision-makers was limited. However, they played an important role in reflecting back 
the expressive activities and sentiments of the movement to participants or potential 
recruits, supporting the development of identity and solidarity, giving greater visibility 
to a range of movement actors, not just the leadership. 
                                                        
473 This is not to assume that all alternative digital news information has accurately represented events 
or that it is not subject to its own political bias. But it has posed an important challenge to the 
complacency of some mainstream media which has a poor record of independent news coverage, 
particularly on politically sensitive issues. Neither is it to suggest that the new plurality of voices 
eliminates the power of the mainstream TV and radio media to shape the national political agenda. 
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Closely linked to alternative media platforms was the development of individual or 
small group information circuits on social media platforms featuring movement 
activities. This facilitated a form of subculture surrounding the movements, enhancing 
and maintaining identity, particularly among smaller collectives of friends and 
associates on closed network platforms, like WhatsApp and Telegram.474  
 
The other side of the malleability of digital and social media is its vulnerability to well-
resourced powerholders using the technology to implement counter-measures to 
undermine progressive movements. This is particularly the case in partial democracies 
like Mexico where powerholders in practice are often not constrained by social norms 
or the rule of law. This has included spreading false information and rumours to 
undermine the credibility of movement leaders and activists. Digital surveillance and 
break-ins to steal offline computer data have been used to gather information, but also 
spread fear. There has also been increasing use of automated and manual BOTs to 
manipulate social media platforms and intimidate activists.475 Digital media is also 
increasingly used to deliver death threats against activists in the form of emails or social 
media messages. The failure of the authorities or social media companies to conduct 
substantive transparent investigations to hold those responsible to account has helped 
foster an increasingly hostile climate for online progressive activism and suspicion 
among activists that this impunity is convenient for powerholders to tacitly 
demonstrate their capacity to act outside the law. 
 
In response to this sense of vulnerability, activists have either disregarded the dangers 
or spent time and resources to evaluate the risks and benefits of forms of digital and 
social media practice for movement activism. This has included decisions to curtail 
                                                        
474 This also supports Treré’s (2015) examination of some of the ‘backstage’ communications patterns of 
YoSoy132 activists which sustained mobilization but which were not visible beyond their closed 
networks. 
475 In the western media the idea of the Russian “bot factory” has become associated with foreign State 
attempts to subvert democratic processes. However, these were also employed with less fanfare (or 
general international media interest) by the political parties in Mexico, particularly the PRI, in the 2012 
presidential elections and then with greater public attention in the case of #yamecanse.  
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certain uses of social media, particularly involvement in more deliberative debates on 
open network platforms. This potentially limits some of the more connective action 
responses to emerging events present in the early stages of mobilization such as in 
YoSoy132 and Ayotzinapa 43. However, growing awareness and evidence of digital 
threats against activists has also facilitated greater knowledge sharing between activist 
groups and NGOs at local and global level to better identify and react to digital threats.  
 
My research found that reflecting on the features of the rapidly changing opportunity 
structure of the digital media environment is part of the adaptive alertness of activists. 
This enabled the movements to respond to and take advantage of the changing media 
landscape, particularly the increased plurality of media actors, including expanded 
access and coverage of diverse voices. As such, this helped, at least temporarily, shift 
the informational balance in favour of more varied coverage of news events, engaging 
digitally connected generations seeking out news information online. However, the 
mainstream media, particularly TV, continues to be regarded by activists and observers 
as the principle shaping force of the political agenda. This kept the strategic attention 
of movement leaderships focused on maximising influence with the mainstream 
media, tending to assume that alternative media would instinctively cover movement 
actions. Even given the scarcity of resources and the need for prioritisation, this 
approach appears to underestimate the contribution of alternative media 
accompaniment to sustain the social movement culture and identity. 
 
The longstanding tradition of threats and attacks against independent journalists and 
social activists has only worsened during the process of partial democratization and 
spiralling violence. As a result, the potential of digital and social media to be used 
against social movements was assumed as a given by many activists, but this - at least 
initially - did not lead to major adjustments in activism. There is a tension between the 
potential of digital and social media practices to favour mobilization versus the 
increasing capacity of powerholders to exploit communicative practices to undermine 
movements and target activists (Verkamp et al. 2013; Treré 2016). The growing 
awareness of these threats, and the knowledge that the authorities will not investigate 
them seriously, has encouraged an increasing reflection on the types of digital 
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communications practices that social activists can engage in securely and safely. The 
evaluation of risk varies widely, but appears to indicate a tendency toward reducing 
unguarded spontaneous and fluid communication on open networks. This may reduce 
potential for less directed forms of connective action visible during the early dynamic 
stages of movement mobilization. However, this more security minded approach to 
digital and social media platforms needs further investigation to make a detailed 
assessment of its impact on activist practice. 
  
I now turn to discussion of the primary research question. 
 
10.4.4 In relation to recent social movements involved in non-institutional contentious 
politics in Mexico, how have human rights discourses and uses of digital and 
social media enabled and constrained these mobilization processes? 
 
This section draws together the previous discussions to address this overarching 
research question. It shows how the particular features of human rights discourse and 
digital and social media have been mobilized to contribute to the strategic and 
expressive dimensions of the movements. However, these logics are not a panacea and 
also introduce elements of risk and over-expectation. In addition, for participants, 
recognising the limited role of both - that is avoiding the movements being understood 
solely in terms of their human rights and digital media practices - was vital to ensure 
the meaning of the mobilizations remained rooted in the struggles for justice in 
Mexico’s partial democracy. 
 
Human rights discourse, even if its meaning and significance is open and contested, has 
become a widely legitimised frame of reference in Mexico for social actors to interpret 
trigger events, particularly justice claims of individuals and communities. This 
reinforces the process of social actors recognising trigger events as symbolic of the 
wider institutional and democratic crises affecting the country, and recognising the 
legitimate role of victims of injustice and of civil society to support those affected in 
claims-making and wider aspirations for institutional and social change. The 
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international human rights movement often supports but does not determine this 
process. 
 
Networks of skilled human rights oriented activists, when participating in the 
movements, facilitate and deepen this interpretive approach. Human rights NGOs and 
activists provide skills and resources for the mobilization process as well as a logic 
oriented toward engagement with the state. These institutional orientations are often 
in tension with more radical transformative aspirations of plural movement 
coalitions.476  
 
Despite the importance of human rights discourse supporting the interpretive 
template of the trigger event, the mobilizing narrative of the movement to motivate 
participation in nationally focused actions is not based on projecting human rights 
discourse. Instead, it is focused on an urgent, emotional identification with individuals 
affected by the trigger events and their responses. These framing narratives are more 
culturally rooted in shared cognitive and emotional recognition of the treatment of 
those affected, their suffering, a sense of solidarity, feelings of concern about wider 
threats and desire to be part of a collective contentious experience of resistance to 
unjust powerholders and the status quo. In contrast to these more subjective, 
emotional rooted responses, human rights discourse is considered too alien, 
institutionalised and technocratic to generate the type of personal and collective 
commitment to inspire and sustain nationally focused contentious action.477 As a 
result, it features more clearly in narratives targeting international audiences and 
institutions. 
 
                                                        
476 However, not all movements rely on these resources and approaches, particularly those not seeking 
state remedy for injustice, such as YoSoy132. Such movements adopt different forms of plural 
contention in which human rights discourse is less relevant as it is not focused on institutional remedy 
for victims, but transformative political processes.  
477 This tension between the particularity of the local versus the universalizing concepts of human right 
is part of the strengths of human rights discourse. However, to only interpret the local through the lens 
of human rights discourse risks excluding key dimensions of the meaningfulness of domestic social and 
political processes which this research explores. 
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On the other hand, the relative detachment of human rights discourse from the context 
can support the agency of key movement actors, particularly victims of grave abuses. 
It can enable them to make claims, usually with the support of local activists, in terms 
of universal standards which are not defined by local and national powerholders. This 
process also facilitates links to international support networks. As a result, using human 
rights discourse for claims-making can strengthen the sense of the legitimacy of 
victims’ claims, reinforcing their voice in the struggle for justice as well as wider social 
change.478 
 
Lastly, I found the idealised role of human rights as an open discourse enabling the 
articulation of plural movements to challenge the status quo to be overstated, 
particularly when facing the consolidated and skilful powerholders of Mexico’s partial 
democracy. The process of developing and agreeing a substantive coalition agenda 
remained unresolved. In effect, this limits the articulation of the movements to 
expressions of their plurality or relatively narrow human rights demands.  
 
In the case of the MPJD and Ayotzinapa 43, the ultimate focus on the particular and 
concrete human rights demands of the families sustained the mobilizations, but 
reduced their movements’ plural and transformative appeal. YoSoy132 avoided 
minimum human rights based demands but struggled to articulate a coherent plural 
agenda beyond the enactment of non-institutional political activism. This reflects 
common tensions in social movements between radical and pragmatic actors, in which 
human rights discourse is often conceived of as a lingua franca (Castells 2009b) for 
articulating these plural actors in either deliberative (Habermas 1996) or agonistic 
(Mouffe 2005) practices. The evidence in each case suggests this expectation was not 
met. Human rights discourse interpreted by the multiple actors involved, facilitated a 
space of initial convergence, but this became too constraining to reflect the substantive 
plurality of movement interests and transformative aspirations. It could not reconcile 
                                                        
478 However, this sense of enhanced victim agency can also diminish in the face of consistent institutional 
failure to comply with international human rights obligations, or when claims-maker expectations of 
human rights discourse are too high or misrepresented to them, or when relations with activist 
supporting human rights claims break down.   
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or sustain the tensions between competing priorities, such as the focus on immediate 
individual justice claims, engagement in wider institutional negotiation or 
determination to sustain forms of autonomous contentious mobilization in pursuit of 
transformative social change. These frictions are not new to social movements, but the 
lesson that many activists felt they had learnt was that human rights discourse was 
only a particular dimension of the mobilization process. It could not and should not be 
seen as its articulating or monopolising discourse; the challenge was finding ways of 
articulating plural actors with different social agendas, without levering these issues 
into the prism of human rights discourse.  
 
In relation to digital and social media, my research shows the adaptive responses of 
the movements engaged with the facilitating potential of the emerging digital media 
environment, but also how this carried with it certain constraining implications for 
sustaining dynamic mobilizations.  
 
As with human rights discourse, the increasing embeddedness of digital and social 
media in social relations facilitates responses to trigger events by a receptive and 
widening online audiences. In particular the rapid, spontaneous and independent 
circulation of information on and responses to trigger events amplifies their impact and 
reach, undercutting institutional efforts to shape the framing narrative.  
 
Digital and social media practices of movement activists are increasingly integrated 
with offline activities. As such, they reduce the resource costs and time necessary to 
extend the reach of incipient mobilizations; supporting rapid coordination and sharing 
of information with distributed recruits to enact collective action events online and 
offline. Each of the three case studies also shows how activist circulation of social 
media coverage of protest events, reinforces the meaningfulness of the movement for 
potential recruits, creating a sense of excitement and involvement.  
 
The immediacy and horizontal connectedness of digital networks reinforces 
communication of the emotional narrative of the movement, which is central to the 
mobilization process. The three movements erupted as social media networks 
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facilitated the sharing of feelings, such as anger and solidarity, reinforcing affective 
narratives. The research suggests, however, that this process was not necessarily 
achieved purely through individualised participation as suggested by Castells (2009a) 
and Bennett & Segerberg (2013). Instead of equal importance are mediating networks 
of small group affiliations, which often involve offline relationships, reinforcing 
emotional and cognitive responses, as well as deliberations about participation. 
 
Digital and social media practices appear to favour the dynamics of rapid recruitment 
into forms of ‘connective’ action, based on looser unaffiliated participation in selected 
online and offline actions. This is in contrast with much social movement theory, which 
suggests that mobilization is based on adhesion to a movement structure or collective 
identity. Despite these early surges in ‘connective’ participation representing some of 
the most dynamic and creative episodes of contention, they are also transitory. As a 
result, they are insufficient to significantly challenge or substantially influence 
entrenched powerholders. Most activists are aware of these ephemeral features and 
the importance of developing more enduring movement practices, such as 
organizational structure, identity and strategy to sustain collective contention.479 
However, this organizational consolidation also appears to contribute to declining 
connective participation. In this context, digital and social media practices can facilitate 
an important early dynamic impetus to contention, but these features are also in 
tension with more traditional or hybrid strategic communications practices. 
Nevertheless, without more resilient structural organization to sustain mobilization, 
movements struggle to move beyond their effervescent beginnings, such as with 
YoSoy132. 
 
This conclusion suggests that more enthusiastic claims about digital and social media 
practices radically modifying the capacity of social movements to impact the public 
sphere and the institutional order are overstated, particularly in the context of partial 
                                                        
479 Some digital activists tend to idealise the initial ephemeral moment as that of maximum creativity, 
as this is when traditional hierarchical forms of movement practice are challenged and innovated, 
potentially enabling new actors to emerge. This perspective tends to identify impact in terms of 
expressive protest movement culture rather than in wider social and political relations.  
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democracies such as Mexico. However, the research confirms their important role in 
the dramatic emergence of the movements. This should not be dismissed, as even brief 
manifestations of non-institutional collective democratic discontent and demands for 
justice are important to show that plural civil society can act collectively; that profound 
if vague desires for change, moral renewal and a new relationship between citizen and 
state can develop just beneath the surface of simulated democratic governance. The 
surging response to each trigger event points to these sentiments and their potential 
to reverberate in the national political narrative and culture. However, the capacity of 
the movements to develop the organisational resources and coherence to sustain 
contention beyond this point is also vital to achieve specific goals and lasting impact. 
This is the case with Ayotzinapa 43 and the collectives of relatives of the disappeared. 
Their sustained mobilization, involving but not characterised by digital and social media 
activism, made a significant contribution to the collapse in credibility of the PRI 
government of Enrique Peña Nieto.  
 
However, perhaps the most significant contribution of digital and social media to the 
milieu in which social movements operate is in relation to the wider media 
environment. In this context, increasingly widespread adoption of digital and social 
media has disrupted the power of dominant elite aligned media forces, enabling plural 
new media actors to emerge giving greater scope for different voices and their 
experience. This strengthens the capacity to disseminate mobilizing narratives to 
potential movement recruits, but it also increases movement leverage with other 
media outlets in the pursuit of strategic objectives. This diverse media and social media 
environment is attracting ever greater audiences in Mexico, forcing traditional TV and 
radio to cover issues once ignored or marginalized. However, this disruptive effect is 
not necessarily guaranteed to continue as the media environment reconfigures nor is 
it exclusively detrimental to elites. For example, movements and social activists are 
vulnerable to negative uses of digital and social media by powerholders, which in turn 
can force them to restrict their online practices. This more constrained use of digital 
and social media by activists may potentially limit some of the dynamic and organic 
features of digitally facilitated mobilization which contribute to trigger events 
becoming symbolic for mass collective action. This changing feature of practice needs 
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to be researched further to better understand its effects as the dynamics of digital and 
social media practice continue to develop and change.  
 
My research evidences the diverse ways that human rights discourse and digital and 
social media feature in the practices of each movement. They are understood primarily 
to enhance important aspects of the mobilizations, but also entail certain logics which 
movements grapple with in the process of consolidating their identity and objectives. 
The three cases show how the meaning of these dynamics are often contested within 
movements, but are part of the reflexive and adaptive practice of social activists 
engaged in mobilizations. In this context, human rights discourse and digital and social 
media are part of the discursive and technological context out of which movements 
emerge. As such, they are deployed as available and potentially useful resources. They 
contribute shaping qualities to the movements but do not monopolise or determine 
their identity or practices, which are the result of dynamic collective processes of 
multiple actors engaging with the meaning of their concrete social and political 
context.  
 
10.4.5 What does the research mean for our understanding of civil society, the role of 
social media, the state, and censorship in contemporary Mexico? 
 
The research shows how civil society in its most dynamic and plural form, that is social 
movements, are able to coalesce and act collectively in Mexico in response to particular 
symbolic events representing the deeper crises in Mexico’s democracy. The collective 
expression of active discontent with key features of contemporary Mexico such as 
violence, injustice and exclusion from effective participation in the construction of a 
fairer society, exerts non-institutional pressures on powerholders. This can awaken the 
sense of social actors directly contributing to the reconfiguration of the status quo in 
favour of the excluded or victimised, of re-establishing normative ideas of citizenship 
and justice to influence institutional practice. This form of independent civil society 
collective action is not an alternative to the captured institutional order, but asserts 
the possibility of constructing change through autonomous collective political action in 
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the public sphere. Outcomes are unpredictable and inevitably disappointing compared 
to aspirations, but the reawakening of hope through the assertion of collective moral 
authority outside the imposed parameters of the State and traditional hierarchies of 
powerholders, is not a marginal feature of political development, but an important 
component to understanding the dynamics of social change.  
 
The research also indicates how the three movements played an important role in 
exposing the bankruptcy of the prevailing political party system and its inability to 
escape capture by multiple vested interests. This contributed to the groundswell of 
popular rejection of the traditional political parties in the 2018 elections. The veteran 
left-wing candidate, AMLO and his party, MORENA, successfully exploited this 
disenchantment, helping foster a sense of hope that he could deliver social 
transformation. This included commitments to address some of the issues that had 
sparked the three movements. However, the challenge for these new gatekeepers is 
to enact fresh democratic and institutional approaches which fulfil these diverse 
expectations. This is no small task, particularly as so many of AMLO’s party and 
appointees come directly from the traditional political parties and bureaucracy with 
links to vested interests and ingrained suspicion of independent civil society.480 
 
Having awakened popular expectations that things can be done differently, the 
repercussions of failure will be grave, risking new levels of disillusionment with 
democratic governance. It is also quite possible that new symbolic events, representing 
emerging failures of governance at national and local level, may also create new 
contexts for plural civil society to engage in non-institutional collective action. The signs 
                                                        
480 The early signs are mixed, particularly in relation to addressing the drivers to the violence and human 
rights violations, such as going back on his campaign promise to gradually remove the military from 
policing functions or develop a clear strategy for addressing the crisis of the disappeared. However, the 
new government has taken steps to establish a form of truth commission to reinvestigate the Ayotzinapa 
43 cases. The extent to which the new government will fundamentally change the relationship of citizens 
to the state and society to institutions or will simply replicate the practices of the past remains to be 
seen. 
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so far are that these types of mobilization may come from the political right seeking to 
challenge the popular legitimacy of the AMLO project. However, it is also quite possible 
that independent progressive actors may also engage in forms of collective contention 
to demand more substantive social and political change. In either scenario, it is also 
clear that a diverse civil society, active on many different issues and in many different 
regions, will continue to play roles in developing public sphere deliberations and 
actions, challenging institutional performance and expressing diverse civil society 
perspectives. These may not amount to national level social movements such as the 
three in this research, but they represent plural forms of social and political 
engagement, with the potential to contribute to Mexico’s political development.  
 
It is in this context that the meaning and uses of human rights discourse remain highly 
relevant for interpreting and framing the successes and failures of governance and 
formulating specific claims against powerholders as well as promoting normative 
change. This research shows how human rights NGOs at national and local level as well 
as the collectives of victims and other groups often use human rights discourse, even 
if only to a limited extent, to frame and press their claims. This means that in certain 
sectors of civil society, human rights discourse features as routinized practice, whether 
in the form legal claims, media messages, institutional negotiation or protest demands.  
 
However, the research also shows that human rights discourse when mobilized as part 
of widescale and plural social movements often displays different features to the more 
narrowly focused practices of human rights NGOs. As such, it cannot be understood 
solely as a strategic tool to engage institutional responsibility, public opinion or even 
as an articulating devise to unify plural actors. It is better understood as operating on 
different levels as a dynamic feature of collective political contention, enabling forms 
of claims-making, but also orienting and shaping these in particular directions. Not all 
of these may be consistent with the aspirations and beliefs of the movements and their 
diverse participant actors.  
 
This has implications for claims-makers, solidarity supporters and the targets of the 
mobilization. Part of mitigating these limitations is recognising their existence. For 
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example, avoiding an overly dominant human rights discourse in the mobilizing 
narrative; recognising that while instantiation of human rights is key to their 
protection, the meaningfulness of human rights claims is not limited to the process of 
legal instantiation; that the a key dimension of human rights claims-making is as an 
expression of self-asserting power to challenge domination and exclusion; and human 
rights demands alone cannot adequately represent a transformational social agenda. 
These are some of the different features and meanings of human rights discourse 
which make it useful but also paradoxical when mobilized as part of collective 
contentious action in a national context. Understanding and shaping these dynamics is 
part of the developing and reflective practice of social activists in Mexico in their 
struggle to contest injustices and impact the country’s political development.481  
 
The same process of reassessment of digital and social media has been underway in 
recent years in Mexico, with early optimism about its supposedly democratizing 
potential, giving way to pessimistic evaluations of its impact on social relations and 
democratic practice. However, this research has shown how social movements in 
Mexico have engaged with digital and social media as part of the mobilization 
processes, enabling the rapid participation of diverse local, national and international 
actors in forms of networked collective contentious action. However, it also suggests 
these features, while accelerating the intensity of the movement, may contribute 
destabilising features, which movements, if they are to endure, need to guard against 
by recourse to more traditional mobilization and security practices.  
 
However, it is also the case that as powerholders, both state and non-state actors, have 
become aware of weaknesses of digital platforms, enhancing their capacity to legally 
and illegally shape digital information flows. This potentially undermines the capacity 
of social actors to safely use some of the more dynamic features of digital and social 
media to challenge dominant narratives. Even worse, this may also increase 
                                                        
481 This is particularly the case in a world where the status and acceptance of the idea of universal human 
rights is under attack on the global stage, not least from the new right-wing governments in the Americas 
reshaping regional institutional outlooks antithetical to many aspects of human rights discourse.  
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powerholder capacity to orchestrate attacks on civil society actors, threatening their 
legitimacy and physical security. The extent to which the new government ends the 
longstanding impunity enjoyed by those who attack social activists, human rights 
defenders and journalists, will play a role in determining how far the digital 
environment can continue to be mobilized in favour of progressive mobilization 
processes.  
 
The emergence of a hybrid news media environment involving print media, radio, TV, 
websites, blogs and social media is radically altering the media landscape globally. It is 
difficult to predict the development of this process and its long-term impact on media 
plurality and access to information in Mexico. However, this research has shown the 
disrupting influence of digital technology on the traditional relations between State 
and media in Mexico. This has so far contributed to greater media plurality and a 
weakening of some of the practices that enabled powerholders to effectively shape 
news narratives. These traditional dynamics have not evaporated, particularly at 
subnational level, but the potential for plural information and narratives to circulate 
has increased. The MORENA government has stated its commitment to strengthen 
media plurality, but it will inevitably face increased scrutiny and attack from a range of 
media interests. The extent to which it institutionalises mechanisms and a regulatory 
environment to ensure media plurality and freedom of expression, including in the 
digital sphere, and resists the temptation to resort to traditional methods to control 
media outputs will be one of its greatest tests and perhaps one of its lasting legacies.  
 
Human rights discourse is often treated as the handmaiden of liberal democracy in 
Western political thought. However, the promise of human rights is much more radical 
than a narrow electoral conception of democracy and individual freedom. It speaks to 
citizenship, powerholder accountability and governance that strives to achieve social 
justice and equality. This includes protecting and fostering individual and collective 
dignity, autonomy and development. Mexico’s partial democracy has so far shown that 
institutional human rights discourse can fail to deliver on almost all these fronts while 
serving to maintain the fiction of a fully functioning democracy. The social movements 
in this research illustrate that this contradiction can be exposed by significant events 
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interpreted by diverse actors to symbolise the deep injustices that have stunted 
Mexico’s development. These mobilizations challenged the terms of this partial 
democracy, but did not necessarily establish the social and political agenda to deliver 
justice and social transformation. Nonetheless, this aspiration remains active in many 
sectors of civil society, particularly in the families of the disappeared and their 
supporters. This sentiment is also latent in broader sections of society. Only the coming 
years will reveal the extent to which institutional practice can be transformed to 
substantively realise human rights ideas and whether national level civil society 
mobilizations will emerge to engage the public imagination to make contentious 
demands for a deeper democratic transition.   
 
 Policy recommendations and follow up research questions 
 
10.5.1 Policy recommendations 
As an international academic based in the Global North, I am conscious of the 
sensitivities of making policy prescriptions to civil society actors in the Global South 
who have a rich tradition of human rights and social activism. This is particularly the 
case when the project has not had the resources to involve those who participated in 
the research in discussion about the findings. However, in my follow-up activities I 
envisage sharing a summary of the thesis findings with the participants to gather their 
responses. 
 
My own reflexive position in relation to the research means that the findings are 
focused on understanding the dynamics of human rights discourse and digital and 
social media in the particular context of nationally oriented movements. That is to 
examine their context specific dynamics, rather than consider them as a subset of the 
global human rights movement or digitally enabled activism socialised ‘outward’ to 
‘peripheral’ contexts in the Global South.482  
 
                                                        
482 As observed earlier, this has often appeared to be an undertone of literature addressing the 
socialization of human rights law and the dynamics of globalization. 
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As a result, the recommendation which emerges from this research to international 
academic, institutional and civil society actors in relation to human rights discourse and 
digital media practices is to pay attention to the particular complex dynamics of their 
use in non-institutional political mobilizations. This means recognising that plural social 
actors use the tools available - some are more committed to the particular features of 
human rights discourse and digital communications than others - but the important 
issue is to understand how the different ways they are used (or not used) and their 
implications in the wider struggle of plural civil society to challenge democratic deficits. 
This means recognising that there are different aspects of their use with different 
meanings and values. For example, human rights discourse cannot only be understood 
as a legal tool, or in the case of digital and social media, their contribution is not limited 
to cost reduction of communications. That is not to argue that international actors 
should support all aspects of these mobilization processes uncritically, but they should 
recognise that they cannot be understood solely in terms of the promotion of 
international human rights norms nor idealised (or perhaps, increasingly, demonised) 
as forms of horizontal digital communication. Instead, their political and social 
significance is rooted in plural traditions and changing practices of activism and political 
culture in Mexico. These processes need to be examined in their own terms not simply 
as local manifestations of global trends. This does not mean ignoring the importance 
of international actors or global political forces in nationally oriented mobilization 
processes, but that the nuanced dynamics of domestic change should be understood 
better in order to accompany local actors in collective endeavours to address  
democratic deficits. So, a question for international actors is also how far non-
institutional social mobilizations can be supported to strengthen local claims for justice 
and democratic accountability, but without imposing models of activism from the 
Global North. This means not focusing purely on institutional human rights initiatives 
or expert partners as the means of supporting democratic development and social 
justice, but engaging with a wide range of social actors committed to different forms 
of democratic participation. 
 
In many respects, this recommendation is also relevant to domestic civil society. 
Assumptions about social movements, human rights discourse and digital media are 
 347 
widely held and wide-ranging; drawing on multiple theories, aspirations and 
experiences. However, these often result in relatively narrow individual perspectives 
which do not necessarily reflect on the different dimensions of their use and meaning 
for engaged social mobilizations, complicating the process of negotiation of plural 
actors in social movement mobilizations. Therefore, as part of adaptive practice, it is 
important to recognise and understand the nuances of the uses of human rights 
discourse as it relates to interpreting the socio-political context and trigger events, the 
role of networks in shaping movements, the relative function of human rights discourse 
in framing narratives and strengthening agency, but also its limitations in relation to 
movement mobilization and articulation. In the same way, social and political actors 
need to reflect on the dimensions of digital and social media as part of their practice, 
including its affective and connective features. These can facilitate civil society 
mobilization, but can also increase transience and vulnerability. Moreover, social 
actors need to reflect on how these practices can consolidate and strengthen a more 
plural media environment in which all members of Mexico’s diverse society can inform 
and be informed as part of the process of overcoming democratic deficits. 
 
10.5.2 Additional research areas and questions 
 
This research has focused on the particular dynamics of social movement mobilization 
in relation to human rights discourse and digital media practice, but in the course of 
this research a number of issues have emerged which merit further investigation.  
 
In relation to the digital and social media, rapidly changing technology and practices 
mean that this area is a moving target, particularly the potential for its covert 
manipulation to serve powerholders, rather than strengthen civil society to mobilize 
and challenge democratic deficits. This includes the issue of increased digital threats to 
social activists and journalists. These subjects deserve further study in relation to the 
practices of the state, political parties, the media, economic actors and criminal 
networks as well as grassroots activists. This would help understand if features of the 
communications landscape have decisively tipped in favour of covert manipulation and 
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surveillance of digital communications, undercutting some of the features identified in 
this research which support forms of progressive social mobilization.  
 
On human rights discourse, this research has focused on the dynamics of practice in 
relation to nationally oriented social movements. This raises questions about different 
contexts in which human rights discourse is operationalised as part of social actors 
engaging with powerholders. For example, in the human rights litigation, advocacy and 
institutional building of NGOs and legal professionals outside the context of mass social 
mobilization. Another question which has also emerged, is how far human rights 
discourse can operate in conjunction with other plural social and political change 
agendas in pursuit of improved democracy and social justice, for example, in relation 
to corruption and inequality. This will be a particularly relevant issues as the new 
administration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador takes office.  
 
Another emergent issue is how human rights discourse features in different types of 
grassroots activism, particularly to question the exercise of formal and informal power 
as part of civil society efforts to increase political participation, social justice and 
accountability at subnational level. As other research cited in this thesis (Ron et al. 
2014) suggests, the assumption that human rights are poorly understood and seen as 
foreign and technocratic may be changing more than activists realise, increasing the 
potential to integrate human rights discourse more fully into different claims-making 
narratives and strategies in a range of conflictual situations. These localised contexts 
also provide a means of exploring in more detail the complex relationships between 
local human rights experts and individuals or communities suffering the denial of rights 
and how this plays out in connection with understandings of human rights, individual 
agency, political subjectivity and the power relations of socialization processes.  
 
On the international stage, the human rights system is coming under increasing attack 
from multiple quarters. The wider impacts of this trend are not clear; for example, 
whether partial democracies such as Mexico, and its subnational powerholders, will be 
even less inclined to comply with human rights commitments and therefore whether 
human rights discourse will continue to be regarded as useful to challenge 
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powerholders. Given this changing environment, further research should investigate 
how human rights ideas are being interpreted and used (or not) by individuals and 
communities suffering different forms of injustice, particularly at subnational levels. 
This will contribute to understanding whether human rights discourse, as a dimension 
of social mobilization and civil society action, is in retreat or is, perhaps, gaining 
currency in the face of new threats. 
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Appendix 
 
What is meant by ‘human rights discourse’ in this thesis?  
 
Practical and theoretical dimensions of human rights are discussed in section 2.4, but 
the concept of ‘human rights discourse’ that this thesis adopts refers to the broad 
intellectual idea and project of human rights as universal standards of behaviour and 
treatment that individuals and communities are entitled to by virtue of being human. 
According to the United Nations:  
 
“Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, 
nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human rights 
include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom 
of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more. 
Everyone is entitled to these rights, without discrimination.”483  
 
This appendix provides an account of different dimensions of human rights discourse 
that are relevant to the thesis.  
 
International human rights law. This establishes particular rights through the UN 
General Assembly’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent 
international and regional treaties, conventions and mechanisms as well as through 
their recognition in national and local laws. These rights are established by imposing 
obligations on states. 
 
However, while these legal instruments instantiate rights in international and national 
public law, ‘human rights discourse’ also refers to the wider social and political uses 
and meanings of human rights in terms of upholding values inherent to human dignity. 
                                                        
483 United Nations: ‘What are human rights’, available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-
depth/human-rights/ [29 October 2018]. 
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This includes how ideas of human rights are manifested and contested in the media, 
popular culture, academia and activism.  
 
Human rights activism. This refers to a dual process. Firstly, activists, who are often 
lawyers or others with some knowledge of international human rights law, analyse a 
particular context or events affecting individuals or communities unfairly in terms of 
breaches in international human rights norms. Activists, who are sometimes directly 
from the communities affected or acting on their behalf, gather and present publicly 
human rights claims based on evidence that powerholders - usually, but not 
exclusively, state authorities - are violating or failing to comply with obligations 
established in national or international human rights law. This can lead to legal cases 
presented to the courts, but not necessarily, as activists may focus their claims on 
media or public sphere exposure of injustice (particularly if fair and impartial legal or 
administrative redress is inaccessible because of the domestic context). In this 
situation, international human rights norms are invoked as the standard to judge local 
actions by and increase pressure on powerholders, through legal and/or moral 
pressure.  
 
The second process, which is less well recognised, involves bottom-up influence on 
international human rights law. In this case, local contexts of unfair treatment of 
individuals or communities, which have not thus far been recognised as human rights 
violations in international human rights law, are interpreted and presented as 
manifestations of the denial of human dignity inherent in the principles of human rights 
discourse, even if not in the letter of human rights law. This process, often involving 
local communities, victims, activists, academics and international legal experts, can 
lead to reinterpretation or extension of international human rights law to include 
previously unrecognised instances of human rights violations. Examples of this process 
include the process of gender-based violence and denial of indigenous people’ rights 
being recognised as violations of international human rights law.  
 
These two processes are part of the complex dialogue between particular instances of 
denial of human rights, claims-making and the legal machinery of instantiation. It also 
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illustrates how despite the concept of human rights being open (i.e. what constitutes 
human dignity?), they are also constantly in the process of definition and partial closure 
through instantiation.  
 
Another feature of advocacy in relation to human rights issues, is the use of human 
rights frames to communicate specific grievances in terms of violations in universal 
human rights, such as the right to free speech or the right not to be killed, disappeared, 
discriminated against or denied access to justice and the basic necessities to live with 
dignity and freedom. In this thesis, human rights frames refer to public sphere 
narratives that appeal to the concept of universal human rights; to position particular 
instances of injustice in relation to them and identify powerholder responsibilities in 
terms of failing to comply with these norms. Framing analysis is discussed in more 
detail in Section 2.3 in relation to the mobilizing process of social movements.  
 
These are some of the key features involved in the concept of ‘human rights discourse’ 
which this thesis examines, particularly in relation to the dynamics of social 
mobilization.  
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Annex 
 
Annex 1: YoSoy132: un pliego petitorio al pie de la Estela de Luz. 23 mayo 2012 
 
La situación en la que se encuentra México exige que las y los jóvenes tomemos el 
presente en nuestras manos, es momento de que luchemos por un cambio en nuestro 
país, es momento de que pugnemos por un México más libre, más próspero y más 
justo. 
 
Queremos que la situación actual de miseria, desigualdad, pobreza y violencia sea 
resuelta. 
 
Las y los jóvenes de México creemos que el sistema político y económico no responde 
a las demandas de todos los mexicanos. 
 
Los estudiantes unidos de este país creemos que una condición necesaria para corregir 
esta situación consiste en empoderar al ciudadano a través de la información, ya que 
ésta nos permite tomar mejores decisiones políticas, económicas y sociales. La 
información hace posible que los ciudadanos puedan exigir y criticar de manera 
fundamentada a su gobierno, a los actores políticos, a los empresarios y a la sociedad 
misma. Por eso, “Yo Soy 132” hace del derecho a la información y del derecho a la 
libertad de expresión sus principales demandas. 
 
Hoy los jóvenes de México hemos encendido una luz en la vida pública del país. 
Asumamos este momento histórico con valentía e integridad. No esperemos más, no 
callemos más, los jóvenes decimos ¡Presente! 
 
A los medios de comunicación nacionales e internacionales, a las instancias 
competentes del gobierno, a la sociedad mexicana en general, el movimiento “Yo Soy 
132”, declara:  
 
Primero, somos un movimiento ajeno a cualquier postura partidista y constituido por 
ciudadanos, por lo tal no expresamos muestras de apoyo o rechazo hacia ningún 
candidato político. Nuestros deseos y exigencias se centran en la defensa de la libertad 
de expresión y del derecho de información de los mexicanos. Nuestra preocupación se 
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deriva del estado actual de la prensa nacional y los medios de comunicación, así como 
de su papel político 
en el contexto democrático. 
 
Segundo, “Yo soy 132”, no representa a ninguna institución pública de educación 
superior, ni privada, su representación depende únicamente de los individuos que se 
suman a esta causa ya que se articulan por medio de los comités universitarios. 
 
Tercero, el movimiento “Yo Soy 132” a través de la deliberación interuniversitaria 
democrática, cuenta ya con principios generales que guían su causa, así como estatutos 
que aseguran la participación de los individuos ya de los grupos que los hacen suyos. 
 
En esencia, nuestro movimiento busca la democratización de los medios de 
comunicación, con el fin de garantizar información transparente, plural e imparcial 
para fomentar una consciencia y pensamiento críticos. 
 
Es por eso que, exigimos competencia real en el mercado de medios de comunicación, 
en particular a lo referente al duopolio televisivo.  
 
Exigimos hacer del acceso a Internet un derecho constitucional efectivo en los términos 
que establece el Art. 1 de nuestra Carta Magna. 
 
Exigimos la instalación en todos los medios informativos radio, televisión y medios 
impresos, civiles que defiendan el interés público, como lo son la publicación de un 
Código de Ética del manejo informativo y la instauración de un ombudsman.  
 
Exigimos someter a concurso producciones para los canales públicos permisionarios a 
las distintas escuelas de Comunicación. Exigimos abrir el debate entre los jóvenes y los 
medios de comunicación sobre las demandas aquí expuestas. 
 
También exigimos garantizar la seguridad de todos los integrantes de este movimiento, 
de quienes se expresan libremente en el país y en particular de aquellos periodistas 
que han sido alcanzados por la violencia. 
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Además, expresamos nuestra absoluta solidaridad con las personas que en los 
próximos días han sido reprimidas por manifestar libremente sus ideas en distintos 
Estados de la República Mexicana. 
 
Como demanda inmediata exigimos la transmisión en cadena nacional del debate de 
los candidatos a la Presidencia de la República. Y no encontramos en esto una 
imposición a las audiencias privilegiadas, sino como forma de garantizar el derecho de 
elegir ver o no a quienes hoy no cuentan con esa posibilidad. 
 
Universitarios, jóvenes y ciudadanos de la República Mexicana, este movimiento los 
convoca a organizarse y sumarse y hacer suyo este Pliego Petitorio. 
 
Por una democracia auténtica, “Yo Soy 132”. 
 
Source: Animal Político, 23 mayo 2012, available at < 
https://www.animalpolitico.com/2012/05/declaratoria-y-pliego-petitorio-de-yo-soy-
132/> [28 October 2018]  
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Annex 2: Asamblea Nacional Interuniversitaria "Yo Soy 132" 
 
Boletín de prensa, 30 mayo 2012 
Resolutivos provisionales sobre las discusiones en mesas de trabajo que llevaron a cabo 
jóvenes y estudiantes que participan activamente en el Movimiento "Yo soy 132", 
organizados en la Asamblea Nacional. 
Interuniversitaria. El evento se llevó a cabo el día 30 de mayo de 2012, en Las Islas de 
Ciudad Universitaria de la UNAM, con una participación de 54 universidades (públicas 
y privadas) de diversos estados de la República Mexicana. El evento contó con la 
participación solidaria de diversos artistas, intelectuales, académicos y organizaciones 
de la sociedad civil, así como con la asistencia de más de 90 medios locales, nacionales 
e internacionales. Al encuentro asistieron más de 6500 personas. 
1. Acerca de la postura y posición política del movimiento 
-Somos un movimiento autónomo y apartidista, que se declara plural, incluyente y 
pacífico. 
-Declaramos que la cultura, el arte y la educación serán nuestras armas más poderosas 
de expresión, manifestación y participación política. 
-Nos pronunciamos en contra de la imposición mediática de cualquier candidato a 
elección popular, así como de los sesgos informativos en los medios de comunicación, 
particularmente de las grandes televisoras del país. 
-Ante la coyuntura electoral, nos manifestamos en contra de la manipulación mediática 
e inconformes con un proceso electoral contaminado que pretende restaurar el viejo 
régimen político. 
-Consideramos que el antiguo régimen priísta ha practicado la violencia de Estado, la 
represión, el autoritarismo, la corrupción generalizada, la opacidad en la toma de 
decisiones públicas, la coacción del voto, entre otras prácticas antidemocráticas. 
-Creemos que existe suficiente evidencia para demostrar que la cara actual de ese viejo 
régimen es el candidato Enrique Peña Nieto y el proyecto que éste representa. 
Aclaramos que no se trata de odio ni de intolerancia contra su nombre, sino hartazgo 
e indignación ante lo que el candidato del PRI representa. 
-Ante ello, y considerando que los estudiantes no conseguiremos solos detener la 
restauración del viejo régimen, hacemos un atento llamado a otros sectores sociales 
que al igual que nosotros se sienten indignados por el estado actual de la nación, para 
llevar a cabo distintas manifestaciones pacíficas, creativas y propositivas en todo el 
país. 
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2. Frente al contexto electoral, la falta de información y la transparencia en los 
comicios, el movimiento declara: 
-No confiamos en el Instituto Federal Electoral ni en los partidos políticos. 
Reconocemos que se está gestando un fraude electoral, que puede llevar al país a una 
crisis social y política de mayor profundidad. 
-Nos pronunciamos por un proceso electoral limpio, transparente y equitativo. 
Rechazamos cualquier tipo de imposición, a través de cualquier medio, del candidato 
del PRI: Enrique Peña Nieto. 
-Hacemos un llamado a la unidad nacional. Este movimiento y los movimientos sociales 
de este país tienen un potencial importantísimo para cambiar las cosas. Tenemos la 
capacidad para organizarnos y cambiar el rumbo de nuestra nación. 
-Ante un posible escenario de fraude electoral o de imposición, proponemos 
documentar todo lo que ocurra durante la elección, a través de mecanismos 
audiovisuales, redes sociales y medios de comunicación alternativos. 
-Proponemos hacer una campaña que denuncie el proceso antidemocrático, ilegítimo 
y fraudulento que hay detrás de la elección. 
-Exigimos que el IFE reconozca a los observadores del Movimiento "Yo soy 132" para 
vigilar la elección. 
-Llamamos a organismos internacionales como la CELAC, para participar en la 
observación de la jornada electoral del próximo 1 de julio. Proponemos una campaña 
de recaudación de firmas, a través de este movimiento. 
-Llamamos a la sociedad civil, y a las organizaciones sociales que coincidan con este 
movimiento, a construir un centro de cómputo ciudadano independiente, que tenga 
observadores en todas las casillas del país, para 
hacer un cómputo paralelo. 
-Exigimos que el próximo debate del 10 de junio, se transmita en vivo y en cadena 
nacional, y que el Movimiento "Yo soy 132" puedan incidir en los temas del debate: 
particularmente en materia de política educativa y democratización de los medios de 
comunicación. 
3. Respecto a la participación en espacios públicos en los medios de comunicación:  
-Exigimos un código de ética para los medios de comunicación, así como el 
establecimiento de la figura de ombudsman -o defensor de la audiencia- en todos los 
medios, garantizando el derecho de replica consagrado en el Artículo 6 de la 
Constitución. 
-Exigimos una revisión del esquema actual de repartición de tiempos electorales. 
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-Impulsamos la creación de medios de comunicación propios de las universidades de 
cada entidad, además de la difusión de TV UNAM a nivel nacional. 
-Proponemos, a partir del lunes 25 de junio, a todos los del "Yo soy 132" a liberar la 
clave de sus módems para garantizar el acceso de la sociedad a la información que se 
distribuye en la red. 
-Impulsaremos la creación de diversos medios de comunicación alternativos para el 
movimiento. 
-Crearemos un podcast que se llame: "¿Quién es Peña Nieto?", que se difundirá a 
través del transporte público y así como en otros medios de divulgación. 
4. Agenda post-electoral y alcances del movimiento Declaramos mantener el 
Movimiento "Yo Soy 132", incluso después del período electoral, en apoyo a un 
proyecto de nación democrático y viable. La agenda pos-electoral del Movimiento "Yo 
soy 132" impulsará los siguientes aspectos: 
-Reforma política de los medios de comunicación. 
-Constituir en un movimiento que lucha a favor de las demandas de la sociedad, 
independientemente de las elecciones. 
-Exigir la transparencia y rendición de cuentas. 
-Exigir espacios democráticos en medios de comunicación. 
-Esclarecer, evidenciar y prevenir los feminicidios. 
5. Respecto a las políticas educativas, el movimiento exige: 
-Que se ejerza con transparencia el presupuesto destinado a la educación. 
-Que se garantice el acceso y la permanencia a la educación gratuita a todos los 
mexicanos sin distinción alguna, en todos los niveles o sistemas educativos del país. 
-El rechazo total y absoluto al Programa de Créditos Educativos para la Educación 
Superior porque viola los artículos 3ro y 24 de la Carta Magna. 
-La constante renovación de la plantilla docente y de investigación de las universidades 
públicas, así como los estímulos dignos para el retiro de los académicos. 
-El cese del Elba Esther Gordillo del cargo de Presidenta Vitalicia del SNTE que ocupa 
ilegítimamente. 
Exigimos juicio político a Elba Esther Gordillo; que se investiguen sus cuentas bancarias, 
propiedades, y las de sus familiares y prestanombres. 
-Que el Secretario de Educación Pública tenga una preparación pertinente en materia 
educativa. 
-Erradicar el analfabetismo de todo el territorio nacional. 
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6. En materia de Ciencia, Tecnología y Salud, el movimiento declara: 
-Exigimos que el presupuesto REAL destinado a Ciencia y Tecnología sea del 2%, 
garantizando su uso efectivo. 
-Debe prohibirse cualquier proselitismo basado en el bienestar social. La salud es un 
derecho y no una mercancía. 
-Exigimos en el próximo debate a candidatos presidenciales hacer explícitas sus 
prioridades, estrategias, presupuesto y gabinete en las áreas de Salud, Ciencia y 
Tecnología. 
-Demandamos la creación de la Secretaría de Ciencia y Tecnología. 
-Exigimos la creación de la asignatura de promoción de la salud, ciencia y tecnología en 
todos los niveles de educación básica, abierta a la multidisciplina. 
-Exigimos la inclusión en los medios de comunicación, televisión y radio, de espacios 
para la divulgación científica. 
-Demandamos que el gobierno electo entregue al Movimiento "Yo soy 132" y a la 
sociedad, su programa de actividades en materia de salud, ciencia y tecnología para 
que el movimiento realice una vigilancia en el cumplimiento. 
 
 
Source: Grupo Formula, 31 mayo 2012. Available at < 
https://www.radioformula.com.mx/notasimp.asp?Idn=247039&idFC=2012> [28 
October 2018] 
 
